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1 Introduction 
I enter a classroom in a primary school in Xishuangbanna1, Southwest China. The 
daily course in Dai language writing has just begun, and students engage in diverse 
activities for ethnic minority language learning. Children of pre-school age write pages full 
of stories in Dai script, they discuss their stories with their classmates in both Dai and 
Chinese language, and the room’s walls are covered with Dai vocabulary cards and 
students’ products. When I ask the teacher in this class about her own role in designing 
this tuition, she explains that this class is a bilingual experimental project, she mentions 
that she has participated in teacher groups that determined the content of textbooks, 
and she says that she can choose the methods for today’s’ class on her own. 
I approach a different school, two hours by bus on a bumpy mountain road away. 
This school conducts Dai language tuition as well, but this time the picture is completely 
different. A teacher writes Dai syllables on the blackboard, bored students copy them, 
and repeat the sounds in chorus. The empty walls feature nothing but a few posters that 
in Chinese language call students to develop skills for the country and for their own 
careers. Although I don’t speak Dai, I understand that even after two years of learning Dai 
script the students still struggle with the basic graphemes and are not able to write 
sentences so far. After an hour the course is over and the students continue with learning 
a different subject taught in Chinese. Later I have the opportunity to ask the teacher in 
private about her role in this tuition. In the beginning she seems embarrassed about the 
class, but then she speaks her mind. She is angered that the school leaders don’t allow 
her to teach more Dai. The school leaders, she says, have decided that education in 
Chinese language is more important. She explains that she must follow these demands, 
but that in her regular classes she still uses every now and then a few Dai words, as she 
thinks this helps students to follow class.2 
The differences in the education of non-Chinese languages at Chinese schools 
point to a competition of different approaches in education management in China. On the 
one side education in China is very standardized. Content and methods in Chinese school 
                                                     
1
 All place names and personal names will be transcribed here in Pinyin, the official standard for 
writing Chinese in the Roman alphabet that has largely replaced the former Romanization systems for 
Chinese (Coulmas 1996, p. 408) (the only exception are country names, which will be referred to with the 
current official English names, e.g. China or Myanmar). This rule will be also applied to references to 
Xishuangbanna (西双版纳), for the region’s place names, and to names of ethnic non-Han persons. 
Although some literature refers to these names with Romanized transcriptions of the Dai sounds (such as 
Sipsonpanna for Xishuangbanna or Muang Ham for Meng Han, see e.g. Hansen 1999 and Borchert 2008), I 
will use the official Pinyin system based on Chinese in order to allow comparison with Chinese literature 
and to reflect the references that interview partners made in my Chinese-language interviews. Furthermore, 
for the convenience of the readers, this text also does not include any Dai writing in its main body. 
2
 Both the schools and the teachers will be introduced in greater depth later. 
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education have to follow goals that are determined in top-down manner, such as 
propagating ideas of patriotism and learning knowledge that the state defines as 
important for economic development. In combination with goals to “civilize” ethnic 
minorities and to bind them with the nation, school education for ethnic minority children 
is especially obliged to follow standardized rules. On the other side, and partly due to the 
same reasons that call for standardized education and strong control over curriculum, the 
Chinese government also calls for new approaches towards diversity in education, for 
student-orientation in the curriculum, and for localization of decision making. It could not 
only be argued that any type of school education requires a certain degree of adjustment 
of teaching towards the backgrounds of students and a given classroom situation, but the 
Chinese government has also proposed to reform the institutions of school and 
curriculum management towards models where teachers and school leaders have more 
discretion to make decisions in the interests of the students, while at the same time new 
accountability measures shall still continue to guarantee the hierarchical control over the 
“output” of education. 
With these seemingly mutually competitive approaches the reforms of the 
Chinese education system are located amidst worldwide discussions on the modes of 
policy implementation, of governing schools, and of decision making at schools on the 
one side and the quality of education on the other side. Many have argued that school-
based decision making improves the quality of education, but often these discussions 
have ignored goals that governments, if one likes it or not, aim at with education at 
schools. 
I argue that the case of implementation of minority language education in China 
provides an enlightening source to study education policy implementation at schools that 
not only, and perhaps not even mostly, aims at of improving the quality of education, but 
that instead is more guided by goals as diverse as cultural protection, appeasement of 
potentially rebellious ethnic groups, and raising access to Chinese language education. 
Many studies that have investigated the specific policies of minority language 
education in China produced valuable insights into the relations between the political 
system, party ideology, and ethnic minority policies in China. Some scholars found 
intensive relations between the concept of an “ethnic hierarchy” and ethnic policies. 
Others, who scrutinized the effects of these policies on the life of ethnic minorities in 
China, have found that some programs of minority language education have brought 
tremendous benefits for students. However, they also found that other programs have 
not only failed to equalize educational access or to raise students’ attainments, but that 
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these programs have also increased the burdens for students. Most of these studies, 
however, lack in ability to understand the processes that happen between policy 
formulation and outcome, since their analytical frameworks lack in measures to capture 
implementation. In light of these research gaps the two above mentioned school 
observations raise questions that reach beyond the individual schools: Why are there 
such large differences between schools in how they implement curriculum polices in 
classrooms? How does decision making at school level affects policy implementation in 
China? What are the outcomes of this process on the quality of tuition delivered at 
schools? How does the Chinese party-state balance the call to raise educational quality by 
diversity with the risk of allowing education against ethnic party lines? How do these 
processes confirm or challenge our understanding of policy making in China? 
The “bottom-up” perspective of the street-level bureaucracy approach provides a 
useful tool to analyze the processes of implementation. Contrary to many “top-down” 
approaches that perceive policy deviation as failure and that aim at smoothening 
implementation in the interests of the policy makers, the street-level bureaucracy 
approach aims at understanding implementation by investigating into the perceptions 
and interests of policy implementers such as social workers, police officers, or teachers, 
who as government employees represent the state towards citizens, but who at the same 
time as service providers at “street-level” are also in constant and closest contact to 
clients. I argue that this approach supports understanding the implementation processes 
of minority language education policies in China. 
Analysis of this case can also contribute to theory development. Literature on 
implementation has produced elaborate insights into the effects of implementation 
decisions, but there is still a need to develop frameworks that combine perspectives on 
implementers’ decisions with analysis of how implementers interact with institutional 
settings of discretion and accountability. 
With this thesis I intend to bridge the two literatures of policy implementation 
through school-based decision making on the one side and ethnic minority policies in 
China on the other. Against the background of the changing institutions of educational 
management in China this study is intended to contribute to an understanding of policy 
making at school level by shedding a light on the relation between institutions and 
decisions of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation in China. 
Through analysis of the case of implementation of minority language education 
policies at schools in Xishuangbanna, a prefecture at the Southwestern tip of China with a 
multiethnic and multilingual population, I intend to scrutinize how institutional settings of 
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school and curriculum management affect decision making by teachers and principals on 
policy implementation. For this endeavor I will introduce into both the institutions of 
schools management and the policies on minority language education in China, and I will 
analyze in depth how school personnel perceive both, how they react, and how they 
legitimize their decisions. This analysis will be based on examples from several schools in 
Xishuangbanna, where I have conducted interviews with teachers and principals, 
government officials and students, where I have observed classes, and where I have 
collected textbook materials, images, and school-internal documents. Based on this 
analysis I will discuss what these examples indicate for our understanding of the effects of 
institutions on street-level bureaucrats’ decisions in policy implementation. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured into three parts. In the 
first part I will provide an overview on the existing literature on studying policy 
implementation from the bottom-up perspective at schools in general, and at Chinese 
schools specifically, and I will summarize research directions on ethnic policies and 
minority language education policies in China and in Xishuangbanna. In this literature 
review I will discuss current research issues and research gaps. Based on this, I will in the 
second part of this introduction outline the design and methodology of my study. I will 
introduce my research question, the variables, and my hypothesis, I will elaborate on the 
benefits and caveats of case study designs, I will outline the fieldwork and data analysis 
that I have conducted for preparation of this thesis, and I will discuss ethical issues of the 
study methods. In the third and final part of this chapter I will outline the structure of the 
complete thesis. 
1.1 Literature review and research gaps 
Scholarship has produced already an intensive stock of literature on ethnic 
education policies in China. However, there are also several research gaps and a lack of 
combining findings from different literatures. In the following I will present a literature 
review on firstly issues of policy implementation at schools in general, and secondly issues 
of ethnic policies and minority language education policies in China and in Xishuangbanna, 
specifically. In order to prepare developing the research question for this thesis, I will 
summarize here both the findings and the current gaps in literature.  
1.1.1 Policy implementation and school-based decision making 
Policy implementation has been in the center of political sciences for decades 
already, but instead of producing one overarching implementation theory there are 
rather specific approaches to analyzing implementation. The so called “bottom-up 
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approach” is especially suitable to study implementation processes at school level, as the 
rich literature shows. 
Bottom-up perspectives on policy implementation 
Implementation research aims at understanding the processes that happen when 
policies are put into practice. In detail, however, depending on different interests of 
scholars the frameworks to analyze implementation differ tremendously. Since the 
groundbreaking work of the founding fathers of policy implementation research, 
Pressmann and Wildavsky (1979 (1973)), the so called “top-down” perspective has been a 
dominant approach. Scholars under this approach rested their studies on concerns about 
what might lead to the observed differences - perceived as failures - between policy goals 
as formulated in programs on the one side and outcomes that did not reach to these 
expectations on the other. From their perspective, policy researchers should uncover 
these failures and suggest measures of how governments can secure smooth 
implementation, for instance through wise choice of instruments (Hogwood, Gunn 1984).  
However, ever since the “textbook approach” (Nakamura 1987) of studying policy 
implementation under the control focus has been criticized for being unable to depict the 
diversity of implementation processes, alternative approaches from a “bottom-up” 
perspective have been developed. These approaches aim at understanding 
implementation through the actions, motivations, and interests of the implementers 
(Elmore 1979). The “street-level bureaucracy approach”, as famously developed by Lipsky 
(1980), argues from a bottom-up perspective that “street-level bureaucrats” such as 
police officers, social workers, or teachers as government representatives at street-level 
are central actors in implementation processes who, due to both the lack of information 
of superiors and the necessity of local and ad-hoc decisions, shape policy measures and 
outcomes tremendously, and in fact even “make” policies. According to students of this 
approach street-level bureaucrats are entangled within complex nets of discretion and 
accountability and these bureaucrats’ interpretations of the triangle of policies, 
institutions, and interests (their own interests, those of their superiors, and those of their 
clients) affects their decision making. Combined with normative discussions on the role 
that decisions by the street-level bureaucrat should play in implementation, but also with 
new considerations of governments’ possibilities to steer implementation under 
democratic imperatives of governance have updated this discussion (Huber, Shipan 2002; 
Barrett 2004; Carpenter 2001; Christensen, Lægreid 2006). 
Implementation studies from the “bottom-up approach” have contributed to 
understanding the policy implementation process as governed by implementers’ actions 
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and interactions. The finding by Saetren (2005) that the frequency of scholarly work on 
implementation studies continuously rises indicates that approaches to study 
implementation are already mature enough to inform studies in a variety of fields. On the 
other side, there is also a lack of understanding the factors that inform implementers’ 
decisions. In contrast to calls to combine the top-down with the bottom-up approaches 
into one overarching, but perhaps illusionary implementation theory (Matland 1995; Hill, 
Hupe 2009) there seems to rather be a need to specify existing analytical approaches for 
particular policy fields and to combine the perspective with these fields’ institutional 
settings. 
Institutions in implementation by school-based decision making 
Policy implementation at schools has been a field that scholars from the bottom-
up perspective have especially scrutinized because the differences in student background 
and classroom situation constantly require teachers and school leaders to make decisions 
on how to implement, adjust, or even reject policy implementation3 and because these 
decisions at school level are critical for educational policy implementation (Weatherley, 
Lipsky 1977; Odden 1991a; Datnow 2000; Honig 2006b). While early research such as that 
by Murphy (1991) still has seen deviation in implementation as a problem, later scholars 
such as Malen (2006) have begun to look at education policy implementation through a 
multitude of eyes, especially through the interests and strategies of school staff in order 
to understand how communication between different actors at schools affect these 
actors’ policy understandings, their evaluation of choices, and finally their decisions. 
Scholars of education policies have come to regard decisions on curriculum policy 
(a “settled, coherent plan or course of action with respect to curriculum matters” (Walker 
2002, pp. 124–125)) that establish standards, testing, time allocation, student placement, 
textbooks, or teacher qualifications through instruments such as mandates, financial 
transfers, or capacity building as one of the main areas where school staff shapes policy 
implementation (Elmore, Sykes 1992; Hansen, Roza 2005). 
The categorization of these decisions, however, is still under discussion. Where 
Kärkkäinen (2012) simply distinguishes between decisions on “What should be taught” 
                                                     
3
 Education is here understood according to the OECD’s definition as “organized and sustained 
communication designed to bring about learning.[…] Organized means planned in a pattern or sequence 
with established aims or curricula and which involves an educational agency that organizes the learning 
situation and/or teachers who are employed (including unpaid volunteers) to consciously organize the 
communication” (OECD 2003). In this thesis I will discuss education almost exclusively as formal education, 
namely as “education provided in the system of schools, colleges, universities and other formal educational 
institutions, which normally constitutes a continuous ladder of full-time education for children and young 
people” (OECD 2011b, p. 271). 
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and “How should it be taught” other have categorized in more detail. Bacharach and 
colleagues (1990) for example, have identified 19 areas of school-based decision making 
on issues from expenditure decisions, to content of tuition, to classroom assignment. 
The scope to make curriculum decisions at schools depends on various 
institutional settings, but under the impression that “education policy demands arguably 
have become more complex” (Honig 2006a, p. 1) scholars under the perspective of street-
level bureaucracy have especially scrutinized the web of discretion and accountability at 
school settings. Both the vertical accountability towards superiors and the horizontal 
accountability towards students, parents, or the local community have been found to 
limit school staffs’ scope for decision making. On the other side, however, accountability 
reaches also its limits due to the need for local deviation according to students’ needs 
(Leithwood, Duke 2004). In the “trilemma” between requests from policy makers, clients, 
and own interests, teachers and school leaders thus constantly make decisions which not 
only affect the implementation of curriculum policies in their classroom, but which also 
affect the institutional shape of accountability itself when school personnel for instance 
create school-based management structures, control information flows, organize interest 
groups, or avoid evaluation altogether (Honig, Hatch 2004; Malen 2006; Figlio, Ladd 2008; 
Hooge et al. 2012). With these approaches scholars of education policy implementation 
have connected theoretical contributions of decision making process analysis with the 
more practice-oriented (and sometimes normative) discussions on the value of 
decentralized education, diversity in education, and local community control of schools. 
These have been discussed intensively around the globe by scholars who argue that 
school-based decision making under certain accountability measures increases the quality 
of delivered education (Fullan 2007; Law, Nieveen 2010; Bruns et al. 2011). 
International comparative studies such as the one by Kärkkäinen (2012) or by King 
and Guerra (2005) have also shown that the institutional settings for school-based 
decision making on policy implementation differ largely between countries. In detailed 
lists of the modes and locations of decision making the latter authors compare, for 
instance, decision making between central government, local government, and school 
level. However, a glance through the literature exemplifies that there is still a gap 
between the already quite extensive knowledge about the differences in institutional 
settings and these settings’’ effects on decision making within schools at specific countries. 
While organizations such as the OECD publish country studies from a macro and system-
oriented perspective, theoretical contributions in handbooks and readers of education 
policy implementation published in English are still based overwhelmingly on examples 
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from the US education system, which raises questions of general applicability of these 
findings. In order to establish a diversified basis for theory development on educational 
policy implementation more studies on the relation between institutions and actor 
behavior at schools need to be conducted worldwide. 
Studying policy implementation at Chinese schools 
China’s tremendous shifts between centralization, decentralization, and 
recentralization in various policy areas (Hawkins 2000; Wong 2009) make this country 
arguably to one of the most suitable ones to study the effects of institutional changes on 
policy implementation. Decentralization under “fragmented authoritarianism” (Lieberthal 
1995) has not only triggered several implementation gaps and inequality in access to 
social services (Wong 2009; Shue, Wong 2007), but on the other side it also supported 
specific modes of policy making, such as experimentation (Heilmann 2008). 
Implementation processes at the local level are especially worthwhile studying in order to 
understand how shifts between central and local control have affected implementation 
behavior. A wide range of scholars interested in the modes of Chinese policy making 
discovered the strong role of local cadres in the policy implementation process. O’Brien 
and Li (1999) have argued that decentralized cadre management and the end of mass 
campaigns have increased cadres’ discretion to choose between different policy goals and 
means under “selective policy implementation.” Others have contributed analysis of the 
sometimes detrimental effects of this discretion on policy implementation at the local 
level when decisions are made against the local population (Zhou 2011b; Göbel 2011). 
Heberer and Schubert (2012) and Heberer and Trappel (2013), by contrast, have argued 
that the complex evaluation system between soft and hard targets under purposefully 
vague policy guidelines not only causes counteractions by cadres to secure, for instance, 
autonomy and career prospects, but that this system also triggers group cohesion as a 
measure to prevent individual cadres‘ misbehavior and corruption. These contributions 
have shed light on the effects of accountability on implementation decisions against the 
background of the Chinese political system, but they also have shown that there is a need 
to specify these mechanisms for individual policy fields. 
Education policy in China is a field where studies of implementation processes 
against the background of changing institutional settings can unveil specific mechanisms 
of decision making by local level government agencies and street-level bureaucrats. Many 
of the plentiful studies on reforms in the Chinese educational system (Pepper 1996; Mok 
2005; Wang 2003; Ryan 2011; Postiglione 2006) have come to see reforms of the Chinese 
 9 
system of funding and managing education to be caught in the middle of waves of 
centralization, decentralization, and recentralization (Hawkins 2000; Mok 2003; Qi 2011b). 
These reforms have been scrutinized under various perspectives. On the one side 
scholars have investigated the reforms in education funding and management as shifts 
between governmental levels. In an early article Paine (1992) described how vertical and 
horizontal negotiations shift the power of the educational bureaucracy. Other 
contributions have shown that the shift of funding responsibility from township to county, 
for instance, has increased the power of counties in oversight over schools (Zhou 2012a). 
On the other side, scholars who studied the effects of changes in school management on 
the relation between schools and government agencies have come to see the newly 
introduced accountability mechanisms such as external and internal evaluation schemes, 
performance-related pay, and promotion according to educational output as means to 
increase control over schools, that, although locally diversified, have increased pressure 
on educators and school managers (Lee et al. 2011; Lai, Lo 2006; Tian 2011). Others have 
scrutinized new means such as school-based curriculum and school-based responsibilities 
to apply for project funding as spaces for school-based decision making (Zhong, Tu 2013; 
Li, Shuai 2010).  
Scholars differ in the evaluation of institutional decision spaces for schools in 
China. While Zhong and Tu (2013) and Law (2011) argue that school-based decision 
making in China is already a current phenomenon in China, which should be increased as 
a motor for educational development, others conclude that institutional settings leave 
hardly any room for school-based decision making, as “the autonomy of schools only 
exists to limited degrees, with schools controlled by quota systems, standardized curricula, 
and assessment systems” (Wong 2006, p. 55). This issue, however, points to the middle of 
educational policy implementation in China. On the one side, Chinese schools as 
overwhelmingly state-owned and state-organized organizations are closely tied to state 
bureaucracy, but on the other side requirements of policy adjustments in the classroom 
are also valid in China. How can we understand the role of schools in policy 
implementation in China? How can we describe and analyze Chinese schools as state 
organizations that at the same time seem to have some specific space for decision making? 
Two gaps in the literature currently prevent answering these questions. Firstly, 
there is a lack of detailed analysis of the effects of these institutions on different types of 
schools programs. International comparative studies that also include China (e.g. King, 
Guerra 2005) describe the larger picture, but lack in analysis of the micro-level of schools. 
On the other side, we know that institutional settings for schools in China not only differ 
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between regions, but also between schools. Dello-Iacovo (2009, p. 244), for instance, 
speaks of the differences between regular schools and the “shining examples” of pilot 
schools. How do these differences affect the space for decision making at schools?  
Secondly, there is a need for a close look at the consequences of these 
institutional settings on implementers’ behavior. While few studies have begun to shed a 
light on teachers’ and principals’ perceptions of policies and institutions (Chai, Wang 2011; 
Peng et al. 2013), these studies often still lack in systematic analysis of actions at schools. 
Law (2011, p. 163), for instance, found that Chinese teachers engage in reforming 
schooling by “contributing to the betterment of education by using their own academic 
theories and practical wisdom”, but his study lacks in analysis of how these contributions 
translate into an outcome that goes beyond the individual classroom lesson. I argue that 
an analysis of the decisions of teachers and principals in the implementation process of a 
specific policy could bridge this gap in the literature by connecting both the institutional 
background of school management with actor behavior measured in output at school 
level. 
1.1.2 Ethnic policies and minority language education in China 
 The field of minority language education in China4 offers rich opportunities to 
study the decisions and implementation behavior of policy implementers at school level, 
as diversification is an inherent approach in minority language education. However, 
studies in this field have also shown that education policies for ethnic minority students 
are closely connected to ethnic policies and language policies. In the next paragraphs I 
will introduce both the literature on ethnic language and minority language education 
policies in China, before in the last part of this sub-chapter I will shortly review the 
literature on Xishuangbanna, the location for this case study.  
Before I will review this literature, however, there is a short remark in order on 
the background of the authors introduced here. Firstly, contributions published within 
                                                     
4
 Scholars refer to minority language education also as heritage language education or mother 
tongue language education. In connection with education in languages other than the children’s mother  
tongue (mostly the national language or majority language) this type education is called bilingual education 
(Baker, Prys Jones 1998, pp. 2–3). According to García (2011) bilingual education uses both the children’ 
mother tongue languages and the other language as language of instruction and it serves to enable 
students to function across cultures. However, in China the term“bilingual education” (双语教育) or 
more precisely “Ethnic-Chinese bilingual education” (民汉双语教育) denotes not only to those models 
that use Chinese and minority languages as language of instruction, but it also denotes to those models that 
use Chinese as a language of instruction to teach language knowledge in one of China’s ethnic minority 
languages (少数民族语言) (for differentiation from the concept of Chinese-English bilingual education see 
Feng 2005). To avoid these terminological ambivalences, I will use the term “minority language education” 
to refer to both the teaching through ethnic minority languages and teaching knowledge about these 
languages. 
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China and those published outside China differ in their research interests. Chinese 
scholars (or more precisely: scholars with Chinese citizenship who publish in China) and 
foreign scholars who publish in majority in English often use similar methods and both 
often agree in a critical evaluation of, for instance, inequality of access to social services 
or differences in livelihood of ethnic minorities in China. However, articles published in 
China often see governmental ethnic policies overwhelmingly as positive and they merely 
call for small adjustments, whereas articles published outside China seem to be more 
interested in concepts such as “nation” or “ethnicity”, which are behind the policies and 
which are often shaped by the state. 
Secondly, there is a lack of voice of scholars from those ethnic or linguistic 
communities where research is conducted. Despite the growing number of contributions 
by Chinese and foreign scholars, members of these ethnic groups are still lacking behind 
in both the numbers of publication and in their ability to affect national and international 
academic discussions. Beyond some rather uncritical policy descriptions (Ai 2001b; Dao 
2001; Dao 2006) there are only few publications available by scholars of, for instance, 
Mongolian, Tibetan, Uigur, Yi, or Dai ethnicity from within China that have been able to 
contribute to larger discussions on ethnicity in China among the international academia 
(Nima 2008; Harrell, Ma 1999; Caodaobateer 2004). This lack of voice can constitute a 
sincere problem in writing about ethnic groups in China when academic discourses are 
largely disconnected from the discourses within ethnic groups. 
Nevertheless, in light of inadequacies that a distinction between contributions by 
“Chinese scholars”, “foreign scholars”, or “ethnic minority scholars” must necessarily 
involve, I will organize the following paragraphs not by origin of the scholars, but by the 
issues they write about, and only when there are striking differences between the 
literatures published within China and without China, I will specify these under the 
respective topic. 
Ethnic policies 
Over the last decades scholars of diverse disciplines, backgrounds, and interests 
have created a profound basis of understanding ethnic policies and minority language 
policies5 in China. Research on ethnic policies in China has been interested especially in 
                                                     
5
 The Chinese case adds specific issues to In addition to the apparently ever-lasting discussions on 
the definition of “ethnicity” and “nationality”. Generally, in this thesis I understand ethnicity according to 
Brubaker’s (2002) definition as a process of flexibly categorizing and constructing identity and group-
belonging of individuals, that is employed by individuals or governments to justify specific actions. In 
China’s official terminology, this process-focused understanding is countered by a state-directed distinction 
of ethnic groups into 56 official categories that since more than 30 years have withstood approaches to re-
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two large fields: the relations between identity and policies on the one side, and the 
relation between social policies and exclusion of ethnically defined groups on the other 
side. 
At least since the 1980s researchers on Chinese ethnic policies have become 
increasingly interested in the impact of cultural policies on ethnic identity. Research has 
often discussed the ethnic identification project through which China’s current 56 
officially recognized ethnic groups have been categorized. Scholars have established since 
long that this process not only lacked in accurately depicting ethnic identities, but more 
importantly that is was politically motivated by the state’s intent to appease ethnic 
groups (Zhou 2003, 2012b; Gladney 1996; Guo 2004).6 Moreover, the ethnic identification 
mirrored also ideologies of “ordering humankind” (Blum 2001) into a pyramid of cultural 
development stages that sees the Han on the top of everyone else. Analysts of Chinese 
cultural production such as film, newspapers, or stage entertainment have shown that 
presentations of ethnic groups materialize these ideologies into images. Although the 
rhetoric of describing ethnic minority groups in these media has changed from problem to 
virtue-orientated depictions of peaceful and happy people living in intact nature and 
society that the (Han) audience yearns for, it is still largely dominated by images of the 
Orientalized, feminized, exotic, and irrational other (Schein 1997; Senz, Yi 2001; Hoddie, 
Lou 2009). Scholars have interpreted ethnic policies in the cultural realm as “civilization 
projects” (Harrell 1995) based on the approach of the Chinese government to impose a 
mix of Confucian beliefs of the educated person and socialist perspectives of societal 
development stages combined to a “quality” discourse that not only targets each Chinese 
citizen, but especially ethnic minorities (Jacka 2009; Dello-Iacovo 2009). Whether 
discussing these projects under the concept of “internal colonialism” (Gladney 1998; 
Sautman 2000), or depicting the process as activities by individual cadres and 
entrepreneurs to marketize ethnic cultures for tourism purposes (Bai 2007; McCarthy 
                                                                                                                                                                
classify (see detailed discussion in chapter 4). Additional difficulties arose when until the 1990s official 
documents in China translated the term “minzu” (民族) as “nationality”, until the then State Commission on 
Nationality Affairs decided to use the English translation “ethnic group” instead (Zhou 2003, p. 94). The 
following renaming of the Commission into “State Ethnic Affairs Commission” indicated this shift, whereas 
renaming the English translation of the “中央民族大学“ from Central University for Nationalities into the 
Pinyin-based name Minzu University of China also indicates that the usage of the term “ethnic groups” is 
still disputed. In order to keep up with literature on China I will not use the term “indigenous peoples”, but 
rather speak of “ethnic groups”. In order to distinguish more clearly I will refer to what Chinese academic 
and official literature terms “民族” with the term “ethnic registration” and to the ethnic belonging that 
interview partners expressed I will refer to with the term “ethnicity”. In many cases both categories overlap, 
but in other cases people make clear distinctions between their official registration and their own feeling of 
ethnic belonging (see for instance Harrell’s (2001b) discussion on ethnic groups). 
6
 Note that the references in this literature review merely indicate the most relevant examples out 
of the already large number of case studies. In order to increase the readability of this text, I have also 
omitted remarks such as “e.g.” in the references of this part of the text. 
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2009), scholars generally agree that state activities have tremendous effects on shaping, 
threatening, or branding ethnic cultures in China. 
Other scholars are more interested in the reactions of those who are affected by 
ethnic categorization. Scholars such as Harrell (2001b) or Hsieh (1995) try to understand 
conceptualizations of identity by analyzing the processes of self-definition of ethnic 
groups, for instance in cultural and educational choices (Yi 2008). Scholars in this field 
have since long pointed to insufficiencies of official ethnic categories in delineating ethnic 
distinctions from the perspective of individuals and groups, e.g. when individuals’ 
descriptions of own belonging differ from official categories (Harrell 2001a, 2001b). 
Globalization and cross boarder identities have additionally contributed to the 
increasingly complex issue of ethnic identity in China (Mackerras 2003). Nevertheless, 
even processes of individual identity formation are determined by the state, or at least as 
a response to it (Shih 2002; Kaup 2000). Studies have shown that schools and universities 
prescribe ethnic affiliation of students, for instance by ethnic segregation, by describing 
ethnic groups in pejorative terms in textbooks, and by defining the educational process 
for ethnic minority students as “modernization” (Bass 2005; Zhao, Lee 2010; Borchigud 
1995; Bulag 2010; Postiglione et al. 2011). Some studies have shown that groups take 
political actions to change ethnic categorization (Heberer 1989) or that individuals apply 
for ethnic realignment of their status (Hoddie 2006a). However, altogether people in 
China seem to accept the overall ethnic registration as a marker for a specific 
identification in state organizations such as schools (Schoenhals 2001). 
A second field in ethnic policy studies lies in in-depth analysis of the political 
system of ethnic representation and of the outcomes of economic and social policies on 
wellbeing of ethnically defined groups of people. From the perspective of policy making, 
scholars, in the tradition of international discussions (e.g. Kymlicka 1995), have been 
interested in how minority rights can be best protected in the political system. Especially 
scholars from outside China have shown that the current political system is ineffective in 
representation of ethnic minorities and have called for reforms towards improved 
political representation (Heberer 1989, 2013), whereas scholars inside China generally 
rather emphasize accomplishments of the existing mechanisms of representation or 
altogether call for a “de-politicized” treatment of ethnic issues by shifting the focus from 
political representation to a mere emphasis of cultural diversity without political 
representation (Ma 2007). 
Concerned with policy outcomes much research has focused on the economic 
wellbeing of ethnic minorities and their access to social services. Especially quantitative 
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studies have shown that poverty is higher among ethnic minorities in China (Gustafsson, 
Sai 2009a) and that governmental budgets allocated for social services are lower in 
localities inhabited by ethnic minorities than those inhabited by ethnic Han (Zeng, Ding 
2010). Although most scholars have acknowledged the positive effects of measures such 
as financial transfers, abolition of study fees, or preferential access for ethnic minorities 
to higher education, they have also shown that ethnic population continues to have lower 
access to social services such as education (Shen 2004; Zhu 2010; Hannum, Wang 2012). 
Not only human rights organizations point to the rising tensions related to these 
inequalities (Human Rights in China 2007), but some scholars have also warned that 
inequality might lead to political instability in China. Although the concept of “stability” 
still awaits further definition for the case of China, authors such as Dreyer (2000; 2005) 
and Sautman (2005) have described economic inequality, a lack of representation, and 
the cultural dominance of the Han in non-Han regions as a cause for local grievances. 
After several decades on publishing in Chinese and non-Chinese languages on 
ethnic issues in China, there have been many accomplishments, but at the same time it 
also seems time to move on. Firstly, although ethnic studies have produced detailed 
insights into ethnicity and identity in China we must also see that not each policy in the 
ethnic field aims foremost at shaping identity. Blum’s remarks from 2002 on the 
obsession of Western authors with identity issues in China are still valid today: “It is 
difficult to accept the fact that people in China can accept what appears clearly to us 
[non-Chinese scholars] as an unnatural, arbitrary system“ (Blum 2002, pp. 1301–1302). 
Pointing to the state sheds a light on how the state shapes identity, but this perspective 
faces the risk to ignore findings of neighboring disciplines. Concerning environmental 
policies and educational policies that are implemented in ethnic minority areas a larger 
perspective on these policy fields can help to understand the structures and goals of 
these policies beyond the ethnic component. Even policies on education in minority 
languages that target ethnic communities or ethnic culture directly are embedded in 
policy goals of the educational system. A combined perspective on both policy goals of 
educational and ethnic policies enlarges the view, and arguably provides a suitable way to 
understand ethnic policies against their background of given institutions.  
Minority language education 
The goals of minority language education, heritage language education, and 
bilingual education have been discussed by educators and politicians, but also by 
academics in the fields of education, psychology, linguistics, or social sciences. Some 
scholars have begun to critically analyze the linguistic and cultural perspectives behind 
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these discussions and established categorizations of frameworks in bilingual education 
(García 2011; Freeman 2007; May 2008). Those advocating for the need of mother tongue 
education argue from a variety of perspectives. From a human linguistic rights 
perspective mother tongue language education is a right of linguistic minority groups, 
from the language endangerment perspective minority language education can prevent 
language death and cultural loss, and from the perspective of education sciences it has 
been argued that tuition in the language that students speak at home increases students’ 
educational attainments (Fishman 1998; Sasse 1992; Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson 1995a; 
Baker 2006; Freeman 2007). Only few voices have been raised to argue against education 
in minority languages, but those who did argued that such tuition confuses students, 
consolidates social segregation, and generally threatens the national language usage 
(Duignan 1998). 
For the case of China most scholars have argued in favor of what is here called 
minority language education or bilingual education (Lam 2005; Xiong 2004; Li 2008b; 
Cobbey 2007; Zhou 2012c). Some Chinese scholars argue specifically from the perspective 
of the state. Fang (2010, pp. 76–77), for instance, argues that bilingual education is “a 
need to secure national unity”, that it “helps [the students] to enter mainstream society”, 
and that it builds up students‘ ability  for “reception of patriotism and socialism”. Others, 
for instance organizations that conduct bilingual education in China, argue more 
specifically with the use of mother tongue education for students’ progress in learning 
Chinese (SIL - East Asia Group 2010). 
Analytical work has shown that China’s minority language education policies are 
closely connected with policy goals in other areas, such as a tool in China’s “language 
engineering” projects to propagate newly created or reformed scripts or to revitalize 
scripts through school education (Zhou 2003; Lam 2005). However, these approaches 
have also caused grievances among the targeted population, including public 
demonstrations, which some scholars have analyzed as ”source of potentially great 
conflict” (Schluessel 2007, p. 272).  
Through diverse case studies at different localities throughout China, academics 
have produced detailed insights into the outcomes of minority language education 
policies on educational attainments, on language usage, and on language perceptions 
among students and the general population (Cobbey 2007, Zhao, Zhao 2010a, 2010b; 
Zhou 2012c; Wang, Postiglione 2008; Teng, Wang 2011; Feng, Sunuodula 2009; Qi 2003; 
Tao, Yue 2002a; Xu 2012b; Tsung 2009). Many studies also include detailed comparison 
between the different models of bilingual education that are conducted at Chinese 
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schools and elaborate on the timing and the methods used in class (Tsung 2009; Dai, 
Cheng 2007). Although these studies have pointed to several achievements of bilingual 
education in China, they have also pointed to a plethora of problems, such as 
underfunded programs, the lack of textbooks and teachers, constantly decreasing school 
hours reserved for minority languages, termination after primary school, disadvantages in 
college entrance examinations, low support by parents, and a generally low level of 
usability of minority languages in the job market. 
However, what these studies often lack in is an analysis of the processes between 
the policy formulation and the measured outcome. Many studies perceive policies as 
fixed programs that are implemented without changes and describe the outcomes as 
direct effects of these policies (Xiong 2004; Ai 2001b; Fang 2010). Under this perspective 
scholars have not been able to assess implementation at the school-level. The perspective 
of “spaces” defined by minority language policies, which students of Hornberger’s (2005) 
ideas on the spaces for bilingual education have been actively used as an analytical 
framework for worldwide studies (Menken, García 2010), could support deepening the 
studies on China. As Chinese policy documents are comparatively vague and as the above 
mentioned institutional shifts in China’s education system have widened the space for 
local curriculum decisions, it seems worthwhile to take now a close look at 
implementation processes against the background of specific institutions of Chinese 
school management in order to understand how local decisions by implementers shape 
the implementation of minority language education policies at Chinese schools.  
Xishuangbanna in ethnic policy case studies 
Research on ethnic minority policies in China has often focused on particular 
localities, ethnic groups, or languages as a basis for case studies. There are studies in 
Chinese literature on each single recognized ethnic group and also on many non-
recognized ones. Journals such as the “Ethnic Research” (民族研究) publish extensively 
articles on ethnic issues of specific groups, and there are many book series on ethnicity 
and ethnic policies for individual ethnic groups available at Chinese book shops. In 2002 
Blum wrote that in English-language literature not every group is represented, but that 
“the ethnic map is being filled in” (Blum 2002, p. 1289). After more than ten years the 
number of research outputs has increased, and today it seems already impossible to 
conduct a comprehensive list of academic work on all of these groups.7 
                                                     
7
 For a summary of research in English language on ethnicity in China organized by ethnic groups 
see footnote no. 1 in Blum (2002, p. 1289), and for a newer account refer to West (2009). See also journals 
such as “Asian Ethnicity”. 
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Xishuangbanna, a prefecture in China’s Southwestern province Yunnan, has been 
a location for a considerable number of studies on ethnicity and languages. Besides 
overall historical accounts and descriptions on the culture of selected individual ethnic 
groups (Yan 1999; Yu 2006) much research has been devoted to questions of ethnic 
belonging in this multi-ethnic locality. Especially ethnicity (and sometimes cross-border 
ethnicity) of the Dai as a group with a pre-revolutionary ethnic distinction that was 
contested and remodeled by the identification project has been in the focus of ethnic 
studies in Xishuangbanna (Hsieh 1995; Borchert 2008; Panyagaew 2010). Besides these 
basic accounts of ethnicity scholars have analyzed the effects of, for instance, 
urbanization, migration, or agricultural changes on ethnic interactions (Cai 1997; Hansen 
2005; Sturgeon 2012; Xu et al. 2014; Evans 2000). 
In addition to these rather general changes in society and economy in 
Xishuangbanna, scholars have identified cultural policies as a major factor in shaping 
ethnic cultures. Studies that have analyzed the cultural production between state and 
non-state sectors have brought to light effects of state activities of transforming images 
of cultures in Xishuangbanna for the purpose of branding the region externally as exotic 
tourist destination, but also to propagate ideas of multiculturalism towards 
Xishuangbanna’s population (Komlosy 2009; Li 2010). Furthermore, the renewed state 
activism towards promotion of selected ethnic minority cultural items, including support 
for the religious revival of Theravada Buddhism, has been interpreted as means of the 
state to present itself as benevolent administrator of ethnic issues (McCarthy 2009). 
Quite in the opposite direction, other studies have investigated into the reactions of the 
people whose culture is branded, marketized, or promoted through these measures. 
Davis (2003; 2005), for instance, who conducted in-depth ethnographic studies on the 
cultural production among the Dai found that behind the public “front stage” cultural 
production by Han and by Dai who “have learned to present themselves in ways that 
Chinese officials (and tourists) would find appealing” (Davis 2005, p. 177) there are also 
lively modes of “back stage” cultural production that include the recitation of century-old 
music. 
Education, and especially bilingual education, has been analyzed by several 
scholars as a means to engage ethnic minority populations with the state and with 
majority society. Through detailed accounts of the history of education in Xishuangbanna 
(Wang, Mi 1998; Hansen 1999) we possess now an understanding that education 
conducted specifically for ethnic minorities and organized by organizations such as 
Buddhist temples has been and still continues to be a major element in education in 
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Xishuangbanna. However, accounts of this type of education have also brought to light 
the changes in the modes of tuition and the difficulties that conflicts with school 
education create for students. Hansen (1999), for instance, based on officials’ statements 
about perceived differences in “developmental levels” between Dai and Han culture in 
education, identifies stigmatization towards ethnic minorities in Xishuangbanna’s schools. 
Luo (2011), informed by the discussion on modernization ideologies in Chinese education, 
describes that the double burden of “modern” Chinese and “traditional” Dai education 
builds up burdens for students in terms of time pressure, stress, and uncertainty about 
their own cultural standing. 
There is comparatively plentiful official data on minority language education in 
this region. Official statistics of the province, prefecture, and county Bureaus of Education 
regularly also include some data of bilingual education and indicate for instance the 
number of students who receive education in minority languages, the number of teachers 
who are active in this field, or the number of textbook volumes produced (see Table 1). 
Title in English Title in Chinese Periods of 
publishing 
Examples of data sets 
China Statistical Yearbook 中国统计年鉴 yearly overall schools, classes, students, teachers 
Educational Statistics 
Yearbook of China 
中国教育统计
年鉴 
yearly overall schools, classes, students, teachers 
China Educational Finance 
Statistical Yearbook 
中国教育经费
统计年鉴 
yearly overall educational expenses 
Yunnan Yearbook 云南年鉴 yearly overall schools, classes, students, teachers 
textbook approval 
province-wide programs 
research activities 
Xishuangbanna Yearbook 西双版纳年鉴 yearly overall schools, classes, students, teachers 
prefecture-wide programs 
research activities 
Xishuangbanna Records of 
Education 
西双版纳傣族
自治州教育志 
irregular, 
last edition: 
2010 
overall schools, classes, students, teachers 
students and teachers by ethnicity 
prefecture-wide programs 
students and teachers in bilingual classes 
Jinghong Yearbook 景洪年鉴 yearly overall students, classes, teachers 
city-wide programs 
research activities 
Mengla Yearbook 勐腊年鉴 yearly overall students, classes, teachers 
county-wide programs 
research activities 
Menghai Yearbook 勐海年鉴 yearly overall students, classes, teachers 
county-wide programs 
research activities 
Table 1: Sources for official statistics on education in China from national to county level with relevance to 
Xishuangbanna. Note: Individual volumes will be referenced in later chapters. 
However, there are also several caveats to this official data. Firstly, since 
educational statistics in China generally only seldom indicate ethnicity of students or 
teachers there are limits to analysis for instance of educational budgets or educational 
attainments in relation to ethnic share of school population. Secondly, official statistics in 
Xishuangbanna, similar to other educational statistics in China (see Henze 1992) often 
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suffer from caveats in clarity of definitions. The statistical yearbooks on school numbers 
in Xishuangbanna, for instance, sometimes list small school points as separate schools, 
but sometimes they list them under the administrative central schools. These caveats 
prevent comparison to some degree. Together with caveats concerning the quality of 
statistical data due to political pressures (see in-depth discussion below) these statistics 
can be used for background information, but they must be complemented by additional 
research sources. 
In addition to official statistics scholars have contributed case-study research 
results on minority language tuition at schools in Xishuangbanna and on its outcomes. 
There are descriptions of prevalence and models of bilingual education in Xishuangbanna 
authored by university and college researchers (Qiu, Yang 2000; Qi 2003; Xu 2012b) and 
by educators or officials who work in ethnic minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna (Dao 2001, Ai 2001a, 2001b; Dao 2006). Both groups of authors analyze 
the current situation of bilingual education at schools in Xishuangbanna, sometimes 
under reference to official statistics, and focus on the achievements and current problems, 
such as a lack of teachers or a lack of school hours assigned to minority language 
education. These authors generally agree on the need of minority language education for 
students in Xishuangbanna and they express satisfaction with the overall policies, 
although they also note that minority language education could be improved. Specific 
project descriptions by activists in those social organizations that conduct bilingual 
education programs in Xishuangbanna have added more details to the picture (Cobbey 
2007). 
Some studies have aimed to address the effects of bilingual education on language 
skills, usage, and attitudes among speakers statistically (Xue 1999; Wang 2001). One study, 
for instance, that compared Dai language skills and language choices between students of 
bilingual classes and Chinese-only classes at several primary schools in Xishuangbanna 
indicates that bilingual education has large effects on students’ Dai knowledge and skills, 
and that students undergo a process of language change towards Chinese in accordance 
to language usage outside and inside schools (Zhao, Zhao 2010a, 2010b). These results 
point to the strong effects of bilingual education policy implementation on language 
preservation, but they also show that language choice and usability in schools depend on 
more variables than merely single programs. 
Other scholars have analyzed bilingual education in Xishuangbanna much more 
critically when they scrutinized the ideology behind bilingual language policies. Davis 
(2003), for instance, remarks that tuition in the reformed or new Dai script at schools 
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drives Dai speakers away from the traditional and religious literature written in the 
traditional or old Dai script. Hansen (1999) argues more generally that preference 
towards Chinese over Dai, as expressed in curricula, officials’ prejudices, or classroom 
practices, creates an environment for acculturation of ethnic minority students, rather 
than active development of the usability of minority languages. 
This literature has contributed to establishing insights into both the policies and 
the outcomes of bilingual minority language education in Xishuangbanna. However, there 
are also several research gaps. Firstly, there has been comparatively much examination of 
minority language education in Dai, but only few studies (Hansen 1999) included Hani, 
Jinuo, or one of the other official and unofficial ethnic minority groups and languages in 
Xishuangbanna. When literature discusses ethnicity this limitation seems to reflect the 
regional approach of ethnic representation in the Chinese political system that attributes 
regions to selected ethnic groups, so that scholars in these regions tend to focus on issues 
of these selected groups only. In the area of ethnic minority language education, however, 
the focus on Dai language education under neglect of education in the other languages, 
seems to derive more from the characteristics of bilingual programs in Xishuangbanna 
that almost exclusively target Dai speakers. Here, I argue, the focus on Dai language 
education studies in Xishuangbanna can be justified. Although it is worthwhile discussing 
why there are no policies and programs specifically for Hani, Jinuo and the other 
minorities in terms of questions on policy implementation Dai language programs offer 
more material for analysis of specific program designs, policy instruments, or outcomes 
than hardly existing programs for other languages in Xishuangbanna do. 
Secondly, there has been little engagement between the political science 
literatures and the ethnographic literatures. Previous studies on minority language 
education in Xishuangbanna have generally chosen not to use frameworks of policy 
analysis and policy implementation, but instead focused on ethnographic frameworks of 
identity production. Apart from pointing to motivations of “the state” as an imagined 
monolithic block, this literature does not specifically explain the dynamics and 
complexities of policy making and implementation. This leads to the awkward situation 
that we know much about policy goals in Xishuangbanna and about the outcomes, but 
only little about the processes that happen in between. 
In sum, literature has contributed already considerably to our understanding of 
minority language education policies and outcomes in China, but there is a gap in 
grasping decisions made during the implementation processes at schools. The 
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comparatively plentiful quantitative and qualitative data on Xishuangbanna can build a 
basis for research in this direction.  
1.2 Design and methodology of the study 
Considering the findings and shortcomings of the current literature I have 
developed a research question and several subsequent hypotheses that combine both the 
bottom-up perspective of implementers’ decision making on ethnic minority language 
education policies with the institutional settings at Chinese school management. In order 
to investigate this research question I have conducted a case study analysis on minority 
language education in Xishuangbanna. In this section I will outline the research question, 
the variables, and hypotheses of this study, before I will provide an overview on the case 
study design, on the fieldwork that I have conducted in Xishuangbanna, and on the 
methodology and hermeneutics of data analysis that have informed this thesis. In the last 
paragraphs I will discuss ethical guidelines and specific issues for this thesis. 
1.2.1 Research question, hypothesis, and innovative approach 
As the literature review above has indicated we now have a well-developed 
knowledge that decisions of street-level bureaucrats matter largely in policy 
implementation. We also know that the state uses institutions to steer ethnic minority 
policy implementation in schools, but that these institutions are subject to change and 
diversification. However, the literature review has also shown that we lack in 
understanding the exact processes of decision making at school level when policies 
demand localization and diversification, but institutions continue to require 
standardization and accountability. In regard to the case of minority language education 
policy implementation in Xishuangbanna, a suitable example that can build up on diverse 
programs for ethnic minority language education at schools and a comparatively rich data 
basis, I propose the following research question for this thesis: 
 
How do institutional settings of school and curriculum management affect the 
implementation of minority language education policies at school level in Xishuangbanna? 
 
The variables in this research question can be summarized with the following few 
statements (all definitions will be introduced in greater depth in the subsequent chapters): 
As independent variable I define institutional settings of school and curriculum 
management in China at those schools in Xishuangbanna that offer minority language 
education. Considering the perspective of actor-centered institutionalists who view 
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institutions as a combination of the rules sanctioned by governments and courts and the 
social norms that require specific behavior of actors, I will thus include both the rules of 
school and curriculum management through, for instance, evaluations, placements, or 
textbook distribution on the one side, and the social or professional norms that exist on 
correct behavior of school personnel in China on the other side. Several of the 
institutional settings for management of minority language education at schools are 
general rules that can be found at other schools throughout China as well, but some of 
these institutions differ for minority language education. One task for this thesis will be to 
carve out these specific institutions and to show their manifestations at schools. 
As dependent variable I define the implementation outputs of public policies for 
formal ethnic minority language education, that is either tuition in one of the non-
Chinese languages in China as content matter (with instructions in Chinese) or tuition that 
employs these languages as language of instruction in class. The focus will be on public 
schools (understood as schools that are funded and managed by the state) that ever have 
or currently do conduct minority language education.  
As intervening variable I will scrutinize in this thesis the decisions of school 
personnel on the implementation of minority language policies. Implementation of 
policies will be understood as “putting policies into practice” specifically at schools, as 
these are the most local part of government bureaucracy. With the terms school 
personnel I refer to everybody who works at schools, but especially I refer to teachers 
engaged in teaching this type of education, and to school administrators such as 
principals and vice-principals who are involved in organizing minority language education 
at school-level, whereas under the focus of tuition decisions party secretaries at schools 
will be only marginally discussed. With the term decisions on the implementation of 
minority language education policies I understand all those decisions by school personnel 
that affect the implementation of these policies through schooling, from organizing 
students, to assigning classrooms, to content choice. 
Although in this thesis I will also briefly introduce other actors such as staff at 
Bureaus of Education and the Ethnic Affairs Commissions8, as well as parents and 
students, I will discuss these actors here merely as source for input for school-based 
actors, but in order to focus on decisions at school level I will not scrutinize for instance 
government-internal bargaining processes or motivations for parents’ actions in depth. 
Nevertheless, through analysis of interactions of school personnel with the educational 
administration, with students, and with parents the effects of these actors’ actions on 
                                                     
8
 See remarks on the translation of these two agencies in chapter 4.  
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schools will be constantly included in the thesis, and will form a major part of the 
conclusion. 
Locally, this study focuses on Xishuangbanna, a prefecture in Southwest China, 
that not only has a special geographical position and political situation that has been 
described as one of the “margins of China” (Sturgeon 2013), “upland socialist South-East 
Asia” (Turner 2013) or as a part of “Zomia” (Scott 2009), but that is also a region with 
some of the most vivid bilingual education programs in China. In terms of time period, I 
will focus in this study on the situation of minority language education at the time of my 
fieldwork visits to Xishuangbanna in the years 2011 to 2013, but I will provide also 
background information on the historical development of the current situation. 
My hypothesis to this research questions has several parts: 
Firstly, I argue that decisions by school staff have large effects on the 
implementation of minority language policies at schools. Although Chinese schools as part 
of state bureaucracy are closely bound to state ideology low mechanisms of personnel 
evaluation in minority language education as a measure to allow for local diversity open 
up larger spaces for school-based decision making in this school subject than in other 
subjects. The specific mix of ethnic language policy requirements at schools as state 
agencies on the one side and low accountability in minority language education on the 
other side presses school personnel to implement these policies, but it also allows for 
discretion to shape implementation by decisions on tuition or on usage of resources.  
Secondly, I propose that under this discretion teachers and school leaders orient 
decisions largely to their own interests and beliefs. Under the given absence of guidelines 
for minority language education in Xishuangbanna school staff is pressured to interpret 
vaguely formulated policies based on their own understandings of, for instance, the usage 
of minority language education for students’ educational attainments or for the 
protection of local culture. I hypothesize that school staff uses this discretion to shape 
policy implementation according to their own material and non-material interests and 
beliefs, including professional beliefs of their role in supporting students’ careers and 
beliefs of the value of ethnic minority cultures. I argue thus that ethnic or professional 
differences within school staff result in different decisions. 
Thirdly, I argue that these specific processes of decision making produce more 
diversity in minority language education than in other school subjects. The various 
decisions that individual teachers and principals at schools make on the implementation 
of minority language education policies combine to a large variety in tuition models 
between schools. 
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This study follows an innovative approach to the study of minority language 
education policy implementation in China. Whereas previous literature has either 
analyzed ethnic minority language education merely from the perspective of government 
ethnic ideology in policy formulation or from the perspective of outcomes of minority 
language education programs at schools (see literature review), with this thesis I will 
introduce a specific perspective on the implementation decisions at schools. For this I will 
use a framework that combines analysis of street-level bureaucratic implementation 
decisions with analysis of institutional settings of accountability systems at schools. To my 
knowledge, with this thesis the street-level bureaucratic framework is for the first time 
employed to analysis of minority language education in China. I expect that this 
framework will produce unique insight into the implementation decisions of school 
personnel at Chinese schools, which previous literature was unable to grasp. 
The objective of this study is to develop a detailed picture of implementation 
processes of minority language education policies at Chinese schools, which informs 
theory development in policy implementation studies. This explorative study belongs to 
the heuristic type of case studies which “inductively identify new variables, hypothesis, 
causal mechanisms, and causal paths” (George, Bennett 2005, p. 75). Consequentially, 
this study is not intended to depict minority language education in all its varieties in China, 
but to deliver insight into causal mechanisms of policy implementation under the specific 
conditions of school management at the observed schools. The findings from this study 
will contribute to the development and refinement of theoretical approaches to study 
policy implementation from a bottom-up street-level bureaucracy perspective. 
1.2.2 Case study design 
The following study will approach the research question by analysis of a case study. 
I will analyze the institutions of school management and the policies on minority language 
education policies in China, and I will analyze in depth, based on examples of schools in 
Xishuangbanna, how school personnel perceive both, how they react, and how they 
legitimize their decisions. For this approach I employ case study analysis. 
Benefits and trade-offs of case studies 
Case study research is a suitable approach to study the questions outlined above. 
Case studies as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – 
at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring 2007, p. 20) are typically 
small-N studies that use qualitative methods. Case study research has specific benefits 
compared to large-N cross-case studies, but it also comes with certain trade-offs. 
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Summarizing the case study approaches that Gerring (2007) and George and Bennett 
(2005) discuss, the benefits of case studies are in understanding heterogeneous and 
complex situations. Case studies are useful for approaching a new phenomenon to 
generate hypotheses, as they allow to consider more details; they can establish internal 
validity of a causal relationship within a case; they can produce insights into causes or 
patterns as they allow for deep analysis and thick description; they are suitable to grasp 
heterogeneity and complex causalities that cross-case studies cannot reflect; and, finally, 
they are a choice at hand when there is rare data on the whole population.  
At the same time, however, this approach is unlikely to falsify hypotheses or to 
establish representativeness within a population. Nevertheless, as George and Bennett 
(2005, p. 30) argue: “Case researchers do not aspire to select cases that are directly 
‘representative’ of diverse populations and they usually do not and should not make such 
claims.” Instead, case study research should be seen as part of the larger kaleidoscope of 
studies that can provide results within their parameters. To situate case study research it 
might be useful to combine small-N case studies with a literature-based introduction into 
the larger population of cases or to combine “a more superficial analysis conducted on a 
larger sample” with “an intensive case study” as Gerring (2007, p. 22) recommends to use 
the advantages of a case study but at the same time to not lose sight of the whole 
population of cases. I will follow this advice in my own case study research by combining 
an outlook on the overall situation of the population with an in-depth analysis of three 
cases. 
A case study on schools in Xishuangbanna 
In my study I will analyze minority language education policy implementation at 
schools in Xishuangbanna. This analysis will contain two parts. Firstly, I will analyze in 
detail the policies for ethnic minority language education in Xishuangbanna. 
Xishuangbanna is one of China’s regions with comparatively plentiful policies for ethnic 
minority language education that include instruments from textbook provision, to model 
school projects, to teacher trainings. An analysis of policies from province to county 
government agencies will establish not only a picture of the policy goals and 
implementation modes, but it will also present the requirements that Bureaus of 
Education forward to schools. 
 Secondly, I will analyze decision making on policy implementation at schools in 
Xishuangbanna against the background of the relations between schools and the Bureaus 
of Education. According to official data some 16 percent of schools in Xishuangbanna 
currently conduct minority language education in Xishuangbanna and an additional 
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unknown number of schools have formerly conducted such education here (see all 
sources and discussion of data in later chapters). Within these 50 to 150 schools minority 
language education is conducted under different institutional settings. Although all 
schools as public educational agencies are part of government bureaucracy they differ 
with regard to how the government supports, requires, and controls implementation of 
minority language policies here.  
 On a continuum between no support for minority language education and most 
possible support, the schools analyzed in this thesis will be grouped into three types: 
firstly, schools that I will call “showpiece minority language education schools” with 
support by large programs that not only offer resources, but that also largely interfere in 
curriculum planning; secondly, schools that I will call “resource supported minority 
language education schools” where programs allocate few resources to schools for a 
specific subject, but don’t interference in curriculum planning; and thirdly, schools that I 
will call “left-alone minority language education schools” that formerly conducted 
minority language education with support by programs, but where this support officially 
or unofficially has been terminated in the meantime. This distinction is helpful for 
understanding the diversity of situations of minority language at schools in 
Xishuangbanna, which will be in the center of the first part of this study. It must be 
understood, however, that this distinction is not a clear cut one, but a provisional tool to 
view different stages on a continuum. 
Following a trend in school research to focus on documentary and ethnographic 
analysis of case study schools (Böhme 2008), I will specify my project through 
documentary analysis of decision making at three case-study schools. These schools will 
be selected according to what Gerring (2007, p. 89) describes as the “diverse case” 
technique of case study selection: choosing cases that “illuminate the full range of 
variation”. Although representativeness in this technique cannot be compared to cross-
case studies, it combines the advantages of indicating the range of possible cases with in-
depth analysis of individual cases. Since randomization with the purpose of 
representativeness for case studies is generally unreliable (Gerring 2007, p. 87) I selected 
three case study schools after review of several schools in Xishuangbanna according to 
explanatory character for the research question. In order to balance depth and breadth of 
the study I will analyze decision making at these schools, but will include further 
observations of a dozen or so other schools in Xishuangbanna.  
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1.2.3 Fieldwork at schools in Xishuangbanna  
For my research project I have chosen qualitative methods for case study analysis. 
These are, according to Gerring (2007, p. 20), in “methodological affinity” to case study 
research. During a period of altogether nine months from September 2011 to March 2012 
and April 2013 to May 2013 I conducted fieldwork mostly in different localities in 
Xishuangbanna (from the urban areas of Jinghong to the rural parts of the prefecture) and 
for introductory purposes also in the national capital Beijing and in Yunnan’s provincial 
capital Kunming. I employed three methods for gathering data: collection of written 
materials, interviews, and classroom observation. Here I will introduce these three ways 
of obtaining data, before I will conclude with a summary of the outcomes and problems 
that I encountered when I employed these methods in the field. 
Access to the field through schools in ethnic minority areas in China 
Gaining access to informants in China has been described as holding specific 
barriers for scholars. With reference to the highland regions of China, Laos, and Vietnam, 
a region that Turner (2013) has called “upland socialist Asia”, Petit (2013) argues that 
doing interviews in authoritarian states suffers from specific difficulties, such as the 
barriers to gaining research permits, the dependency on officials and their contacts, or 
the censorship in project descriptions. Arguably fieldwork in those regions in China that 
are inhabited largely by non-Han groups or that have obtained official “autonomous 
status” (see detailed discussion in later chapter) is affected by these barriers even more 
severely, since authorities might fear that the researcher either is interested in 
uncovering ethnically-related unrest that the authoritarian state wants to cover, or that 
the researcher is himself or herself a source for such unrest. In order to deal with these 
potential barriers it seems wise to rely on multiple sources for fieldwork access at the 
same time. 
In my case, access to the field was provided through several ways. Firstly, I was 
able to gain support from researchers at the Minzu University, Renmin University, and 
Normal University in Beijing, who not only through official invitations but also through 
recommendations to former local research partners opened first doors for me. Officials at 
government agencies in Xishuangbanna have been a second channel to gather 
information, either as interview partners or as providers of contacts to schools. This 
approach to do research “in the footsteps of the Communist party”, as Hansen (2006) has 
called it, made interviews with government officials and school leaders possible who 
otherwise might have denied interviews, but at the same time this approach also faced 
the risk that interview partners feel obliged to confine their answers to the official lines of 
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argumentation. To counter this risk I not only assured them that their answers will not be 
reflected to their superiors, but I also employed a third method to gain access to 
interview partners at schools. Through recommendation by friends I was able to meet 
informants in a less formal way at villagers’ homes or at the school ground, where my 
informants often welcomed me, volunteered to answer my questions, and allowed to visit 
the schools. Many times school staff accepted my offer to teach English classes in order to 
gain closer contact with both students and teachers. Through a combination of all three 
roads I established deep contacts to people in Xishuangbanna from diverse background, 
such as students, parents, grandparents, teachers, principals, government officials, and 
monks, who provided me with insights into their perceptions of minority language 
education in Xishuangbanna. 
Collection of written materials 
In order to gain an overview firstly on the most recent academic research on 
minority language and bilingual education in China and secondly on the available data on 
the case study region, I collected a vast range of literature at bookshops, online, and in 
libraries in Kunming and Beijing. In addition I collected official local government statistics, 
policy documents, and newspaper articles on bilingual education in Xishuangbanna. 
Furthermore, during my visits to selected schools in Xishuangbanna, I was also provided 
with documents describing school-internal procedures and student data including test 
results. Finally, my interview partners gave me school textbooks on the core subject in 
minority languages, specifically edited school textbooks for language education, and 
locally produced textbooks on so called “local knowledge” about the cultural and ethnic 
history of Xishuangbanna. 
School visits and classroom observations 
The second part of my fieldwork activities in Xishuangbanna consisted of visits to 
33 schools, kindergartens, colleges, and universities with the major focus on primary 
schools. Here I observed classes, made intensive notes, collected additional material and 
took photos of each institution. These visits can be divided into two schemes: firstly, 
short-term visits for a duration of half a day to one day in order to gain a broader 
overview of the situation of the educational institutions in the prefecture and secondly 
long-term visits to selected case study schools with durations of three to seven days each. 
The short-term visits brought me to a large variety of mostly rural schools in 
Xishuangbanna. These visits were partly arranged by Chinese advisors and friends, and 
partly arranged by myself. Although differing in detail, they often followed similar 
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procedures, namely formal interviews with the school principals or kindergarten heads, 
followed by a guided tour through the school and formal or informal talks with individual 
teachers. Furthermore, I was often asked to teach English sessions, which I happily did, 
since it gave me the opportunity to engage with students in formalized, but still fruitful 
discussions, most often in Chinese. 
After gaining an overview of the situation in the prefecture I conducted intensive 
case-studies at three primary schools in different localities of Xishuangbanna. Here, I 
stayed at each school three to seven days observing classes and interviewing teachers 
and students at school and at home. Becoming part of the school by teaching English and 
by regularly sitting in the classes, I observed the implementation of the language 
curriculum, student-teacher communication, living environment of the students, daily life 
at school and so forth. Following examples of many other scholars who have conducted 
research on education in relation with ethnic issues through class room observation in 
China (e.g. Hansen 1999; Schoenhals 2001; Luo 2011). 
My analysis at the schools covered four main interests: implementation of formal 
tuition in minority languages and informal bilingual language instructions in class; 
processes and problems of learning Chinese by non-Han students in school; language 
choices inside and outside the classroom; and liberties of school personnel and students 
to influence curriculum and classroom activities. Additionally, I collected data on student 
performance in regular school exams. Despite the limited validity of exams and grades, 
these lists in combination with teachers’ remarks on individual students allow analysis of 
student performance in relation to ethnicity and mother tongue. 
Interviews 
Conducting interviews has been one of the main methods in my fieldwork. I 
conducted interviews with more than 100 respondents in Xishuangbanna on issues of 
minority languages education here (see Table 27 in appendix).9 These interviews have 
been conducted in analytical cycles, which means that I have approached some interview 
partners for several times, with breaks in between to review the questions and answers 
(Froschauer, Lueger 2003). In Kvale’s (2008) differentiation between the factual and the 
discursive goals of interviews, these interviews followed two purposes: on the one hand, 
they aimed at gaining a factual overview of the schools and the influences that actor 
groups have on the decision process; on the other hand, they served as a tool to extract 
the actors’ perspectives within contrasting discourses. The informants can be divided into 
                                                     
9
 In this paper I will indicate the ethnicity of interview partners as official registration, but specify 
language skills and language attitudes on an individual basis. 
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three groups, namely experts, involved actors, and educational recipients. Interviews with 
partners from each category have their particular goals. However, some informants may 
fit into more than one category, such as school principals who are experts in school 
administration, but who often also teach. 
As the first group of interviews I conducted expert interviews with officials and 
academics in China. Expert interviews, which according to Gläser and Laudel (2010) target 
on informants’ knowledge and insights, are an efficient method of collecting official 
statements, but especially in the case of government officials there is the risk that official 
statements conceal personal opinions of interview partners (Berry 2002). I used expert 
interviews to target government officials and administrative staff at the Educational 
Bureaus for collecting data on governmental programs, regulations, and policy documents. 
Additionally, I have conducted expert interviews with Chinese academic scholars in order 
to gain information about recent research projects and to situate my own research 
project within current academic discussions in China.  
Through formal interviews with altogether twelve educational officers of the 
Bureaus of Education and the Ethnic Affairs Commissions from Yunnan Province level to 
Xishuangbanna Prefecture level to Jinghong, Menghai, and Mengla County/City level and 
with several members of Chinese social organizations or international NGOs, I gained 
insights into the activities of the respective governmental agency in terms of promoting 
minority language teaching and implementing bilingual programs for schools, such as 
editing, publishing and distribution of textbooks, the arrangement of teacher trainings, 
and the evaluation of minority language tuition programs. As a matter of fact, all officers 
for bilingual programs in Xishuangbanna at the prefecture level and below are Dai, which 
might be a factor in explaining the strong privileges of Dai tuition vis-à-vis the languages 
of other ethnic minorities in Xishuangbanna. Considering that the existence of bilingual 
school programs depends here strongly on the administrative leaders’ commitments, it 
was rewarding to examine these actors’ influences and interests. 
The second group of informants is comprised of school personnel in 
Xishuangbanna who do or do not conduct education in minority languages. Principals and 
vice-principals were often my first counterparts, since my research at school depended on 
their permit. At most of the times, they welcomed my research, sometimes even 
arranged further interviews with teachers and other informants, provided me with basic 
school statistics, and explained their own roles in setting language educational strategies 
and rules at their schools. In order to gain information about teachers’ abilities to shape 
arrangements at schools through language decisions in the classroom, I have interviewed 
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at large numbers of teachers each visited school and kindergarten. I have discussed with 
them not only their evaluation of the respective school and individual subjects such as Dai 
language classes, but also their liberties, boundaries and strategies for decision making on 
teaching. Many teachers were more than willing to help me understanding their 
situations in the schools. Several teachers utilized these talks as a means of comforting 
their own frustrations with the schooling situation, with students or parents. The most 
fruitful interviews were on the one side those with teachers who officially teach Dai, 
Bulang, or Hani language, as these provided invaluable insights not only in the needs and 
obstacles of language minority language programs at school, but also on their own role in 
shaping the respective tuition. On the other side, teachers who face language barriers to 
students of non-Han mother tongue have been sources for understanding informal 
bilingual strategies in class beyond the official programs. 
Since the bilingual training of teachers is a crucial issue for success or failure of 
minority language tuition programs and since teachers mentioned such training 
repeatedly as a decisive factor in their career I also approached teacher training colleges. I 
interviewed lecturers for Dai language at the Xishuangbanna Teacher College and the 
Yunnan University of Nationalities and lecturers for Hani language from the Hani Research 
Association. At the teacher college, I additionally interviewed college students of a degree 
program who are going to be kindergarten teachers. These interviews with future 
kindergarten teachers were not only informative about teachers’ attitudes towards 
minority cultures and languages, but even more about the limits of choice in study 
programs. 
Students as the recipients of education and thus being most directly affected by 
educational decisions were the third group in schools that I approached in order to 
understand their positions and interests on minority language education. Focussing on 
students in primary schools, but also interviewing several groups of students from middle 
schools and high schools, I engaged in plentiful discussions. I employed two methods for 
interviewing students: formal group discussion in class and informal talks after class. In 
class, I made use of the request by the schools to teach English and “foreign culture” to 
their students. After some English tuition, I was able to ask questions about their feelings 
towards school and especially towards Dai language classes. The second mode of 
engaging with students was through interviews outside the classroom. Constantly being 
surrounded by students, I was able to engage in several discussions with smaller groups 
of students without the teachers or parents being present. Students eagerly showed me 
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their campus while we discussed issues of ethnicity, language usage, and perceptions of 
their schools. 
Finally, I also approached parents, grandparents, or siblings of ethnic minority and 
Han students in order to investigate into their perceptions and decisions in terms of 
educational choices for the children in their families. At their homes, during work in the 
fields, and also when they waited to pick up their children after school, I interviewed 
family members of students who I met in the schools. Many informants in this group 
welcomed me and were willing to answer my questions, especially when I was introduced 
through mutual friends. In fact, not a few parents were in anger about educational 
decisions that their children were expelled to, such as the obligation for Han children to 
study Dai writing, and they eagerly wanted me to write down their complaints into my 
note book. 
Fieldwork outcomes and problems 
The above mentioned methods proved useful for generating a large variety of 
different types of data for this thesis. My shelves are now filled with secondary studies on 
minority language education in China and with textbooks in these languages, I have read 
the most relevant regulations, I have collected files full of statistics on student results at 
my case study schools, I have hundreds of pictures on schools and schooling stored, and 
last but not least I have interview material that Chinese assistants have transcribed and 
that I have coded with the software Maxqda. 
Luckily, many of the difficulties that I had anticipated did not materialize. Firstly, it 
proved to be easier than I had thought to find interview partners. Through the three 
strategies of gaining access to the field described above I was able to speak to a variety of 
interview partners from different professions, ethnic backgrounds, and ages. The 
“sensibility” of issues such as ethnic relations, governmental attitudes in dealing with 
ethnic conflicts, or simply the issue what a teacher is to do when he or she can’t or 
doesn’t want to fulfill demands from superiors were for many of my interview partners no 
reason to not speak about them. Quite the contrary, for many interview partners the 
interviews have been a chance to leave off steam and to speak about troubles that they 
have experienced. Sometimes they expressed the hope that things might better when 
research makes them public. Language issues, to name a second concern, have also not 
materialized as a problem for doing interviews. Most interview partners spoke Chinese 
(which I am fluent in) and for those elderly people and very young children who only 
spoke Dai, Hani or one of the other languages (that I unfortunately don’t understand) 
there were always people around willing to translate. 
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On the other side, the methods also encountered several limits. Firstly, the 
method of gaining contacts through the “snowball method” (one interview partner 
recommends interviews with other interview partners) was extremely helpful to gain 
access to many and diverse interview partners, but combined with the not always easy 
travel conditions in Xishuangbanna and the large distances between schools this try-and-
error method of approaching interview partners based on recommendations without 
knowing much about their position or the quality of data that they could offer proved also 
to be extremely time consuming. Secondly and still related to the issue of time, the 
schedule of my fieldwork visits needed adjustment to the school schedules in 
Xishuangbanna. Not only had I to consider the various festivals of the diverse ethnic 
groups for scheduling interviews, but also the summer and winter breaks of schools. As 
most of my interview partners at schools asked to schedule interviews merely during the 
semester, I had to carefully adjust the schedule to these demands. Thirdly, for some 
interview partners it proved necessary to schedule multiple interviews, as especially 
officials at the Bureaus of Education were initially reluctant to provide more information 
than I already knew from official publications, and only after several visits they had 
developed enough trust and understanding of my research interests that they were 
willing to discuss issues such as problems of their work, their own perceptions of contacts 
to school personnel, and even the quality of the official statistics. 
Additionally, the data produced through this fieldwork also must be seen under 
certain caveats. Firstly, due to limits in time of research and in access I was not able to 
interview government officials at higher hierarchical positions than the Province 
Educational Bureau. Neither the national Ministry of Education or the State Ethnic Affairs 
Commission, nor members of the People’s Congresses were willing to agree on interviews. 
Due to this limitation I am unable to assess internal bargaining processes on minority 
language education programs between governmental agencies. Secondly, I was unable to 
measure the outcomes of bilingual education, for instance student language attainments. 
Such research would have required quantitative methods and very different approaches. 
However, since my research question firstly aims at decision making within schools and 
not on decision making with the governmental administration and since it secondly also 
aims at the outputs of decisions in the classroom, but not on the linguistic or educational 
outcome for the students, both issues are rather minor caveats. 
1.2.4 Data analysis and hermeneutics 
The fieldwork produced data of immense use for this thesis. Before I will start 
elaborating on the results that these materials produced, a few remarks are in order on 
 34 
the quality and reliability of these data, and on how I have proceeded in analyzing this 
data. 
Quality of the data 
Official data on minority language education in China, in Xishuangbanna, and at 
the case study schools serves as important background information for my study. The 
data provided in yearbooks and other official statistical compilations gives basic 
information for instance about the numbers of schools, students, or teachers who are 
involved in minority language education. Specific data on case study schools adds to these 
data sets and fills at least some of the gaps of yearbook data (see both above). 
However, there are also caveats in order in analyzing this data with respect to the 
limited reliability of official Chinese statistical data on education generally, and minority 
language education, specifically. Some scholars10 have criticized official Chinese data 
mining for lacking accuracy due to a lack of training for personnel in the statistical 
departments (Yu 2013), others have argued that the structure of statistical data 
acquisition in China prevents control of central authorities over local acquisition 
preferences (Moser 2009). Reliability of educational statistics must be further questioned 
when data is used to prove that required quotas in the education system are fulfilled. 
According not only to school personnel, but also to officers within the Educational 
Bureaus the pressure to fulfill schooling rates of 100 percent makes leaders, village heads, 
and local educational bureaus deploy measures to forge statistics, e.g. by calling students 
who already dropped out from schooling specifically back for the days of school 
evaluations. Additionally, official statistics in education often lack in clarity of central 
variables, such as a distinction between gross and net schooling rates (Henze 1992, 
p. 155). 
In sum, educational statistics on educational data in China suffices for 
interpretation, as long as the researcher is aware of the caveats and employs measures to 
counter these caveats, as Henze (1992) argues. For my project I have employed three 
measures to improve the usability of statistical data. Firstly, I have questioned the data’s 
plausibility through comparison with data from other regions in China and in some cases 
through comparison with data from other countries. Secondly, I have investigated into 
the modes of official data acquisition for those statistics that I use. Through formal and 
informal discussions with students, school personnel, and staff of the Bureaus of 
Education I was able to understand some of the modes of how official statistics were 
                                                     
10
 Other scholars, such as Ban (2012) or Qi (2003), use data without any further consideration or 
even mentioning the origin of official statistics. 
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forged. In one case staff of the Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education even provided me 
with the “real” numbers that the Bureau established before it was pressured to polish 
them. Thirdly, I have balanced the official statistics with in-depth investigation at school-
level, where I have not only collected data from individual schools, but where I have also 
discussed the contrasts between official data and school situations with school personnel. 
Similar to statistical analysis qualitative data also must strive for validity and 
relevance. In order to secure the validity of my case study I combined several tools that 
handbook authors such as Silverman (2010) recommend. Firstly, I employed method and 
data triangulation through comparison of the case study analysis with other schools in the 
region and through combining the three methods observation, interviews with teachers, 
and review of official documents. Secondly, throughout the data analysis, I have 
employed data respondent validation through discussing interpretations with interview 
participants, with non-involved school teachers, and with other scholars in the field. 
Thirdly, I carefully added analysis of rhetoric to the analysis of “facts” when I not only 
discussed the factual situation of minority language education with my interview partners, 
but also discussed their choice of wording with them. 
Analytical methods  
Hermeneutics as the method to interpret data can denote to anything between 
purely depicting what has been found at the ground to enriching the material by putting it 
into context. However, as Willig (2013, p. 137) writes, “every interpretation is 
underpinned by assumptions which the interpreter makes about what is important and 
what is worth paying attention to, as well as what can be known about and through the 
data.” 
In my analysis of the data I follow the “grounded theory” approach insofar as I 
treat the material as source to generate theories, I have conducted circular fieldwork of 
data gathering, analysis, and again data gathering. At the same time, however, I have also 
used coding paradigms based on the street-level bureaucracy policy implementation 
decision making framework outlined above to structure the material. Codes such as 
interpretation of policies, interactions, decisions, and justification of decisions have 
guided my analysis. Through several rounds of work with the software Maxqda I have 
firstly coded the interview material under “structural coding methods” to gather topic 
lists based on research questions, secondly I have coded statements by informants under 
the “evaluation coding method” to identify participant positions, and thirdly I have coded 
observations at schools under the “descriptive coding method” (see for coding methods 
Saldana 2012). The categories deriving from these codes have guided my analysis. 
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A special issue in analyzing interviews has been to “decipher” the differences 
between official and unofficial language codes in the interviews that Thøgersen (2006) 
has described as a typical linguistic problem for researchers on China. Through 
additionally discussing the material with students, informants, and research assistants in 
China I have confirmed and enriched my understandings and translations of the material. 
1.2.5 Ethics 
The last words in this methodological part shall be devoted to ethical issues, since 
in a certain way these bridge the data collection and analysis. Ethical codes of conduct in 
planning, conducting, and publishing research have become standard for all major 
academic disciplines (Christians 2005). For this research I have adhered to the codes of 
conduct by the German Research Foundation DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
2013) and the University of Duisburg-Essen (Universität Duisburg-Essen 7/16/2004), 
which stipulate, for instance, that researchers are obliged to discuss remaining 
uncertainties in their research results, to honestly indicate contributions by others, and to 
document all results. In addition, there are specific requirements for interview-based 
projects, as handbooks on qualitative research discuss (e.g. Miller et al. 2012; Christians 
2005). Silverman (2010, pp. 153–154) summarizes that the most prominent ethical 
demands for qualitative research are “voluntary participation and the right to withdraw; 
protection of research participants; assessment of potential benefits and risks to 
participants; obtaining informed consent; not doing harm.” Additionally, ethics must also 
be contextualized to the different research disciplines, as one author  (Russell 2013, 
p. 113) reminds us: “Ethics is not first and foremost prescriptive, but better characterized 
as integrative, inter-disciplinary and interpretive.” This contextualization must consider, 
for instance, the cognitive abilities of the interview partners and situational factors such 
as power structures during the interview. In order to contextualize the relevant ethical 
issues, I will here (in addition to the general ethical concerns outlined in the above 
mentioned literature) discuss three issues: informed consent, positionality of the 
researcher, and protection of privacy of informants. 
Informed consent has been established since long as major requirement for 
research, and especially for interview-based research (Silverman 2010). However, this 
requirement contains two ideals that are sometimes difficult to achieve, as Miller and Bell 
(2012) explicate. “Informed” means that participants in research understand the goals of 
research and what will happen with the information that they provide. However, the 
changing research interests during flexible studies and possible limits of cognitive 
understanding of participants into what they are consenting to can both make reaching 
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this requirement difficult. “Consent” means that participants voluntarily and without 
coercion participate in the research. However, the control of explicit or in-explicit power 
structures between researchers, participants, and so called “gate keepers” can at times 
be beyond of the researchers’ control. Transferred to my case this means that informed 
consent of children or employees at school, for instance, under the presence of the 
teachers or superiors might face some caveats. In order to avoid these caveats I 
developed strategies for my research project to avoid these situations. Firstly, I have 
scheduled interviews with teachers mostly for separate meetings without principals, and 
often at teachers’ homes. Secondly, I started interviews with students only after teachers 
had left the classrooms or at localities outside the classrooms. Thirdly, in all cases of 
interviews with children I have not only gained the approval of either the parents or the 
teachers, but I have explained the goals of my research to the students. By adjusting my 
explanations to the students’ cognitive levels I hope to have made my research and the 
potential consequences as clear as possible to my interview partners. 
Probably in any research, but especially in research that is interested in ethnicity, 
the researcher should be aware of his or her own position. Specifically referring to the 
diverse concepts of race, ethnicity, and culture Milner (2007) warns that non-reflected 
positionality can threaten the validity of research results. He recommends that 
researchers together with reflect these concepts participants before, during, and after a 
research project, which means for the researchers to reflect their own racial and cultural 
heritage, the positions of the participants, the representation of race, culture, and 
ethnicity in research, and the context of these concepts in the researched community or 
society. In my own research project I have followed this advice by not only profoundly 
investigating into concepts of ethnicity, race, and nationality in the literature on China 
and in categorizations established by the Chinese government (see discussions in later 
chapters), but I have also discussed ethnic belonging and different concepts of “being 
minority” with my interview partners. 
Finally, for all research it is of utmost importance to protect the informants from 
any harm resulting from providing data. Although it has been pointed out that some 
informants actually want to be named in the research output as a matter of ownership 
over their own testimonies (Silverman 2010, p. 167), confidentiality of interview material 
is one of the main measures to follow this stipulation. Since many of my interviews 
touched “sensitive” issues for the informants, for instance teachers’ reactions when they 
can’t fulfill their duties, it was especially necessary to make the interview material 
anonymous. For this reason I have refrained from providing the real names of my 
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interview partners or their schools, but instead I have developed a code system to refer 
to interviews, to schools, and to other organizations.11 Furthermore, none of the pictures 
attached to this text refer to specific schools, but are merely examples of schools that I 
have visited during my fieldwork. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
In this thesis I will present an analysis of ethnic minority language policy 
implementation at school level, based on a case study of Dai language education policies 
in Xishuangbanna. The thesis will consist of seven chapters, from elaboration of the 
general analytical framework of policy implementation at schools, to presentation of 
specific ethnic and educational policies, to discussion of institutional settings at schools in 
China, to analysis of my case study. 
Following this introduction the next chapter will introduce the analytical 
framework for this thesis. In this chapter I will firstly review a framework to analyze 
street-level bureaucratic policy implementation at schools, secondly I will operationalize 
this framework for the field of ethnic minority language curriculum decisions by school 
personnel, and thirdly I will visualize a combined analytical framework. 
In the third chapter I will specify the framework by outlining the institutional 
spaces that determine school personnel’s options for decision making on the 
implementation of curriculum policies specifically in China. In this chapter I will introduce 
the institutional settings of school personnel management in China, before I will discuss 
how these settings shape decision making space for street-level bureaucrats in relation to 
curriculum decisions at Chinese schools. I will elaborate the roles that institutions assign 
to teachers and principals and I will show how reforms in accountability systems towards 
Chinese school staff widen and limit the space for school-based decision making. 
In the fourth chapter I will outline principles of ethnic minority language education 
policies in China. In the first section of this chapter I will introduce structures of ethnic 
policy making in China, such as the ethnic autonomy system, and I will present organized 
actors for ethnic minority language education in government agencies, in the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), and in societal organizations. In the second section I will 
introduce minority language education policies and instruments in China, before I will 
discuss the problems that these policies meet. With this chapter I will show how language 
                                                     
11
 Generally, I refer to schools by a numeral index (see appendix). For the three case study schools I 
additionally use three pseudonyms, which I have created by combining the syllable "Meng” (勐, meaning in 
Dai “small place in flat land”, which is often used in Xishuangbanna’s toponyms (see extensive discussion by 
Luo 1999), with the Chinese syllables for one (yi), two (er), and three (san). 
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ideologies, structures of policy making in China, and ethnic policy goals all produce 
specific policies for ethnic minority language education in China. 
In the fifth chapter I will introduce to minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna, specifically to Dai language education. After an overview on 
Xishuangbanna’s social, political, and linguistic characteristics, I will elaborate in more 
depth on the situation of minority language education in Xishuangbanna. I will introduce 
to the main governmental and non-governmental actors in policy making here, to the 
tools of policy programs for minority language education, and to official statistical data on 
the current situation of minority language education at schools and other educational 
organizations in Xishuangbanna. This chapter will prepare the ground for analysis of my 
case study, where I will critically discuss the meaning of these policies and policy 
instruments for schools. 
In the sixth and main part of this thesis I will analyze in depth the decisions at 
several case study schools as defined by different institutional contexts of minority 
language programs. Here I will elaborate on the ways how school principals and teachers 
use institutionally defined spaces for decision making on minority language curriculum. 
Interests, policy understandings, and outcomes will be in the center of this analysis. This 
chapter will be a unique analysis of the decision making processes in policy 
implementation against the background of minority language education tuition in 
Xishuangbanna. It will be based on interview data with teachers, principals, students, and 
parents, on my own observations at schools in Xishuangbanna, and on analysis of 
statistical data obtained at the case study schools. 
In the final chapter I will review implications of the case study findings for our 
understanding of the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation in China. In 
the first section of this chapter I will reconsider the framework of street-level 
bureaucratic policy implementation in China. Based on my findings I will propose here to 
include sub-processes of implementers’ interpretations of institutional spaces into the 
street-level bureaucracy framework. In the second and third section I will discuss the 
chances of school-based decision making for pressing issues in two Chinese policy fields. I 
will discuss on the one hand how the relations between institutional settings and street-
level actors’ decision making at schools in China affect the chances of minority-language 
education to raise the quality of educational outcome and on the other hand under what 
conditions school-based decision making on ethnic minority language education can 
provide an option for reforming ethnic policy making in China towards community 
representation beyond approaches of ethnic group distinction and autonomous regions. 
 40 
A short summary of the main findings and an appendix with the table of references, the 
index of interview partners and visited educational organizations, the relevant legislation 
and curriculum schedules, maps on Xishuangbanna, and a selection of images from 
schools in the region will conclude this thesis.12 
  
                                                     
12
 Translations of Chinese terms are not specifically listed in a glossary, but are directly annotated 
at their first appearance in the text. 
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2 Framework: Street-level policy implementation at schools 
As this thesis deals with the implementation of policies through school-based 
implementers, there is a need for an analytical framework that combines an actor-
centered policy analysis with reflection on the institutional settings at school level. The 
bottom-up approach of analyzing policy implementation through decisions by street-level 
bureaucrats elaborated first by Lipsky (1980) provides a suitable perspective to analyze 
the policy implementation processes. However, as a central variable in this perspective is 
the discretionary decision making of implementers, we must combine this perspective 
with an analysis of the institutional settings that govern discretion in social policy 
implementation, especially accountability systems of a given institutional setting. 
With this chapter I will introduce an analytical framework of street-level 
implementation of curriculum policy that focuses on the relation between institutional 
settings at schools and school staff’s implementation decisions on ethnic minority 
language curriculum management at schools. In light of the still largely diverse and 
developing approaches to understand implementation (Barrett 2004) and in notion of 
Winter’s (2006) dictum that looking for one overall implementation theory is rather 
utopian I will present here merely selected elements of an analytical framework than a 
fully-fledged implementation theory. This allows for a deductive and explorative, but 
nevertheless focused, perspective in the analytical part of this thesis. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part I will 
present the bottom-up approach of analyzing policy implementation by observation of 
street-level bureaucrats’ decision making against the background of a given institutional 
setting. The combination of Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy approach with an actor-
centered perspective on institutions allows me establishing a first intermediate summary 
on the relations between implementers’ decisions and institutions. However, only the 
second part, where I operationalize these considerations against the specific context of 
minority language curriculum policies for schools and where I consider specifically the 
relation between accountability systems, school staff as street-level bureaucrats, and 
school-based decision making will make the bottom-up approach to policy 
implementation analysis fruitful for this thesis. In the third section I will combine both 
parts into a framework of curriculum policy implementation by school-based decisions, 
which I will briefly summarize and visualize. 
2.1 Street-level policy implementation framework 
Policy implementation can be seen as a specific stage in the policy cycle where 
policies are put into practice (Jann, Wegrich 2007, p. 44). This stage is situated between 
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agenda setting (including problem definition), policy formulation (including decision 
making), 13  implementation, and evaluation. 14  Considering this position of the 
implementation stage in the cycle, DeLeon (1999, pp. 314–315) defines simplistically: 
“Implementation is what happens between policy expectations and (perceived) policy 
results”. 
However, approaches to analyze the processes within this stage are multiple. The 
bottom-up approach to policy analysis at the street-level of service provision will be in the 
center of this section. The first part will introduce the bottom-up perspective, before the 
second part will elaborate on the role of street-level bureaucrats in this process. The third 
part, finally, will show how an institutional perspective can add to understanding the 
spaces for decision making by street-level bureaucrats. 
2.1.1 Top-down and bottom-up policy implementation theories 
Theories that attempt to define the complexities of implementation differ in their 
perspectives on the very process, the mechanisms, the contributing factors, the goals, 
and the obstacles in this stage. The diverse theories have been grouped into two 
approaches: the “top-down” and the “bottom-up” approach (Hill, Hupe 2009; Elmore 
1979; Matland 1995; Winter 2006). These approaches differ not only between focusing 
on different actors and processes, but also in the evaluation of policy modifications during 
the implementation stage. The top-down approach aims at smoothening implementation 
processes and views departures from original policy designs as systematic faults. The 
bottom-up approach, by contrast, views policy implementation as a process defined by 
the implementing level and understands deviation thus not as fault, but as a constituting 
element of the process. While top-down approaches contributed to our understanding of 
the process-character of policy implementation, it was bottom-up approaches that 
brought to light the outstanding role of decisions by implementers. In the following I will 
                                                     
13 Some scholars group policy formulation and decision making together, since clear separation 
between both is “very often impossible” (Jann, Wegrich 2007, p. 48). 
14
 The policy cycle is an approach to structure the policy process into different stages. Some 
scholars subdivide and extend the original seven phases into up to 18 stages (e.g. Dror 1983). However, 
probably since too small subdivisions often lack in analytical clarity most models of the policy cycle limit the 
number of phases to less than ten, as Parson’s (1995, pp. 78–79) overview shows. As a heuristic device it 
helps policy analysts to move beyond single institutions and to perceive policies as a continuous and 
cumulative process rather than as static objects (Parsons 1995). Despite the criticism towards this approach 
for assuming unrealistic sequences, for lacking explanatory elements, for suspecting goal orientation of all 
policies, for ignoring elements that do not contribute to problem solving such as rituals or symbolic policies, 
and for expecting an idealized cyclical process where policy evaluations directly inform new policies 
(Nakamura 1987) the policy cycle is still a tool that is commonly used to frame specific theories and to 
“communicate” between the specific approaches (Jann, Wegrich 2007, p. 57). 
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review the bottom-up approach to policy analysis in contrast to the top-down approach, 
before I will discuss the need to re-evaluate and further develop the bottom-up approach. 
Top-down approaches 
Top-down approaches define implementation as “what develops between the 
establishment of an apparent intention on the part of the government to do something, 
or to stop doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action” (O'Toole 2000, 
p. 266). Theorists and empirical researchers from this approach aim at understanding the 
factors that contribute to observed differences between government intentions and 
outcomes. Pressman and Wildavsky (1979 (1973)) found that the policy implementation 
process includes bargaining processes at specific “decision making points”. Top-down 
implementation scholars who aim at smoothening the process thus regularly recommend 
to reduce the number of veto points (Pressman, Wildavsky 1979 (1973)), to write clear 
scenarios (Bardach 1977), to formulate statutes that precisely define problems and assign 
responsibilities (Sabatier, Mazmanian 1981), to adjust statutes to the respective context 
(Ingram, Schneider 1990), and to wisely choose suitable steering instruments (Hood 1983; 
Salamon, Elliott 2002; Hood 2007; John 2011; Le Galès 2011). 
Studies from a top-down approach contributed to our understanding that policy 
implementation is more than a simple putting into practice of policies, that it involves 
bargaining and interests, and that implementation processes are often beyond the 
control of the agencies that formulate policies. However, several assumptions of the “top-
downers” have been criticized for creating unrealistic functionalities and for the inability 
to capture the internal processes and motivations that lead to resistance by the 
implementing agencies. Nakamura (1987, pp. 147–149) argues that top-down approaches 
are unable to explain policy implementation under vague policies, policy changes or in 
non-hierarchical environments. Especially the advice by top-downers to reduce veto 
points, their hope for a “game fixer” with unlimited power (Bardach 1977), and the 
recommendations for general hierarchical tightening have all been seen not only as 
unfruitful but also as a barrier to understanding the necessity of changes in policy 
intentions during implementation (Barrett, Fudge 1981; Hall, McGinty 1997). 
Bottom-up approaches 
Bottom-up approaches differ from top-down approaches in several aspects. Top-
down and bottom-up approaches both acknowledge the divergences that policies meet 
through implementation, but the latter perspective turns the analysis of implementation 
“upside down” (Winter 2006, p. 153). While top-downers stress those factors that are 
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within the control of policy makers, bottom-up approaches focus on those factors that 
policy makers cannot directly influence: the knowledge and abilities of problem solving as 
well as the bargaining powers at the local level. When top-down theorists view these 
influences as frauds to hierarchy, bottom-uppers see implementation as a set of 
dispersed and decentralized processes in which complexity and deviation is not only the 
standard but also a source for outcome improvement (Elmore 1979, p. 607). Continued 
negotiations and bargaining between policy-makers and implementers become 
productive ways to improve policies. In this sense, top-downers were challenged by the 
call to replace the focus on “conformance” in the sense of forced implementation with 
the criterion of “performance” in the sense of mutual and consensual reaching of 
agreements on output goals (Barrett, Fudge 1981). This perspective has been uphold ever 
since by defenders of the bottom-up approach who claim that today’s policy analysis still 
needs to internalize this shift (Barrett 2004). 
Elmore (1979) describes under the term “backward mapping” the general 
approach of bottom-uppers to policy analysis. Starting from the observed behavior of 
actors in light of a specific problem, the researcher asks for the factors that inform this 
behavior. According to Elmore (1979, p. 612), these factors are to be found at 
“organizational operations” by “those organizational units and coalitions that have the 
greatest likelihood of delivery-level performance”. Implementation analysts under this 
perspective focus on behavior of implementers (measured as output15) rather than merely 
comparing policy intentions with outcome (Winter 2006). 
Taking up the shortcomings of the top-down approach, a competing approach 
gained momentum in the 1970s and 80s to explain implementation processes from a 
different perspective as “a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, 
between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends” 
(Barrett, Fudge 1981, p. 4). The implementation process has thus “no clear, decisive end 
point” (Elmore 1979, p. 611), but is rather an outcome of constant interactions between 
diverse actors. The contributions of researchers such as Lipsky (1980)), Elmore (1979), 
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 John (2011, p. 4) defines outputs as “what policy systems produce in the form of laws, financial 
decisions, organizational changes, new rules and so on, which are designed to achieve an objective.” Policy 
outcomes, by contrast, he defines as “the consequences of these intended – and sometimes unintended – 
decisions, which are desirable state of affairs.” Referring specifically to implementation, Lane and Errson 
(2000, p. 60) specify that “‘outputs’ refers to measures decided by and implemented within a political 
system, while ‘outcomes’ stands for the consequences of these outputs within as well as outside the 
political system”. In some cases, however, the distinction between input, output, and outcome might be 
blurred. For instance, changes in financial indicators in relation to a specific policy might be analyzed as 
changes in resources provided for policies (input), as tokens that reflect the actions by fund providers 
(outputs) as well as the intended or unintended results of policies (outcome) (see further examples in Hill, 
Hupe 2009, p. 9 and in Lane, Ersson 2000, p. 61). 
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Barrett and Fudge (1981), and Hull and Hjern (1987) received the label “bottom-up 
approaches” due to their unifying focus on the power of the “implementing” or “lower” 
level to shape policies altogether. These early contributions have been further fine-tuned 
for a range of policies such as social service policies (Evans 2010), school policies (Elmore 
2004) or general administration (Sossin 1993). 
Combinations and re-evaluations 
After years of division between top-down and bottom-up approaches (Blum, 
Schubert 2011) scholars have set out to develop theories that combine insights of both 
approaches by acknowledging the rules and regulations as well as the behavior of 
implementers. These “third generation approaches” (DeLeon 1999) often take 
environment and context as additional factors that define actor’s behavior. Matland’s 
(1995) approach, for instance, sees actors’ policy implementation decisions defined by 
resources, power, contextual conditions, and coalition strength, which combine to a 
matrix of conflict and ambiguity. This approach points to the necessity to combine both 
context and decisions, but lacks in explaining the mechanisms between those variables. 
The “multiple governance framework” proposed by Hill and Hupe (2009) similarly 
introduces a perspective that differs along the “organizational structure” and the 
“individual”, but that also lacks in understanding the relation between both. 
However, since according to Winter (2006) creating a single all-embracing 
implementation theory is rather utopian16 the focus now should be on specifying how 
individual variables interact under specific frameworks. The street-level bureaucracy 
framework, for instance, contains already notions of the binding character of institutions. 
An analytical focus on these institutions with the support of insights from actor-focused 
institutionalism can thus establish a framework that contains both the structuring 
mechanisms of institutions and the effects of implementers’ behavior on implementation. 
2.1.2 Implementation decisions by street-level bureaucrats in state agencies 
The bottom-up perspective focuses on implementers since implementers’ 
interest-driven decision making shapes the implementation process and thus the outputs 
of policies. In the following I will present constituting characteristics of three elements: 
street-level bureaucrats, institutional contexts for decision making, and patterns of 
practice. 
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 Approaches such as the one by Berkhout and Wielemans (1999) that, under the aim of including 
all possible variables result rather in confusion than in explaining relations, show that reduction is necessary. 
As Matland (1995, p. 146) remarks: “A literature with three hundred variables doesn’t need more variables: 
It needs structure.” 
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Street-level bureaucrats in state service agencies 
The notion of “street-level bureaucracy” can be seen as the main point of 
reference in the bottom-up approach. It was praised for shedding light on the “real world” 
(Evans, Harris 2004, p. 872) as opposed to the normative ideas of top-down theorists. 
Developed famously by Lipsky (1980) this framework argues that policy implementation is 
determined by patterns of practices that are based on implementers’ discretionary 
decisions. Policy implementers’ beliefs, motivations, and interests are thus main drivers 
for policy implementation, but the scope for decisions is again determined by institutional 
settings. The variety of “multiple, sometimes competing sources of influence” (Meyers, 
Vorsanger 2003, p. 251) creates dilemmas for street-level implementers.  
According to the bottom-up approach individuals in implementation agencies 
have a political role in assigning the allocation and distribution of resources. Elmore (1979, 
p. 612) describes the importance of implementers in light of policies: “Policy can direct 
individuals’ attention toward a problem and provide them an occasion for the application 
of skill and judgment, but policy cannot itself solve problems.” Barrett and Fudge 
summarize that this approach “sees implementers not as passive agents on the receiving 
end of policy, but as semi-autonomous groups actively pursuing their own goals and 
objectives” (Barrett, Fudge 1981, p. 23). 
Lipsky (1980) coined the term “street-level bureaucrat” to describe implementers 
such as police officers, social workers, or teachers, who as social service providers are in 
close contacts to citizens or clients. As professionals they are bound to professional 
standards of client orientated service-provision. 
 On the other side, when these service providers work at public institutes or 
agencies such as in the police service, hospitals, or schools they are also part of the local 
government. As bureaucrats they are bound to administrative hierarchies under the local 
government administration. They are agents of the state and thus advocate state policy 
goals. Through their supervisors at the implementational organizations they are also the 
most localized arm of government. Evaluation mechanisms connect them with local 
government agencies. 
This double role as bureaucrats in government agencies and as service providers 
to clients constitutes a basic dilemma of street-level bureaucrats when policy goals of 
government differ from and clients’ expectations, as Lipsky further argues. On the one 
side, street-level bureaucrats are bound to implement state policies, but on the other side 
they are required to consider clients’ needs. Being caught in between interests of the 
state and interests of the clients this dilemma shapes street-level bureaucrats’ daily work. 
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On the other side street-level bureaucrats gain strength within the 
implementation process from their expert knowledge. Similar to other “bureaucrats” in 
Weber’s sense their knowledge on the field provides them with advantages over 
politicians,17 but their professional training in service professions such as in medicine or 
teaching potentiates this knowledge. 
Actions of street-level bureaucrats matter in several ways. Firstly, street-level 
implementers’ decisions affect policy implementation largely since the behavior of 
individuals adds up to organizational behavior (Winter 2006, p. 153). As public service 
provision takes up large amounts of state budgets and affects directly the lives of citizens, 
street-level bureaucratic behavior becomes an important factor in determining the 
conditions of citizens’ livelihood. Furthermore, policy formulators react to social problems 
often with establishing more posts for street-level bureaucrats. Lipsky (1980, p. 7), 
referring to problems of equal access to social services, argues: “It is far easier and less 
disruptive to develop employment for street-level bureaucrats than to reduce income 
inequality.” Secondly, the behavior of street-level bureaucrats also affects state-society 
relations. Citizens perceive public service programs through state agents and evaluate 
services on basis of these agents’ fairness and responsiveness to their problems (Lipsky 
1980). Thirdly, the decisions of street-level bureaucrats as located at the nexus between 
central and local requirements adjust policies and thus increase potential outcomes (Cline 
2000, p. 554). In this respect street-level bureaucrats have not only “considerable agency 
during implementation” (Malen 2006, p. 97), but can, with some exaggeration, be seen as 
the real “makers” of policies (Lipsky 1980, p. 9). 
Interests 
The role of street-level bureaucrats as bureaucrats and professional service 
deliverers to clients at the same time determines also the interests of this specific actor 
group. Scharpf (1997, p. 21) argues that since human action “occurs in social 
organizations and organizational roles (institutionally and culturally defined) with clearly 
structured responsibilities and competencies and with assigned resources that can be 
used for specific purposes only” actions within these roles must be explained “with 
reference to cultural and social definitions of the role and to the institutionalized rules 
associated with its proper performance.” Scholars of street-level implementation 
(e.g.Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody, Leland 2000; Meyers, Vorsanger 2003) have 
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 The dominance of administrative tasks in policy implementation makes bureaucrats to experts. 
In Weber’s (1994 (1946), p. 18) terminology: “The ‘political master’ finds himself in the position of the 
‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert’.” 
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established that there are at least four factors that motivate street-level bureaucrats’ 
interests. Firstly, street-level bureaucrats as individuals aim at making their own job 
comfortable and at maximizing own profits and personal gratification. Secondly, however, 
street-level bureaucrats are also part of bureaucratic hierarchy and thus need to adhere 
to superiors. Thirdly, street-level bureaucrats as professionals in, for instance, care-taking, 
policing, or teaching are bound to their professions’ norms and beliefs on objectives and 
suitability of treatments. Finally, as street-level workers regularly work closely with clients, 
street-level bureaucrats might also have the interest to satisfy clients’ expectations and 
needs. 
street-level bureaucrats are caught in a dilemma when these interests conflict 
with each other, when policies lack in sufficient implementation means (financial, time, 
human resources), or when policy goals are unclear or even contradicting. On the one 
side, they are bound to policy goals and hierarchies, on the other side these goals often 
stand in contrast to clients’ needs. As service to both interests is restrained by limited 
resources, the work of street-level level bureaucrats is characterized by a contestant 
dilemma that they regularly have to “work with inadequate resources in circumstances 
where the demand will always increase to meet the supply of services” (Lipsky 1980, 
p. 81). Under this dilemma street-level workers try to seek practices that support them in 
reducing workloads, improving services, and meeting the demands of both clients and 
superiors. 
Decisions and practices 
Implementers pursue various strategies18 to serve these interests inside and 
outside the bureaucratic arena. According to Malen (2006), who builds up on Bardach 
(1977), implementers might choose inside the bureaucratic arena one of the following 
strategies: They might shift the goals of policies, adopt them merely superficially, or 
select only parts of policies for implementation; they might ration and husband limited 
resources or use resources for other goals than formulated in policies; they might 
dissipate own energies by slowing down processes or by excluding clients from services; 
they might engage in bargaining processes with their superiors over policy 
implementation. Outside the bureaucratic arena street-level bureaucrats might appeal to 
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 Malen (2006, p. 88) defines “strategies” as the “efforts to exert influence”. Some authors (e.g. 
Bardach 1977) call these strategies “games“ to describe choices of bureaucrats in bargaining situations in a 
“dynamic interplay of influence among diverse actors” (Malen 2006, p. 104). However, due to the potential 
confusion with analytical methods of game theory I avoid the term “games” at this point altogether.  
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legislation or judicial authorities or they might build coalitions with civil society, for 
example by joining public protests (see Table 2). 
Bureaucratic arena Examples of strategies Results 
inside division of resources 
husbanding resources 
superficial adaptation 
shifting goals 
selecting policy parts for implementation 
dissipating energy 
dilution 
appropriation 
outside appealing to higher legislation and judiciary 
coalition building with societal actors 
nullification 
amplification 
Table 2: Examples of implementers’ implementation strategies, after Malen (2006) and Bardach (1977)) 
Under these strategies street-level bureaucrats constantly have to make decisions. 
In order to simplify their decisions they develop “patterns of practice” as routines. These 
patterns “tend to limit demand, maximize the utilization of available resources, and 
obtain client compliance over and above the procedures developed by their agencies” 
(Lipsky 1980, p. 83). Street-level bureaucrats, for instance, might ration services to clients, 
they might reserve resources for those clients who they perceive as most likely to react to 
treatments, they might husband resources for later usage, or they might change their 
expectations towards their own work and towards their clients (Lipsky 1980).19 
These strategies can lead to policy nullification, amplification, dilution, or 
appropriation. Top-down implementation researchers such as Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1979 (1973)) or Bardach (1977) focus especially on outcomes that they see as 
disturbance of policy intentions, a perspective that has been called “misery research” (Hill, 
Hupe 2009, p. 75). However, several newer studies from the bottom-up perspective have 
exemplified that the strategies by street-level bureaucrats lead also to policy 
improvements as measured for example in client satisfaction (Maynard-Moody, Leland 
2000). These studies have studies have shown that decisions by street-level bureaucrats 
can lead to appropriation of policies especially when policy goals are unclear or 
contradicting, when they lack implementation means, or when they lack in clear 
assignment of responsibilities (Winter 2006). 
2.1.3 Institutions in street-level policy implementation 
In the previous sections I have elaborated on the decision making by street-level 
bureaucrats as an integral part of social policy implementation. However, the position of 
street-level bureaucrats and their options to effect implementation is defined by 
institutional settings. Norms of expected behavior of street-level bureaucrats, but also 
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 Sometimes these different strategies overlap. Social service workers studied by Maynard-Moody 
and Leland (2000), for example, developed methods to evaluate the worthiness of investments to clients by 
testing clients’ responses to small scale treatments before they decided to offer services and rationed 
resources until they saw success of treatment. 
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regulated accountability measures define the spaces for individual decisions. I argue that 
policy analysis from a bottom-up approach of looking at decisions by street-level 
bureaucrats can benefit from combining the actor-centered perspectives of decision 
making with an institutional analysis of the settings that define the spaces for this 
decision making. With this inclusion of those institutions that govern discretion at state 
agencies, the state, which was somewhat beyond the focus of Lipsky’s original framework 
of analyzing implementers’ decisions, enters the analysis again as a precondition for 
understanding the position of implementing agencies, especially in political systems 
where these agencies are closely bound to state directives (such as the case of China, 
which will be discussed in depth in chapter 3). In the following paragraphs I will thus 
outline some approaches to actor-centered institutionalisms before I will introduce with 
more depth into the spaces for discretionary decision making provided by accountability 
measures. 
Actor-centered perspectives on institutions 
Institutions define the scope in which decision making at street-level happens. 
New institutionalists in political sciences, after the early configurational approaches and 
the behavioralist turn in the middle of the 20th century, seek to redefine both the roles of 
institutions and actors.20 Scott (2008, p. 6) formulates: 
 “Current institutionalists do not call for a return to ‘configurational history’, but do seek to 
reestablish the importance of normative frameworks and rule systems in guiding, constraining, and 
empowering social and political behavior.” 
One of the main differences in the broad variety of new institutionalisms rests in 
“the role which they allow for human agency” (Peters 2005, p. 158). Actor-centered 
approaches to institutionalism, such as the varieties proposed by Scharpf (1997)21 and 
Ostrom (1982; 2005; 2007), define the roles of actors as strong but analyze their scope of 
actions against the background of institutions.22 Scharpf (1997, p. 34) declares that his 
own approach 
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 The resurgence of institutionalism in the 70s and 80s has been said to have developed as a 
consequence of rising importance of “modern” social, political, and economic institutions (March, Olsen 
1984, p. 734). However, it also developed as a re-evaluation and further development of former approaches 
in institutionalism (Scott 2008). 
21
 Fritz Scharpf and Renate Mayntz cooperatively formulated and published the “actor-centered 
institutionalism” initially in 1995 (Mayntz, Scharpf 1995), but Scharpf developed this concept in full depth 
only in his book from 1997. 
22
 This literature treats institutions as independent variables that determine actors’ behavior. The 
opposite question of how actors’ behavior shapes institutions has been dealt with elsewhere (e.g. Ostrom 
2007). 
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“gives equal weight to the strategic actions and interactions of purposeful and resourceful 
individuals and corporate actors and to the enabling, constraining, and shaping effects of given 
(but variable) institutional structures and institutionalized norms.” 
Institutions in this approach are sources of structure. Scott’s (2008, p. 48) 
definition indicates this structuring element of institutions: 
“Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together 
with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.” 
Through this structuring function institutions also indicate the possibilities for 
interests, decisions, and actions of actors, as Scharpf (1997, p. 41) formulates: “Once we 
know the institutional setting of interaction, we know a good deal about the actors 
involved, about their options, and about their perceptions and preferences.” 
Institutions rarely prescribe only one option for actors, but they “leave 
considerable scope for the strategic and tactical choices by purposeful actors” (Scharpf 
1997, p. 42). This institutional scope of choices defines also the scope of tolerated, 
requested, or limited behavior of implementation agents. Hornberger (2002) and Johnson 
(2009) both term the space defined by the institutional settings and the specific policies 
as “implementational space” that is “opened up” by institutions and that can be filled by 
implementers with actions and meaning. Institutions that define the borders of this space 
have thus an enabling, but also a limiting character for implementers. The choice of 
instruments can affect this space, since instruments define “the extent of legitimate 
coercion” (Howlett, Ramesh 2003, p. 195) from compulsory to voluntary with a broad 
range of mixed shapes in between. 
However, as approaches that focus on the relation between institutions and 
actors are rather heuristics devices than theories that would produce law-like 
generalizations, the specific effects of institutional settings on actor behavior must be 
examined against the individual cases. Scharpf (1997, pp. 29–32) writes that his approach 
produces modules of possible relations, but that the connections remain theoretically 
unclear unless they are situated in real-world settings defined at the macro-level of 
political systems. 
Discretion and accountability 
Two concepts of this “real world” of institutions are especially relevant for street-
level bureaucratic implementation decisions: discretion and accountability. Both concepts 
have been much discussed and their evaluation has been a distinguishing difference 
between top-down and bottom-up approaches (see literature review chapter). With the 
discussion on the shift from a traditional bureaucratic paradigm to “New Public 
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Management” modes of governing, the question of how much discretionary power 
bureaucracies ought to have erupted once more.23 As Lipsky (1980, pp. 15–16) has 
already put it in his early writings: “The search for the correct balance between 
compassion and flexibility on the one hand, and impartiality and rigid rule-application on 
the other hand presents a dialectic of public service reform.” 
Discretion is a principle that allows leeway for agencies that are situated within 
ministerial structures. Different to the concept of autonomy that describes a distance of 
agencies that are independent and disaggregated from the ministerial bureaucracy and 
that have the legitimacy and reputation to decide on own issues (Carpenter 2001, p. 16), 
discretion means here the capability of bureaucratic agencies to individualize policies 
within a given leeway. It “consist of the departure of agency decisions from the positions 
agreed upon by the executive and legislature at the time of delegation and appointment” 
(Calvert et al. 1989, p. 589). At the same time, however, it is still “part of a contractual 
arrangement between politicians and an agency that they establish” (Carpenter 2001, 
p. 17).  
This leeway expressed in an arrangement is thus relational to the degree of 
supervision by higher agencies and the legislature. The relationship between “dilettante” 
and “expert” in Weber’s terminology (see above) requires discretionary decision making 
by executive actors. Even under governance in the sense of including more actors into 
provision and evaluation of public services, the importance of bureaucratic expert 
knowledge is far from vanishing (Le Galès 2011). 
The street-level bureaucracy framework argues that discretion is an inevitable 
element of policy implementation. Lipsky (1980, p. 15) writes that “certain characteristics 
of the jobs of street-level bureaucrats make it difficult, if not impossible, to severely 
reduce discretion.” He argues that discretion can be found in all areas where street-level 
workers need to make decisions beyond handbooks and that require adjustments to 
individual clients. Elmore summarizes that discretion should be seen as a “device for 
improving the reliability and effectiveness of policies at the street level” (Elmore 1979, 
p. 610). Evans and Harris (2004) argue that the professionalism of street-level workers 
justifies defending discretionary power of these actors against new paradigms of 
managerialism. 
Discretion, however, is not to be confused with a complete absence of rules, but is 
bound to accountability towards higher echelons, clients, or the general public. 
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 For a detailed discussion on the historical roots of the involved paradigms see Lynn (2001) and 
Meier and Krause (2003). 
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Accountability “functions when those who are delegated authority have to account for 
what they are doing with this authority or responsibility” (OECD 2011a, p. 78). It can be 
directed towards higher echelons (vertical accountability) or towards peers or other 
stakeholders in society (horizontal accountability) (Hooge et al. 2012). For street-level-
bureaucrats supervision by higher echelons (“administrators”),24 internalized professional 
codices (“occupational norms”), and evaluation by clients and the general public 
(“community norms”) all can limit the scope for discretion (Lipsky 1980). 
Nevertheless, accountability can never be absolute. According to Lipsky (1980, 
p. 159) modes of accountability are restrained by at least three caveats. Firstly, 
administrative control reaches its limits when superiors rely on information that can only 
be provided by those levels that are to be evaluated or when the complexity of social 
work prohibits standardization of evaluation criteria. Secondly, in cases of contradictory 
policy goals, accountability is in danger of resulting in symbolic or irrelevant action. 
Thirdly, in cases where satisfaction with social service provision could be only evaluated 
by clients, higher levels face the difficulty of systematically transforming these subjective 
evaluations into objective evaluation systems. Lipsky (1980, p. 17) argues that 
administrators are interested in achieving results in line with policy goals and agency 
goals, but that street-level workers are generally interested in minimizing workloads and 
maximizing personal gratifications. With regard to management, Lipsky further claims 
that administrators generally favor hierarchical structures, whereas service providers at 
the delivery level strive for larger discretion in decision making. 
In sum, discretion and accountability must be seen as two sides of one coin. They 
define a flexible space rather than an absolute status. In the words by Evans and Harris 
(2004, p. 876) this space is “not an all-or-nothing thing”, but consists of multiple 
dimensions of bargaining based on factors such as the distinct institutional settings in 
bureaucratic administration, the characteristics of the profession, the level of 
specification of tasks, and the ideological perceptions of the need for steering discretion 
at the ground. For street-level bureaucrats accountability measures define spaces for 
implementation decisions. Analysis of decision making within implementation processes 
must thus incorporate these dimensions.  
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 These practices of hierarchical control of bureaucrats contain “the mechanisms and instruments 
used by the government to intentionally influence the decisions and the behavior of the agency in order to 
achieve government objectives” as materialized in “hierarchical, market-like, and/or network based” 
control techniques either before implementational decision making (rule setting, approval requirement etc.) 
or after (monitoring, sanctions etc.) (Lægreid, Verhoest 2010, pp. 4–5). 
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2.1.4 Intermediate summary: Viewing actor decisions against institutional 
background 
The concepts outlined above indicate that firstly decisions by implementers at 
street-level have tremendous effects on the policy implementation process, on outputs, 
and outcomes. Scholarship from the bottom-up approach has since long found that policy 
implementation is not a linear process of transforming policies into outcomes, but that 
through a complex set of sub-processes implementers adjust, shape, and even “make” 
policies. The decisions by street-level bureaucrats, as Lipsky has called policy 
implementers in social service delivery, shape thus not only the outcomes of specific 
policies, but they also determine how government agencies serve clients and how citizens 
view the state that provides these services. Secondly, however, the concepts outlined 
here also indicate that the actions by street-level implementers are shaped by 
institutional settings. Lipsky (1980) interprets decision making by street-level bureaucrats 
as a process under dilemmas between orientation towards superiors, towards clients, and 
towards own interests, but these dilemmas exist only insofar as institutional settings 
allow for several options. The spaces for discretionary decision making created by 
institutions are thus major factors in the policy implementation process. 
An analytical model that combines analysis of actor decisions with the institutional 
background for decision making must be able to grasp the interactions between both. In 
this model implementation is seen as a process located between policy formulation and 
the policy outcome, that s made up of street-level bureaucrats’ decisions.  The model 
views the institutional environment that surrounds actors as a combination of specific 
settings of accountability that shape the discretionary space for decision making.  
However, scholarships on implementation (see for instance the overviews in 
Matland 1995, DeLeon 1999, Winter 2006, and Hill, Hupe 2009) has also indicated that 
there is not a single “implementation theory” that could cover implementation under all 
settings, and instead there is a need to specify analytical frameworks for particular policy 
fields in order to establish models that reflect relations and processes of “real-world 
choice situations” (Scharpf 1997, pp. 5, 32). In the next chapter I will operationalize these 
considerations for school-based decision making on the implementation of minority 
language curriculum polices, before I will conclude with a combined model of curriculum 
policy implementation by school-based decisions. In the summary of this chapter I will 
outline this model. 
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2.2 Operationalization: School-based decision making on minority 
language policy  
Implementation of education policies, and specifically implementation of 
curriculum policies, is a suitable field to study the effects of institutions on decisions by 
street-level bureaucratic implementers in several aspects. Firstly, due to the specifics of 
the teaching process that rests on the close interaction between students and teachers 
and on students’ pre-existing knowledge curriculum policies cannot be implemented 
without adapting learning goals and methods to students’ knowledge and of the learning 
environment (McLaughlin 1991). A bottom-up perspective for curriculum implementation 
analysis is therefore suitable to grasp how implementers’ actions  change the adaptations 
of curriculum policy (Snyder et al. 1992). Secondly, institutional settings at schools 
provide specific conditions for decisions by implementers that allow grasping behavior of 
street-level bureaucrats in an outstanding way. A plethora of institutional settings that 
govern implementation of policies at schools, such as assessment measures, funding 
instruments, or regulative tools define school staff as “bureaucrats”. At the same time, 
however, close contacts to students and professional ethics of school staff position 
teachers and school administrators as service-providers who work for their clients at 
school (Weatherley, Lipsky 1977). 
School-based decision making on minority language education is an area where 
the framework of implementers’ decision making can be studied extensively. Not only are 
“events at the school level […] critical to reform implementation” (Datnow 2000, p. 120) 
but especially in ethnic minority language curriculum institutional settings can be 
expected to allow for larger discretionary spaces than in other curriculum policies, as 
minority language education per se aims at adjustment to local needs of students or 
language communities. 
In the following paragraphs I will provide an outline of how relations between 
implementers’ decision making and institutional settings are distinguished in curriculum 
policies in general, and in policies for ethnic minority language education specifically. 
Firstly, I will define the various types of curriculum and curriculum policy implementation 
at school. Secondly, I will outline how institutional settings of school-management, 
especially discretion and accountability, shape the space for school-based decision 
making on curriculum policy implementation. Finally, I will elaborate the role of teachers 
and principals in the implementation process and I will refer to items of school-based 
decision making on curriculum implementation. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to specify the analytical framework towards 
curriculum policy implementation at schools. I will thus outline the principles of 
curriculum polices and the mechanisms of how institutional settings shape these. The 
specific institutions of school and curriculum management in China, however, and the 
actors in minority language education implementation at Chinese schools will be 
introduced only in later chapters. 
2.2.1 Minority language curriculum policies for schools 
Curriculum policy and ethnic minority language curriculum is the enacted tuition 
and its outcome in educational organizations, but at the same time it is also an output of 
educational policies. In the following paragraphs I will define curriculum and its relation 
to policies and policy instruments. 
Curriculum and curriculum policies 
There are various definitions of the term “curriculum”.25 Walker (2002, p. 5) , for 
instance, defined curriculum as “a particular way of ordering content and purposes for 
teaching and learning in schools”. Porter and Smith (2001) distinguish four types of 
curricula: the intended curriculum as written down in curriculum standards, guidelines, or 
frameworks; the enacted curriculum that students engage with; the assessed curriculum 
embodies in tests; and the learned curriculum as achievements and knowledge that 
students gain during their studies. Additionally, curriculum can be also distinguished 
according to the location where it is “made”. Kärkkäinen (2012) distinguishes between 
central-level curriculum and school-based curriculum. In her definition the central-level 
curriculum refers to the decisions made at the national and the local levels of government, 
whereas school-based curriculum refers to decisions made at school level by individual 
staff, school boards, or local community committees. Both curricula affect each other, 
and especially the set-up of the central-level curriculum has the potential to shape the 
space for school-based curricula. The central-level curriculum can define “the content of 
education by indicating aims, content areas and minimum attainment targets with 
guidelines and examples of interpretation […] and teachers’ practices”, but it can also 
merely “describe general objectives and educational practices leaving significant room for 
curriculum decision making by schools and teachers” (Kärkkäinen 2012, p. 11).  
Summarizing these distinctions, I understand curriculum policy here as a product 
of allocating authority and distributing influence over curriculum decisions (Elmore, Sykes 
1992, p. 203) and as “an integral part of general educational planning and governance” 
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 See for instance the diverse understandings of curriculum collected in Pinar et al. (1995).  
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(Walker 2002, pp. 124–125), whereas I understand the implementation of these policies 
as a process of policy adaptation by school personnel in all types of the above outlined 
curriculum. Analysis of curriculum policy implementation will thus focus on bargaining, 
adaptation, and decision making in this process.26 
Policy formulators use a variety of instruments to shape the content of curricula. 
Schwille et al. (1983) list six types of curriculum policies: standard and guideline policies, 
student testing policies, time allocation policies, student placement policies, textbook 
policies, and teacher qualification policies. Elmore and Sykes (1992) provide examples of 
more specific instruments. Mandates, understood as “rules governing the action of 
individuals and agencies”, for instance, require schools to offer specific courses. 
Inducements, the “transfer of money to individuals and agencies in return for certain 
actions” provide funds to schools in order to adopt a specific curriculum. Capacity 
building, the “transfer of money for investments in material, intellectual, or human 
resources directed to long-term production of desired results” can be found in funding 
university programs to develop new curricula. The “transfer of authority among 
individuals and agencies in order to alter the nature of societal relationships by which 
public goods and services are produced”, finally, can, for example, establish independent 
teacher training centers that support teachers and develop materials (all quotes Elmore, 
Sykes 1992, p. 191). 
It has been said that the higher the level of prescription, consistency, authority, 
and power, the stronger those instruments are in implementation, but it has also been 
said that the strength of these policy instruments also depends on the congruency with 
institutions such as laws, professional education norms, and the possibility of teacher 
participation in the development of curricula (Schwille et al. 1983). Others argue that 
curriculum instruments develop strength when the approaches are consistent throughout 
the complete implementation process (Ogawa et al. 2003). 
Minority language education curriculum 
Curriculum in minority languages27 combines the three measures language policy 
status planning, corpus planning, and acquisition planning. Specific multilingual 
curriculum policies aim at creating as many spaces as possible for multilingual settings in 
schools under the goal to shift language paradigms from monolingual towards 
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 Malen’s (2006, pp. 83–84) statement that educational policies “tend to be adopted and 
implemented through political processes that reflect the relative power of contending groups more than 
the relative merits of policy options” supports this strong role of political bargaining in curriculum policies. 
27
 See definition of minority language education in chapter 1. 
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multilingual paradigms (Hornberger 2002, p. 42), but they also depend on what has been 
described by Hornberger (2002) as a multilayered “ecology”, such as language usage in 
different domains or policy goals such national unity. They affect concepts of inclusion, 
exclusion, assimilation, and diversifiction (Creese 2010), but also issues of minority rights 
(Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson 1995b) and protection of cultures (Sasse 1992). 
In its design minority language education can follow a diversity of goals, models, 
and means. García (2011), with reference to Hornberger (1991), distinguishes between 
four categories that affect the choice of language education in schools. “Linguistic goals” 
indicates the broader outcome of bilingual education in terms of language usage in a 
given society; “direction” distinguishes between the one-way models of language learning 
only by the minority and two-way models of mutual language learning by both the 
minority and the majority speakers; “cultural ecology” refers to the cultural goals of 
bilingual education of shifts either towards to majority culture or to multiculturalism; 
“linguistic orientation”, finally, denotes to the perspective that policy makers use to 
define the issue of multilingualism as problem, right, or resource for society and speakers. 
Combining these categories, García proposes to view bilingual education as embedded in 
four frameworks, the “subtractive-transitional”, the “additive-maintenance”, the 
“recursive-developmental” and the “dynamic-poly-directional” framework (see Table 3). 
 Subtractive-
transitional 
Additive-maintenance 
(enrichment) 
Recursive-
developmental 
(revitalization; 
heritage) 
Dynamic-poly-directional 
linguistic goal monolingual-
monoglossic 
bilingual-monoglossic bilingual-heteroglossic bilingual-heteroglossic 
direction one-way one-way one-way two-way or multiple-way 
cultural ecology 
goal 
monocultural minorities: bicultural 
majorities: monocultural 
bicultural transcultural 
linguistic 
orientation: 
bilingualism as… 
problem resource for minorities right and resource resource for whole society 
Table 3: Frameworks of bilingual education, based on García (2011). 
However, this diversity of possible frameworks indicates two issues. Firstly, the 
concepts and goals of minority language education can differ tremendously. Comparative 
analysis of bilingual and minority language education models throughout the world has 
shown that, there are large differences between countries, languages, and even schools, 
depending on linguistic, ethnic, and social beliefs (Beardsmore 2011; Menken, García 
2010). In the case of China, for instance, ethnic policy making and changing linguistic 
ideologies concerning the value of minority languages have triggered development of a 
variety of general frameworks and specific models, as I will discuss in depth in chapter 4. 
Secondly, on basis of these frameworks, scholars of minority language curriculum 
implementation have pointed to the strong role of implementers at school level in 
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appropriating and in fact “making” minority language policies at schools. Hornberger 
(2002, p. 30) argues that “multilingual policy is essentially about opening up ideological 
and implementational space in the environment” and in a later article she writes that 
these spaces must be “carved out from the bottom up” (Hornberger, Johnson 2007, 
p. 512). Policy instruments, such as the making of curriculum plans that define target 
groups, goals, timing, and exit criteria, the hiring and training of staff, and the publishing 
and delivering of textbooks all determinate the level of standardization of teaching in a 
specific subject (Beardsmore 2011), but the implementation of these instruments depend 
on how actors use the provided spaces. 
2.2.2 Discretion and accountability in school-based decision making 
Activities and decisions on implementation of curriculum policies at school-level 
are, similar to implementation of other policies, determined by the institutional settings 
that define decision making power of actors.28 Elmore and Sykes (1992, p. 192) write: 
“Embedded in any set of curriculum policies […] is a set of implicit or explicit assumptions 
about the allocation of public authority among institutions, public and private.” 
Since public schools are the most localized arm of the state in education provision 
(and especially in Chinese schools, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 3) they are also 
the location where accountability institutions shape implementation processes. Measures 
such as regular evaluations demand adherence to standards defined by policy makers, 
but at the same time, policy implementation at schools also rests on discretionary 
decisions made within schools. The space between discretion and accountability is a 
major location for decision making at schools. 
Discretion and school-based decision making 
The scope for discretionary decision making at school level is determined by the 
degree of decentralization or delegation of authority from educational bureaucracy to 
school-internal actors. Decentralization in educational governance can contain delegation 
of decision making authority to several groups within and outside school. Ferris (1992) 
distinguishes between “administrative decentralization” and “political decentralization”. 
Administrative decentralization, in his understanding, means a shift towards decision 
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 Approaches to study decision making at school level vary between focusing on decisions at the 
school as an entity and focusing on decisions of individuals within schools. Bacharach and colleagues (1990) 
refer to these two approaches as the “single-domain approach” and the “multiple-domain approach”. They 
elaborate that in the single-domain approach “researchers combine all decisions into a single dimension, 
examining participation in decision making as an aggregate organizational characteristic”, whereas 
researchers in the multi-domain approach “adopt the decisions as the unit of analysis and identify several 
domains of decisions” (Bacharach et al. 1990, p. 129). As I investigate with this text into the role of street-
level bureaucrats within schools, I will follow the latter approach. 
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making within schools, whereas political decentralization refers to empowerment of 
parents or the community to govern schools, for example by market-based control or by 
community empowerment. 
Decentralization of educational policy making employs delegation of authority to 
school-level as one instrument in order to raise efficient usage of resources or to 
legitimize policies (Chapman et al. 1999). School-based decision making (sometimes 
called school-based management, see Marsh 2009, pp. 137–138) is “the systematic and 
consistent decentralization to the school level of authority and responsibility to make 
decisions on significant matters related to school operation within a centrally determined 
framework of goals, policies, curriculum and accountabilities” (Hansen, Roza 2005, pp. 2–
3, citing Brian Caldwell 2005). In effect, this means “turning over several aspects of local 
education systems” from politicians to school-level professionals (Odden 1991b, p. 318), 
but it also increases implementers’ opportunities to bargain on policy implementation 
according to their own preferences. 
School-based decision making has been proposed as a means to improve 
educational performance, as it allows the implementing level to use informational 
advantages to adjust policies to the needs of students. Ferris (1992, p. 336) writes that its 
underlying principle is that “those closest to the students are in the best position to judge 
their needs and abilities and, hence, to choose the most suitable methods and 
technologies for successful learning.” Due to the principal-agent problem in policy 
implementation, it can be more costly for central levels, if possible at all, to gather 
information on diverse local conditions at schools in order to make policies, than 
delegating decision making to informed agents at school level (Ferris 1992). School-based 
decision making by implementers can build up on the variety of school-based capacities 
that higher levels do not possess and cannot mandate, such as local expertise, routines, 
resources, and local motivations (McLaughlin 1991). 
However, granting discretionary decision making authority to schools presents a 
“Janus-faced problem of local will [when it] raises the question of who ultimately controls 
the schools: professional teachers […] or political leaders […]” (Odden 1991b, p. 319). 
Decentralization approaches meet conflicts when politicians are unwilling to transfer 
authority, but at the same time they demand problem solutions from schools (McDonnell 
1991). Although delegation of power in educational decision making not necessarily 
reduces the role of state politicians it faces the risk that the interests of school-based 
decision makers differ from politicians’ own interests. In a “trade-off” between potential 
educational gains and the diverging interests of school-based actors politicians can 
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choose to limit decentralization of decision making authority to merely selected issues or 
they can establish accountability systems that allow discretion to specific degrees, but 
relate it to performance measurement (Ferris 1992). 
Accountability 
Accountability systems towards schools limit school-based discretion. As a means 
to counterbalance the principal-agent problem of educational supervision (Ferris 1992) 
accountability in education systems has three purposes: to increase the legitimacy of 
school-based decisions when accountability measures link decisions with achievements in 
school performance systems, to account the quality of educational services (in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency), and to improve services (Hooge et al. 2012, p. 8). 
Accountability systems differ in their general approach of what to evaluate, who is 
eligible as evaluators, and what designs should be used for evaluation. Generally, 
accountability systems vary between vertical approaches, where schools and teachers are 
accountable towards higher echelons of superiors, and horizontal approaches, that focus 
on accountability towards peers and community stakeholders, such as students or 
parents. Vertical approaches can be divided into firstly regulatory approaches that focus 
on school-internal processes measured in compliance with regulations and secondly 
performance approaches that focus on tuition outcomes measured, for instance, in 
students’ test results (Hooge et al. 2012).29 
These accountability systems are often installed top-down, but sometimes they 
are also installed by school personnel themselves. Honig and Hatch (2004) argue that 
schools “craft cohesion” among the school staff in three ways: creating collective decision 
making structures (e.g. establishing school-based management teams), maintaining these 
structures (e.g. providing measures for staff development), and managing information for 
decisions (e.g. setting school goals as formal and informal school rules). All three activities 
serve the purpose of streamlining school staff with school-based strategies and goals. 
Teachers may wish for such accountability. Informal rules and formal standards 
developed by school-based teacher communities, for example, provide guidance for 
decisions under conflicts within schools and they guide the “sense-making” process by 
teachers when they interpret policy goals (Spillane et al. 2002). 
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 Evaluations systems differ further in the specific approaches between status-based evaluations 
that measure a current status of schools compared, for instance, to national averages, and growth-based 
evaluations that measure year-to-year school development of schools. Furthermore, they can vary in terms 
of evaluation sequences and in choice of target groups (e.g. students or teachers) and the set of indicators 
(e.g. subject tests, drop-out rates, retention rates, parental satisfaction, or the equipment of schools with 
teachers and teaching materials) (Figlio, Ladd 2008). 
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Both the vertical and the horizontal evaluation system can result in accountability 
of schools and individuals. Factors of classroom achievements add up to school outcome 
(Creemers 1997, p. 118). Hence, some accountability models of external evaluation 
explicitly target at evaluating teachers, for instance their performance, and choose 
teacher-based sanctions or rewards, such as performance-based promotions and salaries 
(Figlio, Ladd 2008). 
The space for discretionary decision making at schools is defined by the scope of 
accountability, but both mutually reflect each other. Hooge and colleagues (2012, p. 6) 
found that “increased school autonomy often goes hand-in-hand with stronger 
accountability standards”. In this respect, enlarged discretionary decision making 
authority for schools must not be confused with complete school autonomy on the one 
side or with complete community control on the other. Spaces for discretionary decision 
making, by contrast, can be described as a flexible space that allows for specific local 
school-based decisions, that is also limited by measures of school accountability. Both 
school-external and school-internal accountability systems enforce cohesion with policy 
goals, but at the same time they also provide guidance for decision making, uphold 
legitimacy, and may support identity of school staff with school-defined goals. They are 
thus not necessarily and always institutions that schools hesitate to take over, but they 
can also be welcomed by school staff. 
2.2.3 School-based decision making by school personnel 
Educational policies involve a large variety of actors.30 Focusing on the “subset of 
primary policy actors […] that are directly and necessary participating in the making of 
policy choices” (Scharpf 1997, p. 71) school personnel 31  has been termed “visible 
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 Malen provides a non-exhausting list of this “host of ‘visible and hidden’ participants such as 
government officials, educational administrators, teachers, students, parents, community groups, mayors, 
foundations, professional associations, corporations, education reform organizations, policy networks, and 
lay publics” (Malen 2006, p. 86). She divides this wide array of actors into those that are directly involved 
such as service providers and supervisors on the one side and the “’potential partisans’ who may have  an 
interest in the policy area” (Malen 2006, p. 86) on the other side. 
31
 The terms school staff and school personnel are used interchangeably in this text. The OECD 
distinguishes four categories of educational personnel: “i) instructional personnel; ii) professional support 
for students; iii) management/quality control/administration, and iv) maintenance and operations 
personnel” (OECD 2003). In this text I will focus on two groups: teaching (instructional) staff and 
administrative (management) staff. The OECD defines teaching staff (in this thesis summarized as 
“teachers”) as: “professional personnel directly involved in teaching students. The classification includes 
classroom teachers, special-education teachers and other teachers who work with a whole class of students 
in a classroom, in small groups in a resource room, or in one-to-one teaching situations inside or outside a 
regular class. Teaching staff also includes department chairpersons whose duties include some teaching, 
but excludes non-professional personnel who support teachers in providing instruction to students, such as 
teachers’ aides and other paraprofessional personnel” (OECD 2011b, p. 400). Administrative staff refers in 
this thesis to school leaders, and especially to principals (elsewhere called “headmasters” or “head 
teachers”), as these hold “overall responsibility for the operation of an individual school within a wider 
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participants” (Malen 2006, p. 86) and “important stakeholders” (Kärkkäinen 2012, p. 36) 
who can contribute knowledge and experiences to curriculum making, implementation, 
and innovation (Kärkkäinen 2012, pp. 36–37). Studies have pointed to “the significance of 
the actions and choices of teachers” for school change (McLaughlin 1991, p. 151). Odden 
(1991b, p. 307) concludes in his overview on educational implementation research that 
“teacher commitment [is] necessary for successful educational change efforts.” 
Teachers’ and principals’ choices are defined by their roles as street-level 
bureaucrats. Although teachers and principals have different responsibilities and 
decisions to make, the street-level bureaucracy framework sees both groups as caught in 
similar dilemmas between their role as professionals who serve educational needs of 
clients and their roles of bureaucrats entangled in hierarchical structures. In the following 
paragraphs I will present some approaches of grasping how these roles define teachers 
and principals as street-level bureaucrats; how they shape school staff’s interests, beliefs, 
and identities; and finally how this can affect curriculum-related decisions. 
Institutionally defined roles of teachers and principals 
Principals are expected to coordinate tuition and its environment at a school-wide 
level. Under discretionary decision making they can use leadership, trust, or co-operation 
with other school bodies and staff as means to implement decisions (Ferris 1992, p. 340). 
Leithwood and Duke (2004, pp. 106–107), summarizing research on school leadership, list 
ten managerial tasks of school leaders from distributing financial and material resources 
to anticipating predictable problems, to managing the staff and student body. 
Accommodating policies by higher levels “in ways that assist with school improvement 
goals” and “buffering staff as to reduce disruptions to the instruction program” 
(Leithwood, Duke 2004, p. 107) are key managerial tasks that contribute to discretionary 
policy appropriation by school principals. 
Teachers are similarly in a position to accommodate policies, but their tasks are 
less directed to the whole school, but more to the instructional situation of the classroom. 
Instructional leadership, as defined by Leithwood and Duke (2004, p. 96), relates to “the 
behaviors of teachers as they engage in activities directly affecting the growth of 
students”. Teachers can use discretion in classroom-decisions to appropriate 
requirements to their specific students and the specific teaching situation. As many 
authors have argued the teaching profession requires latitude to make discretionary 
                                                                                                                                                                
system run by the central bureaucracy” (Pont et al. 2008, p. 22). In chapter 3 I will further delineate the 
meaning of instructional and administrative staff specifically in China, and in chapter 6 I will investigate into 
the specific positions and responsibilities of school personnel at my case study schools. 
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decisions. Lipsky (1980, p. 15), for instance, argues against instructions for teachers “since 
the philosophy prevails that to a point every child requires a response appropriate to the 
specific learning context”. Ferris (1992, p. 340) writes that “teacher empowerment [is] a 
mechanism to bolster teacher morale and enhance teacher performance and, hence, 
student performance.” 
Internal and external accountability structures define the roles of school staff in 
policy implementation, which at times creates pressures for school staff (Schwille et al. 
1983) . Nevertheless, school-based actors are not merely passive recipients of 
accountability systems, but they also develop strategies to counter these systems. They 
“may wish to avoid accounting for their decisions, practices, and outcomes” and 
according to these preferences they may work to “give accountability relationships a 
symbolic or fake character” (Hooge et al. 2012, p. 17). School staff can, for instance, 
manipulate the pool of students in tests or they can forge test results (Figlio, Ladd 2008). 
According to Ferris (1992) such behavior depends on the design and approach of the 
accountability system. When the measurement, for instance, is deemed problematic or 
when it measures performance that depends on factors such as students’ home learning 
conditions that are beyond the reach of school staff, teachers and principals are more 
likely to resist accountability systems. 
Role-defined interests of teachers and principals 
The double role of teachers and principals as bureaucrats and educational 
professionals shapes different, sometimes conflicting, interests in relation to teaching. As 
bureaucrats, teachers and principals are mandated to stand in for policies decided on 
higher levels, measured by accountability systems. As educational professionals, however, 
their understanding of educational goals might sometimes differ from those policies. 
Demands by parents and students, for instance, can contrast with demands by superiors. 
As individual workers, finally, they might have the interest to reduce workloads and to 
strive for promotion or material benefits. These different roles create dilemmas for both 
principals and teachers when strict policy implementation would counter professional or 
personal interests or when unfunded policy goals stand in contrast to the lack of 
resources at school level (Weatherley, Lipsky 1977). 
Specifically on the issue of minority language education, however, educators 
might have more and specific interests. Ethnicity as a relational concept that individuals 
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use to make decisions32 adds additional layers of interests for street-level bureaucrats at 
schools. Case study research has established that ethnicity plays a strong role in defining 
educators’ interests. Educators’ own language experiences, for instance, might motivate 
them to support students on gaining access to languages (Freeman, Johnson 2010). They 
might have the interest to improve students’ learning or enable students to participate in 
school life through education in minority languages (Hélot 2010). They might also, to 
name a final example, have an interest in promoting a specific language through 
schooling, for instance to revitalize lost languages (Valdiviezo 2010). However, as Creese 
(2010, p. 33) reminds us, researchers should also avoid a “naïve and innocent view” of the 
minority language teachers’ motivations who just might be “tired of just one more 
initiative to change”. These examples indicate that minority language curriculum adds 
complexity to the interests of street-level bureaucrats at schools. In this thesis I will 
investigate into how interests of teachers and principals in minority language education 
depend on these complexities in China.  
The beliefs and understandings of teachers and principals about policies play a 
decisive role in their decision making on implementation. McLaughlin (1991) argues that 
policy success depends on the beliefs of the implementers about the policy. Odden 
(1991b) distinguishes between two types of commitment. A “commitment to try a new 
program”, he declares, can be built before a program starts, for instance, through 
awareness sessions or through respecting teachers’ concerns in the program design. A 
“commitment to a program”, by contrast, emerges only during or after the program by 
teachers’ evaluation of the results of a program. In any case, however, in Odden’s view 
teacher commitment can only develop within the frameworks of teachers’ understanding 
of a policy or a program. Spillane et al. (2002) write that these frameworks depend on 
three issues: implementers “cognitive structures” (e.g. previous knowledge, beliefs, and 
attitudes), their professional and personal situation, and policy signals for interpretation. 
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 In this thesis I will follow Brubaker’s (2002, p. 167) remarks that “ethnicity, race and nation 
should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals — as 
the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded and enduring ‘groups’ encourages us to do — but 
rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms.” Brubaker argues that ethnicity 
can be studied as “practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational 
routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events” (Brubaker 2002, pp. 167–168). In this 
sense, and in reflection of Anderson’s (1991) understanding of the imagined nation, I will see ethnicity of 
school staff here as a current status of imagined and expressed belonging of individuals that affects 
individuals’ decision making. The specific conceptualization of ethnicity by the Chinese state will be 
discussed in chapter 4. 
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Curriculum implementation decisions by teachers and principals 
Decentralization of education policies allows discretionary decisions on curriculum, 
budget, personnel, and school administration (Ferris 1992, p. 338). Curriculum decisions 
can be distinguished between decisions on the content and the pedagogies (Hansen, Roza 
2005). Kärkkäinen (2012) reflects these two dimensions by two questions: The question 
“What should be taught?” describes the content and planning of curriculum. It includes 
decisions on course content, program design, and subject selection. The question “How 
should students be taught?”, by contrast, points to issues of instruction. It covers decision 
making on the selection of methods, textbooks, assessment structures, and periods of 
instruction (Kärkkäinen 2012). 
Teachers’ and principals’ decisions on curriculum can contain a variety of issues. 
Schwille and colleagues (1983) name four fields of teacher decisions concerning 
curriculum content: the time allocated for a subject, the choice of topics, the share of 
content between students, and the definition of achievement goals for students. 
Bacharach and colleagues (1990), refer to 19 areas of school-based decision making from 
classroom assignment to deciding on expenditure (see Table 4). 
Areas of school-based decision making 
1. school assignment 
2. standardized test policies 
3. classroom assignment 
4. grading policies 
5. student assignment 
6. reporting procedures 
7. student removal 
8. student rights 
9. facilities planning 
10. what to teach 
11. budget development 
12. how to teach 
13. expenditure priorities 
14. books available for use 
15. staff hiring 
16. books used 
17. performance evaluation 
18. staff development 
19. student discipline 
Table 4: Areas of school-based decision making (source: Bacharach et al. 1990, p. 136). 
However, these lists of decision making areas must be seen as case-sensitive, as 
they depend not only on the specific institutional setting of a country’s school system, but 
also on the policies in question. For minority language education, for instance, case study 
research has shown that teachers and principals can make specific decisions, such as 
emphasizing the value of minority languages towards students, adjusting their own 
classroom language to the students’ mother tongue, adding language-related 
explanations to content matter, or even prohibiting the use of specific languages in class 
(see examples in Creese 2010; Hélot 2010; Freeman, Johnson 2010). 
Teachers and principals as street-level bureaucrats develop patterns of practice to 
simplify these decisions. In order to fill the spaces provided by policies and institutions 
teachers and principals use “simplification systems” that “provide a set of ‘appropriate’ 
responses to external demands” (Honig, Hatch 2004, p. 20). Pressured by the dilemma of 
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policy demands that exceed their resources in terms of time, energy, or tuition 
equipment, teachers can, for example, engage in rationing educational services or in 
simplifying bureaucratic procedures. Weatherly and Lipsky (1977), for instance, found in 
their study that teachers who were required to assess students’ special education needs 
referred to practices such as rationing the number of assessments, short-circuiting 
bureaucratic forms, or forcing parents to agreements instead of explaining issues. On the 
other side, educators also use strategies to explicate and to justify their own decisions. 
Freeman and Johnson (2010), for instance, found that especially when it comes to 
decisions in minority languages, a heavily disputed issue, teachers and principals also use 
research results for their argumentation for specific models of education. 
Curriculum decisions by school staff can result in policy changes. Teachers’ 
strategies of neglect, adaptation, or resistance, for instance, can result in policy dilution; 
strategies to select policies strategically can lead to policy appropriation; strategies to 
appeal to authorities, to build coalitions with third-parties, or to join public protests may 
result in policy nullification, but they might also result in policy amplification when school 
staff successfully frames policy goals as community benefits (Malen 2006).33 In terms of 
minority language education actions of school-level personnel may not only result in 
appropriation of language policies in the classroom (Freeman, Johnson 2010), but they 
may also unfold effects on the standing of a language in a community and on the 
educational chances of students who speak a specific language, as examples from diverse 
language settings show (Creese 2010; Valdiviezo 2010). 
2.3 Combined analytical framework and transferability to Chinese case 
In this chapter I have elaborated an analytical framework that approaches 
implementation through the bottom-up perspective of the street-level bureaucracy 
framework, but combines it with an institutional perspective on implementational spaces 
provided by the structure of accountability systems. In the following paragraphs I will 
firstly summarize this framework and secondly I will outline questions for transferring this 
framework to the case of China which will guide the specification in the next chapters. 
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 Some research conducted in the US and in Europe showed that teachers’ actions outside 
bureaucratic school organization, e.g. organizing street-protests or joining forces with other societal groups, 
successfully affected legislation (McClure 1991; Fullan 2007; Shipps 2003). However, these actions require 
conscious and concerted efforts and are thus often not only reduced to single issues, but limited to those 
institutional settings where organized action is a possible option. Malen (2006, p. 103) writes that these 
influences often “may be more an ideological ideal than an empirical reality” and concludes that policy 
dilution and appropriation as strategies within the bureaucratic arena are more likely outcomes in schools 
than nullification and amplification as strategies outside the bureaucratic arena. 
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2.3.1 School-based decision making in curriculum policy implementation 
Scholarship on implementation has produced several frameworks and approaches 
to policy implementation. The bottom-up perspective, as I have indicated in this chapter, 
is a useful approach to view policy implementation as a process that is directed by street-
level implementers’ decisions. These implementers’ specific position in hierarchical 
systems, that on the one side bind them to state directives, but on the other side also call 
for local diversity and discretion, shape decisions on policy implementation. However, 
scholarship has also shown that the variables that define the space for discretionary 
decisions by implementers depend on case-specific institutional settings, such as 
accountability systems and professional norms. In police work, teaching, or nursing, as 
examples mentioned by Lipsky, street-level bureaucrats are all required to make decisions, 
but the space to do so differs between the various fields of social service provision. 
With this chapter I have introduced a combined framework for school-based 
decision making in curriculum policy implementation, which allows for analysis of 
implementers’ decision making against the institutional settings of the specific policy field 
of educational policy. This framework focuses on the implementation process between 
curriculum policies and their corresponding policy instruments on the one side and the 
outcomes of teaching at schools. It views the implementation thus as a process with 
policy inputs and outcomes, but at the same time this process is shaken, defined, and 
“made” by school personnel’s decisions and their simplifying “patterns of practice” 
(Figure 1 visualizes this process).  
Decisions and patterns of practice by school-personnel in implementing 
curriculum at school-level are seen as intervening factor in this process. Decisions by 
school-staff concerning curriculum elements such as teaching methods, assignment goals, 
and the usage of teaching materials have a key position, as they affect all stages of 
curriculum from the intended to the learned curriculum. 
However, in this framework school-based decisions are embedded in 
institutionally defined spaces of discretionary decision making. Institutional settings of 
accountability systems in school and curriculum management shape this discretionary 
space, which in turn defines the options for school-based implementers. The space 
created by institutional settings thus affects the modes of how interests, policy 
understandings, and professional roles of school staff shape policy outcomes. 
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Figure 1: Analytical framework of school-based decision making in curriculum policy implementation. 
This framework allows grasping the complex interplay between policies, 
institutions, and actor decisions at school-level when it comes to implementation of 
curriculum polices. However, there are several caveats in order: Firstly, this model defines 
policies and institutions as independent variables. Although several studies have pointed 
to the power of teachers to shape institutions both inside and outside the bureaucratic 
arena (see literature review in introductory chapter), these activities will not be reflected 
in the present framework for the benefit of a focus on the binding forces of institutions. 
Secondly, this approach analyses exclusively actions, decisions, and motivations by street-
level bureaucrats at school level. Interests of other actors, such as parents, politicians, or 
students are beyond the reach of this framework and will appear merely as sources of 
control or as response to decision making by school personnel, whereas the mechanisms 
that produce specific interests of these actors can only be touched marginally as a 
background. The focus on school staff must thus ignore several aspects of policy making 
outside schools, but at the same time it allows to focus on the specific conditions that 
shape policy implementation within schools. 
2.3.2 Transferability of framework to Chinese case 
Employing the outlined framework I will analyze implementation processes for 
education in ethnic minority languages in China. Generally, this framework is designed to 
be applicable to political systems different from Western democracies, as it is open to 
various institutional settings. Different from the original framework of street-level 
bureaucracy as proposed by Lipksy that assumes a strong role of citizens in controlling the 
state and its agents, the modified framework presented here is by definition open to 
various institutional settings. The institutionalist perspective that is applied here 
approaches implementation processes from one step beyond, as it transforms the focus 
from the mere dilemmas of implementers to analysis of the institutional settings that 
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distribute power between actors. Instead of resting in one specific and unquestioned 
political system, this framework thus opens up to various political systems, as it perceives 
institutions as manifestation of a given political system. 
However, transferring this framework to the case of China raises several questions. 
Firstly, the framework presented above focuses on the institutional settings for policy 
implementation at schools. However, institutions of personnel management and 
accountability differ between countries, and even within a single country there might be 
multiple approaches to personnel management and myriads of institutional settings. How 
can the framework include these diverse settings and how can it filter those institutions, 
even the informal or unwritten ones, which have the largest effects on decision making at 
school level? In order to approach these questions I need to specify the institutional 
settings of school and personnel management in China in detail against the background of 
the state’s ideology towards school-based decision making in the educational process and 
its institutional manifestations. Only through this intermediate step I will be able to 
understand the roles that the Chinese state attributes to schools as implementers and to 
depict the modes of how schools in China are bound to the state while similarly enjoying 
discretion. 
Secondly, as the framework analyzes implementation of individual policies there is 
a need to specify the policies in most possible clarity. However, how about cases when 
these policies are complex, when diverse policies compete with each other, when policy 
goals and policy instruments are unclear, or when the approaches and goals of policy 
formulating actors differ from those of state agencies? As I have outlined in this chapter 
ethnic minority language education can follow various linguistic, social, and cultural goals 
and it can employ diverse instruments. For analysis of minority language education 
policies in China I need to specify the framework by minority language education 
instruments and the policy goals of specific actors in the educational and ethnic 
governmental administration in order to grasp the specific interests and reactions of 
implementers within the government and at schools. 
In the next two chapters I will specify the framework for the case of minority 
language education policy implementation in China. In the immediate next chapter I will 
discuss in depth the specific institutional settings for curriculum implementation by 
school-based decision making in China. I will here discuss how the competition between 
approaches to diversify curriculum in China on the one side and a new focus on 
accountability of school personnel on the other shapes the spaces for school-based 
decision making in China. In the next-but-one chapter I will introduce into the policies for 
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ethnic minority language education in China. Here I will discuss how multiple and at times 
blurred policy goals provide specific challenges to implementation processes. In the 
summary of each chapter I will discuss how the framework outlined above must be 
adjusted against the specifics of minority language education policy implementation in 
China.  
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3 Institutions and decision making spaces for street-level 
bureaucrats at Chinese schools 
According to the framework outlined above institutions define the spaces for 
implementation decisions by street-level bureaucrats. Institutions of curriculum and 
personnel management at schools, such as regulations on the share of central and local 
curriculum, the accountability and payment systems of personnel, and norms of teacher 
behavior at schools all shape the space that school personnel has for making decisions on 
curriculum policy implementation. 
School management in China, similar to that of many other countries in Asia 
(Cheng, Townsend 2000), has been subject to reforms in structures, incentives, and 
definitions of spaces for school-based decision making under the goal of education for 
“visions of a modern, technologically driven society, where investments in human capital 
are considered crucial to economic development” (Paine, Fang 2006, p. 281). However, 
neither the goals nor the implementation of these reforms are clear-cut (Tang, Wu 2000; 
Dello-Iacovo 2009) and curriculum and school management at Chinese schools oscillate 
between diversity and standardization. On the one hand, new modes of governing 
schools established measures of increased control over school personnel under the idea 
that curriculum has to unify thinking among students. On the other hand, reform agendas 
demand a more localized curriculum that centers on student diversity and demands more 
discretion for school personnel to determine tuition. 
The institutional settings that have developed out of these diverse and sometimes 
conflicting reform agendas can be expected to shape the space for school-based decision 
making by principals and teachers at Chinese schools. But what are the main institutions 
that affect these decisions? How do institutions such curriculum tables, norms on 
teachers’ roles, and school evaluation mechanisms define the space that school personnel 
in China as street-level bureaucrats can use to adjust curriculum to the local needs, to 
make their classes more exciting for student, to follow their own ideas of good teaching, 
or simply to lower their own workloads? 
In this chapter I will elaborate on the relationship between institutions and street-
level bureaucrats at Chinese schools by shedding a light on the spaces that institutions of 
school management provide for decision making at school-level. In the first part of this 
chapter I will thus introduce into the basic modes of personnel management and 
personnel accountability at Chinese schools, before in the second part I will elaborate 
specifically on curriculum and how these structures define the spaces for decision making 
by school staff as street-level bureaucrats in China. By investigating in depth into the 
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institutional settings as the central part of the policy implementation model outlined 
above, this chapter will lay the ground for a more specific analysis of the spaces and 
decisions on minority language education in Xishuangbanna in later chapters. 
3.1 Institutions of personnel management at Chinese schools 
Under consideration of the perspective of institutions as a combination of 
“regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements” (Scott 2008, p. 48) which guide 
actor behavior but which can also open up spaces for discretionary decisions (see chapter 
2), an analysis of institutions of personnel management at schools must cover both 
formal management structures and informal rules of behavior. Transferred to the case of 
school management in China, two institutional settings are especially of relevance for 
personnel management. On the one side, institutions such as guidelines and societal 
discourses on appropriate teacher behavior assign to teachers a position between 
representatives of the state at local level and autonomous decision makers in the 
classroom. On the other side, institutions of school management, such as personnel 
evaluations establish mechanisms in school management that affect personnel 
deployment, training, and pay. 
However, management of educational affairs at schools in China, including 
organizing and funding of schooling, curriculum, and personnel, experienced major shifts 
over the last years from centralization to decentralization and again to recentralization. In 
the following sections I will provide an overview on the main institutions of personnel 
management at Chinese schools: guidelines that define expected school staff behavior, 
institutions that distinguish school staff into professional levels and grades, the system of 
hiring and promoting school staff, and internal and external evaluation mechanisms. For 
this endeavor I will firstly introduce into the basics of schools and school personnel in 
China. In a second part I will introduce into the organizational structures of school 
management in China. In a third part I will discuss how these structures translate into 
accountability of schools and school personnel. 
3.1.1 Schools and school personnel 
Schooling is a major domain of state activity in China, and roles and norms of 
behavior of school personnel are defined by institutions determined by the state. 
However, there is much diversity within both schools and personnel. In the following 
paragraphs I will illustrate this diversity with a short overview on basic characteristics of 
both. 
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Schools in China 
The Chinese formal educational system34 is composed of two major stages: basic 
and higher education. Basic education includes the following sub-stages: early education 
of a varying length either in pre-school classes attached to schools or in independent 
kindergartens, six years of primary education at elementary schools, three years of 
secondary education at junior middle schools, and another three years at senior middle 
schools.35 Higher education includes tertiary education at diverse forms of colleges and 
universities (Sun 2005; Yang 2010). 
Education from pre-school classes to ninth grade has been made compulsory in 
1986, and educational access continuous to raise (Sun 2005; Yang 2010). Through 
different government levels’ “shared responsibility for compulsory education” (Zhang, 
Zhao 2006, p. 265, see also below) enrollment rates from primary to secondary and to 
higher education have constantly increased since the end of the Cultural Revolution 
(Editorial Board of China Educational Statistics Yearbook 2012). Furthermore, since the 
beginning of the 2000s nine-year compulsory education became free of charge for local 
children in gradual steps from the Eastern regions to the Western regions and from urban 
to rural areas (Chai, Cheng 2011), and increasingly also for migrant children (Schnack 
2010). However, the fees for upper secondary and for tertiary education, fees for reading 
and writing material, for school uniforms, and for boarding, as well as expenses for 
private tutoring can amount to large burdens for families.36 
There is a large diversity of schools in primary and secondary education in terms 
of administration, size, and educational quality. In terms of administrative control schools 
can be divided into public and private schools. 37 Public schools are the main provider of 
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 This dissertation deals exclusively with what the OECD defines as formal education, namely 
“education provided in the system of schools, colleges, universities and other formal educational 
institutions, and which normally constitutes a continuous ‘ladder’ of full-time education for children and 
young people” (OECD 2011b, p. 371). Informal education, e.g. private lessons, education at home, adult 
literacy, etc. will be only marginally touched in this text. 
35
 The Chinese term “中学” has been translated as “secondary school”, “high school”, or “middle 
school”. I will use the term “middle school” here, since this connotes closest to a literal translation of the 
Chinese characters. 
36
 Additional fees in officially free education systems can constitute tremendous barriers to 
education (Tomasevski 2006). In China, the so called “miscellaneous fees” have been major barriers to 
school visits (Brown, Park 2002) until these fees from the 1990s onwards have been banned step by step 
(Zeng, Ding 2010). However, at the schools I visited students had to pay for school uniforms and school food. 
Although the fees were only small relative to the average income (uniform fees were below 100 RMB and 
fees for food were a few RMB per meal) they can amount to burdens for poor families or for those with 
several children. Furthermore, private tutoring is an increasing phenomenon that adds further educational 
costs to families, especially in urban areas (Yu, Ding 2011). 
37
 The meanings of the terms “public schools” and “private schools” are not to be confused with 
those in the USA or Great Britain, but rather refers here to the Chinese context. In this text I will refer to the 
distinction used by the OECD (2004, p. 301) which classifies a school as public when “ultimate control rests 
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education in primary and secondary schooling, whereas private education in this sector is 
comparatively small and mostly a phenomenon of urban areas.38 Furthermore, public 
primary schools are distinguished into central schools (中心学校) and branch or satellite 
schools (分校). Central schools are administrative entities with a school principal who is 
responsible towards the Bureaus of Education (see below), whereas satellite schools are 
branches of central schools. 
In terms of size, primary schools can be distinguished into so called “complete 
schools” (完全小学) that cover all prescribed subjects for grades one to six and “teaching 
point schools” (教学点)39 that due to a lack of teachers or due to small student 
populations offer only limited subjects and classes, typically merely classes from grade 1 
through 3 or 4 (Mo et al. 2012, p. 423). An extreme case has been schools that have only 
one teacher who teaches all students together in one room (一师一校). Due to school 
mergers (see below) this type of school ceased to exist in most parts of the country, 
except some regions in China’s West (Shao et al. 2012). Furthermore, there is a distinction 
between boarding schools and schools without boarding facilities. Especially schools in 
rural areas often provide boarding facilities for students with long distance school ways. 
Boarding schools control students’ communication, activities, and use of time more than 
non-boarding schools (Hansen 2012, pp. 127–128). 
Concerning the location of schools some sources differ between rural schools 
(located in townships) and urban schools (located in cities). This distinction refers to 
                                                                                                                                                                
with a public education authority or agency or a governing body […], most of whose members are 
appointed by a public authority or elected by public franchise” and private when “ultimate control rests 
with a non-governmental organization […], or if the Governing Board consists mostly of members not 
selected by a public agency.” In China the term for this type of schools is “schools run by the people” (民办
学校), whereas the literal translation “private schools“ (私人学校)” is used only to describe schools before 
the founding of the Peoples Republic (Xu 2002). For further distinction of private schools, e.g. into elite 
schools, and a discussion on the dependencies of private schools from government-run schools in China see 
Lin (1999) and Shui (2009).  
38
 With a number of merely 5,000 out of roughly 300,000 private schools occupy only a small part 
of the primary and secondary schools in China (Editorial Board of China Educational Statistics Yearbook 
2012). According to Lin (1999) with exception of a few “elite private schools” most private schools in China 
offer lower educational quality than public schools. Private schools must hence be understood as low-
quality alternatives for those children who are rejected by regular and public schools, such as migrant 
children and local unregistered children of parents who exceeded the birth limits of the one-child policy (so 
called “black children”, 黑孩子, see Greenhalgh 2003). Schools for migrant children, for example, were 
informally founded in the 90s and 2000s with teaching facilities of extremely low quality, classes of up to 70 
students, unprofessional staff, and dangerous buildings (Han 2004). These schools for migrant children are 
now, under large local diversity, increasingly engaged in processes of formalization, registration, and even 
management through government agencies (Schnack 2010). In rural areas those schools that were formerly 
organized and funded by the villagers themselves (Lin 1999) have been transformed especially in the 90s 
into public schools, and village-paid teachers were either added to the pool of public teachers or dismissed 
(Wang 2002). 
39
 These schools are often located in villages, where they are called “village teaching point” (村小
点). 
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responsible government agencies (county and township on the one side and city and 
district on the other), and it does not necessarily reflect occupation of students’ parents 
or usage of land around schools. In close relation to this, schools can be distinguished 
according the quality of educational infrastructure and tuition available. Rural schools are 
much disadvantaged in educational infrastructure compared to urban schools, which is 
related to the underfunding of schools in rural areas (Guo 2007; Gong, Tsang 2011). 
However, the status of schools is subject to changes. Since the 90s school merging 
of smaller schools into larger school compounds with moving students from village day-
time-schools to central boarding schools became a common measure to equalize 
educational quality between schools and to lower costs (Fan 2009). It has been reported 
that half of the Chinese rural schools closed between 2002 and 2012 (Zhang 2012b). This 
process included large movements of students and staff, activities to erect new school 
buildings, and extension of the boarding school system. Although school mergers have 
been praised in the state media (Zhang 2012b), critics point to social and psychological 
problems for families and students. They argue for a reconsideration of the merger 
program and for slowing down its pace or at least improving the management of boarding 
schools in order to achieve educational improvements (Mo et al. 2012; Fan 2009). 
Although it remains to be seen if public pressure will force the government to slow down 
or to halt this policy, the trend clearly is towards more centralized schools and more 
boarding schools. 
School personnel in China 
Teachers and principals or vice-principals are the main staff responsible for 
teaching affairs at schools.40 Chinese scholars distinguish between administrative staff 
and teaching staff (e.g. Wang 2003). However, in many cases principals also teach and 
teachers are also involved in administrational work. So called “Reference tables for 
criteria for authorized size of personnel in schools” prescribe the scheduled numbers of 
principals and teachers for schools, which range between one and two teachers per class 
and one to three principals and vice-principals per school (Wang 2003, p. 105). However, 
as studies repeatedly have shown the actual number of teachers who serve at schools is 
often below the required quota, and especially at rural schools there is lack in teaching 
personnel (Peng et al. 2013). 
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 Additionally, especially larger schools have support staff, such as cooks, nurses, and guards who 
work in schools or the adjacent school enterprises (Wang 2003, pp. 105–106). As this staff is not formally 
involved in curriculum decision making, it will not be discussed here. 
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Most teachers at public schools today are hired by the governmental posting 
system as government employed and managed teachers (公办教师), but temporary 
teachers (代课教师), who are hired by local Bureaus of Education on temporary basis, 
still continue to be a common phenomenon especially at rural schools. After the policy to 
equalize the status of teachers brought a slow end to the system of hiring private 
teachers (民办教师) who were hired, funded, and managed by school communities for 
several decades (Wang 2002), the problem of understaffing at schools become again 
prominent. Facing both the notorious underfunded educational system and the 
difficulties in finding qualified staff especially in China’s Western regions the educational 
bureaucracy started to hire temporary teachers in addition to the regular teaching force. 
The system of private teachers was thus succeeded by the system of temporary teachers, 
but the responsibility to fund these teachers was transferred from the local school 
community to the local educational bureaucracy. In a study conducted in Gansu province, 
Robinson and Yi (2008) found that most temporary teachers are paid much less than the 
regular public teachers, although they are qualified to be teachers and many possess 
qualifications equivalent to those of regular public teachers, and although all of them 
have workloads and responsibilities equal to that of regular teachers. 
Apart from the distinction into public, private, and temporary posts, both teachers 
and principals are distinguished by a ranking system of professional positions. The 
“Compulsory Education Law” (National People's Congress 4/12/1984, § 30) defines three 
teacher levels: low, middle, and high. However, this ranking is more diversified at local 
level. County Bureaus of Education distinguish teacher positions into five ranks – intern 
(newly hired), third class, second class, first class, and superior – according to years of 
teaching and assessments (Wang 2003). Teachers with higher ranks enjoy a higher salary 
and have better chances to be transferred to more prestigious schools. Additionally, due 
to increased social prestige they can, important in times of low formal salary, charge 
higher fees from parents for extra-curricular activities, such as summer classes (Ding, 
Lehrer 2007, p. 193). Additionally, there are distinctions in the occupational position of 
teachers in schools. “Backbone teacher” (骨干教师), for instance, is a term used to 
describe teachers who due to received trainings are seen as leaders in educational reform 
and development at schools (Paine, Fang 2006, p. 282). Class teachers (班主任) are those 
teachers who head one specific class and who are especially involved in administrative 
tasks of this class. According to regulations such as the “Regulation on Classroom 
Teachers in Elementary and Middle Schools” (Ministry of Education 8/12/2009) both 
groups receive additional subsidies to their salaries and enjoy reduced teaching hours. 
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Applicants for teacher posts and principal posts in schools have to fulfill minimum 
requirements of academic achievements, which differ between school levels. Regulations 
define the minimum requirements for teaching positions at pre-school and primary 
school: holding diploma of pre-school teachers’ training institutions or diploma from 
secondary normal schools. Applicants for junior and senior secondary school teaching 
posts must hold at least a diploma from normal universities or a Bachelor degree from 
other universities. Applicants for principal posts must generally hold diplomas of one level 
higher than is required for teacher positions and they must additionally have teaching 
experiences (Wang 2003, pp. 111–113). 
However, not all school staff fulfills these requirements. Although methods such 
as increasing the frequency of in-service teacher trainings, firing unqualified teachers, 
recognizing alternative ways of achieving formal qualifications, and enlarging the pool of 
universities with teacher education all have resulted in an increase of the academic 
achievement levels of teachers in China (Robinson, Yi 2008, p. 36), low formal 
qualification of teachers persists especially in China’s rural areas (Peng et al. 2013).41 The 
mismatch between academic titles of teachers and the subjects that they actually teach is 
higher in rural schools than in urban schools (Peng et al. 2013). Furthermore, temporary 
teachers with lower academic qualifications are especially employed in rural areas 
(Robinson, Yi 2008), since young university graduates hesitate to apply for posts there.42 
Government programs such as the Free Teacher Education program brought more 
students to rural schools, but the program seems to lack in durability.43 Similarly, hiring 
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 Paine and Fang (2007) argue that teacher trainings in China generally face three challenges. 
Firstly, pre-service and in-service teacher education in China were for a long time separated into different 
training organizations, a situation detrimental for control and cohesion; secondly, time and resources 
invested in teacher trainings have been low and have been only recently increased; thirdly, the large 
disparities between rural and urban teacher qualifications adds further difficulties to organize unified 
teacher education programs. 
42
 In a study by Wang and Gao (2013, pp. 70–72) university students of teacher programs largely 
hesitated to teach at rural schools. They named as reasons for their hesitation financial constraints and a 
lack of opportunity for personal and professional development. Additionally they saw rewards for teaching 
at schools as unattractive compared to other jobs’ rewards, they perceived rural areas as being too remote 
and isolated to offer excitement, and their jobs as lacking opportunities for learning and career. 
43
The Free Teacher Education program offers university students scholarships, free 
accommodation, and exemption from study fees, in exchange for a contractual obligation to serve two to 
ten years at rural schools (Wang, Gao 2013, p. 68). However, many students are willing to break the 
contract despite the consequence of having to pay back stipend and study fees. In a study most students 
said that they have been attracted to the program by its financial incentives, not by conviction of the need 
to bring education to rural areas, which may cause low motivation to actual teaching (Wang, Gao 2013, 
p. 70). Furthermore, positions in rural schools can constitute additional harshness to students who grew up 
in different environments. One teacher, interviewed for my research project, who has been transferred 
through this program to a remote village at the border to Laos to a school with low infrastructure and 
strong rates of drug abuse among the students’ parents, complained not so much about teaching in general, 
but more about the difficulties of teaching in an environment that she experienced as foreign and 
unsupportive (TE-10_ST-04_2012-01-06). To sum up, as this program targets students who otherwise could 
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temporary, non-qualified or underpaid teachers does not contribute to creating a stable 
and motivated teaching force at rural schools. Under these conditions the lack of formally 
qualified teachers in rural schools can be expected to continue. 
3.1.2 Organizational structures of school management 
Scholars divided management of schools in China into two distinct areas: external 
management by the Bureaus of Education as responsible governmental department and 
by Party organization, and internal management by principals or committees within 
schools (Yang 2010). Institutional settings of hierarchy and discretion differ between both 
modes of management, but in some areas they overlap. Accountability measures of 
personnel, for example, rely in large degrees on cooperation between the Bureau of 
Education and school-internal advisory groups. Two characteristics of educational 
management structures in China are their local diversity and the constant reforms. In the 
following paragraphs I will provide a small glimpse of school organization structures, 
including graphical visualizations of examples. 
Government structures of school management 
Public schools in China are executive branches of educational bureaucracy, 
represented by the “educational line” from the Ministry of Education at the central 
government level down to the County Bureau of Education (see also chapter…). The 
Bureaus of Education at the diverse administrative levels run schools as “social units” (事
业单位), similar to theaters or hospitals (Zhong 2003, p. 53), which means that the 
administrative level in the educational bureaucracy directly responsible for managing 
schools differs with the level of the schools. Within the location of a given county we find 
offices and social units that are under the jurisdiction of the township, of the county, of 
the city or prefecture, and of the province. In rural areas, generally speaking, rural 
primary schools are under the jurisdiction of the townships, secondary schools within the 
townships fall under the jurisdiction of the counties, and higher education is governed by 
the prefecture or the province (Zhou 2012a). Similarly, personnel appointment and 
funding of schools differs between schools of different levels. Principals for primary and 
junior secondary schools are appointed by the county government, but principals for 
senior secondary schools are appointed by city or prefecture government levels (Lai, Lo 
2006, p. 297). 
                                                                                                                                                                
not afford university tuition instead of those who have a passion in teaching, it seems highly questionable if 
the schools’ teaching force can sustainably benefit from these future teachers. 
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However, school management is affected by reforms and is thus subject to 
changes. The “county-as-the-main-pillar” reform not only shifted funding responsibility, 
but also school management from township to county (Zhou 2012a).44 Liu and colleagues 
(2009, p. 464) depicted the line of responsibility for management of rural elementary 
schools in China45 from county government (represented by the County Bureau of 
Education), to township government (represented by Township School District Governor), 
to individual schools. Figure 3 visualizes this hierarchy of responsibilities for school 
management. 
 
 
Figure 2: The administrative structure of external school management at county level, after Liu et al. (2009, 
p. 464). 
Since this reform was implemented with locally different paces, there exists a 
large variety of school responsibilities. In a survey among more than 50 counties Liu and 
colleagues (2009) found five models of school management based on the question of who 
appoints principals and teachers: township government managed, county government 
managed, district governor managed, district governor and township government jointly 
managed, and county education bureau and township government jointly managed 
districts. However, with the shift of fiscal responsibility for educational provision from 
township to county level in the course of the “county-as-the-main-pillar” fiscal reforms 
between 2002 and 2008 (see above) educational management in most rural localities in 
China is now located with the County Bureau of Education (Liu et al. 2009, pp. 467–468). 
Within the Bureaus of Education so called educational superintendents are responsible 
for supervision of schools, for raising additional funds, and for reporting to municipality or 
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 Murphy and Johnson (2009, p. 450) called this an “unintended effect” of the mentioned financial 
reform. 
45
 Since this dissertation deals exclusively with schools in China’s rural areas (see chapter 3), 
management of urban schools will not be discussed here. 
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province government and to the public (Cravens et al. 2012). Additionally, school 
supervision is also conducted by a series of supervision agencies above the county level 
(Hawkins 2000, pp. 447–448). The Educational Supervision Agency and the local agencies 
together “are responsible for assuring that the various laws and regulations are followed 
by local authorities and educators” (Hawkins 2000, p. 448). 
Party structures of school management 
Additionally, the Chinese system of school organization also secures party control 
over schools. On the one side, each school has a party secretary, the so called “branch 
secretary”, who controls the implementation of party line at schools by conducting 
ideological seminars and by supervising party meetings at schools. The “dual system of 
control” through educational staff and the party secretary has been seen as the heritage 
of two distinct times in China’s history of controlling work units such as schools. Before 
1985 the role of party organizations at schools was much stronger, but after the 1985 
educational reforms principals became the “pre-eminent authority” in schools, and the 
role of the party secretary in running educational organizations has been much reduced 
(Bush et al. 1998b, pp. 137–138). 
On the other side the Party also controls schools through Party organizations such 
as the Workers Union, the Communist Youth League, and the Young Pioneers. These 
organizations are not concerned with organization of daily tuition, but with “ideological 
work”. The Communist Youth League and the Young Pioneers, for instance, train students 
in Party ideology and serve as recruitment tool for future cadre positions. They “train[…] 
young people to become citizens in the Communist state by shaping their concept of 
organization as well as their organizational practice,” (Hansen 2012, p. 125) for instance 
through a system of student associations and student cadres within a class and within the 
school (Hansen 2012). 
Both the Party secretary and the student organizations at school are in a middle 
position between external management through the CCP and internal self-organization. 
On the one side they bind school personnel (and students) to a hierarchical party 
structure parallel to the government structure. Party secretaries, for instance, report on 
their progress in propagating party ideology at school to school-externals, and are held 
responsible for activities at school. At the same time, however, party organizations at the 
schools show elements of grassroots organizations when they organize for instance 
student elections. According to Hansen (2012, p. 138) the party organizations aim not at 
“blind Party loyalty and obedience”, but rather at “a ‘modern’ form of socialist form 
where ideally citizens by their own will [emphasis in source] contribute to the collective 
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through individual initiative under clear guidance and within the fixed framework of the 
party-state.” With this, party organizations control staff and students at schools, but they 
also demand initiatives, innovations, and self-management by party members at school.  
Internal structure of school management 
Laws such as the Compulsory Education Law or the Teachers’ Law define 
organizational structure, hierarchies, and responsibilities of personnel posts in Chinese 
schools, and they divide the internal organization into distinct departments, offices, or 
groups. Additionally schools can also describe these structures and responsibilities in 
school-based handbooks or school statutes.46 
According to a summary by Bush and colleagues (1998b, pp. 137–138) the 
“principal’s office”, the “teaching affairs section”, the “general affairs section”, the 
“teaching and research group”, and the “subject groups” are the major subdivisions of 
school administration.47 The principal’s office is the highest authority within the school. 
The office includes one principal and at larger schools several vice-principals. Below the 
principal, administrative positions are bundled in two departments.48 The “teaching 
affairs section” is headed by a vice principal or an especially appointed teacher and is 
responsible for administration of all teaching. The “general affairs section” is similarly 
headed by a vice-principal and/or the General Affairs Director. It is responsible for all 
administration concerning infrastructure, financing, and teaching materials. Additionally 
there are committees49 to support teaching and school-based research, such as the 
“teaching and research group”, the “class head groups”, and the “lesson preparation 
groups”. All of these groups “comprise […] teachers working together to develop curricula 
and pedagogy“ (Bush et al. 1998b, pp. 137–138). Ni and colleagues (2011, p. 119) found in 
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 In the internet one finds a variety of such school-based handbooks and statutes for public access, 
see for instance Mengla Middle School No. 1 (date unknown): Menghai No. 1. Middle School Guide for 
Public Information, http://doc.baidu.com/view/173f8fd376a20029bd642dba.html or Tonggang Middle 
School No. 3, (2011/4/9): School Constitution, http://tgsz.jlthjy.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=612. 
Furthermore, there are templates for school-based statutes by school administrators: see JSJYTB (2012-01-
04): School Constitution, http://blog.jysedu.com/?uid-1909-action-viewspace-itemid-41587 (all links last 
access August 1
st
, 2014). 
47
 Additionally, some schools run own factories or farms as a legacy from times when schools had 
to generate their own income to pay teachers or to provide food for school population (Bush et al. 1998b, 
pp. 137–138). 
48
 The names of these departments are sometimes translated as “committees” and 
sometimes ”sections” (Yang 2010, p. 82; Bush et al. 1998b, pp. 137–138). 
49
 The “teaching and research group” consists of selected teachers from the respective subject 
departments. Each teacher is organized into one such group. Additionally, teachers can also be organized 
into “class head groups” (only for class head teachers) and into “lesson preparation groups” (groups of 
teachers of one subject or teachers who teach students of the same grade) (Paine, Fang 2006, p. 285). 
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a study that these groups are “indispensable parts” of schools, as teachers discuss their 
teaching methods and curriculum reforms here. 
One formal working mode to conduct educational and general administration is to 
convene to meetings. In the “principals working meeting”, for instance, all principals and 
vice-principals of the school meet to discuss the daily issues of the school. Similarly, in 
“administrative affairs meetings” and “teaching and research meetings” staff meets 
regularly to decide on issues in their respective areas. Finally, in a “staff meeting” all 
teachers and staff convene once a year, and the principal reports here (Yang 2010, p. 82). 
The shape and scope of actual organizational structure varies to large degrees 
between schools. Firstly, the number of administrative staff and posts differs between 
schools. Schools with fewer than ten classes often only have one principal, one 
administrator for teaching affairs, and one administrator for general service affairs, 
whereas larger schools can have more vice-principals and middle-administrators (Wang 
2003, pp. 105–106). Secondly, in some schools the positions of branch secretary and 
principal are hold by two different persons, but at others the principal may also serve as 
branch secretary. Bush and colleagues write that the lack of party secretaries is a sign of 
flatter hierarchies especially at smaller schools (1998a, p. 186). Finally, there are large 
differences in organizational structures between central and satellite schools (for 
definitions see above). School leaders in satellite schools are merely called “branch school 
managers” (分校负责人), and although they actually conduct much of a principal’s work, 
they are subordinate to the central school’s principal. The central school principal, in turn, 
takes overall responsibility on the central school and satellite schools towards the Bureau 
of Education. Administrative responsibilities are thus shared between branch and satellite 
schools, and the pool of administrative staff at branch schools is consequently smaller. 
Similarly, teacher organizations at branch schools are less diversified. Here “teaching and 
research groups”, “class head groups” or “lesson preparation groups” are all bundled into 
one. 
 Due to this diversity visualizations of the organizational structure of schools in 
China can merely reflect administrative division at particular schools. With Figure 4 I 
present an exemplary chart of the organizational structure of one of my case study 
schools. 
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Figure 3: Exemplary chart of internal organizational structure of Chinese school with branch school, after 
school no. 9’s internal administration manual with author’s translation form Chinese to English. 
3.1.3 School and personnel accountability 
School and personnel accountability can be strong measures of management in 
education. Both have been introduced only lately in China by promulgation of respective 
legislation, such as the Teachers Law in 1993, and by installing accountability systems that 
effect professional careers, benefits, and social prestige of teachers and principal, but the 
trend, similar to other countries in Asia (Cheng, Townsend 2000), is clearly towards 
standardization of educational management. However, implementation of several 
institutions for teacher and principal evaluation are still lacking behind the expressed goal 
of modern, standardized, and objective educational management. In the following 
paragraphs I will provide an overview on Chinese accountability systems of both school 
and personnel.  
School accountability 
Local governments in China use evaluations as institutionalized approaches to 
control schools. Under principles that claim to support school development50 both school-
internal and external evaluation mechanisms developed by governments, scholars, and 
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 To name an example: Pudong school district in Shanghai holds that evaluations should be guided 
by the following principles: "the developmental principle (encouraging schools continuous development), 
the subjective principle (establishing the space for autonomous decisions), the collaborative principle 
(emphasizing trust and collaboration), the staged principle (paying attention to school differences and 
diversity), and the stimulating principle (stressing the longitudinal comparison with other schools" (Lee et al. 
2011, p. 34, citing Lee, Ding, and Song 2008 p. 151)). 
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school personnel became central institutions of controlling schools in China (Lee et al. 
2011, p. 34). 
The modes and frequency for local school evaluation differ locally, as they are 
determined by city, prefecture, or county Bureaus of Education. A document by 
Xishuangbanna prefecture, for instance, lists the following measures for evaluation: 
interviews with teachers, consulting teacher materials, seeing through teachers’ 
corrections of students homework, seeing through the routine records of the Class 
Preparation and Research Groups at school, conducting a questionnaire survey, writing a 
report and giving advice for improvements to schools and county education bureaus 
(Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2012). 
Similarly, localities differ in the criteria used in evaluations. Generally, policy 
documents and administrative regulations require basing evaluation criteria on legal 
provisions.51 However, criteria on individual evaluation items differ. Lai and Lo (2006, 
p. 295) note that performance indicators in Shanghai are based on two aspects: schooling 
conditions (including school administration, teacher administration, and logistics 
administration) and educational quality (including admission rate, retention rate, social 
activities). In a collection of evaluation criteria used in China’s schools Tian (2011)52 found 
a variety of different criteria, from general provision of funds to specific effects of 
educational provision, such as student enrolment rates, graduation rates, or attrition 
rates (see tables 29 and 30 in appendix). Many criteria involve infrastructure at schools 
(e.g. school-ground space, school buildings, or textbooks), others approach the quantity 
and quality of a schools’ staff pool (measured in student-teacher ratio and the formal 
academic qualifications of teachers).  
However, as scholars of China’s curriculum reforms have repeatedly bemoaned 
(e.g. Dello-Iacovo 2009), evaluation hardly ever includes criteria on pedagogies or 
educational outcomes beyond the rate of student graduation or student attrition. 
Although many school-based reform plans for local curriculum include evaluation, these 
evaluations are seldom implemented and the majority of schools surveyed in studies 
never experienced evaluations on school-based curriculum (Li, Shuai 2010, p. 30). Student 
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 General policy documents such as the “Opinions on the Responsibility in Executive Law 
Enforcement” (State Council 7/9/2005) require more specification by local administrative regulations. The 
“Mengla County Bureau of Education Measures for Evaluation of Executive Law Enforcement” (Mengla 
Bureau of Education 3/18/2008), for instance, demands that the evaluation of executive agencies in the 
educational sector should include questions such as “Do schools have the legally required certificates? Do 
the measures of law implementation at school follow legal standards? Does the school archive school 
documents according to the law?” 
52
 Tian cites Qi, Ye, and Ye (2009): 政府绩效审计 [Governmental Achievement Audit], Beijing: 
China Modern Economy Publishers. 
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achievement in standardized exams remains to be one of the main criteria for school 
evaluations. This focus on quantitative school evaluations is a major barrier to 
implementation of curriculum reforms for “quality education” in the sense of student-
centered education. 
Schools are ranked in strict orders based on evaluation results. Although the 
system of differing between key point schools and regular schools has been officially 
terminated and has been banned e.g. by the Compulsory Education Law (National 
People's Congress 4/12/1984, § 22), schools are still ranked according to their quality 
differences. The local County Bureaus of Education compile school ranking tables53 that 
contain criteria such as schooling rates in the school district, percentage of students with 
excellent grades in math and Chinese, and drop-out rates. These tables are meant for 
internal use within the educational administration. As the Bureaus of Education use these 
rankings to increase or reduce benefits for schools, for instance in terms of budget or 
staff quota,54 evaluation results have thus direct effects on school infrastructure, teaching 
quality, and resources. Scholars and school personnel, however, criticized these 
evaluations for being unfair, since under such mechanisms well-performing schools 
receive more chances to develop than low-performing schools (Lee et al. 2011, p. 34). 
Furthermore, much information about a schools’ ranking is also publically 
available. Schools, to begin with, present plates of specific program awards prominently 
at the door and announce assessment results publically. School quality is also visible in 
school infrastructure. Finally, information about student-related criteria, such as 
graduation rates of schools, can be leaked to the public. With these and other ways of 
collecting information about school criteria parents can be informed about a schools’ 
ranking and its reputation. With this information at hand parents, especially in urban 
areas, can make decisions on preferred schools for their children to visit.55 
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 These tables are called “tables of educational quality examination results” (教学质量检测成绩
统计表). So called “tables of allocated personnel” (定编统计表) list firstly the number of staff, 
distinguished by full-time teachers, part-time teachers, and non-teaching staff (such as guards, secretaries, 
or electricians), and secondly the number of classes and students in each class. Some local Bureaus of 
Education publish these tables online (see e.g. Suzhou City Education Net (2014/01/03): Suzhou City First 
Senior Middle School Educational Quality Examination Results Table, accessible at 
http://www.szjy.gov.cn/Item/17852.aspx, last access April 7, 2014), but others seem to keep these tables 
merely for internal use. 
54
 In Shanghai and Shenzhen, for instance, local Bureaus of Education not only rewarded the best-
ranking schools with additional funds between 200,000 and 800,000 RMB, but they also increased the 
quota of teachers for best ranking schools by two to three percent (Lai, Lo 2006, pp. 295–296). 
55
 This phenomenon is especially relevant in urban areas where it is geographically easier for 
parents to choose between schools. Although government regulations have been established that 
guarantee students a school place within the local school district, selecting schools is still common in urban 
areas, partly with the involvement of paying additional fees to schools of preferred choice or even 
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Personnel accountability 
The management of personnel at Chinese schools by educational bureaucracy 
underwent tremendous changes since the late 1980s. In Maoist times school personnel 
management has been described as “multiple hierarchies of authority, status, and income, 
as well as labor force of poor skills subject to intrusive and arbitrary discipline” (U 2004, 
p. 2), but since the beginning of the reform period elements to modernize staff 
administration have been introduced. 
Centralization and standardization of personnel management have been major 
drivers of this “modernization”. Reforms caused centralization of personnel management 
when the shift of funding responsibilities for primary and junior secondary schooling from 
township to county (the so called “county-as-the-main-pillar” reform in educational 
funding, see above) was accompanied with a similar shift in personnel management in 
order to tackle the problem of strong divergences in school personnel deployment.56 
Similarly, beginning with the promulgation of the Teachers Law in 1993 that considered 
school teaching for the first time as a profession in need of professional standards beyond 
loyalty to party and state (Paine, Fang 2006, p. 280), reforms lead to standardization of 
personnel management. A major theme of teacher management regulations was the 
quest of how to develop standards for the teaching profession under the goal of 
“modernizing schooling”, to use teachers as “tools to shape human capital”, and to 
ultimately advancing the nation’s economic, technical, and moral development (Paine, 
Fang 2006, p. 281). 
For evaluation of principals the “principal responsibility system” has been 
introduced in the 1980s. Subsequent legislation, e.g. in the Compulsory Education Law 
(National People's Congress 4/12/1984, § 26), confirmed this approach. Goals have been 
to improve school quality and to encourage the transfer of principals from urban to rural 
schools by raising incentives for principals there. The idea behind this is that “principals 
are expected to lead changes at the school level AND cater for the central government's 
demands for performance and accountability" (Qian, Walker 2011, p. 194). Under this 
approach principals gained more autonomy to decide on issues such as hiring teachers, 
using school funds, and to supervise teaching, but at the same time accountability 
                                                                                                                                                                
payments to corrupt school leaders (Wong 2008). In rural areas, however, school choice is much more 
limited due to scarcity of alternatives within the reach of villagers.  
56
 The pay-gap between urban and rural teachers, the delayed payments of salaries for village 
teachers, and the generally underfunded staff system in economically disadvantages regions all caused lacks 
of quality and quantity of teaching staff in rural areas (Li et al. 2007). 
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measures also to evaluate principals’ performance (Zhao et al. 2008).57 One measure has 
been shifting evaluation criteria for promotion of principals from “political” criteria of 
party membership to “professional” criteria of school leadership and school performance. 
A new ranking system of a “professional career ladder” based on criteria of school 
performance and management capabilities under the goal of “moral integrity” of leaders 
in schools was introduced.58 However, as Qian and Walker (2011, pp. 198–199) show, this 
new career system was only partly implemented, so that today principals’ careers only 
partly depend on performance-related factors such as educational output, but non-
performance-related factors such as school size continue to be used for evaluation and 
decisions on promotion of principals as well. 
Concerning teachers there are several evaluation mechanisms present in Chinese 
schools. According to Paine and Fang (2006, p. 286) teachers are faced with three kinds of 
institutionalized evaluation mechanisms: self-evaluation, peer-evaluation, and external 
evaluation. Firstly, teachers are expected to evaluate their own tuition by themselves by 
using textbooks and teacher handbooks as guidelines. According to the authors newly 
hired teachers regularly use these books to learn about curriculum requirements, but 
even advanced teachers orient their teaching to these books. Secondly, teachers are 
evaluated by peers within the schools. After visiting each others’ “open classes” (公开课) 
teachers discuss methods in teacher groups afterwards. Thirdly, there are top-down 
evaluations by inspection teams that consist of officers from the local bureaus of 
education, school principals, and superior instructors, who conduct classroom visits or 
who evaluate statistics such as students’ attrition rates. The former two evaluation 
methods have been the predominant modes for schools to determine and hold teaching 
standards, but recently top-down external evaluations become more prominent. In light 
of the three co-existing modes China’s personnel evaluation system has been called a 
“mixed or hybrid model of accountability” (Paine, Fang 2006, p. 286). 
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 Some scholars have argued that the “teaching and research groups” as the assembly of teachers 
are the actual power holders, as they "form powerful interest groups with specialist knowledge and 
principals have to negotiate with the teaching deans to lead these groups. In extreme circumstances, 
teachers may be able to secure the dismissal of principals if there is significant opposition to their plans." 
(Bush et al. 1998a, p. 188). However, according to the “principal responsibility system” the principal is 
responsible for all outcome of schools and he or she will be sanctioned when the school’s decisions cross 
specific red lines, for instance, when schools reject or expel entitled students of the school district in 
compulsory schooling age, when they levy fees for enrollment, or when they use un-authorized textbooks 
(National People's Congress 4/12/1984, §§ 26,57,58). 
58
 The moral goals of school leader evaluation include elements that Heberer and Trappel (2013, 
pp. 1049–1050) have described with respect to cadre evaluation as traditional approaches to control and 
change attitude and behavior of cadres: “de (moral quality), neng (capability/skills), qin (work 
attitude/diligence), ji (achievements) and lian (integrity/incorruptness)”. As many policy documents 
describe principals as well as teachers as moral leaders in schools, moral values, in addition to standardized 
evaluation indicators, can similarly be seen as basis of school personnel management in China. 
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External evaluations differ much between localities and even between schools due 
to the lack of centralized regulations on criteria for teacher evaluations (Wang 2003, 
p. 123). According to Ding and Lehrer (2007, pp. 193–194) external evaluations at Chinese 
schools can use a selection from the following criteria: teaching skills (measured in 
students' graduation, attrition to higher schools and colleges, and quality of classroom 
tuition); methods in class (new methods used); academic education of teachers (years of 
education and quality of visited college, based on a five-level ranking system of China's 
colleges); teachers’ abilities to monitor students and to detect problems; teachers' 
enthusiasm and concern for students; and teachers' general work ethics. Similarly also 
the modes and the degree of transparency in evaluations differ between localities and 
even between schools. Studies found that some schools publish individual results after 
evaluations, but that other schools merely summarize teacher grades at the end of the 
year without publicizing the exact scores (Liu et al. 2009, p. 469). Some items in 
evaluation catalogues are clearly defined, such as students’ grades in major subjects, but 
others, such as the item “working ethics” are less clearly defined. Nontransparent 
methods and criteria, however, face the risk of detrimental effects for teachers’ 
perception of evaluation fairness and teachers’ willingness to cooperate.59 
Despite this large diversity in criteria the new accountability measures have large 
effects on management of school personnel. Three areas of personnel management have 
been especially affected: personnel deployment, personnel development, and pay. In 
teacher deployment (employment and promotion) the system of the iron rice bowl with a 
guarantees life-long employment irrespective of individuals’ performance has been 
replaced with accountability measures based on educational degrees and performance 
(Paine, Fang 2006, p. 281). Now teachers and principals sign contracts called "education 
objective-accountability agreement assessment" that define their responsibilities. The 
outcomes of teachers’ and principals’ performance determine their chances for 
promotion and transfer to other schools. Underperforming principals and teachers can be 
fired (Lai, Lo 2006, pp. 295–296). Similarly, personnel development has been standardized 
and taken into accountability systems. Teacher trainings that have been formerly seen 
applicable for merely those teachers who did not meet certain requirements, are now 
defined as an integral part of the job for all teachers (Paine, Fang 2006, p. 283). Local 
governments established requirements for teachers to attend annual minimum course 
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 Teachers at Chinese schools surveyed by Liu and colleagues (2009, pp. 469–470) perceived 
evaluations as fair when they knew about the procedures. Other scholars noted that teachers perceive 
evaluations that include student outcomes but that don’t consider student conditions (such as the share or 
students with special needs) as unfair and that those evaluations that increase teachers’ workloads without 
leading to benefits for teachers result in anxiety of school personnel (Lee et al. 2011, p. 34). 
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hours in teacher training seminars, 60  and promotion depends on fulfilling these 
requirements (Paine, Fang 2006, p. 283). Finally, institutions of accountability affect 
teachers’ pay and their working conditions. In addition to already strong local divergences 
in pay61 the introduction of performance-based pay in 2009, under which 30 percent of 
teachers’ and principals’ pay is determined by performance as measured in evaluations,62 
brought additional differences in pay. Now the pay of high earning teachers can double 
that of low earning teachers at the same school (Ding, Lehrer 2007, p. 193). Evaluations 
also determine teachers’ ranks and chances for promotion to higher ranking schools with 
often better school infrastructure. These schools not only have what Han (2013, p. 74) 
calls “non-monetary conditions at school workplace” such as better teachers' offices or 
classroom equipment, but they also provide more possibilities for teachers to earn  
additional income through extra-curricular activities, such as tutoring (Ding, Lehrer 2007, 
p. 193). 
3.2 Spaces for curriculum decisions by street-level bureaucrats at 
schools 
Scholars have argued that school-based decision making by school personnel can 
be a motor for educational development in China (Zhong, Tu 2013; Law 2011; Li, Shuai 
2010). Similarly, the central government argues for school-based decision making as part 
of a strategy to raise educational quality (Ministry of Education 6/26/2012), although it 
initiated decentralization of school management and funding in the 1980s and 1990s 
initially merely to tackle financial constraints (Lai, Lo 2006; King, Guerra 2005). The shift 
                                                     
60
 In some localities these requirements can be quite demanding. The Shanghai government, for 
instance, stipulated that teachers must attend at least 240 hours of training in five years in order to keep 
their current job positions and that they must attend the double amount of course hours when they want 
to proceed to higher positions (Paine, Fang 2006, p. 283). 
61
 School teacher’s pay is determined by county governments and follows the pay of local 
government officials (State Council 12/17/2008). Furthermore, local governments can provide additional 
teacher subsidies based on locality, such as subsidies for teachers who work at rural or “remote” schools. In 
some counties these local divergences can amount to several thousand RMB per year (Li 2014).  
62
 The “Guidelines for the Implementation of Performance-related Pay in Schools in Compulsory 
Education” from 2008 (State Council 12/17/2008) stipulate that from January 1
st
, 2009 the salary of all 
principals and teachers shall be determined as “performance-related pay” (in addition to teachers’ other 
benefits such as housing or medical insurances) as a means to reduce the turn-over rates of teachers, to 
encourage teachers to work at rural schools, and to establish incentives for teachers to deliver “quality 
education”. In detail this means firstly that teachers shall be paid equally to local officials, secondly that 
their salaries are made up of a “basic performance pay” (基础性绩效工资) of 70 percent and an 
“encouraging performance pay” (奖励性绩效工资) of 30 percent, and thirdly that all other bonuses are 
prohibited. The “encouraging performance pay” of teachers’ salary shall be determined by criteria that the 
school defines democratically, and that of principals shall be determined by the local Bureau of Education. 
Although scholars found that the democratic participation in determining the performance-related pay still 
lacks behind and that the goal of equal pay for teachers within one county has not been reached (Chai, 
Wang 2011, p. 113) the performance-related pay can be seen as a powerful mode of controlling teachers’ 
performance in China. 
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towards school-based decision making can be interpreted as a new turn towards 
decentralization. 
 Nevertheless, institutional settings concerning educational decision making in 
China are an issue that is more complicated than a mere central-local dichotomy. 
Decentralizing decision making power to schools is bound by a variety of institutions; and 
the spaces that these institutions provide are flexible and diverse. With this section I aim 
at shedding a light on the spaces in which street-level bureaucrats in China can and do 
make decisions on curriculum. In the next paragraphs I will outline the meanings of school 
curriculum and curriculum management in China, before I will discuss how institutions of 
personnel and curriculum management shape spaces for school-based decision making. 
In the last sections of this sub-chapter I will scrutinize lists of school-based decision areas 
provided in the literature and the role of school-personnel as street-level bureaucratic 
decision makers in these areas.  
3.2.1 School curriculum and institutions of curriculum management 
Curriculum in the Chinese educational system has to fulfill many purposes: 
preparation of students for the labor market, enhancing development of the country, 
training moral values, and educating citizens to love the motherland, to name just a few. 
With such far-reaching goals one would assume that the Chinese state is preoccupied 
with regulating and standardizing curriculum. In contrast, however, localization, diversity, 
and student-centeredness have been major agendas in the latest reform of curriculum 
and curriculum management. Although some scholars have argued from a perspective of 
cultural determinism that curriculum at Chinese schools is a stable expression of an Asian 
“collectivist culture” in distinct opposition to the individualistic attitudes of “the West” 
(Kennedy 2013), an analysis of the changing face of the Chinese curriculum shows that 
curriculum itself and the ways curriculum in China is managed are constantly changing. 
The question between uniformity and diversity has been a major issue in this reform 
perspective (Bahry et al. 2009; King, Guerra 2005). Under the focus of the effects of 
reforms that according to the Chinese government aim at “quality” in both curriculum 
content and in tuition methods I will here introduce into the diverse forms of curriculum, 
teaching practices, and management of curriculum implementation in China. 
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Reforms in curriculum and teaching practices 
Until the late 1980s Chinese governmental regulations provided merely for a 
unified national curriculum.63 Scholars such as Bahry and colleagues (2009, p. 111) 
criticized this central curriculum for being overly oriented towards the coastal and 
economically developed regions and for setting unachievable standards for 
underdeveloped schools in Western and in poorer regions. Similarly, unified content has 
been largely seen as unsuitable to support students in discovering their own environment. 
For ethnic and nomadic minorities, for instance, the centrally unified curriculum has been 
criticized for creating “alien” cultures that set large barriers for educational access 
(Postiglione et al. 2011). 
Curriculum reform started slowly, but in several rounds64 with a wide range of 
policy documents and regulations (see selection in Table 5) it became one of the central 
issues in the education policy agenda of the Chinese central government, thus reflecting 
both global debates and internal pressures within the Chinese educational system (Bahry 
et al. 2009). From the 1990s onwards the Chinese central government initiated 
government-lead reforms on school curriculum that aimed at increased diversification, 
local suitability, and a change of teaching methods. In policy documents, such as the 
“Outline on Chinese Basic Education Curriculum Reform” the Chinese government writes 
that curriculum in China’s schools needs to follow modern developments in order to 
educate students to socially responsible, patriotic, and knowledgeable citizens (Ministry 
of Education 6/8/2001). Some scholars argue that the reform movement started as 
reaction to criticism by parents, scholars, and educators (Adams, Sargent 2012). Ryan 
(2013, p. 82), by contrast, argues that the reform was based on considerations of 
economic needs when she writes that “[r]eform in education […] resulted from the 
recognition of the skills, especially creativity and innovation, that China needs to continue 
to prosper and to become more than just the 'world's factory'.” 
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Literature on curriculum in China focuses on the officially regulated curriculum as supported by 
educational laws and regulations. Although local curricula have been taught unregulated already since the 
times of the Republic of China (see for example the local textbook collection by Ou and Luo (2009)), these 
locally diverse curricula have not been recognized by legislation until the late 1980s. 
64
 Wu and Meng (2010, p. 70) distinguish three stages of curriculum reform: the initiation stage in 
the 1980s with the first discussions on the need of new localized curriculum; the adjustment stage in the 
90s; and the stage of defining and developing new curriculum models since 2000. 
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Date Chinese title English title
65
 
1986 中华人民共和国义务教育法 Compulsory Education Law 
1988 九年制义务教育教材编写规划方案 Scheme for Editing Nine-year Compulsory Education Teaching 
Materials  
1992 九年义务教育 全日制小学、初级中
学课程计划(试行): 
Curriculum Scheme for Nine-Year Compulsory Education Fulltime 
Primary and Middle Schools (draft) 
1993 中国教育改革和发展纲要 Outline of Chinese Education Reform and Development 
1999 面向 21 世纪教育振兴行动计划 Plan to Promote the Operation of Education in the 21
st
 century  
2001 基础教育课程改革纲要( 试行) Outline on Chinese Basic Education Curriculum Reform (draft)
66
 
Table 5: Selection of major policy documents on curriculum reform in China. Modified after Wu and Meng 
(2010, p. 70). 
One of the major changes in curriculum of the last years has been a shift towards 
more local diversity. For decades the uniformity of Chinese curriculum has been 
emphasized as a symbol of China’s unity, but the curriculum reforms at the turn of the 
new century shifted the agenda towards more diversity (Bahry et al. 2009, p. 123). After 
several steps of diversification in curriculum67 the “Outline on Chinese Basic Education 
Curriculum Reform” from 2001 distinguished for the first time in detail three different 
curricula: the national, the local and the school-based curriculum (Wu, Meng 2010; Qi 
2011b).68 In addition to standardized subjects such as math, Chinese69, foreign Languages, 
ideology and politics, history, biology, etc. (see detailed description of subjects in 
appendix) there are now also local subjects such as “three-life education”70 that only 
schools in some selected provinces have introduced, and school-based subjects especially 
on local history, ethnic customs, or other fields such as “population education”, “national 
defense education”, or vocational trainings (Sun 2005). The national curriculum is the 
mandatory curriculum that all children during compulsory education from grade one to 
nine undergo. It “reflects the basic requirements and quality standards that all students 
are expected to meet” (Wang 2010, p. 30), and textbooks differ only marginally between 
localities. The local curriculum, by contrast, is a means to adjust the content of national 
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 English titles are based on own translations from the documents’ Chinese titles. 
66
 Literature in English language offers various translations of this policy document: “Guidelines on 
Chinese Basic Education Curriculum Reform” (Ryan 2013, p. 82), "Guidelines of Basic Education Curriculum 
Reform" (Zhong, Tu 2013, p. 14), "Basic Education Curriculum Reform Outline" (Dello-Iacovo 2009, p. 243), 
and "Outlines of the Reforms in Basic Education Curriculum" (Wang 2010, p. 29). 
67
 Curriculum diversification has been first mentioned in the Compulsory Education Law from 1986 
and has been reaffirmed in the “Scheme for Editing nine-year Compulsory Education Teaching Materials” 
from 1988. The “Curriculum Scheme for Compulsory Education Fulltime Primary and Middle Schools” from 
1992 allowed schools for the first time to expand on the national curriculum and to design “activity courses” 
in addition to the national curriculum for up to six percent, see Wu and Meng (2010). The curriculum for 
senior secondary schools, for instance, has changed already 8 times since 1978 (Sun 2005, pp. 22–23). 
68
 Chinese literature refers to the nationally unified curriculum as 国家课程, to the local curriculum 
as 地方性课程, and to the school-based curriculum as 校本课程 (see e.g. Luo 2007; Wu, Meng 2010). 
69
 A literal translation of this subject’s Chinese title 语文 would be „language and literature“. 
70
 “Three-life education” (三生教育) is a subject developed by the Ministry of Education of Yunnan 
Province that is centered on hygiene and safety in school. It aims, among other goals, at teaching children 
to cope with learning stress (Zhou 2010). 
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subjects locally and to develop specific local subjects in areas such as history or 
geography. In subjects such as moral or health education, for instance, the local 
curriculum also functions as a test field for curriculum experimentation ahead of national 
expansion. The school-based curriculum as the third type is intended as a means to 
develop schools’ profiles and to support adjustments to students’ needs. It is supposed to 
"supplement the shortages of the national and local curriculum and [to] increase the 
relevance of school curriculum to individual schools and students" (Wang 2010, p. 42). It 
covers subject matter such local culture, local literature, music, and drawing, and it is 
taught with materials that are developed at the school level by school staff (Li, Shuai 
2010). 
However, these three curricula have an unequal share in the amount of scheduled 
classroom hours. The “Outline on Chinese Basic Education Curriculum Reform” from 2001 
defines a clear set of subject share for schools in compulsory education. According to this 
share, 80 to 84 percent of school hours are reserved for the national curriculum and 
merely 16 to 20 percent can be used for the local and school-based curriculum (Bahry et 
al. 2009, p. 111). Kennedy (2013, p. 5) writes, referring to the curricula of Mainland China, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong, that “the liberalized elements of the curriculum are always 
secondary to the examined curriculum that remains the most potent force in the region’s 
educational provision.“ The development of school-based curricula has been found to 
“remain in the preliminary stage” (Li, Shuai 2010, p. 33) due to vague conceptualizations 
of school-based curriculum development, lack in support for schools, and the 
overwhelming influence of exams that force schools to shift resources from school-based 
subjects to the nationally unified subjects (Li, Shuai 2010). 
Apart from the localization of curriculum the reforms also aim at a change in the 
traditional teaching methods. Government and scholars in China alike proposed reforms 
towards “quality education”.71  The traditional system of learning and teaching in Chinese 
schools has been called “examination-oriented”, “promotion-oriented”, "textbook-
driven”, and “teacher centered" (Adams, Sargent 2012, pp. 4–5; Bahry et al. 2009, p. 110; 
see also Pepper 1996). Exams have been major determinants of educational success. 
Teachers' lecturing and teachers' questions support students merely to learn the textbook 
content, but not to reflect content critically. Despite its vagueness the term “quality 
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 The Chinese term 素质教育 has been translated into various English terms: "competence 
education", "quality education", "essential qualities education", and "character education" (Dello-Iacovo 
2009, p. 242). 
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education”72 nevertheless became a term to call for reforms in education methods in 
order “to encourage and enable a move away from a transmission approach to teaching 
and learning and towards the development of an 'autonomous' learner” (Ryan 2013, 
p. 82). Dello-Iacovo (2009, p. 243) lists a catalogue of measures that the Chinese 
government proposed to enhance quality education: reduce students’ workloads and the 
importance of exams; limit school hours and the number of books to be purchased; 
mandate 12 weeks of holidays; cultivate students’ curiosity; and conduct experiments in 
class instead of rote learning. Zhong and Tu (2013, pp. 19–20) summarize the changes in a 
before-after comparison: curriculum objectives shall be transformed from knowledge-
based to all-round developmental goals; fixed and academic structures are intended to 
open up to balanced and flexible structures; unified and difficult content shall center 
more on students’ interests; passive and rote learning shall make room for 
communication and cooperation-based learning; examination-centered learning shall be 
changed to diversified value-added assessments; and central government management 
shall be supplemented by local management. 
After more than ten years since the initiation of the curriculum reform in 2001 
scholars attested a varied diagnosis of its effects on actual classroom tuition. Zhong and 
Tu (2013), for example, found in their study on schools which conducted curriculum 
reforms between 2005 and 2009 that teachers internalized the meanings of the reforms. 
Ni and colleagues (2011, p. 118) found in a study that math teachers "hold a more 
dynamic view of mathematics" after the reforms, that they "used more learning tasks 
with higher cognitive demands", and that they asked "more questions that required 
students to describe procedures leading to their answers." However, other studies 
indicated that the “quality education” reforms hardly induced any changes in actual 
classroom practices. Dello-Iacovo (2009), Wang (2011), and Adams and Sargent (2012) 
found that especially in rural areas and in classes that prepare for college entrance 
examinations the share of teacher-centered methods (e.g. teacher lectures) and student-
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 Although pointing to a “highly contested“ (Woronov 2009, p. 568) concept that “lumps together 
[…] apparently unrelated educational issues” as diverse as the universalization of the nine-year compulsory 
education, curriculum reform (including moral, technical, and health education), aesthetic education, 
inclusive education for children with disabilities, and education for ethnic minorities (Dello-Iacovo 2009, 
p. 242), this term nevertheless developed into a major term in both governmental documents and people’s 
discourse (Woronov 2009). The “quality” (素质) discourse connects with discourses on the correct attitudes 
of citizens and the concepts of the “harmonious society“ as a rhetoric for community building and 
governance (Tomba 2009). It is especially used to describe an assumed lacking-behind in moral or 
educational qualities of rural population, peasants, women, and ethnic minorities and is thus used to mark 
distinctions between social groups (Jacka 2009, p. 526). In the educational arena practices under the slogan 
of raising personal qualities such as assessment of students’ ability to govern their bodies and minds have 
been described as a form to achieve governmentality among students (Woronov 2009, pp. 578–579). 
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centered methods (e.g. discussions) did not change, that new curricula have not been 
implemented, that new textbooks lack connection to reality, that teachers did not receive 
sufficient trainings and refused to change their teaching methods, that examinations 
continue to play a central role in curriculum planning as a means to determine students’ 
educational and job opportunities,73 and that new concepts have not been considered by 
school staff. Dello-Iacovo (2009, pp. 248–249) concludes that the reforms have failed and 
that “despite some very inspirational educational reforms at some schools, the essential 
nature of Chinese schools remains unchanged.” 
Despite these caveat both the discussion about the need to reform educational 
methods and the calls for curriculum diversification at the local level have “opened up” an 
“ideological space” (Johnson 2011) for local curriculum agendas which actors at local 
governments and schools in turn can use to change specific aspects of curriculum. 
Although the standardized and nationally unified subjects changed less than scholars of 
the Chinese education system might have wished for, the chance to add local subjects on 
top of the standard curriculum has the potential to challenge previous models of 
curriculum management. The next paragraphs will discuss these models. 
Centralized decentralization of curriculum management 
Not only the content, but also the management of curriculum at Chinese schools 
has experienced major reforms over the last decades.74 The tone in policy documents that 
describe “curriculum management” (课程管理) as a summarizing term for development 
and implementation of curriculum policies at school level recently changed towards a 
new emphasis on power within the combined making and implementation of curriculum. 
“The Outline on Chinese Basic Education Curriculum Reform” from 2001 proposes a 
clearer distinction between the power to develop curriculum at national, local, and school 
level and recommends including expert consultations, public discussions, and 
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 This unchanged strong role of exams has not only met criticism. Studies showed that many 
parents, for instance, are also in favor of exams, as they perceive exams as a fair means to achieve equality 
in opportunities based on educational merits (Dello-Iacovo 2009, p. 247). 
74
 Some scholars point to global trends in education reform and argue that China has been affected 
by these trends similar to other regions in Asia. Cheng and Townsend (2000, p. 319), for instance, write that 
the search for effective schools, the increased use of market forces in educational provision, the 
development of educational standards, the shift to decentralized educational management, and the 
development of new curricula and examination practices have been common trends in reform in a number 
of Asian countries, including China. However, not only have comparative studies (e.g. the one by King and 
Guerra 2005) shown that China differs from other Asian countries in its mode of educational governance, 
but numerous studies on the Chinese development have also illustrated (e.g. Pepper 1996; Hawkins 2000) 
that instead of blindly copying global trends China’s reforms in educational management rather follow 
experimentation. 
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experimentation as methods to implement these reforms. In the newer document “Ruling 
schools by law - Outline for Implementing a Modern School System” the Ministry of 
Education (6/26/2012) uses terms such as “democratic control” over curriculum 
implementation, the “rule of law” in school governance, and the “guaranteed freedom” 
of schools, teachers, and students.75 Chinese scholars have picked up this new tone and 
have discussed the need to increase local responsibility (Wu, Meng 2010), legitimacy 
(Zhong, Tu 2013), and democratic control (Li 2013) over curriculum policy and curriculum 
management. 
Nevertheless, despite this new emphasis traditional institutional settings of top-
down control continue to determine curriculum policy implementation. Some have 
argued that static institutions such as the examination system with its long history in 
imperial China (Elman 2000; Berry 2011) are distinct manifestations of “Chinese 
pedagogic culture” that prevent implementation of imported “Western pedagogic 
cultures” (Yin et al. 2014). Others have argued that the persistence of institutions amidst 
the changes of China’s educational system is connected to policy implementation that 
uses experimentation, flexibility, and “vagueness” to create innovations through local 
implementation diversity (Paine 1992). 76 
Starting with governmental conferences and documents in 1985,77 fiscal and 
management responsibility in the Chinese education system was at least partly shifted 
from central to local and from state to private actors. The reforms towards more 
decentralization and marketization complemented the state’s provision of educational 
services in higher education and – to lesser degrees – in primary and secondary education 
with service provision by private actors, and it shifted fiscal responsibilities to local 
government levels and to families (Hawkins 2000; Mok 2009). The major motivation for 
this centrally-induced decentralization has been to reduce financial burdens from the 
center: “[A] much hoped for outcome [has been] an educational system that would more 
nimbly respond to economic needs” (Hawkins 2000, p. 445). 
The “Outline on Chinese Basic Education Curriculum Reform” from 2001 (Ministry 
of Education 6/8/2001, § 16) mentions for the first time a three-tier system of curriculum 
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 However, the terms used for reform goals differ between the targeted educational organizations. 
According to the “National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development, 2010-
2020” (State Council 7/27/2010) institutions of higher education shall strengthen their autonomy in areas 
as diverse as research, administration, and the usage of funds. Primary and secondary schools, by contrast, 
shall merely “perfect the school administration system” by including external experts and by enlarging 
principal’s responsibilities education. For all educational institutions, however, reforms shall result in more 
“democratic supervision” of educational organizations. 
76 For experimentation and flexibility in Chinese policy implementation see also chapter 4.  
77
 For instance the “Decision of the CPC Central Committee Reform of China's Educational 
Structure” from 1985, see Hawkins (2000, pp. 442–444). 
 98 
management: the national, the local, and the school-based curriculum management (国
家、地方和学校三级课程管理). According to this document the national level is 
responsible for overall curriculum planning, for establishing national criteria for national 
curriculum subjects, for deciding about the share of school hours for subjects, and for 
facilitating experimental projects. Local educational bureaus (i.e. bureaus on provincial, 
city, prefecture, or county level) are responsible for developing local plans to implement 
national curriculum and for drafting plans, targets, and criteria for local curriculum. The 
school level, finally, is not only responsible for implementing national and local curricula, 
but also for identifying educational needs of the local community and to develop school-
based curriculum plans (Wang 2010, pp. 29–32). This three-tier system follows two 
contrasting principles at the same time. Firstly, the new system aims at a clearer 
distinction between the three administrative levels of central, local, and school 
curriculum management for individual subjects when it distinguishes responsibilities 
between these levels. At the same time it confirms hierarchical dependency when it 
defines that schools and local educational bureaus can develop own curricula only under 
the supervision of the next higher administrative level. 
Curriculum management in China today is characterized by both elements of 
centralized and decentralized control. On the one side curriculum management, in the 
shadow of broader education policy reforms, experienced shifts towards decentralization. 
Fiscal decentralization brought increased discretion to local levels and schools, which 
especially urban schools use to offer private tutoring in the afternoon or during holidays 
(Ryan 2013, p. 84). Furthermore, under the trend to “marketize” educational service 
provision in China (Mok, Tan 2004) textbook publishers have been encouraged to publish 
textbooks, teachers’ handbooks, and additional classroom teaching materials since 2001, 
so that government agencies can choose between different textbooks at sub-national 
levels. Finally, the possibility to draft local curriculum standards for local and school-based 
curricula brought additional decentralization effects (Qi 2011b, pp. 30–31). 
On the other side, however, structures of hierarchical control limited 
decentralization of curriculum management. Firstly, the center is still active in drafting 
educational legislation (Hawkins 2000, p. 447). Secondly, the Office of National Education 
Inspectorate (Qi 2011b; Cravens et al. 2012) has installed a system of supervision for 
educational administration and schools (Qi 2011b, p. 32) that aims at “assuring that the 
various laws and regulations are followed by local authorities and educators” (Hawkins 
2000, p. 448). Thirdly, in the distinction between national, local, and school-based 
curricula discretion is limited to the local and school-based curriculum and cannot exceed 
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20 percent of the overall delivered curriculum (see above). Fourthly, textbooks have to 
undergo a review process under supervision by the next higher administrative level (see 
above). Fifthly, standardized testing continues to guarantee a high level of supervision 
over schools and local educational bureaus by higher levels. Standardized student tests 
determine the evaluation of educational success of students and schools as “a powerful 
tool to impose the national standards and requirements to Chinese schooling" (Qi 2011b, 
p. 34). Finally, some policy areas that have been decentralized in earlier reforms have 
been recentralized again. In the areas of educational financing, for instance, the shift of 
financial responsibility for funding compulsory education from township to county level in 
2008 and the increase of financial transfers from the center to less developed regions 
especially in China’s West has recentralized major financial responsibilities recently (Zhou 
2012a). 
In sum, decentralization of power in curriculum management in China must be 
understood as a more complex issue than a mere shift of authority between three clearly 
defined tiers. Qi (2011b, p. 36) notes that “the central state has no real attempt to 
diversify Chinese education system by transferring its decision making authority to lower 
levels”. Instead, reforms have been used to constantly readjust the relationship between 
the center and the local level. The center conducts the pace and direction of this reform. 
Hawkins (2000, p. 452) notes: “China's decentralization fits the general definition of a 
transfer of authority (particularly financial) and decisionmaking from higher to lower 
levels but it is less clear whether this is a complete devolution or more of a delegation of 
authority. Decentralization in China appears to have characteristics of both“. This can also 
be seen in curriculum management in China. Institutions for curriculum management 
bind the diverse levels of curriculum management together under hierarchical control, 
but at the same time they allow for local discretion. This “seemingly paradoxical mixture 
of centralization and decentralization” (Qi 2011b, p. 34) must be seen as a network of 
shared, but constantly re-negotiated responsibility for curriculum development and 
implementation that opens up spaces for local decision making and for bargaining at the 
local level. 
3.2.2 Institutional spaces and areas for school-based decision making in China 
Institutions for management of school, personnel, and curriculum define a flexible 
space for school-based decision making. In the following paragraphs I will elaborate on 
the mechanisms of how institutions provide spaces and set limits to school-based 
decision making, before I will illustrate the flexibility of this space and the need for local 
interpretation. 
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Spaces for discretionary decisions at schools 
The above discussed institutional settings of managing schools, school personnel, 
and curriculum provide for some space for school-based discretionary decisions. Firstly, 
schools in China can use school-based resources to organize their own affairs. Although 
study fees have been largely abolished, some schools continue to demand fees from “out 
of plan students” who reside outside the schools’ catchment area (Wong 2006, p. 47). 
Furthermore, schools run additional enterprises such as farms or factories on the school 
ground (Bush et al. 1998b). Especially after kindergarten education experienced a rapid 
growth (Gao, Zhang 2011) the fees that schools collect from adjacent kindergartens can 
be used for school purposes as well. One of the case schools that I visited for my study, 
for instance, spent additional income generated by running a kindergarten to purchase 
school infrastructure (e.g. surveillance cameras) or educational materials (e.g. books and 
a piano) (PR-12_2012-01-17). 
Secondly, the organizational structures and measures of school and personnel 
management allow for discretion as well. In external school management structures the 
principal responsibility system defines principals as educational managers who can and 
should make decisions to improve the educational outcomes of their schools. Similarly, in 
school internal organization the “Staff Representatives Assembly” and other committees 
have been established to represent teachers’ interests and to guarantee teachers’ 
participation in school matters. Teachers also participate in peer-evaluations and in 
school inspection teams. 
Thirdly, the curriculum and actual necessities of teaching practice in the classroom 
allow for discretionary decision making, especially since local and school-based 
curriculum have been on the agenda of education reforms. Schools can shape the 
planned, delivered, and tested school-based and local curriculum of up to 16 percent and 
thereby build up a specific school-profile (see above). 
Finally, the diversity of tuition practices in the classroom, that, as any other area 
of street-level service delivery, has to rely on adjustments to clients’ needs, has been re-
affirmed by the official “quality education” discourse. Student-centered methods, 
incorporation of local knowledge, and curriculum content that is oriented towards 
students’ interests all require a certain space for teachers to make decisions in the 
classroom (Lai, Lo 2006, p. 300). 
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Limits of Spaces for discretionary decisions at schools 
At the same time that institutions allow for discretionary decision making by 
schools, they also limit the space for such decisions. Firstly, schools’ possibility to 
generate income on own discretion is limited. Since study fees have been abolished the 
largest share of educational financing derives again from the state (Editorial Board of 
China Educational Statistics Yearbook 2012; Mok 2005). Furthermore, schools’ discretion 
to spend remaining self-generated income is limited to those areas that governmental 
inspectors agree upon. Finally, as principals have assured me (e.g. PR-12_2012-01-17), 
schools can only cooperate with civil society organizations or accepts donations if the 
local Bureaus of Education agree. 
Secondly, although organizational structures have been set to establish school 
autonomy and democratic participation by school personnel, mechanisms in both areas 
are limited by the actual distribution of power. The Staff Representatives Assembly, that 
has been installed to represent staff in school-based decision making, has been found to 
merely “present and legitimize the decisions of the senior staff members” (Lai, Lo 2006, 
p. 299) and regular teachers have hardly any say in this committee. Furthermore, since 
Teacher Unions in China lack power to represent teachers78 teachers also lack the means 
to formulate policy demands in a legal and organized structure. 
Thirdly, the institutional space for local and school-based curricula is limited by the 
dominance of standardized curriculum subjects. Not only are more than 80 percent of the 
delivered curriculum reserved for these unified subjects, but institutional settings such as 
the exam focus and the teaching-by-the-book method in schooling (Wang 2011) provide 
these subjects with more importance in the school system than local school subjects.79 
Furthermore, schools are required to use only those textbooks and to teach only those 
local curricula that have been approved by the Bureaus of Education and to select content 
in line with basic educational and state ideology, such as ethnic harmony, patriotism etc. 
(National People's Congress 4/12/1984, §§ 26,57,58). 
Finally, the space of school personnel to make autonomous decisions is limited by 
evaluation mechanisms that measure teaching success in student exam grades and 
attrition rates (Wong 2006, p. 50). As long as there is a continuous lack of evaluation 
criteria of individual student development and student centered teaching (Dello-Iacovo 
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 With the China Education Trade Union (CETU) China has the worlds’ largest union of teachers, 
but this union’s is rather set up to control teachers than to represent teacher’s interest, as it lacks means to 
bargain for teachers’ interests for instance through strikes (Loveless 2000, pp. 255–256). 
79
 This imbalance of importance of curriculum further limits local curriculum. Scholars reported 
that schools often use the time reserved for local curriculum for further teaching in the regular and 
standardized subjects in order to improve students’ exam results in these subjects (Li, Shuai 2010, p. 35). 
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2009) the increase and standardization of personnel evaluations continues to limit the 
space for discretionary decisions of teachers. 
The flexibility of spaces for school-based decision making 
The above elaborated parallel existence of institutional settings that widen the 
space for school-based decision making on the one side and those that limit this space on 
the other indicates that the borders for this space are flexible. This flexibility derives from 
two constituting characteristics of decentralization of decision making in educational 
policy implementation in China: the paradox of centrally-driven decentralization in 
China’s education system, and the unclear responsibilities in educational management. 
Decentralization of China’s educational policy has been largely driven by the 
central governments’ activities to delegate power, rather than by local governments’ and 
schools’ activities to gain these powers. The process of educational decentralization has 
been steered by the central government, which made recentralization under policy goals 
such as raising equality in educational access in inter-township comparison comparatively 
easy (Hawkins 2000). Similarly, the central government shifts decision making authority to 
schools under slogans such as “quality education” or the “principal responsibility system”. 
However, the term “autonomy” seems to be unsuitable to describe the space for school-
based decision making in China when it is understood as the power to permanently make 
decisions without being subject to accountability. Instead, this space can rather be 
understood as temporary delegation of decision making power of specific items to 
schools under accountability that can be withdrawn once policies change. 
The space for school-based decision making in China is defined by unclear or 
vague institutional boundaries. Several organizational structures in the Chinese 
educational management are unclear, for instance the power of school committees or the 
share of responsibilities between townships and counties (King, Guerra 2005, 
pp. 183,197). Policy documents that use vague language to describe responsibilities and 
power of organs in educational management contribute to this vagueness.80 Furthermore, 
policies concerning educational management are implemented in different scope and 
pace at different localities within China. Shifting funding responsibility from township to 
county, for instance, took in some regions several years with at least five intermediary 
steps, as Liu and colleagues (2009) observed in Gansu province. In connection with 
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 Examples for vague language can be found in many policy documents in China. The “Outline for 
Ruling Schools by Law” (Ministry of Education 6/26/2012), for instance, proposes that school management 
should respect “democratic participation” of school staff, students, and society, but neither defines it this 
term nor does it provide measures to guarantee participation. 
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continuous reforms local diversity leads to unclear institutional settings at local base, 
since implementers cannot always be aware of the current state of reform in their locality, 
and literature cannot depict the pace of local reforms on national comparative scale 
either.81 
3.2.3 Areas of school-based curriculum decision making in China 
A few scholars provide lists on issues of school-based decisions in the educational 
system in China. In comparison to other scholars King and Guerra’s (2005) catalogue of 
the changes of educational decision making in three educational decision areas in 
secondary education (instructional matters, personnel management, and resources) in 
the Asian countries China, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Laos between 1998 and 
2003 is the most detailed one.82 These two scholars distinguish between four loci of 
decision making (central government, intermediate government, local government, and 
school) and between two modi of decision making (decisions made in full autonomy on 
the one side and decisions made in consultation or within a framework on the other side). 
Table 7 indicates their findings for the case of China. 
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 Contradicting descriptions and evaluations of the power of specific actors in the educational 
system in China are common in the literature. Some scholars describe the Staff Representatives Assembly, 
for instance, as main holder of decision making power in China’s schools (Bush et al. 1998b), whereas other 
see this assembly as a committee to merely inform teachers about decisions made elsewhere (Lai, Lo 2006, 
p. 299). 
82 Wong (2006), for instance, writes that school finance, educational goals, school management, 
personnel and staffing, curriculum setting, and student recruitment are all effected by school-based 
decision making in China, but lacks in specific descriptions of decisions in these areas.  
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Key decisions 1998 2003 
Instructional matters 
Instruction time A A 
Designing programs of study A A 
Defining course content A A 
Choosing textbooks b c 
Teaching methods D c 
Mode of grouping students D D 
Support activities for students D D 
Creation/closure of schools c c 
Creation/abolition of grades A A 
Setting qualifying exams A c 
Credentialing c D 
Methods for assigning students’ regular work d c 
Personnel management 
Hiring teachers D c 
Hiring principals c c 
Fixing teacher salaries d c 
Fixing principal salaries d c 
Career of teachers D d 
Career of principals c c 
Resources 
Allocation to school for teaching staff c * 
Allocation to school for nonsalary current expenditure D c 
Allocation to school for capital expenditure C c 
Use in school for capital expenditure C c 
Table 6: Table: Locus and mode of key decisions in lower secondary education in China, 1998 and 2003, 
after: King and Guerra (2005, p. 185). Note: Indicated are locus and mode of decision. Decisions made in full 
autonomy: A: central government; B: intermediate government; C: local government; D: school. Decisions 
made in consultation or within framework: a: central government; b: intermediate government; c: local 
government; d: school. *: left void in source. 
According to the authors, educational decision making in China was in 2003 more 
decentralized than in the other four countries of this study. The central government 
decides in merely four items, namely defining instruction time, designing programs of 
study, defining course content, and creation or abolition of grades. These four items are 
also centralized in the other surveyed countries, which according to the authors "reflect[s] 
the widely held belief that the education system helps promote a national identity as well 
as shared values" (King, Guerra 2005, p. 185) and that central governments are reluctant 
to grant autonomy on these issues. 
In China the “intermediate government level” (provincial government) and the 
“local government level” (county and township government) both have been much more 
powerful in 2003 than those in the other countries of this study. Although this study does 
not sufficiently show differences between township and county responsibilities, it 
becomes clear that local government levels are especially involved in financing of 
education and personnel management. 
There are only few items in 2003 that the authors see as clearly school-based: 
grouping students, support activities for students, credentialing, and determining 
teachers’ careers. Interestingly most of these items are, similar to the items under central 
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governmental control, in the area of instructional matters, which indicates that the 
content of teaching is decided by the government, but choosing the methods of teaching 
this content is left to schools’ discretion. 
The table indicates also trends concerning shifts in decision making in China. 
Firstly, the mode of decision making for several items has changed from unregulated and 
autonomous decision making to coordinated and regulated modes. The number of 
decisions under “full autonomy” decreased from 13 in 1998 to 7 in 2003, whereas at the 
same time the number of decisions made “in consultation or within a framework” 
increased. Secondly, the number of school-based decisions decreased from 6 in 1998 to 4 
in 2003, which further contributes to the low prevalence of school-based autonomous 
decisions. These shifts reflect several of the changes in institutional settings that have 
been discussed above. The increase of personnel management decisions that are made in 
the mode of “consultation under frameworks”, for instance, is an outcome of the 
constant increase in regulations concerning the management of schools and personnel. 
The shift of resources allocation from schools to local government is related on the one 
side to the intensified and standardized responsibilities of government to fund schooling 
and on the other side to the progressive abolition of school fees. The shift of 
responsibility for choosing teaching methods from schools to local governments, to name 
a final example, is as an outcome of increased regulation of curriculum by local 
government. 
However, educational decision making in China is much more diverse than the 
study by King and Guerra depicts. Firstly, both modus and locus differ between localities. 
What for comparative reasons has been subsumed under the label “China” differs 
regionally. The presence of local curricula, for instance, depends on how much the 
provincial government is willing to develop own subjects. Secondly, the scope for local or 
school-based decisions differs between “core subjects” such as math and Chinese on the 
one side and subjects such as local history on the other. Thirdly, the scope for local 
decisions also differs between schools levels. College entrance examinations play a 
stronger role in secondary schools than in primary schools, and in higher classes than in 
younger classes, so teachers’ autonomy in first-grade classes to make decisions for 
example on class content can be expected to differ from that of teachers in the last 
grades of secondary schools. Similarly, the autonomy of “shining examples” (Dello-Iacovo 
2009, p. 244) of pilot schools, elite schools, or private schools strongly differs from that of 
regular schools. If schools are well-equipped personnel they might be able to run projects 
to develop school-based curriculum or they might send teachers to trainings, but if they 
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lack these resources their space to make discretionary decisions can be much more 
limited, for instance when teachers cannot attend trainings due to the lack of staff who 
could cover for those on leave (Brock 2009). Finally, abilities and chances to take over 
responsibilities for decision making also differ between individual teachers. As several 
studies (e.g. An et al. 2007; Peng et al. 2013) have, not surprisingly, shown that teachers 
in China react differently to outside stimuli of reform it is only consequential that the 
scope for school-based curriculum development and curriculum decisions also depends 
on individual teachers’ capacities and interests. 
To summarize, there are only a few items where school personnel can act as the 
sole decision maker, such as decisions concerning teaching methods (e.g. the amount of 
homework, the share of lecturing, or the degree of response to students’ concerns), but 
in several areas school personnel can make decisions in coordination with other actors 
(e.g. participation in local or school-based curriculum development projects or defining 
the feedback provided on school-based teacher evaluations). However, in light of the 
flexibility, these lists can only provide a general picture and must be specified for specific 
localities, specific decision areas, and specific understandings of power and autonomy. 
3.2.4 School personnel as street-level bureaucrat decision makers in China 
According to the model of bottom-up street-level bureaucratic policy analysis 
outlined in the theory chapter institutions define the position and the options of street-
level bureaucrats in policy implementation. The sections above have indicated that 
diverse institutions of accountability and discretion shape the space for decisions by 
school personnel at Chinese schools. However, in this section I will argue that institutions 
also shape the role and the benefits that street-level bureaucrats at Chinese schools can 
gain through decision making. In the next paragraphs I will thus introduce into the modes 
of how institutions define the roles and interests of school personnel in Chinese policy 
implementation. 
Institutionalized roles of school personnel as street-level bureaucrats 
Institutions define the roles of school personnel as street-level bureaucrats in 
China. First and foremost, through various mechanisms reaching from teacher education, 
to hiring by the governmental Bureaus of Human Resources, to pay-determining 
evaluations, Chinese school staff is heavily entangled with institutions defined by the 
state. These institutions define school staff as members of state organizations. Through 
connecting implementation behavior with hiring, pay, and promotion these institutions 
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pressure school staff to accept roles, and as Xu (2012a) writes, the acceptance of these 
roles increases with time of working at schools. 
Additionally, norms of teacher behavior demand that school staff represent state 
ideologies. The Chinese state uses schooling as a tool to establish and safeguard 
ideological values such as patriotism, “social stability”, and party leadership over societal 
matters, as many authors repeatedly have argued (Hansen 2013, 2012; Kipnis 2011, 2007). 
School personnel have to fulfill roles of implementers of these political goals and values, 
and fundamental opposition is unlikely to be tolerated by government and supervision 
agencies. Teachers are expected to fulfill their role as speakers’ of state ideology, to 
accept the initiatives organized by state, and to arrange their teaching accordingly (Lai, Lo 
2011). 
Furthermore, norms on teacher behavior, as institutionalized for instance in 
legislation, formulate expectations on the moral and professional roles of both teachers 
and principals. The Compulsory Education Law (National People's Congress 4/12/1984, §§ 
28–29), for instance, specifies that teachers shall be “a model of virtue for others” and 
that they shall be “loyal to the cause of the education of the People”. In addition 
stakeholders in politics and society, such as politicians, colleagues, and parents, uphold 
expectations towards teachers. To abide to moral codes and to political ideologies; to 
have kind, happy, confident, and diligent personalities; to achieve high student outcomes; 
and to continuously evaluate and improve their own teaching are only some of the moral 
requirements that scholars have found in teacher evaluation material (Peng et al. 2013). 
Similarly, principals are expected to be “trustworthy to implement educational guiding 
policies, laws and regulations" and they "must be a paragon of virtue and learning, must 
have strong leadership ability and management skills, and must be committed to a career 
in education" (Wang 2003, pp. 111–113). 
At the same time, however, institutions also place school personnel in a role of 
service providers who are expected to consider the interests of the clients. Scholars have 
argued that expectations on teacher behavior are rooted in Confucian tradition with its 
“system of hierarchy and respect [that] has influenced heavily conventional views of 
teachers and students where teachers were highly respected and seen more in the role of 
a strict but benevolent parent" (Ryan 2013, p. 81). These scholars argue that this value 
system is still the basis of the evaluation of teaching quality in China, in contrast to 
evaluation systems of “the West” which have been said to focus more on elements of 
school and societal environment (Peng et al. 2013). Despite the oversimplifying cultural 
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determinism of this perspective it indicates some norms in Chinese discourse that frame 
teachers as decision-makers. 
The new focus on localized curriculum and on reforming teaching methods 
towards students’ interests, students’ needs, and students’ conditions requires additional 
teacher autonomy. Coupled with ideas of educational “modernization” documents such 
as the Teachers’ Law (National People's Congress 10/31/1993) or the Outline to Rule 
Schools by Law (Ministry of Education 6/26/2012)  established the formal terminology to 
provide schools with larger spaces for discretionary decisions. A societal discourse on 
teachers’ roles as moral leaders and experts who can be trusted with some degree of 
autonomy provide some space for teachers’ discretion.  
These institutional settings affect the decision making by school personnel. In a 
study by Wang (2011) teachers said that institutionalized norms, such as being held 
accountable to timely “finish” textbooks within a term, cause them to adjust their tuition 
to teaching according to the book as a defensive strategy. Even if students don’t learn the 
content, teachers at least can say that they have done their job. Another study by Lai and 
Lo (2011) has observed that teachers in China, even when they felt uncomfortable with 
curriculum guidelines or when they feared student resistance, “did not dare to publicly 
express their disagreement” (Lai, Lo 2011, p. 236).  
Chinese teachers and administrative school staff experience the typical street-
level bureaucrat dilemma between hierarchical control by superiors and client orientation, 
as defined by Lipsky (1980). On the one side, institutions require to make decisions 
according to hierarchical structures. Wong (2006) writes about an institutionalized 
“dependency culture” between patrons and workers at Chinese schools based on 
accountability, that places teachers in a dependent position towards their superiors in 
school, and that makes school leaders dependent from government administration. On 
the other side school personnel also perceive that they are required to consider students 
as clients in their decisions. Studies found that school personnel in China also reflect on 
the learning progress of students. Wang (2011, p. 163) argues that at Chinese schools 
“students are one of the most important circumstantial factors for teachers to decide on 
the teaching strategies.” In light of these contrasting accountability foci Chinese teachers 
and school leaders perceive, as studies have argued (Peng et al. 2013; Yin et al. 2014), the 
diverse expectations between leaders in classrooms and the more stepped-back role of 
enablers of student-centered tuition as a dilemma that causes stress to teachers and 
administrators, especially for older teachers and teachers in schools of large class sizes.  
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Interests of school personnel in school-based decisions 
Institutions define not only the role of teachers and principals in decision making, 
but they also determine how specific decisions can benefit principals’ and teachers’ 
interests. Although policy documents such as the Teachers Law prescribe that teachers 
shall foremost consider interest of students and the nation (National People's Congress 
10/31/1993), teachers as humans and workers also hope for gaining personal benefits, 
such as higher salary, work security, or reductions in workloads, and institutions shape 
how school staff’s decisions benefit from decisions. 
Ranking, as a first example of institutional settings, determines teachers’ and 
principals’ personal benefits, such as salary, housing, or the chances to get promoted to 
better equipped schools or to localities with higher living standards. Since, as was 
discussed above, teacher ranking is based on evaluation criteria that focus on students’ 
end-of-term exam results in major subjects such as math and Chinese the institutional 
settings reward teacher decisions that improve these outcomes, such as increasing 
students’ workloads in these two subjects. Similarly, institutionalized evaluations that 
determine principals’ careers mainly by factors of school performance as measured in 
student attrition rates pressure principals to make decisions that improve these results, 
for instance by scheduling more human resources within the school to higher classes for 
preparation of college entrance exams. In their study on teachers in China Ding and 
Lehrer (2007) found that the possibility to improve ranking was a major factor in teachers’ 
decisions in class. Similarly, Qian and Walker (2011) found that principals aim at 
improving positions in order to be promoted to schools with high ranks. 
Institutions that regulate local curriculum can similarly affect the benefits that 
principals and teachers gain by decisions on implementing this curriculum. Since the 
standard subjects are more often included in teacher evaluations, teacher deployment 
schemes, and teacher trainings (see above), teachers benefit from choosing these 
subjects in their own college or university education, from investing more own resources 
in terms of time and energy here, or from applying for teacher trainings in these subjects. 
On the other side, teachers and principals can also benefit from establishing additional 
local curriculum, for instance when it increases parents’ choice for a specific school, which 
used to increase school personnel’s income through parents “sponsorship fees” until 
these fees have been made illegally (see above), and still continues to increase school 
staff’s chances for additional income through private tutoring.83 
                                                     
83
 The notorious “Olympic Math”, a specific Math course, exemplifies how one subject leads to a 
nationwide “school selection rush”. When in the early 2000s secondary schools started to select students 
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However, the modes of how institutions reward specific decisions with benefits 
for school staff can only insufficiently be generalized. Firstly, since institutional settings 
related to school-based decision making are often flexible, changing, and unclear decision 
making by school personnel according to institutional spaces can thus only happen within 
processes of interpreting policies and institutions. Secondly, institutional settings differ 
between localities, subjects, and schools. Finally, institutions may be able to define 
specific rewards, but the degree of how much school staff wants these rewards depends 
on individual preferences. In this respect institutions can affect decisions by school 
personnel, but they must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, looking at individual 
institutional arrangements and individual teachers’ interpretations of these arrangements. 
3.3 Summary of chapter and specification of framework 
In this chapter I have introduced to the institutional settings that define the space 
for curriculum decision making by school staff as street-level bureaucrats at Chinese 
schools. Two contrasting characteristics of curriculum and school management define this 
space: central unification and standardization on the one hand and flexibility and local 
diversity on the other hand. Government-lead reforms in curriculum management have 
opened up spaces for local curriculum due to new approaches for student-centered 
“quality education”. However, these spaces have been confined to a small percentage of 
school hours and non-core subjects. Similarly, institutions of school and personnel 
management provide for and actually demand decision making by school personnel. 
Schools are requested to develop own profiles, to manage staff, and to establish school 
development plans. At the same time, however, reforms in personnel management 
established new institutions of accountability, for instance by regularized school 
evaluations, mandated personnel trainings, or performance-based pay. 
Institutionally defined spaces for school-based decision making place principals 
and teachers in a position where they can make discretionary decisions on a range of 
issues, but the institutions also prevent full autonomy of decision-makers at school level. 
Institutionalized norms of teacher behavior, for instance, call for decision making by the 
expert in the classroom, but they also define school staff as members of state 
bureaucracy. Similarly, new approaches to localized curriculum demand that school 
personnel adjust curriculum to local needs, but at the same time personnel accountability 
                                                                                                                                                                
according to their achievements in privately tutored Olympic Math courses, schools created a market for 
private Olympic Math at public elementary schools and private tutoring schools. Due to connections 
between leaders of public schools and private learning institutions this brought a fortune to some school 
leaders (Li, Fan 2011, pp. 78–81). 
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measures pressure school staff to make decisions according to unified standards. In sum, 
the role of street-level bureaucrats at Chinese schools can be described as constantly 
moving between discretionary decision-maker and bureaucrats in state-governed 
agencies. 
Institutions, however, often merely provide “blurred” spaces for school-based 
decision making. This chapter has thus also shown that generalized assumptions on 
decisions by teachers and principals can only be drawn to very limited degrees. First, this 
chapter has elaborated on general institutional settings for schools and for the main 
curriculum, but what about the distinct institutional settings for individual subjects? 
Institutions such as teacher evaluation, school internal teacher representation, or 
teaching norms follow national unified guidelines, but one can assume that for local 
subjects, such as local history or minority languages, there are different institutional 
settings, different approaches, and different perceptions of the value of diversity in place. 
Second, due to flexible and unclear institutional settings lists of modes and loci of 
decision making can merely summarize decision making areas on a national basis, but 
cannot provide sufficient information about decision making at local and school level. 
Local differences in institutional settings, the pace of reforms, and the goals of policies 
define spaces for decision making at schools in much variety. Third, although institutional 
settings of curriculum and personnel management have been standardized, their effects 
on curriculum decision depend on how school personnel interact with institutions. 
Teachers’ and principals’ interpretations and usage of institutions, their fear of sanctions, 
and their knowledge of tolerated behavior can be expected to filter institutional 
boundaries for school-based decision making spaces. The flexibility and unclear 
definitions of institutions in school management in China amplify this role of school 
personnel. 
These findings call for two adjustments of the analytical framework of school-
based decision making in curriculum policy implementation that I have introduced in the 
previous chapter in the way how the framework understands the institutional settings of 
school management and how it depicts discretionary decision making spaces at schools. 
Firstly, the framework views institutional settings of school and personnel 
management as force that shapes the spaces for discretionary decision making. In the 
case of personnel accountability at Chinese schools the institutional settings establish 
blurred boundaries for this discretionary space. On the one side institutions such as 
evaluation-based unified student exams demand top-down implementation of 
educational policies, but on the other side a lack of control and teaching guidelines also 
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enables decision making by school staff. With this diverging space the framework is 
suitable to grasp dilemmas of school staff in China as street-level bureaucrats that, in light 
of dilemmas of diverging policy goals and tuition demand that exceed the resources at 
schools, must engage in constant decision making. At the same time, however, this 
finding also calls to adjust the framework in its understanding of these dilemmas to the 
Chinese case. As first adjustment the framework needs to understand dilemmas for 
street-level bureaucrats different from those in Western democratic countries. Whereas 
the street-level bureaucracy framework originally perceived dilemmas for street-level 
bureaucrats as deriving from different demands by clients (citizens) and by superiors (in 
government agencies), educational institutional settings of personnel management in 
China merely provide power to supervisors in government agencies such as the Bureaus 
of Education and the Bureaus of Human Resources, but schedule hardly any participation 
by parents or students in the supervision of school staff. Instead of focusing on the 
conflicting pressures by citizens and superiors, analysis under this framework must thus 
include a focus on how different and sometimes conflicting approaches to personnel 
management within the government agencies create dilemmas for school personnel and 
how school personnel interpret these spaces. 
Secondly, the framework views institutions from an actor-centered institutionalist 
perspective as a force that shapes the possibilities for decision making by actors. This 
chapter has shown that institutions provide large spaces for school-based decision 
making, but it has also shown that the spaces differ tremendously between specific 
decision making areas. While school staff in China generally is able to make decisions on 
tuition matter within the classroom, for instance, school staff is to much less degrees 
involved in decision making on financing education. The second requirement to the 
framework is thus that it will need to distinguish between the effects of institutional 
settings on decision making in specific areas of schooling. Accordingly analysis of decision 
making at Chinese schools will need to conduct separate rounds of analysis of how 
specific spaces affect individual decisions.  
In the next chapters I will pick up these calls for adjustments by focusing on 
minority language education in Xishuangbanna. Firstly, I will answer the need to include 
diverging institutional settings of local and non-standardized school subjects by 
specializing on one of the most localized school-subjects in China: minority language 
education. I will discuss if and how institutional settings differ for ethnic minority 
language education from other subjects and how policy goals demand local diversity for 
minority languages. Secondly, I will address the issue of local diversity by spotlighting 
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institutions at one particular place and at selected schools. I will analyze the role of ethnic 
autonomy as well as cultural and linguistic characteristics of a region and institutions of 
educational management in minority languages on the example of school in 
Xishuangbanna. Thirdly, I will pick up the need to include the effects of principals’ and 
teachers’ understanding of the vague institutional settings at Chinese schools in the main 
empirical part of this thesis which will center on the question of how school personnel 
interpret and make use of institutional spaces in curriculum decision making at selected 
case study schools.  
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4 Minority language education policies in China 
Ethnic minority language education policies are a suitable example to study policy 
implementation at delivery level, since these policies directly target or at least are 
developed against the background of diversity in students’ mother tongues. In this 
chapter I will outline the basic structures and instruments of minority language education 
policies in China in order to provide an understanding of the policies and their sources. 
These general outlines of policies in China will lay the ground for the more specific 
investigation into structures, policies, and implementation procedures in Xishuangbanna. 
China as a multi-ethnic and multilingual country provides exceptional conditions 
for minority language education policies. According to the sixth census from 2010 8.49 
percent of the countries’ 1,3 billion citizens were registered as one of the 55 official non-
Han ethnic groups, of which the largest groups are Zhuang, Hui, Manchu, and Uighur with 
populations of each more than 10 million (Editorial Board of China's Ethnic Statistical 
Yearbook 2013, pp. 624–625). Similarly, with an estimated number of over 100 
languages84 China is linguistically extremely diverse. There are languages of several of the 
world’s major language families.85 They use different phonology, semantics, and syntax, 
and more than 30 employ even specific scripts (Zhou 2003, p. 129; Teng et al. 2011, 
p. 1).86 
This diversity is a linguistic resource, but speakers’ linguistic shift towards Chinese, 
which as the national language enjoys an outstanding position compared to the so called 
“minority languages”, resulted in endangerment and even extinction of several of these 
languages.87 With currently at least 135 vulnerable, endangered or extinct languages 
                                                     
84 The exact number of languages can only be estimated due to a lack in accurate data. Firstly, the 
last national survey that focused specifically on minority languages was conducted between 1986 and 1988 
and targeted speakers of 37 languages in China. The census of the year 2000 included again some questions 
on the usage of languages, but merely on respondent’s ability to speak Chinese and not on what other 
languages they may speak (Leading Office for Research on the Situation of Usage of Language and Script in 
China 2006). The census surveys of the following years excluded questions on languages altogether (Bradley 
2007b). The ethnic composition described in the census surveys delivers some hints, but one cannot deduce 
the actual language knowledge and language usage by individuals from this data. Furthermore, since the 
ethnic surveys are limited to the official ethnic categories, they cannot provide information about the 
different language varieties that are sometimes subsumed under umbrella terms, for instance the 
categories Dai or Zhuang (Zhang 2011b). Finally, among linguistic academics the classifications of languages, 
languages families, and dialects are not undisputed (Klose 2001, pp. 13–18). 
85
 The genetic classification approach arranges languages into groups and subgroups according to 
lexical, morphological, and other characteristics. “Families” such as Tai-Kadai, Sino-Tibetan, Indo-European, 
or Austronesian are the broadest categories in this scheme (Klose 2001). 
86
 For detailed descriptions and maps on the spread of China’s languages see Australian Academy 
of the Humanities, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 1987 and Crissman 2012. 
87
 Under the term “language endangerment” and “language death” linguists describe a process 
where external factors such as political measures or media push individuals to not use a language anymore, 
which results in lexical simplification and language decay (Sasse 1992). Scholars distinguish between safe, 
endangered, and extinct languages. A language is considered safe, when it is used by speakers of all ages, 
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(Moseley 2010)88 China is among the countries with the highest number of endangered 
languages89 worldwide, which not only has major effects on the diversity of languages 
globally, but also on cultural heritage conservation in China. 
Ethnic and language policies specifically regarding these ethnic minority groups 
and languages are a specific policy field in China that serves purposes as multiple as 
protecting cultural heritages, raising social benefits for specific groups, or securing 
national political unity (Shih 2002). These policies base on institutional settings of ethnic 
and language politics that have been created decades ago, but still continue to shape 
policy making and implementation in China. 
In this chapter I will outline policy goals and instruments for ethnic minority 
language education at schools in China. However, in order to understand the background 
of these policies I will connect them with the structures of policy making in China in 
general, and with structures of ethnic policy making in particular. In the first section of 
this chapter I will thus outline the structures and actors in ethnic minority policies in 
China, before in the second section I will discuss specifically minority language education 
policy goals, approaches, and instruments. 
4.1 Structures and actors of ethnic minority language education policy 
making in China 
In this section I will discuss the structures of ethnic minority language education 
policy making in China, since these structures define the scope of governmental and non-
governmental actors that are involved in policy formulation and in designing programs 
before implementation at school level. Structures and conflicts of ethnic policy making 
will be discussed in the first part, whereas the second part will focus on how vertical and 
                                                                                                                                                                
when it is taught to next generations, and when it is used in major domains. The category “endangered” 
covers a broader variety: a language is “endangered, but stable” when children still learn and speak it at 
home and the transmission to next generations is secured, but the language is not used in school, work or 
other public domains. Once children speak a language not anymore to their peers, the language is termed 
“instable”. Once children stop to learn a specific language as their mother-tongue and only adults or only 
the grand-parent generation speaks the language it is categorized as “definitely”, “severely” or “critically 
endangered”. Finally, when a language is no longer spoken anymore by anyone, it is classified as “extinct” 
(Klose 2001). Large compendia such as the “UNESCO Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger” (Moseley 
2010) or the “Atlas of the World’s Languages” (Moseley et al. 2007) use these classifications to establish the 
status of each of the world’s languages. 
88
 See for the latest language evaluations also: www.unesco.org/culture/languages-atlas/index.php, 
last access 2013-11-12. 
89
 According UNESCO statistics only a few number of other countries had larger numbers of 
vulnerable, endangered, or extinct languages in 2013: India (197), the USA (191), and Indonesia (146), see 
UNESCO: Language Atlas: www.unesco.org/culture/languages-atlas/index.php, last access 2013-11-12. A 
UNESCO research team estimated that until the end of the 21st century 90 percent of the world’s languages 
of today will be extinct (UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages 2003, p. 2). 
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horizontal structures of administrative division translate into administration of ethnic 
minority language education policies in China. 
4.1.1 Structures and conflicts of ethnic policy making 
Two approaches have been particularly influential for policy making and 
implementation in China, but also for citizens’ identity. The ethnic identification project 
on the one side as an approach to base ethnic policies on group-based rights continues to 
determine parts of the official identity of each Chinese citizen and for distinguishing 
preferential access to some governmental services. The approach of autonomous regions, 
on the other side, is the major approach for area-based ethnic policies and distinguishes 
administration and policy making of complete regions. Both approaches, however, face 
major challenges, and their effects are far from guaranteeing ethnically-based autonomy 
to individuals or groups. 
Ethnic groups and ethnic identification 
The ethnic identification project 90  has been a large academic approach to 
distinguish Chinese citizens into different ethnic groups that in its basic distinction still 
exists today. Based on the idea of “ethnic nationality” (Minzu) under united citizenship 
and nationalism that China’s Nationalistic and Republican movement, and especially Sun 
Yat-sen, propagated in the early 20th century (Gladney 1996, p. 85) the Communist 
government started in 1956 a project to distinguish ethnic groups.91 
 In theory four criteria borrowed from Stalin have been applied: groups of 
individuals should be distinguished as ethnic groups when they speak a common language, 
reside in a common territory, have a common economic life, and a common culture 
(Heberer 1989). However, these criteria have been challenged already after the first 
round of investigation. Not only have proponents of the Anti-Right movement demanded 
to abandon research on religion and instead to focus merely on distinction of 
development stages of groups based on economic life in preparation for socialist re-
organization (Stone-Banks 2004), but the criteria have been also applied rather flexible 
out of strategic concern as a reward for those groups that either supported the 
Communists during the Long March or that have been deemed potentially dangerous to 
the new government (Heberer 1989; Zhou 2003; Guo 2004). 
                                                     
90
 In Chinese this project has been called “ethnic identification” (民族识别). As Blum (2001, pp. 62–
63) writes, this term, however, does not relate to understandings of identity as “individual self-sufficiency 
and consistency“, but rather is intended to distinguish groups and to sort individuals into these groups. 
91
 See discussion on the translation of the term “Minzu” as “ethnic group” in footnote 5. 
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With establishing recognition of today’s 55 groups (in 1979 the Jinuo have been 
recognized as the 55th and so far last group) the identification process has been 
“effective in delineating ethnic boundaries” (Guo 2004, p. 202). However, the 
identification project also created long-lasting dissatisfaction among a number of groups 
and individuals. Firstly, during the identification process many groups who have 
considered themselves as distinct have been identified as belonging to larger groups. 85 
percent of the more than 350 groups that have applied for group identification have been 
identified either as Han or as one of the other non-Han ethnic groups (Gladney 1996, 
p. 92). In the aftermath several groups signed petitions for re-identification, but not 
always with success (Heberer 1989). Secondly, individuals also have been identified under 
categories different from what they themselves consider their identity, such as decedents 
of Han migrants in ethnic minority regions (Heberer 1989, p. 34). In reaction to this 
perceived feeling of inadequate identification, but arguably also due to the benefits that 
recognition as member of ethnic groups means, individuals have successfully applied for 
realignment of ethnic registration (Hoddie 2006b). 
Despite these flaws the ethnic identification project continues to be a major 
mechanism of governing China’s population. The project has not only succeeded in 
establishing newly created categories that individuals in China employ to view others and 
themselves today,92 but it also continues to be the basis of ethnic policies directed at 
individual citizens, such as exemptions from birth-control or preferential access to higher 
education. 
Ethnic representation and administration 
The second approach of ethnic politics is the establishment of ethnic autonomous 
regions. Based on the dual principles of firstly providing minority protection rights to 
ethnic groups rather than to individuals and secondly of attributing ethnic minority rights 
to local representation, selected ethnic groups have been granted nominal autonomy 
over a limited range of policy fields (Heberer 1989). These areas have a larger share of 
non-Han population and are expected to serve the specific needs of one or more ethnic 
                                                     
92
 Although categories of ethnicity and national belonging are largely shaped by the party-state 
(Christiansen 2004), these categories have been taken over by Han as well as by ethnic minority groups. Not 
only the Han use these categories to distinguish themselves as modern, clean, and urban from “the others” 
that are perceived as less civilized, less hygienic, and less rational (see e.g. Blum 2001), but also those 
classified as non-Han accepted the categories of the ethnic identification project as classifiers for group 
belonging. See for instance Gladney’s (1996) account of how groups of people who hitherto had little in 
common except believing in Islam accepted the shift of the term “Hui” from its original meaning of “Muslim” 
to an all-embracing ethnic category “through a dialogue of self-examination and state-recognition” (p. 97). 
See also Kaup’s (2000) account of the Zhuang identification project. 
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groups.93  Many autonomous areas have been excluded from nationwide shifts to 
urbanize the administrative division (Zhang, Meng 2013). Although the number of 
autonomous areas has been reduced over the time (Zhang 2012a) they are still the main 
approach for ethnic self-administration.94 
Ethnic groups in these areas enjoy a specific degree of autonomy, guaranteed by 
laws such as the “Regional National Autonomy Law”.95 Two particular measures in the 
realms of personnel and policy making have been subject to this autonomy. Firstly, the 
Regional Autonomy Law stipulates that the chairs or vice chairs of the local People’s 
Congresses as well as the leaders in government should be composed of members of the 
respective designated ethnic group. Secondly, local People’s Congresses and governments 
are granted the right to make own laws and regulations that diverge from the national 
ones (Article 19, 20). This right especially covers policy fields such as culture and 
education, but also economy (Di 2004). Administrative autonomy can thus unfold effects 
on policy making through two ways. On the one side, it can be expected that designated 
minority areas more often run unique policies and programs than regular areas. On the 
other side, the stipulation that government leaders are members of the local ethnic 
groups might have effects on the making or the alternation of policies that are especially 
connected to the identity of ethnic groups such as cultural practices or representations. 
In sum, however, the right to autonomy is strictly limited to selected policy areas, 
it does not provide for independency of groups or regions, and citizens cannot sue 
governments on basis of this law (Gladney 1996, p. 91). Instead, the autonomy for ethnic 
                                                     
93
 In theory autonomous areas were only established in localities with a high percentage of non-
Han population (Di 2004), but in reality the share of non-Han population of China’s designated autonomous 
areas differs extremely. In 2006 the share of non-Han population in designated autonomous minority 
prefectures, for example, varied between 16.9 and 95.8 percent (Lai 2010, pp. 69–70). This large variety has 
been partially caused by shifts in population after the establishment of the respective autonomous areas 
due immigration of Han people. However, it also shows that autonomous areas were not established purely 
according to statistical ethnic shares, but also due to strategic consideration of granting autonomy as 
appeasement for specific groups. 
94
 In 2006 there were 155 such areas at province, prefecture, and county level and more than 1000 
at township level (Lai 2010). 
95
 The autonomy area system changed over the history of the People’s Republic. Based on the 
promise by the Communist Party to provide autonomy to ethnic minorities in exchange for help during the 
Civil War, the autonomy system gained momentum in the 40s and the 50s by the ethnic identification 
projects. During the Cultural Revolution ethnic autonomy eroded, but was re-established again in the 
Reform Era (Heberer 1989; Lai 2010). Until 1984 the regional autonomy was much under-regulated and the 
promise for autonomy to ethnic groups still awaited realization. As a reaction to demands of non-Han 
delegates at the People’s Congress the Regional Autonomy Law (民族区域自治法; English literature uses 
various translations: Law on Regional Autonomy, Regional National Autonomy Law, Minority Regional 
Autonomous Law, Law of the PRC on Regional National Autonomy) was promulgated in 1984  (Heberer 
1989). Since this was the first time minority issues were dealt with in a “basic law” (Lundberg 2009), this 
“upgrading of minorities, their autonomy, and their self-administrative bodies” (Heberer 1989, p. 43) meant 
a large step for the regularization of ethnic autonomy. 
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regions in China has been described rather as a “limited administrative autonomy” (Lai 
2010, p. 66). 
Conflicts and “de-politicization” 
Political ethnic relations in China are contested through several problems. These 
can be roughly distinguished into three areas: lack of political representation, economic 
disadvantages including exploitation of resources, and cultural conflicts caused by an 
ideology of Han cultural supremacy.96 
Economically, ethnic minorities suffer from lower income and disadvantaged 
occupation compared to Han. Although “in economic terms, the minorities are much 
better integrated into the Chinese nation-state than ever before” (Mackerras 2004, p. 164) 
poverty is especially high among ethnic minority people in Western and rural regions 
(Gustafsson, Sai 2009a). Although poverty is rather related to factors such as local land 
resources than directly to ethnicity, ethnicity is a factor in determining how people can 
react to poverty, when for instance job discrimination97 or difficulties for migration 
disadvantage especially ethnic minorities (Gustafsson, Sai 2009b). 
In the cultural realm ethnic policies have been similarly contested. Policies under 
an approach that has been termed by Harrell (1995) as “civilizing project” and that 
combines Confucian ideas of the value of the cultural person with Communist ideologies 
of social stages of development have been perceived by “peripheral groups” as 
approaches to force acculturation and, in the end, assimilation. Cases where the state 
promotes ethnic minority cultures for marketization purposes (McCarthy 2004, 2009; 
Davis 2005) confirm the perception “that the PRC government is concerned foremost 
with national unity and economic development, and is only interested in protecting 
minority culture insofar as it can bring benefits to these overarching goals” (Human Rights 
in China 2007, p. 31). 
In the political realm, as has been pointed out many times (see e.g. Heberer 1989, 
2013; Lundberg 2009; Lundberg, Zhou 2011), the promised autonomy for ethnic 
minorities suffers from several caveats. Firstly, there are limitations inherent in the 
Autonomy Law itself. Due to the obligation for governments of autonomous areas to seek 
review of laws and regulations by higher levels, local governments are unlikely to produce 
                                                     
96
 This categorization summarizes Heberer’s (2000) five sources of ethnic conflict in China: 
collective memory and historical knowledge; political sources; economic sources; cultural conflicts; new 
conflicts due to economic and social change and due to breakdown of authority.  
97
 Ethnic discrimination in employment is officially prohibited in China, but nevertheless numerous 
accounts of discrimination against Uighur and other ethnic minority job applicants (Human Rights in China 
2007; Lee 2012) indicate that this practice is common.  
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any regulations that would go against the main goals of superior levels. Instead “the State 
leadership shows the way by pointing to the areas that the so-called autonomy can be 
exercised, creating a case-by-case ‘balance’ between local or minority interests and the 
central interests” (Lundberg 2009, p. 411).98  Consequently, only few such separate 
regulations for autonomous areas have been formulated, especially in areas of culture 
and social life such as the Marriage Law or the Inheritance Law.99 Secondly, the main 
principles of hierarchical control and evaluation as well as the trickle-down approach of 
ordering and funding policies from the higher to the lower levels both remain 
unchallenged. Policy experiments have to adhere to major lines of the central 
government, similar to experiments in regular non-ethnic regions (Heilmann 2008). 
Thirdly, the supremacy of the Han-dominated party over government remains untouched. 
The law stipulates only that the highest officials in government and People’s Congress 
should be of the respective ethnic minority, but the more influential party positions are 
unaffected. Fourthly, there is a lack of democratic control. The meaning of autonomy is 
limited to the ethnicity of its leaders, but does not establish mechanisms of controlling 
these representatives by all members of the respective ethnic group. Policies that diverge 
from national standards not necessarily are materializations of genuine preferences of 
the respective ethnic group. Summarizing these caveats scholars stress that the Regional 
Autonomy Law “cannot be considered as providing adequate minority protection” 
(Lundberg 2009, p. 402). There must be more institutional changes before the autonomy 
system is able protect interests of ethnic groups to meaningful degrees. 
In light of these problems conflicts on ethnic representation, cultural self-
determination, and economic participation have been constantly present in China. The 
separatist movements that have developed as reaction to perceived or real oppression by 
the Chinese state especially in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Sichuan gained internationally much 
attention (Mackerras 2004). Arguably even more important are reactions such as cross-
border or internal migration, segregation in social life, or the revitalization of local 
cultures including religions (see Heberer 2000; McCarthy 2009), as considerably more 
people used these reactions to change their own life and to change society in ethnic 
communities (Kaup 2000; Mackerras 2003). However, these reactions must not 
                                                     
98
 The Law of Regional Autonomy (National People's Congress 12/1/1984) stipulates that the 
organs of autonomous areas need to ask higher levels for permission to flexibly carry out or to halt national 
regulations (Art. 19,20) and that the organs shall place the interest of the state as a whole above anything 
else (Art. 7). The principle of “democratic centralism” that organizes party hierarchy from center to local 
shall not be challenged by this law (Art. 3). In this regard, hierarchical structures guarantee that 
autonomous regulations will be formulated only in those areas that the central level agrees upon. 
99
 By 2003 only 133 self-government regulations and 384 separate regulations have been 
formulated (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2005, § 3). 
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necessarily be considered as a threat to “stability”100 as “dissident minorities do not have 
the strength to force the government to accept their demands for separatism or true 
autonomy” (Dreyer 2000, p. 139), but rather as a symbol of individualization and 
diversification that can be found in other parts of Chinese society as well (see for these 
social changes e.g. Heberer 2013). 
Although the growing diversity combined with ethnic minorities’ demands for 
economic and cultural participation make changes in ethnic politics necessary, scholars of 
China’s minority politics disagree on the direction of these changes. On the one side there 
are scholars who argue that the political system needs to be changed towards a real 
representation and empowerment of China’s ethnic minorities. Heberer (2013), for 
instance, argues that the protection of minority rights needs more democratic control. He 
concludes that even under federalism real autonomy for ethnic minorities can be only 
reached when minority regulations are coupled with democratic reforms. On the other 
side there are scholars who propose to change the political representation of minorities 
in exactly the opposite way. Ma (2007), for example, argues that the area autonomy 
system contributed to an unwanted “politicization” of ethnic groups. He calls thus for a 
“de-politicization”of ethnic issues in order to shift political activism of ethnic groups 
towards patriotism for the Chinese nation. In any case, as far as these large systematic 
changes are not on the horizon, both the group-based ethnic identification approach and 
the ethnic autonomous area approach continue to be major elements in ethnic policy 
making. They find their expression in individual policy fields, such as language policies and 
education policies, which will be discussed below. 
4.1.2 State and party actors in ethnic minority language education policy 
making 
A multiple set of actors is involved in formulating ethnic minority language 
education policies in China, in designing policy tools, and in establishing programs for 
minority language education. Due to the large role of the state in school education in 
China, governments are the main corporate actors, sometimes supported by activities of 
social organizations. As the purpose of this section is to layout the origins of policies and 
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 Although commonly used in politics and academia (e.g. Shambaugh 2000; Sautman 2005; 
Dreyer 2005, 2000), the concepts of stability and instability are not well-defined, and seem to be used as 
umbrella terms to refer to the various consequences of societal changes in China. Even if one only looks at 
the “stability” of party rule, dependencies are difficult to establish. It is, for instance, unclear if ethnic 
conflicts destabilize the rule of the CCP when they demand democratic representation, of if they not merely 
provide an opportunity for the party-state to strengthen its legitimacy by showing its role as defender of 
national stability. 
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instruments that reach schools, I will limit the perspective here to corporate actors101 at 
government level and at the level of social organizations. The power of individual 
parliamentarians, governmental offices, or externals such as parents to influence the 
policy formulation process102 will thus not be discussed at this point. 
In the next paragraphs I will introduce into the general structures and 
responsibilities of government agencies and social organizations in minority language 
education in China against the horizontal and vertical administrative division in China. At 
this point I will describe the main structures of actors in this field, whereas the individual 
agencies responsible for programs in Xishuangbanna will be introduced in chapter 5. 
Horizontal and vertical government division in policy making in China 
The political-administrative system of government in the People’s Republic103 is 
divided vertically and horizontally into a system of several layers that have been 
described as “tiao-kuai system”, which refers to a system of double control of 
government agencies at a particular local division (“kuai kuai”) on the one side and within 
the functional line of the ministries (“tiao tiao”) on the other side (Lieberthal, Oksenberg 
1988, p. 141; Mertha 2005). This system on the one side allows for extensive control of 
the executive, but on the other side it also pays tribute to the large diversity of interests 
between the individual agencies. Academia has described China as being “among the 
most decentralized countries in the world” (World Bank 2007a, p. 33) and as “fragmented 
authoritarian state” (Lieberthal 1992; Mertha 2009)  
Horizontally (“tiao tiao”), the government is divided into several ministries and 
committees, but at the same time there is a parallel system of party organization, a 
duality that stretches through all vertical levels.104 However, as a major element of 
Leninist organizational practices both government and party interact very close with each 
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 Corporate actors are according, to Flam (1990, p. 6), those organized actors "which participate 
directly in (policy-oriented) decision making, are formal organizations, have a real constitution and a real 
membership, purport to represent the interests of their membership, but often have been challenged for 
misrepresenting these interests by both internal and external critics, and, therefore, can be said to also 
pursue autonomous, member-independent interests." Individuals, by contrast, are defined here as those 
actors who aim at influencing decision making, but who are not organized into membership organizations 
based on constitutions. 
102
 At this point it will suffice to refer to the rich literature on the role of individuals in 
governmental agencies, such as literature on the role of cadres in policy making, especially in the 
implementation stage (O'Brien, Li 1999; Göbel 2011; Heberer, Schubert 2012). Research also pointed to the 
specific role of leading ethnic minority cadres or heads of government as agenda setters for minority 
language education (Caodaobateer 2004; Bulag 2010) . 
103
 For description of the legislative organs such as the People’s Congresses and the People’s 
Consultative Conferences refer to Zhong (2003) and Heilmann (2004). 
104
 It must be noted, however, that this division is not based on the Constitution, but on 
observation of actual share of power as delegated by higher levels (World Bank 2007b, p. 34). This explains 
the power of the center to shift institutional structures according to perceived necessities (Mertha 2005) .  
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other. Decisions on major policies are first made within the party committees, before 
being promulgated and implemented through government (Heilmann 2004; Zhong 2003). 
The government is parted into diverse ministries, committees, bureaus, and other locally 
diverse agencies. This variety creates room to adjust structures to local conditions, but at 
the flip-side of the coin it also creates the possibility to create agencies merely as reward 
for loyalties. Zhong (2003) for example, reports of massive over-staffing of agencies at the 
county and the township level. The unclear division of responsibilities between these 
agencies has been said to lead to inefficiency and to implementation gaps (World Bank 
2007b). 
Vertically (“kuai kuai”), the political system is divided into five levels: 1) central 
level; 2) provinces, autonomous regions, directly-administered municipalities, special 
administrative regions; 3) prefectures, prefecture level municipalities; 4) counties, 
county-level cities, urban districts; 5) towns, townships, street offices. Village 
administration and residents communities as grassroots units are excluded from this 
division (see Figure 2) (see further Heilmann 2004 and Joseph 2014). 
One of the major local differences is the existence of prefectures. Although from 
1978 onward in many localities the administrative power of prefectures have been 
reduced or the prefectures as an administrative entity has been abolished altogether in 
favor of direct management through cities and provinces according to the “city-leading-
county” (市管县) approach (Chien 2010) a number of designated minority autonomous 
prefectures were left untouched due to above mentioned principle of ethnic autonomy. 
The Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture is such a case, so that here the 
prefecture has an intermediary role that elsewhere is already taken by cities, and the city 
of Jinghong is hierarchically at one level with the counties Mengla and Menghai. 
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Figure 4: Administrative division in the PR China. After Joseph (2014, p. 9).  
The vertical and horizontal structure of the “tiao-kuai system” is mirrored in the 
relations of the individual agencies and offices within the government. Binding and non-
binding relationships relate each agency with other agencies (Mertha 2005; Zhong 2003). 
The major element of controlling lower levels through superior levels is the evaluation of 
individual officials through a regular, formalized, and rigid evaluation system (Heberer, 
Trappel 2013). 
However, the position of agencies within the administrative levels is also subject 
to changes. Through a process that has been dubbed “soft decentralization” (Mertha 
2005) many offices or “service-oriented units” (事业单位) that formerly belonged to the 
counties have been shifted to the jurisdiction of the cities or prefectures (Zhong 2003). 
This advanced the power of higher levels and decreased the autonomy of counties and of 
townships, but it also increased the diversity of actor relations at the local level. Within a 
given county we find now offices and social units that are under the jurisdiction of the 
township, of the county, of the city or prefecture, and of the province. Schools are an 
example of this diversity: Rural primary schools are officially under the jurisdiction of the 
townships, secondary township schools fall under the jurisdiction of the counties, and 
higher education is governed by the prefecture or the province (Zhou 2012a). 
Policies are made within these structures through a system of “nested hierarchy” 
(World Bank 2007b, p. 34) in which the local and the central levels fund policy programs 
together. Lower levels must apply for funds and have the responsibility to contribute own 
funding. Although some scholars described this system as hindering smooth 
implementation due a lack of coherence (Chien 2010) and as a source for funding lacks 
for social services105 it is also a mechanism that allows for flexibility in implementation by 
the local levels, which is vital in a country as large and socio-economically as diverse as 
China. In result, policy making is characterized by intergovernmental interdependencies 
as well as by bargaining between government agencies and individual officers (Lieberthal 
1992; Blachford 2004). 
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 Especially the process of “soft decentralization” resulted in several negative consequences for 
service provision at the lower levels when higher levels took more lucrative offices and lower levels were 
left bereft of possibilities for revenue making (Zhong 2003; Mertha 2005). Furthermore, after expenditure 
from national to sub-national levels, local governments have been faced with a burden of unfunded 
mandates, which leads in consequence to the under-provision of social services and the introduction of 
extra-budgetary activities by local governments (Wong 2009). Efforts to centralize some of the major 
expenditures of local governments to higher levels are a reaction to this problem. Responsibility for 
provision of compulsory education, for example, that used to be one of the major expenditure burdens for 
township governments (World Bank 2007b), was shifted to large degrees to county and province level (Ho, 
Niu 2013). 
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Educational and ethnic government agencies 
State actors are the main organizers, funders, and evaluators of educational 
policies in the basic education stage in China, whereas private tuition plays only a major 
role in higher and pre-school education and in tutoring (Deng 1997; Mok 2009).106 China’s 
government budgets for education contain mostly three positions: teacher salaries, 
school buildings, and miscellaneous expenses such as teaching material, salaries for non-
teaching staff, and school activities (Zhou 2012a). Before 2002, all administrative levels 
from center to township contributed to these expenses, but townships carried the largest 
portion of it. A major reform of educational funding in 2002 under the slogan “county as 
the main pillar” shifted funding responsibilities completely from townships to county 
governments, which improved the overall funding situation (Zhou 2012a), but through 
special transfers and programs, such as earmarked project funds to rebuild dangerous 
school buildings, the central level and the provincial governments (and to smaller parts 
also social organizations and inter-provincial support programs107) still contribute a large 
share to the educational expenses. As an effect of the “governing through projects” 
approach a variety of governmental actors are involved in the funding of compulsory 
education in China.108 
Governmental agencies play also a considerable role in school-based education in 
minority languages. From the early departments of minority languages that existed from 
the Qin to Qing dynasty to the apparatus for educational and ethnic affairs in the People’s 
Republic minority language education was always an issue closely connected to the 
state’s interests and thus subject of diverse actions by state actors (Dai, Cheng 2007). 
In legislation the formally highest actors in the People’s Republic are the National 
People’s Congress, the sub-national People’s Congresses, and additionally the 
Consultative Conferences with a high number of ethnic minority delegates, each with 
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 In the 80s, 90s, and early 2000s financial sources for education provision in China relied heavily 
on fees levied upon students and parents, but with the abolition of study fees for compulsory education this 
burden decreased considerably (Yu, Hannum 2006; Murphy 2007). 
107  There are numerous examples for such projects. An example for contributions by 
comparatively wealthy provinces is the so called "partner program" (对口支援), in which one province in 
the East partners with one province in the West to support the latter's schools or teacher trainings. The 
most famous social organization that contributes to educational infrastructure in China is Project Hope that 
by donations from citizens erects school buildings and dormitories in poor villages. 
108
 Zhou (2012a, p. 213) criticizes this phenomenon for lacking in two points. Firstly, he argues, 
there is lack in transparency and democratic control, when funders in Beijing who lack the ability to control 
local implementation instead of the local parliaments and governments decide about the set-up of local 
education. Secondly, in his observation, local governments tend to withdraw funds that were originally 
reserved for educational purposes, so that the educational sector does not benefit from additional central 
funds. 
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specific committees on minority and educational issues. 109  However, the de-facto 
decision-maker on all levels concerning the basic policy directions are the party 
organizations and committees, as all major decisions are first discussed and agreed upon 
by the Standing Committee of the Party and only after government promulgates them 
(Zhong 2003, p. 58). Nevertheless, although the People’s Congresses and even more so 
the Consultative Conferences are extremely limited in their authority and still have “a 
long way to go toward becoming a meaningful legislative, supervising, and representative 
democratic institution” (Zhong 2003, pp. 63–64) they have important functions as 
transmitter of interests of the social groups that they represent. Even if delegates’ 
proposals are not implemented directly, the People’s Congresses and the Consultative 
Conferences at the diverse levels as agenda setters on the one hand and as mediators 
between social groups and governmental decision makers on the other push decision 
makers to deal with these issues. 
In the executive realm two main lines are responsible to implement minority 
language policies: the nationalities administration and the educational administration. 
Both parallel lines exist from the central to the local levels in their own structures. In 
some cases responsibilities are clearly distinguished, in others they overlap. Horizontally 
the minority and the educational administration are in a “kuai”-relationship at the level of 
ministries under the State Council. Vertically both the ethnic and the educational 
administration have bureaus at all levels of administrative division from the central to the 
local under the “tiao”-relationship (see also Table 11 in chapter 5 on the example of 
Xishuangbanna). 
The nationalities administration is headed at central level by the State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission110 and finds its counterparts at the province, the prefecture and the 
county level (called Bureau at both latter levels). Their task is to participate in the 
coordination of all policies that are related to ethnicity and thus to secure the rights of 
the ethnic minority groups. Its main working field is to run and coordinate scholarship 
about ethnicity and ethnic culture, which includes research on languages and surveys on 
the economic situation of minorities. Through a system of Nationality Universities the 
State Ethnic Affairs Commission oversights much research related to ethnicity, but it is 
also engaged in the training of minority students and minority cadres. The Committee of 
Guidance Work for Minority Languages and Literature and the Department of Education 
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 On the national level, for example, there is the “Nationality Committee of the National People’s 
Congress”, which is “responsible for working out enactments concerning national minority problems” 
(Blachford 2004, p. 104). 
110
 In 1998 the agency changed its English name from State Commission on Nationality Affairs to 
State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Zhou 2003, p. 94). 
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and Science are the divisions responsible for dealing with minority language education. 
The central-level State Ethnic Affairs Commission names the “participation with the 
harmonization of bilingual education” as one of its responsibilities111, but developing 
actual programs for individual language promotion at school level is left to the provincial 
and local Bureaus. In contrast to Blachford’s (2004, p. 104) evaluation that the State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission has “considerable powers”, it must be seen clearly that this 
ministry is rather “weak” compared to the education ministry, as its budget is 
considerable smaller. 
The educational administration as the second line responsible for minority 
language education is equipped with a comparatively large budget112 and is responsible 
for organizing, guiding, and supervising all educational matters from kindergarten to 
university, to adult education (Deng 2010). It is divided into four different vertical 
administrative levels from center to counties, depending on the locality. The central 
Ministry of Education (MOE) is “dedicated in formulating concrete regulations, guidelines, 
and overall plans” (Qi 2011b, pp. 31–32) for minority language education and organizes 
conferences on minority language education to propagate language ideologies and to 
share local implementation experiences. The Provincial Bureaus engage with minority 
language education mostly through publishing textbooks and through organizing teacher 
trainings. Prefectures, cities, and counties additionally can also hire teachers for minority 
language education. Schools (sometimes referred to as the fifth level, see Deng 2010, 
p. 126) are the most local executive organ (the role of schools within party-state 
structures has been explained in depth in chapter 3). 113 
Party organization 
Closely interwoven with the state agencies are the organizations of the 
Communist Party of China (the CCP) in the party-state of the People’s Republic. With its 
double structure of party and state organizations party organizations continue to be 
present in all organizational levels of government and social units. At county level, for 
instance, the Party apparatus is organized from the Standing Committee of County Party, 
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 See State Ethnic Affairs Commission: http://jykjs.seac.gov.cn, last access June 11, 2014. 
112
 At some administrative levels, especially at county level, educational expenses accumulate 
almost to half of the government’s yearly expenses (World Bank 2007b, p. 33). 
113
 Townships as well as villages are not included in this list since their role in education is very 
limited. After a wave of decentralization of funding responsibilities in 1985 townships and families 
themselves used to be the major providers of educational funding (Qi 2011b), but in 2001 all educational 
funding responsibilities of townships were transferred to counties and the school fees levied on parents 
were gradually abolished (Zhou 2012a). The main role of townships and village heads is now to guarantee 
that all children in compulsory schooling age attend school, but they do not run educational programs at 
schools. 
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to the General Office, to specific Bureaus and Offices such as Bureau of Cadre Files, the 
Women’s Association, or the Communist Youth League (Zhong 2003, p. 58). 
Although the CCP has reformed its ideology (from revolution to modernization 
and development), the modes of party membership (inclusion of more social groups than 
before), and the management of party personnel (standardized system of personnel 
management under collective of leaders instead of rule by autocrats) (Heberer 2013, 
pp. 74–75), the CCP still continues to lead state, society, and economy through the 
following mechanisms: representation of party branches in all state organizations and 
social units, determination of personnel politics by party, party membership of all state 
leaders, party rule over military, participation of central party committees in formulation 
of main laws (Heberer 2013, p. 81). 
However, the influence of the CCP on specific decisions varies. Zhong (2003, p. 55), 
for instance, writes that merely “all major” decisions, and especially decisions regarding 
“economic matter”, must be approved by the Party, whereas decisions in other areas are 
left to the individual government agencies. 
In ethnic minority issues the Party approach is generally to balance potential 
ethnic conflicts by installing Party membership beyond ethnic registration. Not only has 
the percentage of ethnic minority members in the Central Committee of the CCP 
increased compared to the Maoist era, but the CCP also actively uses its organizations to 
recruit and train ethnic leaders (Li 2008a, pp. 6–7). Ethnically indifferent citizenship under 
one Party state has been thus discussed as new mode for ethnic governing (Ma 2007). 
 However, the approach to represent a multi-ethnic country with a party that is 
build up in majority by Han and that is “is dedicated in its organizational structure to the 
levelling of all ethnic differences” (Heberer 2013 p. 11) faces the risk that ethnic minority 
people perceive the CCP as hostile. Not only is the percentage of non-Han party members 
lower than the share of non-Han people in the population (Heberer 2013, p. 78), but 
many non-Han see the Party as organization of the Han. Heberer (2000, p. 7) writes that 
although citizens of all ethnic groups have been affected by the political movements such 
as the Cultural Revolution  
“there is one important difference: these movements were perceived by the Han as movements 
for which their own political leadership was responsible, but by non-Han as movements for which 
the Han and their party were responsible. In the first case it is considered as a political conflict, in 
the second case as an ethnic one. The trauma of those years, when all ethnic and religious 
differences were regarded as hostile and reactionary, has not simply disappeared.” 
Nevertheless, ethnic minority language education seems to be only a minor issue 
of party organizations. Not only is there no particular party organization responsible for 
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ethnic minority language education, but also have interviewed officers in the Bureaus of 
Education and the Nationality Affairs Commissions said that the Party does not interfere 
with their day-to-day decisions, which indicates a that the Party views minority language 
education as less important than other minority issues (see also discussion on the role of 
party secretaries in the Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education in chapter 5 and the 
discussion of branch secretaries at the case study schools in chapter 6).  
Social organizations 
Social organizations114 have emerged in China since the 1980s and 90s as a 
reaction to loosening bindings between society and state, but also as a reaction to 
growing diversification of interests. Social organizations in China, different from many 
“pressure groups” in Western Democracies, have much less access to participation in the 
formal political system (Heberer 2013, pp. 131–132). Their actions of social service 
provision are more bound to governmental organizations and depend on cooperation 
with these, as for instance Gransow (2009) shows on the example of poverty alleviation 
organizations.115 In the field of education Chinese social organizations fulfill rather the 
role of service-providers than that of advocates for under-served and under-represented 
groups. Arguably social organizations that work in the educational realm have to embed 
themselves even more into the political system of the state than organizations that 
provide non-educational services since their activities often rely on state-controlled 
schools.116 
Social organizations also play a role in providing resources for minority language 
education in China. Firstly, there are national and international social organizations, such 
as the US-based NGO SIL117, that conduct projects in minority language education at 
schools. Secondly, there are university-based projects by teams of researchers who 
develop projects that combine research with supporting schools, for instance projects by 
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 Chinese social organizations are sometimes differentiated into non-government organizations, 
quasi-government organizations, and government-organized non-governmental organizations (Gransow 
2009; Ma 2005). Since all of these organizations, in theory, are required to embed to some degrees with 
state organizations I will use here the wider term "social organizations" only. 
115
 Factors such as the request to register with state agencies, financial dependencies from state 
funding, and exchange of personnel between state agencies and social organizations contribute to the close 
relations of Chinese social organizations with the state (Ma 2005). 
116
 An example is the work by social organizations for educational access of migrant children in 
Chinese cities as an example of organizations focusing on a specific group of children who suffer from 
educational exclusion. Instead of rallying migrant workers to protest for educational access for their 
children, for example, social organizations in Chinese cities rather engage in providing education by sending 
teachers to migrant schools (see examples discussed in Schnack 2010). 
117
 See SIL East Asia: http://www.eastasiagroup.net/, last access June 10, 2014. 
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the Minzu University in Beijing.118 Thirdly, so called “ethnic research organizations” as 
associations of researchers, officials, and citizens of a specific ethnic or language group119 
conduct also projects for minority language education (see examples in Zhao 2012). 
Religious organizations based on temples or mosques, finally, are engaged in minority 
language education when for instance understanding of religious texts requires reading 
skills in minority scripts. 
However, the scope of activities by these organizations is very limited. Firstly, as 
has been said above, social organizations in China are limited in their activities to specific 
permitted areas, and in education they need to cooperate with the Bureaus of Education. 
Furthermore, especially religious organizations face tight limits of action due to strict 
state control (Heberer 2013, pp. 179–180). Ethnic organizations, similarly, are bound to 
state control, and individual ethnic leaders have often been incorporated into state 
organizations or academia.120 Finally, as the membership and financial resources of these 
organizations are restricted 121  their output in terms of resources or programs is 
additionally limited. 
4.2 Minority language education policies 
In the previous section I have outlined the basic structures that define both ethnic 
minority policies and the scope of actors involved in policy formulation in China. In this 
section I will show how these approaches affect minority language policies in general and 
policies for ethnic minority languages, specifically. I will here outline firstly the 
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 See e.g. Ou, Luo (2009) on a cooperation between the Minzu University and local schools 
throughout China to develop local textbooks. 
119
 Organizations of this type are generally centered on one specific ethnic group and conduct 
activities to promote knowledge and research on the culture or language of this group (see examples 
presented by Li and Chen 2010). Similar to other organizations these research organizations are also closely 
connected to the state, for instance financially. 
120
 After the consolidation of rule by Chinese Communist Party in ethnic minority areas some of the 
potentially rebellious former ethnic leaders have been placed in research organizations to submit their 
knowledge to the new rulers under a highly controlled environment. The former Dai king of Xishuangbanna, 
Dai Shuixun, is a prominent example of such incorporation. After he was forced to resign as king he become 
a victim of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, but after his rehabilitation he was provided with 
a post in the People’s Consultative Conference and with a position at the Yunnan Nationalities Institute 
where he published several books on Dai language. The way how Baidu, a government-controlled online 
encyclopedia, presents this former king as an excellent scholar, as a morally upright family father, and as a 
contributor to ethnic culture preservation shows that this approach of incorporating old ethnic elites into 
academia is still today seen as a success (see http://baike.baidu.com/view/308305.htm, last access Dec. 17, 
2013). 
121
 To my knowledge there are no corporate actors for parents and students beyond school level 
that would advocate for minority language education or that would implement programs in this field. 
Parents can potentially determine policies by their market force through choice of schools, but only few 
parents use this instrument, since firstly the scarcity of rural schools often prevents school choice, since 
secondly religious education is not a permitted alternative to state-run schooling; and thirdly since there 
seems to be a lack of interest among parents in minority language education (see discussion in chapter 5). 
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approaches in minority language policies that the Chinese government promoted 
between language engineering, language protection, and language hierarchization. 
Secondly, I will outline how these approaches translate into policies and policy 
instruments instruments for education in minority languages at schools and other 
educational organizations in China. 
4.2.1 Approaches in minority language policies in China 
Language policies have a strong position in shaping ethnic identity, but they have 
also been an object of repeated struggle. Although the Chinese government often tried to 
legitimize ethnic language policies through notions of “linguistic logic” or “economic 
needs” (Zhou 2004b), minority language policies also reflect political ideologies between 
assimilation and diversity. Zhou (2003) distinguishes three phases of language policy in 
China: the “first pluralistic stage” (1949-1957) when the government supported the 
development of minority languages, the “monopolistic stage” (1958-1977) when minority 
language speakers were forced to use Chinese and the Chinese script, and the “second 
pluralistic stage” (1978 until today) with a new interest in language diversity and 
liberalization of minority language policies. Instead of providing a historical review – 
which can be found in Zhou (2003) and Lam (2005) – I will summarize in the next 
paragraphs the main elements and effects of current minority language policies in China 
with specific reference to language and script identification, language engineering, and 
the struggle between promoting minority languages versus promoting Chinese. 
Language and script identification 
Similar to the ethnic identification project the newly established Communist 
government in Beijing started projects to identify languages and scripts of the ethnic 
minorities in China. Teams of state-owned research institutions have conducted language 
surveys based on criteria of linguistic genetics since the establishment of the People’s 
Republic (Zhou 2003, p. 22). However, categorization of languages in the People’s 
Republic was never a purely linguistic exercise, but was always also a question of political 
dimensions. Although scholars who rendered the verdict on the status of languages 
claimed that the categories were based on linguistic factors (Zhou 2004b) the central 
government in Beijing used language and script recognition as a political-strategic tool in 
securing support by those ethnic groups that were deemed important enough to receive 
autonomy in language issues. Ethnic groups that were politically organized, that resided 
at the borderlands, that were historically less integrated, or that cooperated with the 
Soviet Union during wartimes where considered a potential threat to unity and had their 
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languages quickly recognized, whereas small inland ethnic groups had to wait for decades 
(Zhou 2003). 
According to this identification project scripts have been categorized into the 
officially recognized scripts, the unofficial experimental scripts, and the completely 
unrecognized scripts. Each category of scripts still today receives different treatments in 
the complex and powerful language work schemes of research and government. 
Mongolian, Tibetan, Korean, Uyghur, and Kazakh were immediately recognized as 
complete so that their scripts were allowed for teaching. Zhuang followed later. Dai, Naxi, 
Xibe, and other scripts were classified as incomplete and commonly unused and their 
tuition in schools was decided to be “experimental”. For several languages such as Uyghur, 
Zhuang, Yi, and Hani commissions developed new writing systems based on either the 
Roman or the Cyrillic alphabet (Zhou 2004b). The remaining scripts, which were often 
used only by very small communities or only in limited domains, were completely 
unrecognized by governments and research teams, despite efforts by individuals or 
informally organized groups of intellectuals in the respective speaker group to apply for 
script identification. These scripts are not allowed to be taught in schools or used in state 
media. 
Language engineering 
Based on this categorization, Chinese linguists employed “language engineering” 
to reform many minority scripts.122 Governmental agencies have developed computer 
fonts for some minority scripts.123 Especially those scripts which had – despite rich 
literatures and former use in administration – failed to gain the “complete” status had to 
undergo several rounds of “simplifying” reforms or where completely abolished in favor 
of Roman or Arabic script, accompanied especially in the “monopolistic stage” by 
prohibition of using the traditional scripts (Zhou 2003). Although after Mao’s death some 
script reforms have be reversed (Blachford 2004) the reforms resulted not only in 
confusion within the speaker group but also in massive drops in literacy in the respective 
language (see the example of Dai script in chapter 5). 
This project of language engineering, including the imposed shifts from indigenous 
or Arabic scripts to a Pinyin-based alphabet, was an output of nationalism that aimed at 
binding ethnic groups to mainland China by controlling the sphere of communication. On 
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 “Language engineering“ has been also used to reform Chinese language, for instance in 
Putonghua standardization and in script reforms (see Rohsenow 2004; Lam 2005). 
123
 The exact number of available input systems is under constant change. The White Paper from 
2005 (2005, § 5) lists four input systems: Mongolian, Tibetan, Uygur, Korean, Yi, but in the meantime such 
systems have been developed also for other languages, see e.g. Yin et al. (2011). 
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the one side, it has been argued that only through “changing the backward status of the 
ethnic minorities could real equality among the ethnic groups be achieved” (Zhou 2004b, 
p. 57). Script reforms have been seen as a tool to fight poverty and exclusion. On the 
other side, reforms often included a push towards Han-Chinese. For example, the 
enforced replacement of the Arabic writing for Uyghur language by Roman alphabet in 
the 60s was - under social engineering ideology of the Great Leap Forward – labeled as a 
necessary step for the sake of simplifying printing and reading, but imposed also a cut 
from history and literature on Uyghurs. The reform, however, was short-lived and soon 
after Mao’s death local governments on request by language communities shifted the 
script back to the Arabic system (Blachford 2004). 
Minority languages versus Chinese promotion 
Several laws and documents promulgate the protection of the right to use 
minority languages and the responsibility of the state to develop and promote language 
diversity. China not only ratified many international treaties for the protection of minority 
language rights,124 but the protection of minority rights also resulted in comparatively 
“impressive” (Lundberg 2009, p. 404) numbers of regulations. The Constitution (National 
People's Congress 12/4/1982), for instance, specifies that ethnic groups have the right to 
use and develop their own languages (Art. 4), and the Regional National Autonomy Law 
(National People's Congress 12/1/1984) stipulates that autonomous organs must 
guarantee the freedom of the nationalities to use and develop their own languages (Art 
10), that autonomous authorities should use minority languages while carrying out their 
functions (Art. 21), and that cadres should learn minority languages (Art 49).125 The 
central government’s White Book on Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2005, § 5) lists 
the following measures to promote minority languages: collecting traditional written and 
oral literature, creating software for writing systems, researching and exhibiting “minority 
culture” in scientific research volumes and museums, publishing books, newspapers, and 
magazines as well as broadcasting via radio and TV in minority languages. 
In practice, however, these policies are countered firstly by inequality between 
Chinese and minority languages and secondly by inequality within the group of minority 
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 Such as International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Loper 2012). 
125
 A law specifically for the spoken and written minority languages that would guarantee the 
usage of minority languages was proposed and set on the agenda of the National People’s Congress during 
the making of the “Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language”, but it was never ratified 
(see Lundberg 2009: 405-6). 
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languages. Chinese language, for instance, is promoted by institutions of the educational 
system, by the large media availability in Chinese, and by a generally higher image of 
Chinese, uttered even by party leaders of the autonomous regions (Dreyer 2002). 
Additionally, policy measures such as language research, development, and usage differ 
between the more supported minority languages of “fully developed” status, the less 
supported “experimental” minority languages, and the unsupported and unrecognized 
languages (Zhou 2003). Although the central government at times uses minority 
languages, e.g. it publishes documents of the National People’s Congress in different 
scripts, but at local level minority languages are much less used. The low level of 
government staff’s knowledge in minority languages and the lack of official signage in 
minority scripts has been said to both cause barriers for citizens who don’t speak Chinese 
in approaching government agencies, and it is has been said to cause low quality in 
governmental interventions, e.g. in conflict investigation (Zhou 2004a). In broadcasting 
and newspaper printing, “perhaps the only arena where the government has done a 
relatively good job” (Zhou 2004a, p. 88) the government runs specific programs in 
minority languages126 because it views control over media as source of control over 
citizens. In education, finally, minority languages fill a specific place, but often this place is 
not only limited to small parts of the curriculum, but has over the last years even further 
been reduced (see below). 
In effect, language policies in China have been more successful in promoting 
Chinese language as lingua franca than in promoting minority languages. The state has 
reached the goal of Chinese-based “linguistic citizenship” (Zhou 2012b, p. 20) for many 
citizens, but on the flipside of the coin the preferential policies towards Chinese have 
caused not only language death (see above), but made language issues a major point of 
grievances among minorities. Minority advocate groups outside mainland China regularly 
criticize the language policies of the Chinese government for “inadequate protection of 
cultural identity” (Human Rights in China 2007, p. 38), and inside China ethnic clashes 
have erupted on the issue of feared cultural loss by language shift  (Wong 2010). 
4.2.2 Minority language education policies and instruments 
Policies on the realm of ethnic minority languages can tremendously affect the 
level of endangerment of languages since education in minority languages is an important 
                                                     
126
 A White Paper by the Information Office of the State Council of People’s Republic of China 
(2005, § 5) lists the following numbers of publications and broadcasting stations in minority languages as of 
2003: books: 4,787 titles, totaling 50 million copies; magazines: 205, totaling 7.81 million copies; 
newspapers: 88, totaling 131.30 copies; local radio stations broadcasting in 15 languages; local TV stations 
broadcasting in 11 languages. Compared to the large numbers of books and nationally available TV 
programs in Chinese language these figures indicate the dominance of Chinese in media. 
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factor in determining the status, the development, and the usability of minority languages 
(Sasse 1992). At the same time, however, policies on ethnic minority language education 
can follow multiple purposes such as raising the educational attainment of students, 
lowering language-related educational barriers, or binding ethnic minority students to 
schools (Hornberger 2005). In the following paragraphs I will outline policy goals, 
legislation, policy instruments, models, and problems of minority language education in 
China…  
Policy goals 
Official statements define a plethora of purposes for minority language education 
policies. According to the Decision on Deepening the Acceleration of Reforming the 
Development of Ethnic Education (State Council 7/7/2002, § 1) minority education should 
“increase the scientific culture of China’s minority ethnics, accelerate the economic 
development and social progress in ethnic minority regions, strengthen ethnic unity, 
maintain social stability in ethnic regions, and safeguard national unity.” Some Chinese 
scholars present in a similar tone lists of goals of minority language education. Fang 
(2010), for instance, writes that this specific education is a prerequisite for a bilingual 
society, a method to improve minority education in general, a hope and wish for the 
minorities, a prerequisite for educating highly qualified human resources among the 
minorities, and a need for national security. 
What appears in official statements as a harmonious set of goals, however, is in 
detail a mélange of several not always congruent goals between national unity based on a 
national language on the one side and ethnic and linguistic diversity on the other. These 
contrasting goals are reflected also in the different approaches of the various 
governmental agencies. The ethnic administration as the agency responsible for 
researching ethnic cultures for instance defines linguistic diversity at schools as a policy 
goal, but the education administration measures policy success in educational attainment 
under nationally unified standards oriented towards Chinese, such school grades in 
Chinese Language and Literature or college entrance rates . 
This diversity of policy goals provides a blurred picture for the learners, as Lam 
(2008) points out. For Chinese speakers the policy goals are clear: they are encouraged to 
master the national standard Chinese (without local dialects) and additionally English. For 
ethnic minority speakers, however, the policy goals are much less clear: On the one side, 
policy documents and laws define again and again bilingual usage of Chinese and minority 
languages as a right, but on the other side speakers see that policies clearly favor Chinese. 
According to official ideology, speakers are expected to develop into “masters of both 
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minority and Chinese” (民汉精通) who are equally competent in both languages (Feng 
2005). The current Chinese education system leaves the question of how to reach this 
“idealized conception of bilingualism” (Feng 2005, p. 532) often to the learner. 
Legislation 
Legislation on ethnic minority language education followed the ideological 
changes in minority language policy described above. During the “first pluralistic phase” 
the government issued several plans and decisions for the promotion of education in 
minority languages, but during the “monopolistic phase” of the Cultural Revolution it 
terminated these policies completely, only to renew them during the “second pluralistic 
phase” again.127 Today, minority language education has been promulgated as a state 
goal, as a right of the ethnic groups in the constitution and in several laws, and as a task in  
the long-term development plans (see Table 5). 
 
Promulgated 
by 
Promulgation 
or revision 
Title in English Title in Chinese 
National 
People’s 
Congress 
 
2004 Constitution 中华人民共和国宪法 
2006 Compulsory Education Law 中华人民共和国义务教育法 
2001 Regional National Autonomy Law 中华人民共和国民族区域自治法 
2000 Law on the Standard Spoken and Written 
Chinese Language 
中华人民共和国国家通用语言文字法 
State Council 
 
2010 National Outline for Medium and Long-
term Education Reform and Development, 
2010-2020 
国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要, 
2010-2020 
2002 Decision on Deepening the Acceleration of 
Reforming the Development of Ethnic 
Education 
国务院关于深化改革加快发展民族教育的
决定 
Table 7: Selection of major national policy documents on minority language education and Chinese 
language education in China (compare also with annotated table in appendix). Sources: National People's 
Congress 12/4/1982, 4/12/1984, 12/1/1984, 10/31/2000; State Council 7/27/2010, 7/7/2002. Note: This 
table includes laws, plans, opinions, and regulations on national level. Examples of local regulations and so 
called “administrative measures” (办法; 管理办法) will be documented in the chapter on Xishuangbanna. 
The Constitution establishes that “[a]ll nationalities have the freedom to use and 
develop their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or to reform their own 
folkways and customs” (Art. 4). The Regional National Autonomy Law stipulates that 
schools shall use textbooks and teach minority languages if conditions allow for that (Art. 
37). The National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development 
describes in more detail that the central and the local governments shall promote 
bilingual education and that both levels shall “respect the right of ethnic minorities to use 
their own ethnic minority scripts for education” (Art. 26-27). 
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 See historical overview on minority language education legislation in Teng, Wang (2009, 
pp. 336–339). For an extensive list of national regulations on both minority education and language 
regulations in China refer also to Si (2011) and to Cultural Information Office of the National Committee on 
Ethnic Affairs (2006). 
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However, legislation on ethnic minority language education suffers from several 
caveats. Firstly, minority language legislation in China suffers from the generally low 
binding strength of laws (see also Potter 2010) as they don’t provide for law suits based 
on violation of language rights. Secondly, minority language education legislation has a 
low position compared to other legislation and especially compared to legislative acts 
that demand education in Chinese language. Not only do laws such as the Constitution or 
the Educational Law stipulate that Chinese language shall be the major language in 
Chinese public affairs including education, but legislation also specifies standards for 
education in Chinese language in more depth than education in minority languages. The 
“Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language”, for instance, stipulates 
that the standard language of education shall be Chinese and that teachers be proficient 
in Chinese (Art. 9 and 19). Specific regulations stipulate the minimum standards of these 
requirements. The Outline for Chinese Language and Script Education at Full-time 
Nationalities Secondary and Primary Schools (State Council March 1983), for instance, has 
already in 1982 stipulated that ethnic minority students shall know 1,300 characters and 
2,500 words when they complete junior high school. For minority languages the proposal 
for a similar law has been abolished (Lundberg 2009, pp. 405–406). 
In sum, legislation on minority language education suffers from a low level of 
binding strength towards the executive and from a lack of detail compared to legislation 
on Chinese language education. As scholars have found in other countries (Churchill 1986) 
legislation on minority language education in China established a “symbolic value” of 
minority languages and it strengthened the argumentative position of individual actors 
within the administrative divisions in interdepartmental bargaining, but due to its 
vagueness legislative accounts seem to be less important than actual decision making 
during implementation. 
Instruments: teacher training and textbook production 
In light of diverging policy goals policy instruments128 are also extremely diverse 
and differ regionally. Experimentation as a major model of Chinese policy implementation, 
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 Policy instruments or - to use a synonym - policy tools bind different stages of the policy cycle 
together as “subject of deliberation and activity in all stages of the policy process” (Howlett 2011, p. 22). 
Policy research has been busy in categorizing policy instruments since long (see Hood 1983, 2007). In a 
newer contribution Howlett (2011) distinguishes four main categories. According to this organizational tools 
are government actions that directly affect policy output and delivery, for instance the direct provision of 
public services through government or quasi-governmental organizations as well as the establishment of 
networks with other service providers. Authoritative tools, by contrast, are those tools by which 
governments steer the behavior of targets by the use of authority. Examples are direct governmental, 
delegated, or voluntary regulations. Financial tools are defined as those tools that encourage or discourage 
actor behavior by creating financial incentives for example through taxes, grants, or subsidies. Information-
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for instance, leads to a diversity in models and instrument application between 
localities.129 Within this diversity a range of instruments is used for these interventions, 
but especially employing and training bilingually trained teachers and funding and 
delivering textbooks in minority languages to schools have been discussed in the 
literature as important measures of minority language education internationally 
(Beardsmore 2011) and in China (Xiong 2004; Tsung 2009; Cobbey 2007), and shall thus 
presented here in detail. 
School teacher pre-service education as one of the major instruments in bilingual 
education policies is in China highly controlled by the state and became ever more 
formalized and centralized over the last decades. Since the abolition of the private or 
substitute teacher system in China (see chapter 3) public colleges and pedagogical 
universities (so called “Normal Universities”) are the main providers of those degrees that 
entitle to serve at public schools, and many school positions require Bachelor or Master 
Degrees. However, despite several non-didactical study programs on minority languages 
in China’s colleges and universities,130only very few universities in China offer teacher 
education specifically in minority languages (Su 2013; Zhang 2011b). Furthermore, the 
fact that after the end of the “teacher positioning system” (the “bianzhi system”, see 
Brødsgaard (2002)) graduates from bilingual programs cannot be sure to find 
employment anymore and jobs in bilingual teaching positions are rare, only very few 
college students are interested in such majors (Wang, Chen 2012). 
Textbook publishing 131  as another instrument in the tool box of bilingual 
education has been also largely used by the Provincial and sub-provincial Bureaus of 
                                                                                                                                                                
based tools, finally, are those tools that aim at communicating or limiting information for example by 
information campaigns, publishing research, or censorship. 
129
 Implementing policies through experimentation and model projects, so called “pilots”, is a 
major mode of policy making, testing, and learning in China, where local governments develop own 
solutions to policy problems within centrally defined spaces, with the outlook to popularize successful 
innovations (Heilmann 2008). Bilingual education policy in China resorts to models and local experiments as 
well. Following the experimental policy approach government agencies start a program, choose a relatively 
small number of schools or classes as pilots (试点学校/ 试点班) and implement education projects on a 
trial basis there. In theory, these models should be short-termed and subject to regular evaluation. This 
approach has the benefit that it encourages local innovations and inter-school competition. However, at the 
same time it produces, by default, also inequalities when only selected schools or classes receive 
investments. One can assume that government agencies tend to choose project schools that have already a 
relatively good basis in order to raise the probability of success in their projects. This approach bears thus 
the risk that not the neediest receive investments but only those that either have good connections to 
government agencies or that have an already well-developed educational infrastructure. 
130 
Especially minority teacher colleges (民族师范学校) offer these majors. Nationality Universities, 
by contrast, rather train researchers in minority languages than teachers (Teng, Wang 2009). 
131 
Books for use in Chinese schools have been distinguished into three types: firstly, textbooks that 
are published by the provincial Bureaus of Education on core subjects, such as Math and Chinese with 
largely unified content; secondly, local textbooks that are edited and published by province, prefecture, or 
county agencies on subjects that are not nationally standardized, e.g. the “Three life” textbooks on hygiene 
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Education and the Ethnic Administration to promote minority language education. As the 
Chinese state controls the content and delivery of school textbooks132 the Bureaus use 
funds and structures to approve, print, or distribute textbooks also in minority languages. 
Three instruments are of particular importance. 
Firstly, the state controls a large share of the writing and editing process of 
textbooks. In minority language education, the state produces textbooks in math and 
Chinese Language and Literature that are translated from Chinese to the respective local 
minority language and then published bilingually with the minority script under or beside 
the Chinese script (the so called “Ethnic-Chinese contrastive teaching materials”, 民汉对
照教材) and textbooks that aim specifically at learning one minority language. The former 
type of textbooks is produced by the Provincial Bureaus of Education, but the latter type, 
due to the local specifics of minority language education in China, is typically produced 
locally by prefecture or county level (Ou, Luo 2009). The number of these textbooks has 
been said to have increased nationally since the "Plan for the Reform of Basic Education 
Curriculum" emphasized in 2001 the value of local and “experimental” textbooks (Zhang 
2011b), but the actual usage in class can be expected to differ locally. 
Secondly, the state keeps control over each textbook edition that is supposed to 
reach schools by a process of textbook approval conducted by specific committees. Since 
1986 all textbooks for primary and secondary school must be reviewed by the review 
committees at higher levels (Chen 2002). According to the “Provisional Procedures on the 
management of approval of primary and middle school textbooks” (Ministry of Education 
6/7/2001) textbooks edited by county or prefecture level are to be evaluated by a 
committee on province level, and textbooks on the national curriculum subjects edited by 
                                                                                                                                                                
education by Yunnan Province (Editorial Board of 'Live life living' no date) and "Underground treasures" on 
Yunnan’s natural resources (Editorial Board of Yunnan Province Local Compulsory Education Teaching 
materials no date); thirdly, school-based textbooks that staff of a particular school (often with outside 
support) developed for their school. Education legislation encourages the development of all three types 
(Teng et al. 2011, p. 48) and all three are commonly found in Chinese schools. Scholars from the Minzu 
University in Beijing, for instance, collected in a large study more than 2000 local or school-based textbooks 
from all over China (see Ou, Luo 2009). Furthermore, there are books that teachers and students can 
additionally buy for classroom preparation, such as the so called “books to support learning” (辅助读物), 
“books for outside class” (课外读物), and “teacher books” (教师用书) (Zhang 2011c). Sometimes schools 
also edit and print handbooks by themselves, hand them out to their teachers and demand that teachers 
prepare their lessons according to these handbooks. 
132
 The state uses these mechanisms also to control the ethnic ideology transmitted in textbooks. 
According to a study by Zhang (2011c, p. 66) the state expects that textbooks in minority languages and 
especially those that present local culture convey three ideologies to students: “Ethnic unity, patriotism, 
love your hometown.” Textbooks that were published about 20 years ago depicted ethnic minorities as 
culturally underdeveloped groups that are in need of help by the Han (Bass 2005). Although today 
textbooks rather emphasize the value of local culture, unity and support of ethnic groups under one nation 
are still the major themes of depicting ethnicity in textbooks. 
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provinces are additionally reviewed by the State Textbooks and Approval Committee. 
Only textbooks that are deemed suitable by these Committees will be printed.  
Finally, the state controls printing and school-delivery of textbooks. Nationally or 
provincially unified textbooks are produced by a monopoly of a few number of officially 
designated school textbook publishers under state control. County governments deliver 
textbooks to schools, which hand them over to students free of charge (Qi 2011a). 
Models 
Notwithstanding the extensive discussions especially on the differences in tuition 
models133 there are several communalities among minority language education models in 
China. Firstly, minority language education is amidst an overall decreasing trend. Despite 
the caveats in available statistical data134, statistics suffice to indicate a general trend of 
decreasing student numbers in minority language education programs in China. In Yunnan, 
for example, the cumulated number of students in bilingual classes fell from 478,050 (or 
10.85 percent of all primary school students) in the year 2004 to 165,000 (3.89 percent) in 
2011, which is a decline by 65.48 percent (Xiong 2004; China Education Daily 2011; 
Yunnan Bureau for Statistics 2012).135 Research documented the decline in student 
numbers specifically in education programs that use newly created scripts such as Zhuang, 
Buyi, Dong, or Miao language (see examples in Teng, Wang 2011). Even in localities that 
report large numbers of students in bilingual education136 the figures also indicate a rise 
of Chinese education that has substituted the former minority-languages-only tuition. 
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 Some scholars (e.g. Tsung 2009; Dai, Cheng 2007) describe these models regionally defined and 
term models as “Southwestern model” or “Tibetan model”. These distinctions indicate specific 
constellations of minority language education in China, but they ignore the differences within localities and. 
134
 Official Chinese statistics often refer to the “rate of coverage by bilingual education” (接受双语
教育覆盖率). These statistics, however, are only of limited use, since the very definition of who counts as 
bilingual student embraces students of different language backgrounds who underwent different tuition 
programs in terms of length, goals, and curriculum. Furthermore, the official statistics lack in reliability 
concerning student numbers. To begin with, figures published are merely based on student numbers that 
the schools provide to their supervising agency. Schools might feel compelled to report higher numbers of 
students in minority language classes in order to show that they fulfill the required general schooling rates, 
which results in false numbers of overall students (see also remarks on statistical data in introductory 
chapter). However, underreporting drop-out students has presumably fewer effects on statistics on 
bilingual education programs in primary schools because the drop-out phenomenon is here less severe than 
in middle schools. 
135
 These sources refrain from explaining the origin of the statistics and must thus be treated with 
care. However, during interviews officials at the provincial Ministry for Education and at the Yunnan 
Province Ethnic Affairs Commission confirmed the general trend of a decline of bilingual education in 
Yunnan. 
136
 Statistics from some counties in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Yanbian report an increase of 
bilingual education coverage rates of up to 100 percent in primary school (Wang 2012) and pre-school 
(Minzubao, http://www.mzb.com.cn/html/Home/report/381940-1.htm, last access 2013-06-18). However, 
the accuracy of these statistics must be questioned,, since the goal of raising bilingualism overlaps here with 
the goal of popularizing pre-school education, where local governments must meet hard targets that are set 
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Secondly, the majority of localities offer minority languages merely in primary 
schools and kindergartens,137  but conduct all education at secondary and tertiary 
schooling in Chinese.138 The limitation to the primary education sector is due to the 
function of minority language education in China as serving as intermediary tool to 
support ethnic minority students learning Chinese, but once they are able to use Chinese, 
the then “useless” minority language education is terminated. In terms of timing the so 
called “pyramid-model”, a head-start in minority languages followed by slow substitution 
by Chinese tuition, seems to be common among the large majority of bilingual tuition in 
China, but some localities also schedule models of abrupt language shifts from one grade 
to the other (Tsung 2009). In both models, however, the national and the local 
governments follow the goal to include ethnic minority students into the mainstream 
education and to use language as a tool to bind ethnic minorities socio-linguistically to the 
rest of China. 
Thirdly, minority language education is conducted mostly in rural areas with a high 
share of ethnic minority population and populations of low household income139, but 
hardly ever in urban regions or in regions with high Han-shares in the population. 140 Both 
                                                                                                                                                                
on national level. An official at the Education Bureau in Xishuangbanna told me during an informal talk that 
since the statistics on pre-school education have to meet predefined targets, officials in all Educational 
bureaus are pressured to forge the statistics. At this point I am unable to evaluate the reliability of the 
above mentioned reports. 
137
 The situation of bilingual teaching at kindergartens differs extremely between the regions. This 
is related to different understandings of the purpose of pre-school bilingual education. In Xinjiang, bilingual 
education serves as added Chinese education to the regular Uighur education that dominated for decades 
in pre-school education. The region has already a large coverage of bilingual kindergartens due to 
governmental initiatives (Ma 2009; Zhang 2010). In Yunnan, by contrast, bilingual education is understood 
as adding minority languages to the regular Chinese education. In this province there are only very few 
kindergartens that offer education in minority languages. During a discussion with more than 30 
kindergarten leaders from regions with large non-Han populations all over Yunnan I found that only one 
kindergarten offered Arabic writing classes for Hui children, but none of the others offered education in 
minority languages. 
138
 Literature reports vivid minority language education at elementary and middle school level (see 
e.g. Bao 1995; Wulan 1997; Fang 2010; Ma 2009; Cobbey 2007; Wang, Postiglione 2008; Tsung 2009; Zhou 
2012c; Kuang 2004; Dao 2001; Jiang 2001; Dai, Cheng 2007; Schoenhals 2001), but there is hardly any such 
education in higher education. Xinjiang, probably China’s region with the most vivid higher education in 
minority languages, step by step expelled Uighur language from teaching at University level since the 2000s 
“in order to address the employment difficulties of minority graduates” (Ma 2009, p. 208). Today Uyghur 
education in Xinjiang, similarly to Mongolian education in Inner Mongolia, has been largely reduced to 
elementary schools and pre-school classes (Ma 2009; Fang 2010; Wulan 1997). 
139
 Both the rural and the ethnic minority population in China - with a few exceptions, e.g. the 
Koreans - are on average financially disadvantaged compared to urban and Han population (Gustafsson, Sai 
2009a). Similarly, children of ethnic and rural families have lesser pocket money, wear cheaper clothes, and 
receive less gift-money for spring festival (CYRC China Youth Research Centre 2007). Related to family 
income children in rural and especially in designated poverty areas have much lower rates of educational 
access (Hannum, Adams 2009), and attainment and drop-out rates are here higher than those at urban 
schools (Wu, Zhang 2010; Wang et al. 2011). 
140
 Iredale et al. (2001, p. 116), for example, report that Mongolian language education used to be 
conducted at three schools with more than 2000 students in the City of Hohhot in earlier times, but that in 
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contribute to a perception of ethnic minority education as a model suitable for 
“peripheral people” (Harrell 1995) in the meaning of economically deprived ethnic groups 
who live far away from the assumed cultural, political, and economic center, but not as 
suitable for people residing in the assumed centers, neither for Han nor for urban ethnic 
minorities. 
Fourthly, minority language education is conducted often at rural schools and thus 
of schools that have in average lower quality and reputation.141 The limitation to rural 
schools, that has been reported from many countries in the world (see e.g. Jones, Martin-
Jones 2004), is due to several reasons. Firstly, it has been argued that rural areas in China 
suffer from a lack of Chinese-speaking teachers, which makes tuition in minority 
languages the only option (Ma 2011a). Secondly, minority language has been argued to 
be used as a tool to attract especially children of rural families who are critical towards 
urban Han life, as Postiglione et al. (2011) show on the example of Tibetan nomadic 
herders. Thirdly, from the perspective of language planning, minority language education 
for rural children who more often still speak non-Chinese languages as mother tongues is 
deemed to be more fruitful for the goal of language preservation. Fourthly, as rural 
children more often suffer from language-related barriers minority language education is 
used especially in these areas to support non-Chinese speaking children (SIL - East Asia 
Group 2010). Finally, parental support for minority language education is more likely to 
be higher at rural localities, whereas in urban areas resistance against such education can 
be expected to be higher, since in urban areas parents have more expectations for their 
children to visit higher education, and they have more choices to choose schools.142 
                                                                                                                                                                
1996 there was only one Mongolian language school with 600 students left, whereas in rural areas 
Mongolian education was much more vivid. From Honghe Prefecture in Yunnan a statistic registers almost 
all schools that conduct bilingual education as rural schools (Wen 2011). 
141
 The lower quality of rural schools has been observed also in other countries. Harrison and 
Busher (1995) summarize three problems of small rural schools. Firstly, small rural schools are unable to 
deliver a curriculum as diverse as that of urban schools due to limits in staff and material. Secondly, the 
cultural and geographical environment leads to isolation of pupils, to teacher professional stagnancy, and to 
a lack in preparation of rural students for the requirements of urban societies. Thirdly, small rural schools 
are cost-inefficient and school development is thus hindered by limited funds. In China, this is additionally 
related to the underfunding of schools in rural and minority areas (Guo 2007; Gong, Tsang 2011; Zeng, Ding 
2010), which, for instance has resulted in higher prevalence of so called low-quality “minban” private 
teachers in rural and ethnic minority areas (Iredale et al. 2001, p. 118). The image of ethnic minority villages 
being “under-developed”, “uncivilized”, and “at the margins” (Litzinger 2000; Murphy 2004) may further 
provide difficulties for educational administration to find teachers who are willing to serve in village schools.  
142
 In China the desire for minority language education is higher among the rural population than 
among the urban population (Tsung, Cruickshank 2009, Zhao, Zhao 2010a, 2010b). In other countries, by 
contrast, rural parents who require more education in the national language perceive activists who try to 
implement minority language education programs as “outsiders trying to impose disadvantageous 
educational changes” (Coronel-Molina 2011, p. 148). There is a need for more research on attitudes of 
Chinese parents’ and their possibilities to exercising pressure on government. 
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Fifthly, minority language education can be mostly found at public schools and 
kindergartens and only seldom at private ones. Since private education is still a 
comparatively small phenomenon that is mostly located in urban areas143 demand in 
private education is rather for education in Chinese than in minority languages.144 This, 
however, is not only an indicator that the fate of minority language education lies in the 
hands of the state, but it is also an indicator that the general population does not deem 
minority language education in schools or kindergartens worth for investing their own 
money (see discussion on language attitudes and actions by parents in chapter 5 on the 
example of parents in Xishuangbanna). 
Finally, with respect to the four frameworks of minority language education that 
have been introduced in chapter 2, China follows largely models of the “subtractive-
transitional framework”, where children who are perceived as lacking Chinese abilities 
receive mother-tongue tuition in non-Chinese languages under a gradual change towards 
Chinese. Although there have been tuition models under the “additive-maintenance 
framework”, that is the tuition in minority languages and Chinese throughout all formal 
educational levels (see examples mentioned by Bilik 1998 and Ma 2009), these programs 
seem to be an issue of the past. Similarly, “recursive-developmental” minority language 
education for language revitalization has been conducted, for example after script 
reforms of Uighur and other languages, but with the end of the large language 
engineering projects these models also terminated (Rohsenow 2004). The “dynamic-poly-
directional framework”, finally, that aims at transculturalism through mutual learning, has 
not been reported from any model in China. Although there are increasingly popular 
models of teaching English as a language of instruction to elite urban children (Feng 2005) 
literature does not report any models that teach minority languages to Han children. 
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 The merely 5,000 private schools (Editorial Board of China Educational Statistics Yearbook 2012) 
in China occupy only a small part of the schooling sector. Only the minority of these private schools are 
what Lin (1999) has called “elite” schools that offer better quality than the public ones. The majority of 
private schools are low-quality alternatives for those children who are rejected by regular and public 
schools, such as migrant children or so called “black children” who were born into families that exceeded 
the birth limits of the one-child policy (see Greenhalgh 2003). Schools for migrant children, for example, 
were informally founded in the 90s and 2000s with teaching facilities of extremely low quality, classes of up 
to 70 students, unprofessional staff, and dangerous building structures (Han 2004), but are now increasingly 
engaged in formalization and management through government agencies (Schnack 2010). In rural areas 
most private schools that used to be organized and funded by villagers themselves have been transferred 
into regular public schools, and the teachers have been added to the pool of public teachers (Lin 1999; 
Wang 2002). 
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 Literature reports very few cases of private elite education in minority languages in China. Fang 
(2010, p. 54), for example, writes of a private school in a rural Uyghur-only language area in Xinjiang that 
offered especially Chinese education for children of families who were unsatisfied with the surrounding 
Uyghur schools. However, this phenomenon seems to be very small, as for instance none of the private 
educational institutes in Xishuangbanna falls into that category. 
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However, since implementation of the above mentioned instruments rests mainly 
with provincial and sub-provincial Bureaus of Education application of these instruments 
differs largely between regions. In Xinjiang, for instance, Uighur education is sometimes 
taught throughout all grades in primary school and even in secondary schools (Ma 2009), 
but in Yunnan minority language education is generally taught only at primary schools 
(Tsung 2009). Moreover, there are even differences within provinces, prefectures, and 
counties. Within Xinjiang, for instance, some counties schedule bilingual education from 
the first grade, others start with Chinese only, and others continue for some years with 
Uighur education before they introduce Chinese (see examples in Ma 2009). These 
divergences in policies on the one side reflect the categorization of languages into 
different development stages. Korean, Mongolian, and Tibetan bilingual education, for 
instance, has been fully revived after the interruption of the “monopolistic stage”, but 
minority language education in Naxi, Miao, and Dai until today remains in the 
“experimental” mode, and for Bai, Buyi, and Dongxiang there are even less options for 
minority language education (Zhou 2001). On the other side, however, the fact that even 
within one language and within one administrative division education models differ 
indicates that not only the polices, but even more so the actions of implementers shape 
the outcomes of minority language education in China. This will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Implementational problems 
Implementation of minority languages at school level meets a set of barriers 
caused by education policies and by societal changes. In the societal realm migration 
caused higher linguistic heterogeneity also in school communities, which according to 
authors such as Xiong (2004) might make minority language education in schools difficult. 
In Xinjiang, for instance, following large immigration of Han Chinese, authorities 
terminated Uighur and Kazakh language education at several schools (Ma 2009), and 
similarly Tibetan education in Sichuan has been said to have been become more difficult 
in light of immigrating Han population (Tsung 2009). 
In addition the low usability of minority languages in many domains caused 
difficulties in educational programs, e.g. difficulties of textbook translation into languages 
with limited vocabulary (Tsung 2009, p. 175). More barriers exist when minority 
languages are excluded from usage in public domains, when there are no books available 
apart from textbooks, and when all other school subjects except the courses for minority 
languages are taught in Chinese. Under these circumstances minority language promotion 
 145 
through schools meets a lack of legitimacy and risks to lose students’ and teachers’ 
willingness to engage in teaching and learning minority languages and scripts. 
In the realm of educational policies minority language education suffers from 
additional difficulties. Scholars such as Xiong (2004) have argued that programs for 
minority language education lack in resources, for instance to produce textbooks or to 
hire bilingual teachers.145 More importantly in terms of origins and stability of resources, 
however, seems to be the low and unstable position of minority language education in 
legislation. Teng and Wang (2009, p. 339) formulate with precaution: “Legislation on 
ethnic minority education has been started to gain attention, but we can also say that 
policies and legislation on bilingual education is still immature.” In a more direct way one 
could also say that for the sake of Chinese language education legislation on minority 
languages is kept under-developed on purpose. Whatever the reason, this 
underdevelopment has serious detrimental effects on the stability of projects and on 
students’ educational careers, when for instance even successful minority language 
education projects that raised students’ overall education achievements and contributed 
to language protection have been abruptly terminated in favor of Chinese, thus resulting 
in severe bends in students’ educational careers (see e.g. examples mentioned by Nima 
2008, Ma 2009, Tsung 2009, and Postiglione et al. 2011). 
Educational policies in fields other than minority language education also 
endanger minority language education sustainability. The policies of forced school 
mergers, to name an example of China’s educational policies that recently resulted in 
much grievances (see remarks in chapter 3), have caused linguistic heterogeneity at 
schools. More generally, but arguably more influential, are institutional settings of the 
school and college entrance examination systems. When these examinations can be only 
taken in Chinese the usability of minority language education for the students is limited, 
and so is, as will be discussed in later chapters, also the motivation of teachers to conduct 
this type of education. 
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 The complaint about a lack of teachers, however, refers to very different issues in China’s 
various regions. Due to the lack of nation-wide statistics on the number of bilingual teachers this complaint 
can be substantiated only on a local basis. In those regions where education in minority languages used to 
be a strong branch of school education, supply of teachers who are fluent in minority languages, such as 
Uygur or Kazak, was never a problem, but finding Chinese speaking teachers often was. The “problem of 
bilingual teachers” (Teng, Wang 2009, p. 496) means here a shortage of teachers who speak sufficient 
Chinese (Fang 2010; Cai, Du 2013). In regions such as Yunnan, by contrast, where education in Chinese 
language was much wider spread already for decades the “problem” refers not to teachers’ Chinese 
language skills, but to the difficulties of finding teachers who can teach in minority languages. In these latter 
cases teacher scarcity can be a serious problem for bilingual programs in smaller languages, which resulted 
in some cases in the expiration of bilingual programs (see examples reported by Blachford 2004 and Tsung 
2009). 
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4.3 Summary of chapter and specification of framework 
In this chapter I have elaborated on the structures, policies, and instruments of 
minority language education policy making by government agencies in China. This 
overview has shown that both the making of and the approaches to ethnic minority 
language education policies are deeply rooted in the Chinese political system. Structures 
of policy making in China, from the general vertical and horizontal division of government 
administration to the approach of ruling minorities by ethnic group distinction and by 
partial regional autonomy are all mirrored in the making of ethnic minority language 
policies. Similarly, minority language education policies also reflect goals of language 
policies and ethnic policies in China. The strategy to “pacify” potentially separatist ethnic 
groups by granting the right to use ethnic minority languages in schools, while at the 
same time promoting Chinese language, for instance, aims at hedging minority languages 
in education to small areas. 
At the same time this chapter has also shown that narratives of a suppressing 
state that enhances language death by force are too short-handed. Instead, this chapter 
has shown that there is a large gap between formulation and outcomes of ethnic minority 
language education policies in China. Many policies for the support of ethnic minority 
languages are contested by policies that demand an ever increasing share of tuition in 
Chinese language. Compared to the vague policy guidelines for ethnic minority language 
education the outcomes of tuition are less than satisfying. This chapter’s detailed analysis 
of instruments and structures has shown that there are a plethora of policies and 
instruments to support minority language education at schools. Lam’s (2005, p. 153) 
summary that “[w]hile the Chinese government does not suppress minority languages, in 
the sense that there is a stick to force minority learners to convert to Putonghua, there is 
certainly a carrot to attract them to do so” must be complemented by a view of how the 
carrots and sticks work specifically. 
These findings call for two adjustments of the analytical framework of school-
based decision making in curriculum policy implementation in the way how the 
framework understands policies and instruments. Firstly, the framework as outlined in 
the previous chapter depicts policy implementation as a process of putting one policy into 
practice. However, for the case of ethnic minority language education in China there are 
multiple policies with diverse and sometimes even conflicting goals. School education 
policies aim, for instance, at binding ethnic minority groups to the majority society and 
the state by a unified education and at the same time they aim at promoting diversity as a 
promise to China’s ethnically defined groups. Accordingly the item “policies” in 
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framework needs to be adjusted to capture this diversity. The framework needs to 
capture policies not as clear-cut single policies, but rather as a complex field of policies 
with blurred, competing, diverse policy goals that require selection by implementers, and 
to analyze policy implementation not as a one-way process, but to include interpretation 
and selection by implementers. 
Secondly, the framework as outlined in the previous chapter understands policy 
instruments as policy manifestations that reach schools. In the case of ethnic minority 
language policies in China, however, due to the diversity of actors, agencies’ complex 
vertical and horizontal relationships, and experimentation as policy making approach 
policy instruments for ethnic minority language education at China’s schools are diverse 
and differ locally tremendously. Not only the modes of textbook provision or teacher 
training, but the very basic models and frameworks of ethnic minority language education 
differ between China’s regions, languages, and even between schools. The framework 
needs to capture this diversity of instruments by distinguishing between those 
instruments that aim merely at symbolic actions and those that enable school staff to 
conduct specific tuition. With this selection the framework will be enriched by analysis of 
how implementers take over, make use of, or even ignore instruments. 
Under this specified framework the findings of this chapter indicate two lessons 
for the further proceed of this text, which all will be addressed in the next chapters. 
Firstly, the differences between policy formulation and outcome indicate that decisions 
by implementing agencies have the power to shape policy outcomes. A large part of the 
problems of ethnic minority education policies relates to problems of implementation, 
such as lacks of resources, shifts in models, or competition by other policies. As these 
complexities meet at the implementation level, policy analysis seems to be good advised 
to not only analyze policies as formulated in documents, but to analyze how instruments 
and structures translate into policy implementation at the street-level, in this case at the 
school-level. In relation to the contrasting policy goals introduced here and the variety of 
the actors that are involved in minority language education, schools receive an 
intermediary position as implementation base of policies. Secondly, the short outline of 
ethnic minority language policies and outcomes in China also shows a large variety of 
models, instruments, and outcomes in this diverse country. This finding indicates the 
need to specify policies, instruments, goals, and outcomes against the background of a 
specific region, which I will elaborate in the next chapter for the case of Xishuangbanna. 
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5 Field: Dai language education in Xishuangbanna 
With this dissertation I analyze policy implementation of minority languages at the 
example of case study schools that are situated in Xishuangbanna Prefecture in 
Southwest China. In order to understand implementers’ decisions there are a few notes in 
order on the background of the people, the languages, and the policies of the region. In 
the first section of this chapter I will hence provide an overview on the political, social, 
educational, and linguistic situation in Xishuangbanna. In the second section I will outline 
the settings of minority language education in Xishuangbanna, from the actors in 
government agencies and social organizations to the policy instruments and to the 
current situation of tuition. Based on statistical data, literature, and interviews with 
government officials this chapter will draw the background for the analysis of school-
based policy implementation decisions in later chapters. 
5.1 Overview Xishuangbanna 
Xishuangbanna is a political entity of prefecture level in the Southwestern Chinese 
province Yunnan. At the same time, however, due to its historical, ethnic, and economic 
characteristics Xishuangbanna can also be seen as a distinct cultural region. In a study on 
regions in China the geographer Krechetova developed the concept of “economic and 
cultural complexes”, which in the author’s understanding are given when an area is 
characterized by three properties:  
- “Homogeneity of material and spiritual culture among the population of a territory (or regular 
alteration of the limited number of groups of people with different cultures); 
- Homogeneity of economic characteristics (or regular alteration of groups of people with different 
characteristics of economy); 
- Closer relationships between the economy and culture of population of an area than between 
economy and culture of population of this area and other areas.” (Krechetova 2011, § 5) 
Under this perspective Krechetova defines Xishuangbanna as one unique 
economic and cultural complex, comparable to complexes such the “Tibetan Plateau 
complex”, or the “Eastern Yunnan complex”. According to this author, Xishuangbanna’s 
specific agricultural traditions of plough-based land cultivation, the low share of ethnic 
Han in the population, the economic dependency on tourism, and the linguistic history of 
Dai language and script allow to speak of Xishuangbanna as one distinct area (Krechetova 
2011, § 55).  
In this section I will pick up this notion of a cultural and economic area, that in the 
case of Xishuangbanna overlaps with political and administrative divisions, and provide 
information on those cultural, economic, and political characteristics of the region that 
affect the possibilities, the need, and the difficulties of minority language education in 
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Xishuangbanna. In the first paragraphs I will provide an overview on the geographical and 
economic situation, followed by an overview on the administrative and educational 
situation, before I will conclude this part with a short outlook on the ethnic characteristics 
of this region. In a second part to this overview I will specifically describe the linguistic 
situation in Xishuangbanna as a prerequisite to analysis of minority language education at 
the prefecture’s schools. 
5.1.1 A border prefecture: Social and political overview Xishuangbanna 
Geography and economy 
Xishuangbanna is in a middle position between China and South-East Asia. 
Politically located at the Southwestern edge of China in the province of Yunnan (see 
Figure 6 in appendix for map), in terms of natural geography this region resembles much 
of the neighboring countries Laos and Burma as part of the “Greater Mekong Subregion”, 
named after the Mekong, a river that connects Xishuangbanna with its Southeast Asian 
neighbors (Xu et al. 2014). With its subtropical climate the mountainous region offers 
unique flora and fauna in China and has been described as a “biodiversity hotspot” 
(Martin 2013, p. 29). Although this biodiversity is under threat due to an increase in 
rubber tree plantations (Xu 2006; Xu et al. 2014)146 Xishuangbanna is biologically still an 
outstanding post in China. Geographer Grumbine (2012, pp. 83–84) describes the 
differences in landscape when he notes his impressions of a journey along the Mekong 
River: 
“Tracing the Lancang from northern Yunnan into Xishuangbanna, a traveler passes into a different 
world. Without leaving the province, you swap snow leopards for elephants and tigers, fir trees for 
rubber and rice, the Himalaya for the old world tropics. Xishuangbanna’s seasonal rain forests are 
unique, the northernmost extension of tropical Asia in China.” 
Economically Xishuangbanna has experienced in the last few years an economic 
boom with a yearly steady increase in average income per person between 15 and 20 
percent over the last years (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Statistics 2013, § 5). This growth is 
connected, among other factors, to the agricultural shifts towards rubber plantations, to 
Xishuangbanna’s intermediary position between China and Southeast Asia, and to the 
growing tourism industry. In terms of income Xishuangbanna’s population benefitted 
from the increase of rubber tree and banana tree plantations, as well as from the increase 
in tea prices, although the collateral decline in space for food production for the local 
market has threatened food security (Xu et al. 2014). The development of trade and 
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 Pictures in Martin (2013) illustrate the resulting change of landscape. 
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traffic between Xishuangbanna, the rest of China, and neighboring countries in Southeast 
Asia has contributed further to the economic growth (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Statistics 
2013, § 5). Finally, tourism to Xishuangbanna, “one of the most popular tourist 
destinations in southwest China” (Hansen 2004, pp. 73–74), advanced from 7 million 
tourists in 2010 to 12 million in 2012, generated a revenue of 13 billion RMB in 2012 
(Xishuangbanna Bureau of Statistics 2013, § 11)  created jobs in the tourism industry and 
shifted labor markets from agriculture to service industry (Evans 2000). 
The specifics of this economic boom had also effects on migration and the ethnic 
share in Xishuangbanna’s population. On the one side, 67 percent of Xishuangbanna’s 
permanently registered population is registered as “agricultural population” (农业人口) 
(Xishuangbanna Bureau of Statistics 2013, § 11), and the high profit margins in agriculture 
have made farm jobs or farming the families’ fields also attractive for young people. 
Secondly, due to the increased job chances in Xishuangbanna – and arguably as interview 
partners insisted also a consequence due to the region’s natural beauty – the region has 
transformed from a place where people migrate away to an immigration destination for 
migrant workers from other parts of the country. Whereas interview partners could lively 
recollect how they went in the eighties and nineties to Thailand to seek jobs none of 
them saw this today as an attractive option anymore. Instead, the region is now a 
destination for migrant workers who seek jobs in the service sector or at the plantations. 
Xishuangbanna’s population has increased between 2000 and 2010 by 14 percent, and 
much of this through immigration (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Statistics 2011, § 5). This 
immigration has, in addition to the earlier state-directed migration by Han-settlers (see 
below) contributed to a change in the ethnic share of Xishuangbanna’s population. 
Amidst this economic growth, however, there remain large gaps in income. Not 
only earn Xishuangbanna’s urbanites with on-average yearly 18 thousand RMB three 
times the income of rural population in the region (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Statistics 
2013, § 11),147 but there are also large differences in income within the rural population. 
Generally speaking, those who have been fortunate enough to reside in villages in the 
valleys, where growing rubber trees can generate high income, where compensations for 
newly built streets or airports bring additional income, or where urbanization made 
renting space for factories or housing possible, some villagers had the opportunity to 
make a fortune, whereas villagers in mountain villages with less developed infrastructure 
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 These figures, it must be said, can represent real incomes only to small degrees as they don’t 
reflect non-monetary benefits from work and they don’t reflect differences in living expenses between 
urban and rural areas. Nevertheless, travelling through the region easily confirms differences in income-
related living standards such as car ownership. 
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and, due to the high altitude without possibility to grow rubber trees, participated less in 
the region’s economic raise. 
Politics and administration 
Before the establishment of the People’s Republic Xishuangbanna was a kingdom 
of villages ruled by an ethnic Dai monarchy under a king in Jinghong (the “cao 
phaendin”).148 This king’s authority, however, was limited internally and externally. Firstly, 
as the court was unable to enforce certain standards throughout the kingdom, such as 
religious or linguistic unifications, Xishuangbanna at that time must be rather seen as a 
confederation of several states (Borchert 2008, pp. 116–117).149 Secondly, the courts’ 
authority depended on relations with the neighboring strong Chinese empire. 
Xishuangbanna had to pay tributes to Kunming, and from time to time there was a 
Chinese army stationed in Meng Han. However, since both the tribute system and the 
military presence of the Chinese state were rather nominal, scholars tend to view 
Xishuangbanna, similar to the Nanzhao kingdom, as an independent state (Hsieh 1995). 
Since the court in Jinghong respected the nominal supremacy of the Chinese empire, the 
relation was rather marked by co-existence than by resistance and conflict (Borchert 2008, 
p. 166). 
Beginning with the 1910s until the 1950s Xishuangbanna was side-effected by the 
political changes in China, but the Dai elites and the dynastic families continued to play 
influential roles even under the new rulers of the Republic and the People’s Republic in 
China. After the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1911/12 the Chinese also established 
administration in Xishuangbanna, but the monastic family continued to rule in practice 
(Hansen 2004, p. 55). During the civil war the People’s Liberation Army entered 
Xishuangbanna and at 23rd January 1953 the kingdom was officially dissolved and the new 
autonomous district Xishuangbanna was established. However, even then and although 
“the PLA’s entrance into Sipsongpanna represented a fundamental change in the 
relations between China and Sipsongpanna” (Borchert 2008, p. 115) the new rulers left 
Dai elites in leading positions.150 Since then top-level positions such as the local branch 
                                                     
148
 Hsieh explains that under the Dai monarchy villages, and not clans were the basic cultural, 
political, and social unit, conferring benefits to members that lineage did not offer. In this respect, the 
author argues, lineage “never developed into the clan, nor was primordial ethnic identification sought from 
the lineage or descent line” (Hsieh 1995, pp. 304–305). 
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 “Sipsongpanna”, the Dai origin of the Chinese geographical name Xishuangbanna, meaning 
“twelve townships” (Davis 2005, p. 8), indicates the confederative character of the kingdom. 
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 The Dai king was a central figure for identification of people in Xishuangbanna. Even after the 
last Dai king Dai Shixun had resigned, he continued to be perceived as a symbol reflecting nostalgia for the 
old monarchic home country of Dai people outside China, as Hsieh (1995, p. 304) argues in light of “tens of 
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secretary of the CCP in Xishuangbanna have been Han cadres, but other positions, such as 
prefectural governor have been filled with ethnic Dai (Hansen 2004, p. 55).151 
Today Xishuangbanna’s administrative status is that of a prefecture in Yunnan 
Province. It is divided into three county-level entities: Menghai County, Mengla County, 
and Jinghong City (see Figure 7). On the next lower level the area is divided into 31 
townships and one street office, and below that 220 village committees support 
administration. With 966 km of international borders to Laos and Myanmar the region is a 
major trading hub and a gateway to China’s connections with its South-East Asian 
neighbors (Xishuangbanna Government 2010). 
Xishuangbanna has been established as China’s first autonomous district (which 
was later renamed into an autonomous prefecture) (Xishuangbanna Government 2010). 
This autonomous status covers, similar to other autonomous regions in China (see 
chapter 4) decision making on multiple policy arenas, especially on culture, but also on 
economy. Regulations such as the “Stipulation of the Autonomy of the Dai Autonomous 
Prefecture in Yunnan Province” stipulate that government in Xishuangbanna is 
implemented by the ethnic Dai152 and that although the local government has to follow 
instructions and laws from higher levels it can “flexibly implement” or even stop 
implementation of policies (Yunnan Province People's Congress 9/8/1987).  
However, the autonomous status of Xishuangbanna has been evaluated very 
differently. Some authors, and especially Chinese authors, have claimed that the 
autonomous status of Xishuangbanna “terminates ethnic barriers, solves ethnic conflicts, 
develops ethnic friendship, and advances ethnic unity” (Yan 1999, p. 468). Beyond these 
general slogans, other authors, however, have been much more critical towards the 
implementation of autonomy in Xishuangbanna. Firstly, as has been said in chapter 4, the 
concept of regional autonomy in China is limited to specific policy domains, it suffers from 
a lack of democratic control, and main positions in the party depend on Han control. 
Autonomy of Xishuangbanna Prefecture is similarly limited by these principles. The 
prefecture’s government, for instance, depends on the relations with Yunnan Province 
and its Han-controlled party, the CCP branch secretary is an ethnic Han, and the party is 
not controlled by democratic elections by citizens. Secondly, especially in Xishuangbanna 
                                                                                                                                                                
thousands” of Dai people who kowtowed to the former king during his visit to Chiang Mao in Thailand in 
1986. 
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 The current branch secretary of Xishuangbanna is since 2012 Chen Yuhou, an ethnic Han who 
graduated in Yunnan’s Qujing; the current prefectural governor is since 2013 Luo Hongjiang, an ethnic Dai 
from Jinghong. 
152
 Dai autonomous areas can be only found in Yunnan. Xishuangbanna Prefecture, together with 
Dehong Prefecture are the largest such entities, followed by several Dai Autonomous Counties in the 
Prefectures of Honghe and the Cities of Yuxi, Enmao, and Lincang. 
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granting autonomy under the rule of the Dai has been seen by members of the other 
ethnic groups as continuation of the Dai kingdom and was opposed by groups such as the 
Hani or the Jinuo who demanded more representation for their own ethnic groups 
(Hansen 2004, p. 56). Thirdly, increasing disputes about resource exploitation between 
Han-farmers, local minority farmers, and corporations additionally threaten autonomy of 
local population (Hansen 2004, p. 70). 
Ethnicity 
Xishuangbanna is inhabited by a multiethnic and multilingual population. The 
census from 2010 (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Statistics 2011) reports that only 30 percent 
of the 1.1 Million inhabitants are registered as the national ethnic majority group Han, 
whereas 70 percent are registered as minority ethnic groups, of which the Dai are the 
largest group (see Table 8).153 Over the last decades the Han become the largest ethnic 
group, whereas the share of the Dai decreased to the second position. Compared with 
1956 the share of registered Dai among the population strongly decreased by nearly 50 
percent, and at the same time the share of Han quadrupled. The state-orchestrated mass 
immigration from the mid-1950s onwards, but also later individual migration by Han from 
the Inner Chinese regions (mostly from Hunan), has increased and continues to increase 
the share of Han in Xishuangbanna (Hansen 2005). 
Year Ethnic group Population Share in population 
1956 Han 17,905 7% 
Dai 128,700 50% 
Total 258,645 100% 
2010 Han 340,431 30.03% 
Dai 316,151 27.89% 
Hani 215,434 19.01% 
Lahu 61,504 5.43% 
Yi 66,731 5.89% 
Bulang 47,529 4.19% 
Yao 22,266 1.96% 
Jinuo 22,124 1.95% 
Miao 19,055 1.68% 
Total (and within these 
ethnic minorities) 
1,133,515 (793,084) 100% (69.97%) 
Table 8: Official ethnic composition of Xishuangbanna's Population. Source for 2010: (Xishuangbanna 
Bureau of Statistics 2011), for 1956: Xishuangbanna guotu jingji kaocha baogao, cited in McCarthy (2009, 
p. 73). Note: data shows long-term registered residents in Xishuangbanna, but neither foreigners, nor 
unregistered migrants. 
Although ethnic registration of the groups in Xishuangbanna, similar to other 
ethnic groups in China, lacks in accurate description of people’s identity, people use 
ethnic categories to describe their own identity. The category Dai, for instance, that has 
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 In addition to these officially recognized groups there are also non-recognized groups, such as 
the Ake or the Pin, whose members are officially registered as members of one of the ethnic groups (in this 
case Hani and Bulang), but who sometimes define themselves as ethnically distinct (Dai, Sheng 2012). 
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been created by Chinese ethnographers at the negotiation table in Beijing in 1951 to 
embrace a variety of ethnic groups in Yunnan that had historically little contact, dressed 
differently, had mutually unintelligible languages, and used different writing systems, and 
which also ignores historical relations between people in today’s China with people in 
Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos has been said to be “a testament to the productive power 
of these discourses and technologies of control” (Borchert 2008, p. 117).154 Despite all 
these caveats not only did all of my interview partners knew their own ethnic registration 
and that of the people close to them, but they also often referred to this ethnic 
registration as a major point of their own group belonging, as a source for their demands 
for cultural protection, and as a reason for their own choices in terms of language use at 
home. 
Ethnicity serves in Xishuangbanna not only as a marker for individual identity, but 
it is also used as a marker to sort ethnic groups in hierarchical orders. In interviews that 
Hansen (1999) conducted in Xishuangbanna lay people as well as government officials 
expressed beliefs of developmental statuses of ethnic groups that place Han at the top of 
a pyramid, followed by the Dai, and then by the other ethnic groups. Although ethnic 
images depict all non-Han groups in Xishuangbanna as “innocent”, “Orientalized”, and 
“feminized” people (Komlosy 2009; Schein 1997; Evans 2000), Dai ethnicity enjoys a 
better reputation as traditionally most developed group among those in Xishuangbanna. 
Blum (2001) calls the Dai “the fetishized ethnic other” as this group is presented not only 
as “abstracted from their actual social life and detached from their individual 
characteristics, reduced to picturesque and simplified versions of their full human 
character” (Blum 2001, p. 104) in images that depict Dai as irrational, sexually liberal, and 
mysterious, but also as civilized and culturally developed. Hani or Jinuo, by contrast, are 
still today depicted as “natural”, “primitive”, and “backwards” (Hsieh 1995; Sturgeon 
2012). The dominant role of the Han can be seen through their historically strong 
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 Some authors have argued that the Dai in Xishuangbanna have had historically close contacts to 
the other Dai states in what is today Northern Thailand and Laos, but that as “the members of this ’tacit 
alliance’ were absorbed into various independent modern nation-states” (Hsieh 1995, p. 324) ethnic cross-
border identity has been weakened. Despite the still common cultural flows between for instance Thai 
music and Xishuangbanna’s consumers, but also in terms of migration of monks and workers between both 
countries (Davis 2003), ethnic identity is merely an additional category to national identity. In contrast to 
Hsieh’s (1995, p. 325) point that “the Dai have become politically and ethnically passive”, I argue here that 
the ethnic groups of Xishuangbanna can well distinguish between an ethnic and a citizenship belonging and 
that inactivity in forms of a lack of independency movements does not necessarily mean inactivity in ethnic 
cultural affairs. 
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presence in government, military, and trade. The Dai, at the same time, have been 
represented in government and enjoy at least formally an outstanding position.155 
In Xishuangbanna ethnicity also often comes with financial differences and 
segregated living, a fact that continues a century-old inequality of resource access based 
on ethnically separated locations of settlement. Although Xishuangbanna’s cities are 
ethnically mixed and – different to cities in some of China’s other official ethnic minority 
areas – there are no specific Dai or other ethnically defined quarters in Jinghong, in rural 
areas ethnic groups live largely separated. The Dai live especially in the fruitful valleys, 
whereas other ethnic groups such as Hani or Jinuo have over the last centuries been 
expelled to the hills (Cai 1997). Those Han who have migrated into Xishuangbanna’s rural 
areas through the large state-orchestrated migrations in the 50s and 60s, settled in so 
called “farms” (农场) near to state-owned plantations. Walls and rows of brick houses 
easily distinguish them from the houses of other ethnic groups (Hansen 2005, p. 84). 
Although the ethnic communities often had contacts, the local separation is still largely 
intact, there is only few migration between rural areas in Xishuangbanna, and there are 
only few inter-ethnic marriages (Cai 1997). 
The separation in locality also resulted in financial inequality between the ethnic 
groups. Many Dai become in the last year wealthy by running rubber and banana 
plantations in the valleys and can today expose their new wealth in villas, motorbikes, 
and cars. Han workers at the state-owned rubber plantations, by contrast, have 
benefitted much less from the increase in rubber demand. As their plantations have been 
producing rubber for higher prices due to inefficiency and costs for social benefits, in fact 
many Han workers have been laid off and forced to migrate to cities for off-farm work (Xu 
2006). The climate in the hillside areas, finally, does not allow to plant rubber trees, so 
that Hani, Ake, and Jinuo who settled there were similarly excluded from the benefits of 
rubber and banana agriculture. In effect, non-Dai ethnic minorities seem to have 
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 After the founding of the People’s Republic the Chinese government employed different ways 
to deal with old ethnic elites that posed potential threats to the new rulers. In some cases members of 
ethnic elites had to withdraw from any public roles and especially during the Cultural Revolution minority 
cadres lost their positions, if not their lives. In other cases, however, local ethnic elites were incorporated 
into the new government or adjacent organizations (Rossabi 2004). It has been argued that in 
Xishuangbanna the de-grading of local elites was a slower process than elsewhere and that the local Han 
government incorporated minority leaders more than governments in other regions did (Yang 2008). Since 
the mid-1950s “the policy of cooperation with traditional Tai and religious elites was turned into a policy of 
struggle in which Tai and other minority elites where encouraged to fight against the local headmen and 
traditional authorities” (Hansen 2004, p. 56). However, even at that time incorporation of former ethnic 
elites was still used as a measure to deal with former power holders. The former king of the Dai, for 
instance has been secured a new position as a researcher at university, was allowed to publish, and even to 
receive the “koutao” by ethnic Dai in Thailand (Hsieh 1995, p. 304). 
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considerably less average income than the Dai. 156  The Dai’s economic success in 
combination with positively attributed minority culture created the image of the Dai as a 
successful people who are able to combine traditional culture with modern Chinese life. 
The differences in access to natural resources and land have resulted in conflicts, 
but these have been much smaller than in other regions in China. Not only tries the 
government to keep the image of Xishuangbanna as a peaceful land free of ethnic 
conflicts (Komlosy 2009), but also interviews partners throughout Xishuangbanna said 
that these conflicts are only small-scale and are not comparable with conflicts in Xinjiang 
and Tibet. Although the ethnic component of demonstrations by laid-off plantation 
farmers still awaits in-depth research one can surely say that ethnic conflicts are not as 
present as in other regions of China. Hansen (2005, p. 61), argues that this is related also 
to the history of relatively peaceful immigration. 
Especially Dai culture has enjoyed an outstanding position in public attention, and 
is currently strongly revived. With its history of writing, the strong Buddhist organizations, 
and the support by the court Dai cultural items as diverse as script, religion, and stage 
performance have flourished under the Dai kingdom (Borchert 2008; Davis 2005). Even 
after Xishuangbanna “was fully incorporated into the geobody of China [and] the Dai-lue 
(monks and laity) became increasingly subject to both the discourses and the disciplinary 
technologies of the CCP state” (Borchert 2008, p. 117) Dai culture continued to be 
present in both people’s daily life and the Prefecture’s official representation. Traditional 
Dai song culture, for instance, has survived the Cultural Revolution “backstage” (Davis 
2005), and the Buddhist religious culture has revived to a “renaissance” (McCarthy 2009, 
p. 75), with new temples being built all over Xishuangbanna’s Dai communities and a 
constant raise in the number of monks in monasteries since the 1980s (McCarthy 2009, 
p. 76). 
The revival of ethnic minority culture as practice and as marketization, however, is 
closely connected to state activities. On the example of official’s sponsorship for the Dai 
New Year, the Dragon Boat festival, some music and performance troupes, or the “Ethnic 
Tourist Villages” scholars have shown that the Chinese state, or at least individual officials, 
use specific images of minority cultures as instruments for regional marketization and for 
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 Official statistics lack information about the ethnic share of wealth. However, as any tour 
through Xishuangbanna’s valley villages of Dai and through the hillside areas of the Jinuo, Yao, or Hani 
illustrates the exposed wealth differs largely between these two geographical and thus ethnically separated 
areas. Driving through the valleys one sees modern bungalows with cars in front, owned by former farmers 
who have rented out their soil to companies. In between the fields there are small shags without sanitation 
for migrant workers who work the plantations, but participate much less in the profit. In the hills, finally 
wooden stilt houses dominate with, at most, a motor bike at the door, whose inhabitants work the family’s 
tea, sugar cane, or rice fields. 
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showing the state’s benevolence towards ethnic groups. By selecting a “staged 
authenticity” in minority shows, tourist villages, and brochures the state engages in 
creating images of ethnic groups that presents a peaceful, and yet exotic world of ethnic 
distinctiveness to officials, tourists, and local population alike (Davis 2001). McCarthy 
(2009, p. 72) summarizes this instrumental approach with the following words: 
“[Dai culture] is an instrument or tool that can be deployed in the service of various ends. Dai 
cultural resurgence has been a boon for the tourist industry in Xishuangbanna; tradition and 
revenues are tightly intertwined. The ostensibly friendly historical relationship between the 
Chinese empire and the Tai kingdoms is played up to attract foreign investment. Cultural and 
religious ceremonies also serve as conduits through which the party-state asserts its authority and 
legitimacy. The state makes a great show of its support for Dai cultural distinctiveness, but it 
expects Dai compliance in return.” 
The images, the level of tolerance, and the state-orchestrated support, however, 
also differ between the groups. Culture perceived as specific Dai, including Theravada 
Buddhist traditions such as temple education for young boys (see below), has been 
tolerated and even welcomed by the state which has “repudiated the anti-religion, anti-
tradition bent of Maoist socialism” (McCarthy 2009, p. 71). Religions of other groups, 
however, have been still called “superstition” and their religious festivals do not receive 
support similar to that of the Dai. During both the national Chinese New Year and the Dai 
New Year, for instance, all government offices are closed, but not during the Hani New 
Year. Additionally, ideologies of “development stages” of the diverse minority cultures in 
Xishuangbanna are still uttered by officials (Hansen 1999) and are prevalent in public 
displays of ethnic groups. In the “Rain Forest Valley Park” near Jinghong, for instance, 
actors display the officially unrecognized group of the “Kemu” as stone-age people who 
utter monkey-like sounds. Although an extreme this example indicates that ethnic 
prejudices today are not only used for marketing the exotic, but are still also present in 
discourse among common people and officials. 
Education in Xishuangbanna 
Xishuangbanna’s landscape of educational facilities reaches from kindergarten to 
college level, but due to school mergers, the growth of pre-school education, and the 
overall educational expansion it is constantly changing. In 2012 there were 363 
educational facilities in Xishuangbanna (including private kindergartens, but not including 
facilities of other private education) with 180 thousand students and nearly 13 thousand 
teachers (see Table 9). Ethnic minority students visit the regular schools, but additionally 
since 1982 there are also two primary and four secondary “ethnic schools” which have 
then replaced the “ethnic classes” at regular schools (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 
 158 
2010b). Due to school mergers (see chapter 3) Xishuangbanna’s number of primary 
schools including so called teaching points (see chapter 3) has been reduced to a fifth 
from 1330 schools and school points in the year 1991 to 229 in 2012, while at the same 
time student numbers have increased by 4.66 percent (Xishuangbanna Bureau of 
Education 2010b, p. 50). With an average of 388 students per primary school in 2012 
Xishuangbanna has been almost exactly on that year’s national average of 386 students 
(own calculation, based on Editorial Board of China Educational Statistics Yearbook 2013 
and Editorial Committee of Xishuangbanna Yearbook 2013). At the same time, however, 
not only the numbers of students and teaching staff have raised157, but especially the 
“spring of kindergartens” in China’s rural areas (see chapter 3) has increased the number 
of public and private kindergartens in Xishuangbanna. In 2012, for instance, 
Xishuangbanna’s Educational authorities started erecting 39 new public kindergartens, 
using nearly 3 billion RMB of the National Pre-school Education Development Program 
(Editorial Committee of Xishuangbanna Yearbook 2013). 
 2005 2012 
 Institutes Students Institutes Students Schooling rates Teaching staff 
Technical three-year college* 1 1,763 1 2,923  173 
Regular senior high school 68 55,831 15 11,817 58.3 % 794 
Vocational senior high school 4 8,440 216 
Junior high school 37 40,067 80.5 % 2,462 
Vocational junior high school 1 614 36 
Central primary school 732 94,342 157 88,813 99.9 % 4,880 
Teaching point primary school 72 
Kindergarten 23 5,114 51 27,082 77.8 % 890 
Total 804 153,697 363 180,407  9,566 
Table 9: Educational Institutions in Xishuangbanna in 2012. Source: Editorial Committee of Xishuangbanna 
Yearbook 2013; Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2010b. Note *: In addition to higher education at 
Xishuangbanna’s Technical College there are also other institutions of adult education, such as teacher 
training schools and party schools, which are not indicated in this table. 
Educational attainments have constantly risen over the last years in 
Xishuangbanna. From 2005 to 2012 the numbers of students in tertiary education at 
Xishuangbanna Technical College alone have nearly doubled, and the numbers of 
students in secondary and primary education have also increased (Editorial Committee of 
Xishuangbanna Yearbook 2013; Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2010b). Official 
schooling rates in primary education have reached to almost 100 percent. According to a 
summary of prefecture-level census data from 2000 and 2010 the number of citizens with 
university diploma tripled in these ten years and the rate of illiterates decreased by 1 
percent (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Statistics 2011).  
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 The number of full-time teaching staff has, for instance, increased from 8,999 in 2005 to 9,566 
in 2012 (Editorial Committee of Xishuangbanna Yearbook 2013; Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2010b). 
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However, especially ethnic minority students seem to encounter difficulties in 
educational attainments. In comparison of the ethnic composition of students in the 
different educational levels (see Table 10) the share of non-Han students decreases with 
years of schooling (from 74 percent of students in primary schools in 2005 to 59 percent 
senior high graduates in 2011), which indicates high drop-out rates especially of non-Han 
students in primary or secondary schooling. Similarly, access to tertiary education seems 
to be difficult for ethnic minorities. In 2005, for instance (the latest available statistics on 
this matter), merely 494 of the 1,763 tertiary students (28 percent) have ethnic minority 
status (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2010b, p. 208).  
 Primary students in 2005 Senior High graduate students in 2011 
Ethnicity no. of students percentage no. of students percentage 
Dai 25,643 27 % 517 16 % 
Hani 19,802 21 % 766 24 % 
Yi 9,192 10 % 334 10 % 
Lahu 5,543 6 % 106 3 % 
Jinuo 2,078 2 % 83 3 % 
Bulang 4,157 4 % 52 2 % 
Yao 2,819 3 % 36 1 % 
total all non-Han 69,234 74 % 1,894 59 % 
all others (mostly Han) 25,108 26 % 1,290 41 % 
Total 94,342 100% 3,184 100 % 
Table 10: Ethnicity of primary school students in 2005 and Senior High Graduate Students in 2011. Source: 
Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2010b, p. 208; Editorial Committee of Xishuangbanna Yearbook 2012, 
p. 493. 
In sum, in many of its educational developments Xishuangbanna resembles similar 
developments all over China, such as the expansion of schooling and kindergarten 
education, but in low educational attainments of ethnic minorities is differs from Han 
areas in China. Although especially teachers have argued in interviews that the lower 
attainments of minority students are based on the students’ “laziness” and an 
“unwillingness to learn”, scholars have argued that these lower attainments are at least 
partly due to language barriers in education. In the next sub-chapters I will present these 
arguments in detail and will discuss the instruments and tuition models of bilingual 
education that have been scheduled as a tool to lower these barriers. 
5.1.2 Hierarchies in diversity: Minority languages in Xishuangbanna 
The ethnic diversity of Xishuangbanna is also reflected in the linguistic diversity 
among the population. In the following paragraphs I will present this linguistic diversity in 
the categories that Ellis (1994) describes as “societal factors” of language acquisition: 
proficiency, usage, and attitudes. However, as Dai is the only minority language used in 
Xishuangbanna’s schools I will here focus on Dai, and its relation to the other languages 
present in Xishuangbanna. 
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Language diversity in Xishuangbanna 
The prefecture of Xishuangbanna can be counted as one of the linguistically most 
diverse areas in China (Bradley 2007a). Xishuangbanna’s geographical characteristics 
where mountains used to limit mobility, a history of political segregation into diverse 
kingdoms, and finally an ethnic segregation between the Dai in the major valleys and the 
Hani, the Jinuo, and the other language communities in the mountain regions all 
preserved languages amidst pressures for language unification that elsewhere in China 
resulted in language shifts and the extinction of languages (see examples in chapter 4). 
This language diversity makes Xishuangbanna not only a major hub for research on 
languages and their usage, but also an area for language intervention and language 
policies. 
Besides the Chinese language which is spoken in Xishuangbanna in a local dialect 
there are many other languages spoken in Xishuangbanna, of which the Dai158, Hani159, 
Bulang160, and Jinuo161 are the most prominent ones (Bradley 2007a) (see also maps in 
Australian Academy of the Humanities, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 1987 and in 
Crissman 2012).162 These languages are very diverse in terms of language genetics, 
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 Literature in English lists the Xishuangbanna Dai under a plethora of different terms: Lu, Lue, 
Lüe, Dai Le, Tai Lue, Tai Lu, Tai Ly, Tay Lü, Tailwe, Tai Lue, Thai Lu, Thai Lue, Xishuangbanna Dai, 
Sipsongpanna Dai, Suipaiyi, Shui-Pai-I (Klose 2001, p. 73). Following Bradley (2007a, p. 179) who notes that 
the “tendency in the literature on Thai [i.e. Tai] languages to identify languages by place names or official 
exonyms rather than the autonyms” causes problems for classification of Tai languages I will refer to this 
language here with the Chinese autonym that my interview partners used: “Dai”. I will add other 
geographical markers when I speak of the varieties in other regions. With “Tai” I will refer to the above 
mentioned larger language family and I will use the term “Thai” to denote to the national language of 
Thailand. 
159
 The Hani language is spoken by approximately 1.3 million people in China, Myanmar, Thailand, 
Laos, and Vietnam (Dalby 2004, p. 241). This language has many names: The official Chinese term is Hani 
(哈尼), the languages’ speakers call themselves in Chinese either Hani or Aini (僾尼), and in when authors 
write about this ethnic group outside of China “Akha” (阿卡) seems to be the most widely used term. Some 
authors (Hansen 1999) use the term Akha also to refer to the ethnic group in China. However, in this text I 
prefer Hani, since this is not only the official Chinese term but it is also the term mostly used by my 
interview partners. Further synonyms for the Hani language used by literature in English are Aini, A-k’a, Aka, 
Angka, Ikaw, Ekaw, Jani, Kaw, Khako, Kha Ko, Khao Ka Ko, Ko, Ssaqniq, Tawkaw, Yani, Zani, Za-nyi (Klose 
2001, p. 110). For further linguistic description see Dalby (2004). 
160
 Bulang language is also known as Blang, Bulan, Bulang Wa, Plang, Pula, Pulang, Puman, Hkawa, 
K’ala, K’wa, Khon Doi, Kontoi, Hsen Chun, Sen Chun, Wengung, Kien Ka Lawa (Klose 2001, p. 159). For 
linguistic description see entry “Palaung” in Campbell (1991, pp. 1076–1077). 
161
 Synonyms in English literature for Jinuo language are Jino, Jinuoyu, and Youle (Klose 2001, 
p. 256). The language is spoken by around 10,000 people in Yunnan (Bradley 2007a, p. 173). A brief look 
through some of the larger compendia on the world’s languages reveals that the Jinuo language (基诺) is 
much less discussed than Dai or Hani which might be related to the comparatively late recognition of Jinuo 
as official ethnic group in 1979. 
162
 Linguists endangered languages such as Lewis (2009) list further languages such as Lahu or 
“Kemuhua” (i.e. the language of the Kemu, a group that is in Chinese official statistics not officially 
recognized as an “ethnic group”, but merely as a “people” (Kemuren), and thus as a branch of another 
ethnic group (Dai, Sheng 2012)). These languages, however, play hardly any role in public language 
recognition, education, or official public usage. 
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speaker numbers, and script development. In the system of linguistic genetics many 
language families are present in Xishuangbanna. Dai language, for example, belongs to 
the Tai-Kadai branch of the Austro-Thai family, Bulang belongs to the Mon-Khmer family, 
Chinese to the Sinitic branch of the Sino-Tibetan family, and Hani as well as Jinuo to its 
Tibeto-Burmese branch (Bradley 2007a). In phonetics the languages differ also strongly. 
Both Dai and Chinese are tonal languages (Chinese has four tones and Dai six), but Hani, 
Bulang, and Jinuo, for instance, are non-tonal languages. Although speaker numbers can 
only be estimated, it is clear that there are speaker groups of hundreds of thousand 
speakers on the one side and speaker groups as small as only the population of a few 
villages.163 In terms of scripts, Xishuangbanna’s languages also differ. Chinese and Dai both 
have a long history of script development including script reforms but they differ with 
regard to the structure of their writing systems.164 The Hani script that was only created in 
the 1950, based on the Latin alphabet. The Chinese writings system is based on the 
meaning of words, but the writing systems of Dai and Hani are based on sounds.165 For 
languages such as Jinuo there exists no script in popular use at all (Bradley 2007a, p. 173; 
Campbell 1991). In terms of language endangerment, finally, Xishuangbanna’s languages 
also differ. Language transmission in Bulang and Jinuo is unsecure, especially since these 
languages are completely excluded from formal education, but Dai and Hani language are 
comparatively well developed, have larger numbers of speaker communities, and are 
transmitted within families, although they are threatened by limits to usability in some 
domains (Moseley 2010). 
The Dai language 
Dai language is a tonal language with mostly monosyllabic words that have four 
parts: initial, vowel, final consonant, and tone. It derived from a proto-Tai, but borrowed 
much from Pali language and from Chinese language.166 Dai belongs to the Tai-Kadai 
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 The Pin 品, a group of people who live in only one village in Mengzhe, are probably the smallest 
native language group in Xishuangbanna. Unrecognized by any state authority, the people themselves and 
their surrounding neighbors claim that their language is nowhere else spoken. Although by no ways being 
able to verify this claim, I list this example here in order to show how the language diversity inflicts not only 
linguist, but is a defining characteristic also when the inhabitant of this region speak about their languages. 
164
 Although the terms “script“ and “writing system” are often used interchangeably, linguists 
distinguish both: A writing system is a larger entity, such as the alphabetic system or the logographic system, 
under which the scripts of the diverse languages fall (Coulmas 1996). 
165
 In linguistic terminology (Comrie 2005) the principles of these three writing systems are as 
follows: Chinese uses a logographic writing system that takes morphemes as the basic unit of 
representation. Dai uses an alphasyllabic writing system with consonants as basic units on which diacritics 
for vowel representation are added. Hani, finally, is transcribed through the Roman alphabet with 
phonemes as its basic units of representation. 
166
 For further linguistic description of the Tai languages see Strecker (2009). 
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language family and is thus related to a variety of languages spoken in Thailand, Vietnam, 
China, Laos, Myanmar, and India. Although close to Thai, Zhuang and other languages, it 
is mostly unintelligible with these (Strecker 2009, p. 654). Dai language is spoken by 
approximately 6.5 million people in China, Myanmar, and Northern Thailand.167 In China 
there are four official Dai varieties:168 the Xishuangbanna Dai (西双版纳傣, spoken 
exclusively in Xishuangbanna), the Dehong Dai (德宏傣 of Dehong prefecture in Yunnan’s 
Southwest), the Hongjin Dai (红金傣, spoken at the Red River and the Jinsha River) and 
the Jinping Dai (Jinping Dai 金平傣 of Jinping County in Honghe Prefecture). Of 
Xishuangbanna’s three dialects (the Menghai dialect, the Mengla dialect, and the 
Jinghong dialect) the Jinghong variety is the officially used standard for TV, radio, and 
language classes in higher education. In primary and middle school education, teachers 
for Dai language in Xishuangbanna are asked to use the Jinghong standard. However, 
some teachers who I interviewed also use the local Dai dialects (see below). 
The Dai language in Xishuangbanna is represented by an alpha syllabic script169 
that derives from Khmer and is close to Lao and Thai writing (Dalby 2004, p. 605). The 
script is not only used to write Dai language, but also to transcribe Bulang language which 
lacks a distinct script of its own. The Dai script has been used over several hundred years 
for administrative work at the court in Jinghong, for writing and reciting Buddhist 
religious texts, and also for daily purposes among lay people in Xishuangbanna.170 
However, in the course of national script evaluation and reform in the 1950s a research 
team from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the National Affairs Committee of 
Yunnan Province deemed this script unsuitable for modern use, with its more than 60 
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 Dai is called Khun in Myanmar and Thai Lanna in Thailand (Dalby 2004, p. 346). 
168
 These official categories relate to the location where the variety is spoken. Besides there are 
also the categories “Water Dai”(水傣) and “Dry Dai”(汉傣). However, the official locality-related terms are 
more common not only in academic literature and government documents, but also among my Dai-
speaking interview partners in the schools and the villages. Nevertheless, researchers differ in the 
categorization of the Dai varieties. Zhou and Fang, for instance argue that the Dai varieties in China are in 
fact different languages since they use different scripts and are to a high percentage mutually unintelligible 
(Zhou, Fang 2004). Other linguists argue that the Dai varieties are close enough to be seen as one language. 
Dalby (2004, p. 346), for example, writes: “Under its many names, the majority language in these areas 
[Thai Lanna/ Khun/ Dai Lu] is recognizable one; it is written in the same traditional script; and it is the 
vehicle of the same Buddhist culture”. The Chinese government holds the latter position and treats all Dai 
varieties as one language, with consequences for instance on textbook development. Although on 
provincial level textbooks for Xishuangbanna and Dehong Dai have been developed or translated separately, 
developers have to share a provincial budget for textbook development with merely the same amount of 
funds and personnel resources that are available for more unified languages, as one official in the textbook 
development offices of Yunnan Province complained (SC-15_2012-03-23). 
169
 The Dai script in Xishuangbanna is called Dai Le or Dai Lue (傣仂文) and is not only used by 
speakers of Dai but also of Bulang language (Zhang 2009). Furthermore there are three other scripts to 
represent Dai language outside Xishuangbanna: the Dai Na (傣哪文) script used in Dehong, the Dai Beng (傣
绷文) used in Ruili, and the Jinping Dai (金平傣文) used in Honghe (Zhou, Fang 2004). 
170
 The oldest reference to Dai script dates back to the 12th century BC (Wang, Mi 1998, p. 933). 
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letters and many homophones. They created thus a new Dai script171 with a reduced 
number of letters and a radically simplified writing that resulted in a change of 90 percent 
of the graphemes.172 Through the ratification of the “Plan for the Amendment of Dai 
Written Language in Xishuangbanna” by the central government in 1955 this reformed 
script was mandated as the only Dai script allowed to be used for publishing and teaching, 
but after a relaxation of language policies in the 80s the “Plan of Using the Traditional Dai 
Written Language in Xishuangbanna” (Dalby 2009) from 1989 permitted again to use the 
traditional in schools and for newspapers. In my observation today both the “Old” and 
the “New Dai Script” are in use, but their domains differ: the old script is used at temples 
and for religious purposes and the new script is used in school education and in most of 
the publishing.173 Since 2005 there is a system of computer fonts available for the new Dai 
script and since 2008 also for the old Dai script (Yin et al. 2011). However, compared to 
Chinese, these computer fonts were rather late developed which delayed the usage of Dai 
in multimedia communication (Liu 2011).  
The reform from the old to the new Dai script can be seen as an example for failed 
language engineering programs in China with devastating consequences for the speaker 
community. Those who were literate in the old script became illiterate after the reforms 
when all publications shifted to New Dai. Learners of the new script, by contrast, where 
able to read the newly published works, but unable to read historical texts (Hansen 1999, 
p. 100). As Davis (2003, p. 191) puts it: “The new alphabet cuts a generation of [D]ais off 
from their centuries of written traditions.” The reasons for this outcome have been 
interpreted differently. Zhou and Fang (2004) argue that the distance between 
government and speaker community prevented the government from grasping the 
communities’ needs and wishes. Davis (2003), by contrast, doubts benevolent goals of 
language engineering altogether and argues that the reforms were politically motivated 
and that they aimed at driving Dai people away from both their religious traditions and 
from Dai speakers in neighboring countries. Whatever the motivations for the reform, for 
Dai tuition the reform created an additional burden. Learners can either invest time and 
effort to learn both the old and the new script or they can choose one script on the price 
that their reading and writing skills will be limited to either monastic writing in the case of 
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 The traditional version of Dai has been since then called “Old Dai Script” (老傣文) and the 
reformed one “New Dai Script” (新傣文). 
172
 For a detailed linguistic description of the old and new Dai script see Zhou and Fang (2004). 
Compare also with Omniglott, http://www.omniglot.com/writing/tailue.htm and SEASite, Center for South 
East Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University http://www.seasite.niu.edu/tai/TaiLue/, last access for (2004) 
both Oct. 23, 2013. 
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 Zhang (2009) still writes in an article from 2009 that Xishuangbanna’s media and education 
system uses mainly the old script but the author’s data seems to have been outdated already at that time. 
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Old Dai or writing outside the monastery in the case of New Dai. The discussion in the 
next chapters will show that Dai tuition in schools goes the latter path: Dai education in 
Xishuangbanna’s schools is exclusively conducted in New Dai and runs thus parallel to 
education in Old Dai at temples. 
Language acquisition and proficiency 
Despite the lack in accurate data on language skills of Xishuangbanna’s population 
case studies indicates that Chinese proficiency and Dai proficiency among 
Xishuangbanna’s population depends on speakers’ place of residence, age, gender, and 
level of education. 
Firstly, the place of residence correlates with the ability to speak Dai. Minority 
languages are more often spoken in rural areas, whereas Chinese proficiency is better 
developed in Xishuangbanna’s urban areas.174 
Secondly, the language competences differ between age groups. In Xue’s (1999) 
study, for example, all elderly respondents spoke both Chinese and Dai, but many of the 
younger respondents spoke only Chinese. Concerning knowledge in written minority 
languages the differences are even greater. For example, the majority of Dai students in 
two of my case-study classes said that in their families the grandparents, but not their 
parents were able to read and write Dai (ST-12_2012-03-02; ST-11_2012-03-02). This gap 
in proficiency in Dai script is an outcome of the closure of monastic education during the 
Cultural Revolution. For skills in Chinese language the age factor is similarly relevant. 
Generally speaking, younger ethnic minority people speak better Chinese than the older 
generations. A principal said that teachers can easily communicate in Chinese with 
parents of the children in their class and grandparents under 60, but those above this age 
often lack Chinese skills (PR-11_2012-01-12). This can be explained by the differences in 
schooling opportunities, media exposure and migration patterns between the 
grandparent and the parent generation. 
Thirdly, especially in writing skills in Dai language there is a gender gap in Dai 
knowledge among the older generations. Girls used to have fewer opportunities to learn 
Dai script since in principle only boys are eligible to achieve monastic education (Hansen 
1999, p. 100). The recent decrease in monastic education in combination with gender-
unspecific Dai education in schools (see below) is likely to narrow this gender gap.  
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 In the mentioned studies the category “urban” relates to the City of Jinghong, the County seats, 
and also the Township seats. The term “rural”, by contrast, denotes to villages and townships. In the study 
by Zhao and Zhao (2010b; 2010a), for example only half of the surveyed Dai people in townships were able 
to speak Dai, whereas in the villages nearly everybody has fluent Dai skills. 
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Fourthly, the length of formal education relates positively to Chinese language 
skills, since formal school education emphasizes and trains Chinese. Oral and written 
proficiency in minority languages, however, is not that clearly related to the level of 
education, but rather depends on individual factors such as the question if the family 
used the respective language at home. 
Additionally, there are large differences between the share of people who are able 
to speak minority languages and those who can read and write the Dai script. Among the 
Dai population observed by Zhao and Zhao (2010a) only a small percentage of the 15-30 
year olds knew how to read and write Dai script; and even the skills of these were 
“medium” at the most. Additionally, the survey shows that competences to write Dai 
differ between localities. Firstly, Dai skills are generally a little higher among village 
population than among township population. Secondly, there are differences between 
the villages. In the survey by Zhao and Zhao (2010b; 2010a) more than 40 percent of the 
young population in some villages claimed to be fluent in Dai writing, whereas in other 
villages no-one was able to write Dai. Analysis of these cases shows that in those villages 
with high prevalence of knowledge in written Dai schools conducted at least at some 
point tuition in Dai. This indicates that not only the shape of a language or individual 
family decisions matter for language knowledge, but to a large degree also institutional 
settings of language learning at schools. 
Non-Chinese children in Xishuangbanna acquire Chinese on the one side and 
minority languages on the other through very different channels. Chinese can be learnt 
through many channels: family, TV, peers, to name just a few. Formal education in 
Chinese language is successful in enhancing minority student’s Chinese proficiency, which 
can be observed at schools easily. Kindergarten teachers told me that many ethnic non-
Han children lack even basic Chinese skills at pre-school age, but after a few months the 
skills between Han and non-Han students equalize. A principal at one middle school said 
that after a few years one cannot even distinguish who is Han and who is minority just 
from listening when children speak Putonghua (PR-11_2012-01-12). Although there is a 
need for detailed long-time language surveys, and although official statistics in 
educational yearbooks and in school evaluations do not list exam results and student 
attainments by ethnicity, 175 the regular student exam grades that I collected during field 
visits and that I have analyzed in depth (see chapter 6) indicate that language skills 
equalize over the years. Where in younger classes in each class there are some non-Han 
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 One can speculate that the limited availability of data in Chinese official statistics on educational 
success by ethnicity is due to the political sensitivity of data that would show ethnic inequality. 
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students who reach only very low scores, their number reduces in higher grades, and 
finally there is hardly any difference between students of different ethnicity in “Chinese” 
(语文) exams. In contrast to findings from other regions in China, minority status and 
non-Chinese mother-tongues not necessarily lead to lower exam grades in 
Xishuangbanna.176  
Learning of minority languages, by contrast, is much more limited and depends to 
higher degrees on the parents’ will to speak minority languages at home or to teach the 
scripts to their children. Some speakers of minority languages choose to speak only 
Chinese to their children since they deem Chinese as more important for their children’s 
future careers. For children of parents who do not speak any of the region’s minority 
languages the chances to learn these languages informally through peers are extremely 
few. None of my Han student interview partners learnt Dai or Hani language beyond a 
few words without tuition at a formal course, even if their friends at school spoke these 
languages. This is of course not to say that it is impossible to learn these languages as a 
second language, but it rather indicates the importance of formal educational settings 
and societal support for learning languages. In formal education tuition in oral and 
written minority language proficiency is limited to very specific places. Only a small 
percentage of Xishuangbanna’s population receives this tuition, as will be shown later. All 
three factors, the limited availability of formal tuition of minority languages, the 
deliberate decision by mother-tongue speakers against teaching minority languages and 
scripts to their children, and finally the lack in willingness to learn minority languages by 
non-mother-tongue speakers, may in future result in stagnation if not decrease in the 
numbers of speakers of minority languages in Xishuangbanna. 
Language usage 
The usability of a language domains, the “characteristic settings” in which a 
language is exclusively or predominantly used (Sebba 2011, p. 451), is an indicator of the 
degree of language endangerment, but it also indicates the motivations of speakers to 
use, learn, and teach a language. Research showed large differences of minority language 
usage between domains in China (Zhou 2003; Chen 2010; Teng, Wang 2011). In the 
following I will present findings on the usage of Xishuangbanna’s languages, and 
especially the Dai language, in five broad fields of domains: within the family at home; for 
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 One explanation might be Xishuangbanna’s ethnic minority population suffers much less from 
poverty than those in other regions of China, where poverty negatively effects educational attainments 
(Murphy 2007; Hannum, Adams 2009). 
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religious purposes; in literature and media; in public and for government and 
administration; for employment and migration. 
At home and in communication between family members the choice of languages 
depends much on individual speakers’ beliefs, abilities, and preferences. Although there is 
no large-scale survey on language choice among ethnic minorities in Xishuangbanna, 
existing small-n case studies (Wang 2001; Luo 2011, Zhao, Zhao 2010b, 2010a) suggest 
that Dai, Hani and the other languages are more often used in private than in public 
domains and more often to talk to family members than to strangers. In more detailed 
analysis, however, they also show that choice of language correlates with location of 
residence, age, and educational level. Generally, rural families and elderly people choose 
more often minority languages than Chinese. Children, however, speak often minority 
languages when they are young and shift gradually to Chinese until some hardly ever 
choose Dai to speak with friends (Zhang 2008). 
In literature and media, minority languages are used in some classical media. Dai 
script was and still is most prominently used in the Buddhist palm leaf sutras177, but 
minority languages were also popular in traditional oral literature, such as the song epics 
of the Dai, the so called “Zhangha” or “Zanha”, performed by trained singers at festivals 
and ceremonies (Davis 2005). Both the oral and the written literature, although not read 
and understood by all, have a place in the collective memory of the communities, as most 
members of the communities know about their existence and partly about their content.  
In modern media, however, the Chinese language is overwhelmingly dominant. 
The only existing books written in Dai script are textbooks and very few selections of folk 
stories, but apart from that bookstores in Jinghong and the county cities only present 
Chinese language literature. With the Dai edition of the Xishuangbanna Daily there is a 
daily newspaper written in non-Chinese script, but the number of readers of this paper is 
comparatively small. 178  More important in terms of audience are TV programs 
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 These are Buddhist texts on religious, on moral, and legal issues, and astronomy, nature, and so 
forth (Wang, Mi 1998, pp. 934–935). Written either on paper or on Palm leaf trees from the Asian Palmyra 
Palm (Borassus flabellifer), the so called “Palm-leaf classics” (贝叶经, see Gan, Wan 2009) build up a 
religious source and a historical point of reference in a tropical region with little archaeological remains. 
Although the bulk of these texts are stored away in museums, archives, and temples the cultural practices 
related to these texts still remain in ceremonies where priests and monks employ old palm leaf texts in their 
rituals. During my stay at an ethnic Bulang village in Menghai County I was invited to a healing ceremony, 
which included the writing of blessings from old palm leaf books onto Banana tree leaves. 
178
 Its Dai language edition is the largest minority language paper in Yunnan and the only non-
Chinese newspaper in Xishuangbanna, featuring since 1957 mainly translations of the Chinese edition (Liu 
2011). However, with circulation numbers of 8,300 in 2009 (Zeng 2010) the paper reaches only few readers 
compared to the overall number of ethnic Dai in the region. The circulation numbers suffered from switches 
from the New Dai to the Old Dai and to the New Dai again (Zhou, Fang 2004), and from the limited 
distribution to villages (Zeng 2010). Creative solutions such as the establishment of “newspaper villages”, 
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broadcasted on an hourly base in minority languages,179 since nearly every household in 
Xishuangbanna owns a TV set.180 However, as the overwhelmingly majority of programs, 
such as soap operas or documentaries, are in Chinese, viewers watch mostly Chinese 
language TV. 181 The radio program seems to be more vivid, and, as an anchor of the Hani 
program described, the radio station conducts several activities such as calling in for chats 
with the anchor, language trainings, and cultural activities such as exhibitions and 
celebrating local festivals (SO-06_2012-02-20). However, both TV and radio programs in 
minority languages have their largest audience among the elderly and it seems difficult to 
reach younger generations. In internet and mobile phone communication, however, 
minority languages are nearly absent. To my knowledge there is no Dai script input for 
SMS on mobile phones, and on the internet there are hardly any pages in Dai or Hani 
script, despite the existing computer fonts.182 Taken together, minority languages play a 
specific role in consumption of media of classical and religious content, and in 
governmental broadcasting that combines language work with information and 
propaganda. In all new media, with the exception of some music in minority languages,183 
however, Chinese language dominates. 
                                                                                                                                                                
where villagers order newspapers collectively, could not solve the program of outdated news at the time of 
delivery (Zeng 2010). The possibilities that the internet offers for instance to change between Old and New 
Dai, or the interaction with the readers through the Web 2.0 might offer new chances, as Yin et al. (2011) 
hope, but the villagers’ lack of internet access on the one side and their lack of interest towards this paper’s 
official news on the other side will continue to limit the circulation of the paper among Xishuangbanna’s Dai 
speaking village population.  
179
 Since 1955 one local TV station and one radio program reserve a few hours per week for 
programs for Dai and Hani language broadcasting (Daizuwang 2010), but not in the Prefectures’ other 
minority languages (Parts of the Dai language program are sometimes also uploaded to websites, see e.g. 
http://www.zueiai.net/radio/yn/12.html). The programs feature mostly news in Dai and Hani language, 
read by a single anchor in a monotonous voice. Although some interview partners remembered to have 
seen movies or cartoons dubbed into minority languages, these seem to have been only short-lived 
experiments. 
180
 In 2008 Xishuangbanna accomplished the goal that villagers in every village with more than 20 
households are able to receive TV (Xishuangbanna Governmental Affairs Online 2009). The high attention of 
politicians to those very few people who cannot receive TV, an issue labeled “TV watching difficulties” (看电
视难问题) (Xishuangbanna Bureau for Broadcasting and TV 2009) shows the importance that the 
government attaches to this medium of information and propaganda. 
181
 Villages that are close to the national borders receive also TV and radio from the neighboring 
countries in Thai, Lao, and the languages of Myanmar. However, according to my observations the villagers 
watch these programs rather seldom. When I asked for the reasons for not watching foreign programs two 
of my interviewees said that the programs were not as interesting as the Chinese ones (OT-03_OT-04_2012-
02-13). 
182
 QQ, Weibo, Weixin, and other platforms that Chinese frequently use are all in Chinese and even 
those forums that deal specifically with Dai issues (e.g. the “Daizuwang”, see http://daizuwang.com, last 
access 2013-09-17) use Chinese language for discussion. The only exceptions seem to be learning tools for 
Dai language, such as “Learn Dai script with me” (http://jh.xsbnedu.cn/bnjyjmcjy/Default.html, last access 
2013-09-17), which was created by the local office for minority language work. 
183
 My interview partners of non-Han ethnicity referred many times to songs and concerts in Dai, 
Hani, or Yi languages that they admired. The local DVD shops offered a selection of records in these 
languages. Although there was also some rock music in minority languages available most of this music was 
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In the public domain of administration Chinese language clearly dominates. 
Although minority languages are still much used at markets or within villages (e.g. village 
announcements by the village heads), the status of Dai language as lingua franca has been 
taken since long by the Chinese language (Cai 1997). Similarly, although Dai script can be 
found at street signs and shop signs, this high visibility of Dai script has only little effects 
of the actual use of Dai, partly because some of these signs are misspelled.184 More 
importantly, however, is the fact that Dai and the other minority languages can hardly be 
used when citizens want to contact public administration. Although officials are 
encouraged to use minority languages in contact with citizens,185 all documents are 
written only in Chinese, with a few exception, such as local village chronicles or public 
signage in museums.186 
In the labor market minority languages are increasingly replaced by the 
requirement of Chinese proficiency. Although in some professions minority language skills 
are an asset, such as for cadre promotion,187 and although there seems to be less open 
discrimination towards non-Chinese speaking job-applicants than in other regions of 
China188 the requirement to prove Chinese proficiency in many high-qualification jobs 
                                                                                                                                                                
conducted in what is branded all over China as minority music: happy rural non-Han population dressed in 
colorful costumes sing easy tunes about longing for love and nature. 
184
 The prefectural and county governments of Xishuangbanna demand that all public institutions, 
but also shops and road signs feature both Chinese and Dai script (see e.g. Mengla County People's 
Government 8/5/2007; for example of street signs see also image in appendix). What gives the visitor the 
feeling of diversity is, however, hardly an indicator that minority scripts are really used in public or that they 
are treated equally with Chinese script. Not only are the Dai fonts often smaller than the Chinese characters, 
but often the translations are also wrong. A Dai scholar explained to me that while the Dai writings on the 
street signs are generally correct, since they were translated by governmental bureaus, the Dai script 
restaurants and shop signs are often misspelled because restaurant and shop owners, not knowing the rules 
of Dai script, often transcribe their shop names from Chinese into random Dai sounds instead of translating 
meanings correctly (SC-15_2012-03-23). Although internet users have offered to help with translations free 
of charge (see e.g. Baidu: http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/508675077.html, last access 2013-09-17) many 
of Xishuangbanna’s Dai signs in public are still useless for Dai readers who would try to figure out what a 
shop or restaurant offers.  
185
 Officially the policy that party cadres should learn minority languages aims at a better mutual 
understanding. On the example of a “mass incident” in Xishuangbanna, where local farmers demonstrated 
against corrupt cadres and expansion of state plantations in 2008, a county secretary in Xishuangbanna 
argues that a lack of mutual language understanding contributed to this incident (Wu 2011). 
186
 The Xishuangbanna Ethnic Museum displays large texts also in Dai script, but the detailed tags 
are only in Chinese. Another example is the Xishuangbanna Tropical Garden where guides dressed in 
uniforms that resemble Dai costumes not only tour the visitors through the garden, but the program 
includes also learning the Dai words for “Hello, boy” and “Hello, girl”. Apart from this pseudo-usage of Dai, 
all other work and public signage in the garden is, again, only in Chinese script. 
187
 Although not a target of cadre evaluation per se, the ability to communicate with local 
population, as has been argued for example by Wu (2011), is central to obtain social stability and the 
avoidance of public protests, which in turn is one of the “hard targets” in cadre evaluation and promotion 
(Heberer, Trappel 2013). 
188
 Jacobs (2013), for instance, reports in the New York Times a case from Kashgar where jobs were 
offered only to ethnic Han or to speakers of Chinese as first language. Job discrimination is a strong factor in 
ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and is also an issue for international investors. When Volkswagen planned to open 
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constitutes an institutionalized preferential treatment of Chinese language that begins 
with school exams (these will be discussed in detail below) and ends with exams for job 
entry. Not only do posts in government offices and posts for teachers require proficiency 
in Chinese189 and application tests are only written in Chinese, but also job advertisement 
in private companies increasingly demand Chinese skills. Not least through the change of 
migration destinations from Thailand in the 90s and early 2000s to inner Chinese 
destinations of today190 minority languages lost in the domain of the labor market clearly. 
The last domain that shall be discussed here, the religious domain, is, by contrast, 
still largely dominated by minority languages, and in the case of Dai also by minority 
language scripts. Especially in Theravada Buddhism, Xishuangbanna’s most prominent 
religion with most believers among the Dai and Bulang, Dai script plays a considerable 
role. Its main texts (sutras, epics etc.) are written in the classical Dai script (Wang, Mi 
1998, p. 935), and reading and reciting these texts is a major element in the daily 
schedule of the monks (Wang, Mi 1998, p. 938). Furthermore, Dai script is used also in 
religious practices conducted outside the temples such as blessing ceremonies for new 
houses, healing ceremonies for the sick, and rituals performed at the case of births or 
deaths. Knowledgeable old people keep the books at home in order to copy the scripts 
once they are needed. Bridges, pavilions, and road crossings are often blessed with wood 
carvings in Dai script. 
Language attitudes 
Language attitudes - the “disposition to respond favorably or unfavorably” to 
one’s own language or the language of others (Baker, Prys Jones 1998, p. 174) - 
determine the motivation to learn languages and the choice of languages, they shape the 
long-term outcomes of language programs in the educational sector and ultimately they 
also impact language status, language restoration, and language death. According to 
Edwards (2002) language attitudes can be distinguished into three components: affective 
                                                                                                                                                                
a factory in Xinjiang, for example, there were demands by exile Uighur organizations and foreign 
parliamentarians towards Volkswagen to establish a quota system to guarantee hiring of ethnic Uyghurs 
and Kazakhs (Lee 2012).  
189
 National regulations define the minimum language standards for teacher promotion, but local 
regulations can further define more demanding requirements. Different requirements are sometimes 
defined according to teachers’ age and the subjects taught, but in general the requirements increasingly 
demand Chinese proficiency (Liu 2010, p. 27). 
190
 At a village inhabited mostly by ethnic Bulang I was told that Bulang or Dai language skills were 
beneficial when in the 90s young people of this and other villages went for work to Thailand. However, due 
to the economic rise of China’s industry and the Asian Financial Crisis migration from Xishuangbanna’s 
villages to the factories of mainland China became more profitable in the 2000s, and today internal 
migration superseded migration to South-East Asia even in border villages, so that minority languages are 
not beneficial for migration anymore. 
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components as the feelings towards the aesthetics of a language and towards its speakers; 
cognitive elements as the beliefs about the value of a language for specific purposes; and 
behavioral elements, for example to use a language in specific situations or the decisions 
one makes to learn a language or to urge one’s children to learn it. In the following 
paragraphs I will summarize findings of the research literature on the language attitudes 
of Xishuangbanna’s speaker population in all three components. 
Xishuangbanna’s minority language speakers express large affection to the 
languages of “their” ethnic group and wish these languages to be protected. In Zhang’s 
(2008) study, nearly all surveyed Dai respondents say that Dai language has some or much 
use and that they support the use of Dai language because they have a “deep affection” 
to this language. Similar to what has been found in other parts of China concerning 
minorities’ affection toward ethnic languages (see e.g. Ma 2011b; Mueggler 2001), in 
their opinion mother-tongue language is a part of not only their own individual identity, 
but also of the identity of the ethnic group as a whole, in cross-border identity and 
cultural consumption. Davis’ quote from an interview with a Chinese Dai monk who spoke 
about a song in Thai language exemplifies the appeal of Thai music to young Dai Chinese: 
“We like this song, because it is what our lives are really like. You never hear a song like 
this in Chinese” (Davis 2003, p. 197). In this respect, some Dai listeners’ preferences of 
Dai or Thai over Chinese is based on both the language and the content of a music that 
they feel is more “localized” and fits better to their lives than Chinese music. 
Affection towards Chinese language is very positive throughout Xishuangbanna’s 
population, as it relates to images of cultural development. Many of my non-Han 
interview partners who considered their level of Chinese proficiency as low said that they 
lack Chinese proficiency because they “lack culture” (没有文化) which is, in their 
argumentation, due to their short time of having been in school. This perspective 
constructs a hierarchy of cultures and languages where Chinese culture and the language 
that represents this culture are seen as higher status. This perspective shows that the 
linguistic and cultural hegemony expressed through “civilizational projects” (Harrell 1995) 
is not only a perspective followed by the Han majority, but one that is taken over by 
minorities themselves. 
The positive images of minority languages as providers of identity for ethnic 
groups on the one side and the perceived value of Chinese on the other side both find 
their expression in affection to learning languages. Similar to surveys conducted 
elsewhere in China where respondents in overwhelming majority stated their belief that 
learning minority languages and Chinese language are both good things (Teng 2002; Ma 
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2011b), Dai villagers in my non-representative interviews said that they think learning Dai 
is a benefit for their children (e.g. FA-05_2012-03-03; FA-06_2012-03-03). Interestingly, 
however, are the ethnic differences in the evaluation of the question of who should learn 
the respective languages. Minority languages are generally seen as belonging to non-Han 
groups. Ethnic Han, but also the minority people themselves consequently often wished 
that ethnic minority people become bilingual, but it was hardly ever expressed that Han 
should become bilingual as well. 
In cognitive language attitudes people in Xishuangbanna are aware of the limited 
usability of minority languages in many domains. Some speakers of minority languages in 
Xishuangbanna (similar to other minority groups in China, see Teng, Wang 2011) perceive 
minority languages generally as useful within their own communities and to understand 
the history of the religion of an ethnic group,191 but they are also very aware of the limits 
of usage of minority languages outside the family or village domain. Although in the 90s 
and early 2000s Dai language was helpful to find jobs in Thailand, this advantage 
diminished after Dai migrants saw the inner Chinese labor market as more profitable than 
the Thai labor market. With the shift from Dai to Chinese as Lingua Franca at the 
beginning of the People’s Republic (Cai 1997) there are nowadays little incentives for Han 
to learn Dai anymore. For ethnic Han the aversion against obligations for their children to 
learn minority languages are even greater. In interviews Han parents expressed their 
anger that their children are obliged to learn Dai at school. Under the perspective that 
minority languages are a thing of ethnic minorities but nothing worth achieving for Han, 
tuition in minority languages and scripts for Han children means for many Han parents a 
waste of time – time, that would be better invested into learning Chinese. 
Chinese language, by contrast, is perceived by probably all citizens of 
Xishuangbanna as the language of the official world, as requirement to gain jobs, and as 
the language of schooling and examination. Several ethnic minority parents who I 
interviewed and especially those who are teachers themselves spoke Chinese at home in 
order to help their children get acquainted to Chinese at an early stage. Some argued 
against teaching minority scripts to children by pointed to the already very high burden to 
study Chinese and English (e.g. FA-07_2012-03-04). Two young Hani language speakers 
formulated their aversion against learning the Hani script: “The ability to speak is enough. 
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 The colorfully illustrated descriptions of village histories written in Dai script on the walls of 
several Dai temples throughout Xishuangbanna are an example for the usage of Dai script in village memory. 
Young monks in a temple explained why they found these paintings and the writings important for their 
own identity: “Each of these paintings is a book. It shows where we came from and what our ancestors did. 
These paintings give all this from one generation to the next one” (MO-01_MO-02_2012-01-30). 
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Learning the script has no use. What could we do if we would learn this script?” (OT-
03_OT-04_2012-02-13). 
In their behavioral attitudes, finally, Xishuangbanna’s speakers evaluate activities 
to promote and develop Xishuangbanna’s minority languages differently. On the one side 
scholars have said that minority groups in Xishuangbanna actively promote their own 
languages and argue that this support derives from a wish for an alternative sub-culture 
in the shadow of the mainstream Chinese culture. Davis (2003), for example, writes about 
some cases where young Dai monks created Dai fonts for computer use and installed a 
print shop for leaflets and books in Dai language. Organizing and visiting concerts for 
music in minority languages are other options to “vote” for a stronger presence of 
minority languages in the public sphere. Creating internet pages concerning Dai or Hani 
language to discuss strategies to develop and protect mother-tongue languages192 is 
another example for such language promotion activities from bottom-up. Furthermore, 
several ethnically defined organizations such as the Hani or the Dai research organizations 
also offer platforms for self-organized activities for language promotion.193  Through 
financial ties, personnel overlaps between staff of the ethnic bureaucracy and the 
research organizations, and direct supervision and accountability these organizations are 
closely connected to the state, but voluntary engagement in these organizations can be 
interpreted also as an expression of individuals’ wishes to promote Hani or Dai language. 
According to a leading member of the Hani Research Organization villagers often invite 
the organization’s language teachers to their villages in order to conduct Hani script 
trainings (SO-06_2012-02-20). Although these classes did not evolve into larger 
movements and tuition was often merely short-timed these activities constitute examples 
where ethnic minority speakers became active to support their mother-tongue languages. 
On the other side, speakers’ activities to promote ethnic minority languages 
protection in Xishuangbanna apparently never went never beyond legal means. To my 
best knowledge there have never been demonstrations specifically on ethnic minority 
culture and languages in Xishuangbanna. Education in minority languages is only a minor 
issue in parents’ demands to politics and schools, if it is an issue at all. All my interview 
partners reacted with incomprehension when I asked if they ever uttered demand for 
more minority languages towards state authorities. Teachers and principals similarly 
stated that parents do not approach them with demands for more minority language 
education in schools. Finally, and probably the most decisive factor for transmission of 
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 See for example http://tieba.baidu.com/p/1308660862, last access 2013-09-17. 
193
 See: http://www.chinahani.com/newshow.asp?id=525, last access 2013-09-17. 
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minority languages in Xishuangbanna, parents and students here do not base their choice 
of schools on the languages taught there (see case study analysis in chapter 6). 
Differently to what Yi (2008) describes in her study on school choice for Tibetan 
and Hui parents as a dilemma when they have to choose between Hui/Tibetan schools 
and Chinese schools, ethnicity poses hardly a dilemma for parents in Xishuangbanna. 
After intensive school mergers there are only very few schools with ethnically 
homogenous student populations left and these schools are generally village schools of 
lower educational quality. Those parents who send their children to local village schools 
do so because this is more convenient and not because they expect a more localized or 
specifically Dai or Hani curriculum. The choice to carry the burden to send children to 
schools far away for example in the county or prefecture seats was motivated mainly 
because of better educational chances. This shows that although minority people might 
wish for a protection of minority languages, not everybody is willing to see this in schools 
happing where it might influence the chances of one owns children for education, 
graduation, and at the job market. 
Summarizing language attitudes and language usage among Xishuangbanna’s 
speaker groups we can draw several conclusions. Firstly, there are strong differences 
between the affective, cognitive, and behavioral components of language attitudes. 
Although ethnic minority respondents in my interviews and in those of other scholars 
often mentioned the value of minority languages for their own identity and that of their 
groups, only few could recollect any actions they undertook to secure that this language 
will be preserved. 
Secondly, there are large differences in the attitudes towards the individual 
languages. Influenced by societal prejudices towards ethnic groups and by the status of 
the language in different domains Han, but also members of the ethnic minorities 
themselves, construct what Edwards (2002, p. 100) calls a “pyramid” of languages. The 
national standard Chinese and the slightly less prestigious Xishuangbanna dialect as not 
only as the carrier of national culture, but also as a prerequisite for social mobility and 
income improvements are on top of this pyramid, whereas minority languages are seen 
on a much lower position due to their limited use in various domains. Within the diverse 
minority languages there are further sub-differentiations that place Dai in top position, 
followed by the other minority languages. This relates to Dai’s historical role as language 
of administration in pre-Republican times, to the belief that languages with a script are 
more valuable than those without, to the public promotion of Dai by the state, and, finally, 
to the socio-economic status of the respective ethnic group. This hierarchy is directly 
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reflected in knowledge about the language. Although not all my Dai interview partners, 
for example, knew how to read and write the Dai script, but nearly everybody knew of the 
existence of this script. Interviewed Hani speakers, by contrast, only seldom knew that 
there exists a script to express their mother-tongue. 
The state contributes to constructing the “hierarchy” of languages according to 
perceived levels of development and “backwardness”. Especially languages with a script 
are in this hierarchy seen as more developed than languages without scripts. Hansen 
(1999) analyzed in detail how teachers formulate this perspective when they lecture 
about the backwardness of minority groups that lack scripts and when they perceive 
civilization as script-based. This shows that language attitudes are not merely individual 
beliefs or aesthetic feelings, but are embedded in a variety of other factors, such as size 
and status of the language groups or political support by the state. Support by the state 
for Dai language, for instance, has resulted in a larger public visibility of this language 
compared to the other languages. 
These configurations of language usage outside schools shape the success of 
bilingual language education programs. On the one side, bilingual education in 
Xishuangbanna can build up on the positive affective attitudes towards multilingual 
education and language preservation, especially concerning Dai language. On the other 
side, bilingual education in Xishuangbanna has to struggle with the limits of language 
usage to very specific domains, with a lack of in minority language media, and with the 
image of Chinese as the generally more useful and more modern language. These limits 
pose severe challenges to bilingual education programs at schools in Xishuangbanna. In 
the following sub-chapter I will analyze how formal minority language education reacts to 
these challenges. 
5.2 Minority language school education in Xishuangbanna 
Formal education194 in minority languages in Xishuangbanna has a long tradition in 
monastic education, in adult education, and in school education. In this thesis I will focus 
on the third option, the school education, but before that a few words are in order on the 
other two modes of education.  
Theravada Buddhist monastic education in Dai language has been a major source 
of learning in Xishuangbanna, similar to many other South East Asian Countries. Mostly 
ethnic Dai parents, but also ethnic Bulang parents send their male children from the age 
                                                     
194
 Baker (2006) distinguishes two types of language learning: informal language acquisition on the 
one side for example at home or through peers, and formal language education on the other side through 
instruction for instance in schools. Since informal language education has been mentioned already in the 
explanaitions on language use at home, I will focus here on the formal educational domain. 
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of seven to ten for several years to live at a local monastery, to become monks195, and to 
receive an education that covers religious issues and also topics such as astronomy or 
medicine, and to lean Old Dai script to read sutras and other religious texts (Wang, Mi 
1998). This type of education, it has been argued, not only reproduces Dai and Bulang 
culture, but the educational practices are also a part of Dai and Bulang culture itself (Luo 
2011). Despite the current decrease in the number of young monks,196 despite the 
limitation to old Dai, and despite the exclusion of girls and women, 197 this mode of Dai 
language education has been an alternative to (Chinese-based) school education 198 and it 
contributed to preserving and transmitting Dai script to next generations. 
A second option to gain formal education especially in Dai script has been adult 
education, most prominently the so called “literacy classes” 199. These classes, which have 
been installed all over China to reach locally determined quotas of literacy in Chinese, 
have been held in Xishuangbanna also on Dai script, and in experiments also on Hani 
script.200 However, despite the officially announced success of literacy classes in both 
                                                     
195
 Xishuangbanna Theravada Buddhist clerics are distinguished in a locally diverse system. 
Translating the categories provided by Wang and Mi (1998, p. 932) clerics ranks are “Small Monks” (小和尚, 
young monks of child age who just come into the temples), “Big Monks” (大和尚, elderly monks with 
responsibility to care for the younger ones) and finally the “Buddhist Grandfathers” (佛爷, leaders in the 
temples). Ranks are obtained by duration at temples and by exams. In general “Small monks” study in 
classes, whereas clerics of the rank “Big Monks” and “Grand Buddha” study by themselves. Since clerics of 
both latter ranks regularly teach the younger monks, I refer to them as “senior monks” in contrast to young 
student monks who I refer to as “junior monks”. 
196
 The number of boy monks decreased in the last years steadily. After temple education reached 
a peak in 1991 when 6092 monk students were registered inside and outside schools, the numbers 
decreased year by year and in 2005 (the lasts available figure) merely 3185 boy monks were at temples. 
This decrease could be interpreted by a general decreasing interest in religion, but the recent rise of newly 
build temples and religious activities in Dai and Bulang villages contradict this hypothesis. A better 
explanation seems to be the double burden by schooling and temple education that Luo (2011) describes in 
detail. Student monks regularly encounter conflicts between using their time to do the regular homework 
and exam preparation on the one side and studying Dai script and religious texts on the other side. In light 
of this conflict lower numbers of monk students can also indicate that Dai parents more and more seek to 
avoid this double burden for their children. 
197
 The general rule is that only boys are eligible to become novices in Dai and Bulang temples 
(Hansen 1999), but senior monks may also admit girls to the classes. Several of my female interview 
partners mentioned that they joined their male friends to Dai temple classes in young ages. Other women 
who today are able to read and write Dai said that they learned Dai script from their fathers. This mode of 
family-based tuition was and still is a mode of securing cultural transmission in families without male 
offspring. 
198
 Temple education constituted an educational option even before the first public schools were 
introduced to the region (Wang, Mi 1998). In the years after the “liberation” of Xishuangbanna in 1953 
temple education existed parallel to the regular education. During the Cultural Revolution monks often had 
to resign from religious life and many had to flee the country (Hansen 1999), but villagers mentioned also 
that even at that time some monks continued to teach Dai script, although in a less formal and less 
publically visible way. 
199
 The official term is 扫盲班 which can be literally translated as “classes for eradicating illiteracy”. 
200
 In Xishuangbanna Hani script was only used once in 1995 in the literacy classes programs for 
roughly 4 percent of the learners enrolled in that year (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2010b, p. 191). 
The fate of Hani script in literacy programs is similar to that of the other scripts that were created in the 50s 
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raising the numbers of literates in Xishuangbanna the share of Dai in these classes has 
been steadily reduced in the last decades,201 and since 1999 they do not include minority 
scripts anymore. Instead, the government has stipulated that also those adults who are 
literate in Dai script need to attend Chinese literacy classes (Xishuangbanna Bureau of 
Education 2010b; Wang 2001). 
In addition to these “literacy classes”, but not exclusively targeting Chinese-
illiterate population, both Xishuangbanna’s minority language associations and individual 
speakers organized minority script classes. The Xishuangbanna Hani research organization, 
for instance, occasionally runs Hani script tuition classes on invitation by local speaker 
communities who offer for example board and lodging for the instructors. In these cases 
staff from the government-funded broadcasting department, the Hani research 
organization (a state-controlled civil society organization funded through member 
contributions), and local members of the speaker community worked together in order to 
promote Hani script (SO-06_2012-02-20). Dai teachers mentioned in interviews privately 
organized classes that they have conducted on villagers’ requests, but they also said that 
these classes terminated after a few months due to a lack of students. Although at this 
point I am unable to evaluate the spread of such individual and private classes, these 
examples indicate an interest of the population in minority languages that, nevertheless, 
only seldom translates into demand for classes. 
In this chapter, however, I discuss the third field of education in minority 
languages in Xishuangbanna, the school education. This field differs from the two former 
mentioned fields by the forced character of education for children at schools, by the large 
scope of school education that reaches every child in a given locality, and by the 
                                                                                                                                                                
and that were hardly any more used in the new century (Teng, Wang 2011). Due to the limited usability of 
the new scripts in society, but also due to its “experimental status” (see above) even in Honghe Prefecture, 
an officially designated “Hani Autonomous Prefecture” Hani script was reduced greatly for literacy classes 
since the beginning of the new century (Ma 2011b).  
201
 Governmental statistics claim that these classes have been a great success, since more than one 
hundred thousand people learned basic skills in reading and writing, and the official illiteracy rate has been 
reduced from 32.53 percent in 1982 to 0.64 percent in 2005 (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2010b, 
p. 191), but sometimes former students of these classes disagree with this claim by arguing that the classes 
have not made them literate in the scripts. In my interviews, many elderly people described themselves still 
as “illiterate” despite class visits. They argued that their own school visit was too short and too long ago and 
that literacy classes were too superficial, so that now they are unable to read and write sufficiently. Due to 
limited practice in writing and reading after the programs finished the rate of those who underwent 
illiteracy-eradication programs, but who afterwards again fell into illiteracy is high among Xishuangbanna’s 
rural minority population (Wang 2001). However, as the official statistics excluded these people from their 
numbers of illiterates, there is a gap between the official story of nearly complete eradication of illiteracy in 
Xishuangbanna and the actually limited success of these programs. Definitions of illiteracy vary even 
between the regular census surveys of different years (Huang 2009). The educational yearbooks count 
everyone who went through at least four years of formal schooling or who knows more than 500 Chinese 
characters as literate (Wang 2001, p. 237). 
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overarching presence of the state in the organization and design of content and tuition. 
Policies have tremendous effects on the outcomes of education in minority languages in 
Xishuangbanna, as they define the goals and the means of tuition. 
In order to lay the ground for the discussion on the policy implementation at my 
case study schools I will in this section outline the policy instruments for ethnic minority 
language education that reach schools. For this endeavor I will firstly provide a brief 
overview on the main actors in government agencies and social organizations, before in 
the second part I will discuss in depth the policy instruments that these agencies employ 
to promote minority language education at schools in Xishuangbanna. 
5.2.1 Governmental and social organizations as policy makers 
In chapter 4 it has been outlined that governmental agencies, and to lesser 
degrees also social organizations, are major formulators and makers of ethnic minority 
language policies in China and that structures of ethnic policy making, such as the 
administrative divisions and the ethnic autonomy approach to policy making, also apply 
to ethnic minority language education policies. In this section I will provide a dense 
overview on the specific agencies in Xishuangbanna, followed by a short presentation of 
selected social organizations that are active in the field of ethnic minority language 
education here. In the final paragraphs of this section I will discuss differences of interests 
within these agencies and organizations in order to understand the policies and 
instruments that these agencies and organizations create. As I focus in this chapter 
specifically on policy instruments I will not discuss the process of policy formulation and 
the influence of parents and other social actors on this process.202 
Government agencies 
As has been elaborated in chapter 4 the nationalities administration and the 
educational administration are the main executive agencies for minority language 
education in China. Both have offices from the national level to the city/county level in 
Xishuangbanna (see Table 11).203  
                                                     
202
 Concerning parents shaping language policies through school choice and other actions see the 
remarks on behavioral language attitudes by ethnic minority speakers in Xishuangbanna above. 
203
 According to my interview partners, minority language education has never been organized by 
the townships (OF-01_2011-12-05; OF-01_2011-12-21; OF-08_OF-09_2012-02-07). 
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 Education Ethnic Affairs 
National 
level: 
China 
Ministry of Education (MOE, formerly State 
Education Commission): ‘Department of 
Minority Education’ 
教育部: 民族教育司204 
State Ethnic Affairs Commission: Department for Education and 
Research: Office for Ethnic Languages and State Committee of 
Guidance Work for Minority Languages and Literature  
国家民族事务委员会 (国家民委委)：教育科技司：民族语语文
处 and 少 数民族语文指导工作委员会办公室 (国家民语委) 205 
Provincial 
level: 
Yunnan 
Yunnan Bureau of Education: Office of Ethnic 
Education 
云南省教育厅：民族教育处206  
Yunnan Provincial Ethnic Affairs Commission: Department of 
Education and Science and Yunnan Provincial Committee of 
Guidance Work for Minority Languages and Literature 
云南省民族事务委员会 (省民委):教育科技处207; 云南省少数民
族语文指导工作委员会办公公室 (省民语委)208 
Prefecture 
level: 
Xishuang-
banna 
Xishuangbanna Prefecture Bureau of 
Education: Division of Ethnic Education: 
Bureau of Translation and Editing of Chinese-
Ethnic Teaching Materials 
西双版纳傣族自治州教育局：民族教育科, 
民汉教材编译办公室209 
Xishuangbanna Prefecture Bureau of Ethnic Affairs: Ethnic 
Division 
 西双版纳傣族自治州民族宗宗教事务局:民族科210 
City or 
County 
level: 
Jinghong, 
Mengla, 
Menghai  
Menghai County Bureau of Education: Office 
of Teaching and Science 
勐海县教育局：教科室211, 
Mengla County Bureau of Education: Office 
of Teaching and Research 
勐腊县教育局 ：教研室室212 
Jinghong City Bureau of Education: Office of 
Teaching and Research 
景洪市教育局：教研室213 
Menghai County Bureau of Ethnic Affairs 
勐海县民族宗教事务局214 
Mengla County Bureau of Ethnic Affairs 
勐腊县民族宗教事务局215 
Jinghong City Bureau of Ethnic Affairs 
景洪市民族宗教事务局 216 
Table 11: Government departments on education in minority languages from national to County level. 
Although the Ministry of Education at the National level is on top position in the 
“kuai” relation of the educational line it does not organize programs for minority 
language education directly, so that the Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Education is the 
highest authority that organizes programs for minority language education that also cover 
Xishuangbanna. The Yunnan Bureau of Education established an Office of Ethnic 
Education that is increasingly engaged with publishing minority language textbooks, 
                                                     
204 
http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/A09/index.html, all last access July 
1st, 2014. 
205 
http://jykjs.seac.gov.cn/ 
206 
http://www.ynjy.cn/chn201004071054442/ 
207
 http://www.ynethnic.gov.cn/Item/24.aspx 
208 
http://www.ynethnic.gov.cn/Item/7.aspx 
209 
http://www.xsbnedu.cn/CotePage/JyjJG.aspx 
210 
http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model60/newsview.aspx?id=1489330 
211 
http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model38/newslist.aspx?classid=109920 
212 
http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model1/newsview.aspx?id=1421220 
213 
http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model3/newsview.aspx?id=1353717 
214 
http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model12/default.aspx?departmentid=9121 
215
 http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model12/default.aspx?departmentid=9204 
216
 http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model1/default.aspx?departmentid=9003 
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running model programs at schools, and organizing in-service training for minority 
language teachers (OF-13_2012-03-23).217 
The Prefecture Bureau of Education is arguably the most relevant governmental 
departments for minority language education in Xishuangbanna. Since 2008 it has a 
specific department for bilingual education, the so called Bureau of Translation and 
Editing of Chinese-Ethnic Teaching Materials. Staffed with three officers and an irregular 
budget that ranged in the last years between 300,000 and one million RMB this 
department has three tasks: translating and editing textbooks, organizing teacher 
trainings, and conducting research programs (OF-01_2011-12-05). 
On county level minority language education has a less prominent position within 
the educational administration. The county-level city Jinghong has one officer specifically 
for minority language education, but at the County Bureaus of Education in Menghai and 
Mengla minority language education is administered by officers of other departments, for 
example by the research department (OF-07_2012-01-11; OF-08_OF-09_2012-02-07). In 
the 90s and early 2000s under the auspices of the then-vice head of the County Bureau of 
Education the Menghai Bureau of Education was very active in hiring teachers and 
publishing textbooks for minority language education. In 2008, however, the Prefecture 
Bureau of Education established the mentioned department and the county programs 
were severely decreased in scope. 
As has been said in chapter 4 the share of responsibilities between government 
departments is in theory determined by top-down hierarchies, but inter-departmental 
bargaining also plays a role. In Yunnan, for example, the Department of Education and 
Science and the Committee of Guidance Work for Minority Languages and Literature 
under the Yunnan Provincial Ethnic Affairs Commission used to run a program for 
language education in minority languages. In 2000, however, the Ministry of Education 
took over this program. A responsible officer (OF-12_2012-03-23) explained this shift in 
the following words: “Our department should not be responsible for guiding activities. 
We are not the Bureau of Education. We just wanted to test the outcomes of bilingual 
education in nationalities regions.” After the experiments showed promising results the 
Bureau of Education took over. In this example the Committee used the unclear 
delineation of responsibilities to run experiments in order to set the agenda for bilingual 
                                                     
217
 A review of Yunnan's Educational Yearbooks from 1986 until 2012 illustrates this. The yearbooks 
recollect the major activities of the Bureau for each year. Before 2005 the yearbooks do not specify 
activities on education in minority languages, from 2006 to 2010 the yearbooks merely shortly report on 
textbook approvals, but from 2010 onwards they report in special chapters on minority languages including 
remarks on conferences, program funding, teacher trainings, and research activities. 
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education. By proving beneficial outcomes for overall educational success, a factor that is 
very important for the Bureau of Education, the Committee was able to bring forward its 
own agenda, namely the promotion, transmission, and tuition of minority languages. 
After 2000 the Committee changed its role from the provider of bilingual programs to 
advisory services for the Bureau of Education. Although funding responsibility shifted to 
the Bureau of Education today the Ethnic Affairs Administration still has large influences 
on the program, for example when the Bureau of Education relies on their expertise in 
choosing schools for program implementation. 
Social organizations 
Several social organizations (e.g. Project Hope218 or METRU 219) have been active 
in providing general educational services at state-run schools in Xishuangbanna, such as 
providing textbooks or erecting school buildings. Organizations also engaged in funding 
and organizing projects to change curriculum and teaching methods, which sometimes 
includes minority language projects. The US-based NGO SIL runs a project for Dai 
language education at five schools in Xishuangbanna since 2005.220 This project installed a 
completely new curriculum of Dai teaching at these schools (an all-Dai head-start in pre-
school), new teaching methods (student-based project work), and the development of 
new teaching materials by the teachers. Similarly, the Centre for Biodiversity and 
Indigenous Knowledge (CBIK) 221 introduced new methods and contents to one Hani 
village school when it sent textbooks on Hani culture to that school and trained some of 
the school’s teachers in methods that encourage students to explore their own village. 
Other projects merely aimed at installing one specific subject at a school. The “School-
based Curriculum Development Project” run by scholars from Beijing’s Minzu 
University222 supported the teachers of one middle school in Jinghong to write and print a 
school-based textbook on Xishuangbanna’s geography and culture that became the basis 
of a two-hour class on local culture for students of that school. Finally, there are 
companies and individuals who donated money to erect school buildings or to purchase 
books for school libraries, but none of this aimed at specifically providing education in 
                                                     
218
 See http://www.ynprojecthope.org, last access 17 Dec, 2013. 
219
 See http://www.bnjhjx.cn/Content.aspx?xk=26, last access 17 Dec, 2013. 
220
 See http://www.eastasiagroup.net/, last access 17 Dec, 2013 and Yunnan Provincial Ethnic 
Affairs Commission (no date). 
221
 See http://www.cbik.org/, last access 17 Dec, 2013. 
222
 See Editorial Board of "Yunnan Province Jinghong City Menghan Township Middle School 
School-Based Textbook" (2009). 
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minority languages.223 Of these projects only the NGO SIL focuses on education in 
minority languages in schools, whereas the other mentioned projects often recognize the 
language-related difficulties of minority students, but answered this with providing 
additional tools to learn Chinese faster. 
Although diverse in content these projects also share several similarities. Some 
goals of these social organizations overlap, such as raising students’ attainments in all 
subjects or raising knowledge of local culture. Furthermore, all mentioned educational 
social organizations focus on specific schools rather than providing educational materials 
for all schools via the Educational Bureaus. Instead of long-time and wide-spread 
engagements they choose to set examples and conduct experiments in close cooperation 
with state agencies. None of the projects described here runs projects with private 
schools or with private kindergartens. 
On the other side, the work of social organizations differs between work inside 
and outside the educational administration system. “Ethnic research organizations” don’t 
conduct projects on minority education within schools, but instead outside the school 
realm. The Hani Research Organization, for example, regularly conducts trainings in Hani 
script. However, these activities are not directed towards school children, but to the 
whole population. Beyond letting the Hani Research Organization use the school building 
for their evening classes, there have been no attempts to transform these classes into a 
regular subject for students (SO-06_2012-02-20). The mentioned division between the 
“ethnic line” and the “educational line” in both government agencies and social 
organizations seems to constitute a certain barrier for cooperation between organizations 
working in either of these fields.  
There is another type of organizations that provide education in minority 
languages in Xishuangbanna: religious organizations. Dai Buddhist organizations, temples, 
and the Theravada Institute for Dai Studies all conduct education in Dai language. 
However, religious organizations are required to keep a distance to school education. Due 
to a strict ban of religious education at regular schools monks who are knowledgeable in 
Dai script are not allowed to teach at regular schools and the Buddhist organizations 
similarly cannot run Dai educational programs there. Although policy slogans such as “Let 
Chinese education enter the temple, let Dai language education enter the classroom” 
suggest the sharing of policy implementation between temples and schools at equal 
terms, this relation is in reality very unequal. Senior monks are requested to guarantee 
                                                     
223
 This approach to focus on school infrastructure, but not on ethnically specific content has been 
also observed in other cases in China where ethnic minority entrepreneurs have donated for educational 
purposes for the local communities (see example reported by Heberer (2007, p. 158)). 
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that novices at the age of compulsory schooling visit schools. Long school days and, in the 
case of centralized boarding schools, the requirements to stay at school overnight reduce 
the time of tuition at temples (Luo 2011). 
Policy goals 
Officers at the relevant agencies224 describe themselves as executives of higher 
level policies and their work as depending of requirements from upper levels. One officer 
put this simple: “When upper levels require us to do so, we in lower levels do it” (OF-
07_2012-01-11). Another official said: 
“The question if Mengla and Menghai conduct bilingual education depends on how much 
importance the Bureaus of Education attaches to it. If they take it seriously we can run bilingual 
education, but if they don’t we have to slow down” (OF-01_2011-12-21). 
In contrast, they describe their work also as responsible towards the people and 
they say that their own work should benefit the population. One officer said “If you want 
to serve the people it is good to understand their language” (OF-07_2012-01-11). Another 
officer said that conducting bilingual education needs to be in line with the “masses”: “If 
the masses request bilingual education we can conduct it, but if they don’t need it we can 
postpone it” (OF-01_2011-12-21). 
In their descriptions of policy goals officials at the government agencies differ 
according to their position in the educational or ethnic administration. Those officers in 
the Bureaus for Education who are concerned with the overall educational situation in 
the region see bilingual education as a tool to learn Chinese. In an official publication the 
Research Department of the Educational Bureau of Xishuangbanna described the goal of 
bilingual education as “increasing the efficiency of ethnic minority students’ learning 
Chinese and other subjects” (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2010b, p. 216). Those 
officers, however, who work specifically in the field of minority language education, argue 
differently. One officer at the office for bilingual textbook translation at the prefecture 
level said that minority language education has three goals: firstly, “to train the learning 
interests of ethnic children,” second “to rise the quality of their education, including 
Chinese learning and civilizational qualities”, and thirdly “to propagate ethnic culture.” 
(OF-01_2011-12-05). Similarly, an officer at a county Bureau for Education responsible for 
                                                     
224
 In addition to their professional position officers’ interests are without question also defined by 
individual beliefs and identities. One officer at a County Bureau of Education, for instance, referred to his 
personal interests with the words: “I am Dai; I want to pass the spirit of this culture to the future” (OF-
08_OF-09_2012-02-07). However, as in this part of this text I am interested rather in the actions of the 
agencies as corporate actors, I will not discuss personal identities and interests of individual actors here, but 
will refer to chapter 6 where I will discuss these issues in detail on the example of identities and beliefs of 
implementers at school level. 
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bilingual education described the goals of bilingual education as specifically cultural-
related: “We need to protect the culture of the ethnic group. We need to emphasize that 
there is a crisis” (OF-08_OF-09_2012-02-07). Another official responsible for bilingual 
education connected bilingual education with the spread of cultural traditions when she 
said: 
“We not only teach the script, but also the culture. [Apart from language education] there is 
another thing: We ethnic people have many traditions, and we also have many music instruments. 
If we gain the financial means we want to pass these traditions through the teachers to the 
students” (OF-07_2012-01-11). 
These multiple interests connected with bilingual education can also be found in 
the argumentation of social organizations. In a project description the NGO SIL refers to 
the goals of Dai-Chinese bilingual education in Xishuangbanna as “an important tool that 
students can use in their transition to the educational system in the national language”, 
but on the other side the organization also refers to the threats for Dai culture provided 
by social development. They describe their Dai bilingual project in Xishuangbanna as “to 
let students successfully adapt to the Chinese language educational system without 
sacrificing their Dai ethnic identity” (SIL - East Asia Group 2010, p. 1). 
In sum, policy goals described here are multiple and both governments and social 
organizations combine several arguments into legitimizing policy interventions at schools. 
In their arguments governmental and social organizations do not differ much, but there 
are differences in argumentation between the individual bureaus in the agencies. Officers 
in the Bureaus of Education who work in basic education or education research are 
generally more concerned with success in Chinese education, whereas officers in the 
bureaus for bilingual education and at the Ethnic Affairs Commissions argue more with 
the need for protection of cultural and linguistic diversity. 
5.2.2 Policy instruments and tuition 
In the following paragraphs I will provide an overview of the main instruments 
that the province, prefecture, and county governments choose to promote the tuition of 
minority languages at schools in Xishuangbanna. Applying the distinction outlined in the 
theory chapter of four types of instruments to the analysis of minority language 
education policies, I will present in short overviews the following items: regulations 
(authoritative type of instruments); funding (financial type); experimental model 
development, textbook publishing, school model programs, staff development, and 
student assignment (organizational type); and research and evaluation (information-
based type). In a conclusion I will summarize the outcomes of these instruments for 
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individual types of minority language education models in Xishuangbanna. The question 
of how schools use and alter these tools will be discussed in a later chapter. 
Regulations 
Regulations on education in minority languages are authoritative instruments that 
prescribe the usage of languages or that guarantee the right to use languages, but they 
are also instruments to organize responsibilities for organizational tools, such as provision 
of education materials. In addition to the national laws and regulations discussed in 
chapter 4 the province, prefecture, and city/county level have also promulgated 
regulations (see Table 12). Due to the line hierarchy regulations are in most areas 
congruent with those at the next higher level. However, at the same time, local 
regulations are also a chance for local governments and for individual officers to set own 
agendas. The “Opinion on the Further Strengthening of Bilingual Education Work in 
Primary and Middle Schools in Areas Inhabited by Ethnic Minorities” by the 
Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education, for example, was drafted by a team composed of 
the officers for bilingual education and bilingual teachers, which might explain its richness 
in details. 
Administrative 
level 
Promulgated by Year (latest 
revision) 
Title in English Title in Chinese 
Yunnan Province Yunnan People’s 
Congress 
2013 Yunnan Province Regulations on Work on 
Ethnic Minority Script225 
云南省少数民族语言
文字工作条例 
 Yunnan People’s 
Congress 
2013 Yunnan Province Regulation on the 
Promotion of Ethnic Minority Education226 
云南省少数民族教育
促进条例 
 Yunnan Bureau of 
Education 
2010 Yunnan Province Outline for Medium and 
Long-term Education Reform and 
Development, 2010-2020227 
云南省中长期教育改
革和发展规划纲要, 
2010-2020 
Xishuangbanna 
Prefecture 
Xishuangbanna 
People’s Congress 
1993 (under 
revision) 
Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture 
Regulation on Ethnic Education228 
西双版纳傣族自制州
民族教育条例 
 Xishuangbanna 
Bureau of 
Education 
2009 Opinion on the Further Strengthening of 
Bilingual Education Work in Primary and 
Middle Schools in Areas Inhabited by Ethnic 
Minorities229 
关于进一步加强少数
民族聚居区中小学双
语教育工作的意见 
 Xishuangbanna 
Bureau of 
Education 
2010 Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture 
Outline for Medium and Long-term 
Education Reform and Development, 2010-
2020230 
西双版纳傣族自治州
中长期教育改革和发
展规划纲要, 2010-
2020 
Jinghong City, 
Menghai County, 
Mengla County 
(selection) 
Mengla Bureau of 
Education 
2009 Mengla County Development Plan on 
Bilingual Education, 2009-2015231 
勐腊县双语教学工作
发展规划, 2009-2015 
                                                     
225
 See Yunnan Province People's Congress 5/1/2013 
226
 See Yunnan Province People's Congress 10/1/2013 
227
 See Yunnan Educational Bureau 2010 
228
 See Xishuangbanna Prefecture People’s Congress 3/21/1993 
229
 See Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2009 
230
 See Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2011 
231
 See Mengla Bureau of Education 2009 
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Table 12: Recent legislation to promote education in minority languages at schools in Yunnan and 
Xishuangbanna (compare also with Table 5 on national laws and policy documents in chapter 4; for 
annotated table see appendix). Note: Included are documents that are titled as laws, plans, opinions, and 
regulations. So called “administrative measures” (办法; 管理办法) will be documented under the 
respective paragraphs on individual instruments, such as textbook approval or teacher employment. 
The regulations on minority language education deliver justifications that minority 
language education is necessary as a tool for the protection of cultural rights and as a tool 
to raise educational achievements of minority students. All regulations state that minority 
language education should be developed, but at the same time they also state that 
Chinese language education should be spread. None of the plans and regulations 
elaborates on the possible contradictions between both demands. 
The regulations also provide lists of measures that governments are supposed to 
take in order to support minority language education. Besides the general call to adjust 
the curriculum to local needs, all regulations mention publishing bilingual textbooks, 
organizing teacher trainings, and conducting research on bilingual education. Regulations 
at province, prefecture, and county level additionally call to construct a teacher 
evaluation system that establishes financial benefits for bilingual teachers and they call to 
establish model schools. The proposals by the Xishuangbanna Prefecture Bureau of 
Education and the Mengla County Bureau of Education (see for all sources footnotes to 
Table 12) define models for minority language education in specific grades and even 
determine the number of schools that are scheduled to implement these models. These 
proposals favor Dai language education strongly over education in Xishuangbanna’s other 
minority languages when they propose intensive Dai studies during diverse school grades, 
but schedule the other languages merely as auxiliary tool in the regular classes. Finally, 
the Yunnan Province Regulation on Minority Education and the corresponding 
Xishuangbanna regulation both demand that Educational Bureaus establish fixed budgets 
for bilingual education out of the Compulsory Education Budget. 
In contrast to all major subjects taught at China’s schools Xishuangbanna’s 
minority language education lacks curriculum plans that would specify educational goals, 
timing, and exit criteria.232 Individual language programs, similar to other such projects in 
China,233 developed school-based guidelines for teaching hours, scheduling, and methods 
(see for instance the “Dai-Chinese Bilingual Education Experimental program“ discussed 
below), but none of Xishuangbanna’s government agencies promulgated such guidelines 
so far.  
                                                     
232
 A few local governments in China established such regulations also for minority language education, see 
for instance Xinjiang's "Trial Scheme for Curriculum Settings of Bilingual Education during Compulsory Education Stage" 
as discussed in Fang (2010, pp. 168–173). 
233
 See for instance the projects described in Cobbey (2007) and in Zhou (2012c). 
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The regulations are limited in their effects on policies. Most of these regulations 
contain only extremely vague statements and choose terms such as “strengthen” or 
“deepen” without offering details on instruments or outcome measurements. Mostly 
they refrain from attributing measures to distinguished agencies and instead we find 
constructions such as “teacher trainings should be installed” or “textbooks are to be 
printed”. The value of legislation on minority language education in Xishuangbanna is 
rather as a provider of “vocabulary” for application and guidance for lower-level 
administration. 
In sum, there is still a large lack in regulations concerning the curriculum, teacher 
benefits, and evaluations in Yunnan and Xishuangbanna. Although especially the more 
recent regulations of the last few years from province down to county government 
established already the official vocabulary and the justifications for minority language 
education officers in the Bureaus still wait for the second step of detailed instrument 
regulations. This lack has severe consequences for policies. On the one hand, it creates 
barriers for the stability of minority language education when teaching plans, teacher 
employment, and textbook production all depend on the unstable support by local 
governments and individual cadres. As responsible officers in the Bureaus of Education 
told me this lack of stability prevents them from enlarging language education programs, 
since they cannot guarantee funding even for the next year (OF-01_2011-12-05; OF-
01_2013-05-03; OF-07_2012-01-11). For schools the lack of regulations similarly means 
that neither school principals nor teachers can expect stability of minority language 
programs. 
Funding 
Although there is a lack in accurate statistics on the funding of minority language 
education234 funds for bilingual education in Xishuangbanna seem to stem in majority 
from diverse governmental and non-governmental agencies, but not from private sources. 
According to officers at the educational bureaus, Yunnan’s annual budget for bilingual 
education amounts currently to 20 Million RMB (10 Million provided by the Central 
Government and 10 Million by the Yunnan Provincial Government), of which an 
                                                     
234
 Many scholars (e.g. Zhang 2011b) lament that the funds for bilingual education throughout China are 
insufficient, although nobody knows the actual sum of funds on national level. This lack in data is partly due to the 
diversity of government levels that contribute to these funds, so that studies can provide only local insight. Moreover, 
and this counts even for local studies, the existing data is far from being accurate. Case study literature on bilingual 
education in China regularly remains silent when it comes to actual figures of funds. My interview partners, similarly, 
were extremely reluctant to provide detailed data. Although some respondents referred to allocated sums none of 
them was able or willing to provide detailed accounts of expenses, which might be due to their perception that figures 
concerning ethnic minorities are too sensitive for publication. In any case, this lack of accurate and detailed data 
prevents comparisons between regions and over time. 
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unspecified amount supports projects in Xishuangbanna (OF-13_2012-03-23).235  The 
Xishuangbanna government allocated independently from these funds 300,000 RMB in 
2010 and 500,000 to 600,000 RMB in 2011 for bilingual education purposes; and the city 
of Jinghong similarly allocated additional funds for teacher trainings (OF-01_2011-12). 
The county governments, by contrast, do not allocate specific bilingual education funds. 
One officer in a county Bureau argued that there was no need for county budgets since 
the prefecture already conducts bilingual education work: “If they organize this, we don’t 
need to. We are united” (OF-07_2012-01-11). 
Furthermore, there are contributions by social organizations and individuals. The 
international language NGO SIL provided funds to organize projects in two regions in 
Yunnan, one of them Xishuangbanna. The newly started “Zero Barrier” project (see below) 
will be equipped with one million RMB yearly. Companies from other regions in China as 
well as local individuals contributed donations for school infrastructure, such as materials 
for a museum room and a small library with approximately 200 volumes of books on Dai 
culture and language at a primary school in Mengzhe Township. To my knowledge there 
are no donations by government departments of other provinces specifically for bilingual 
education in Yunnan or Xishuangbanna.236 Finally, schools can also use revenues from fee 
collection in attached kindergartens and from using school-owned land.237 
These funds are used for four kinds of activities: teacher trainings (at province, 
prefecture, and city/county level); editing, printing, approving, and delivering textbooks 
(province and prefecture level); provision of school infrastructure, for example computers, 
cameras, and TV sets; and finally activities for research and information on bilingual 
education, such as inspection tours or conferences. The funds are not used for teacher 
salaries, since minority language teachers are paid regular salaries through the counties’ 
departments of human resources. An additional financial benefit for bilingual teachers to 
                                                     
235
 Until the year 2000 the Yunnan Provincial Committee of Guidance Work for Minority Languages 
and Literature of the Ethnic Affairs Committee contributed also own funds to run language projects at 
schools, but later funding responsibility was transferred to the Bureau of Education. 
236
 Interprovincial donations especially for bilingual education have been reported from other 
localities. The Shanghai Municipal Education Commission, for example, donated in 2011 2.5 million RMB to 
install bilingual teacher competitions in Kashgar, Xinjiang (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2012). 
237
 Principals' willingness to use these school-generated funds to support minority language 
activities varies extremely. In Cobbey's (2007) survey some principals indicated a commitment to use own 
funds for minority language project, but those principals who I interviewed have been much more critical 
towards this issue (see discussion below). 
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reward their higher workloads was paid only until the late 80s, but was meanwhile 
abolished.238 
The data on funding leads to two conclusions. Firstly, the claim that insufficient 
funds hinder the development of bilingual education can be only substantiated by 
analyzing the actual needs of schools, teachers, and students. The accumulated statistics 
are too broad to allow distinguishing individual funding lacks, and there is a lack of data 
on the current usage of funds at school level. Secondly, and this seems to be the most 
pressing issue for my respondents in the bilingual education offices, the amount of funds 
changes from year to year. None of the fixed budgets for education analyzed here 
contained long-term commitments to bilingual education work, but instead both the 
budget and the number of staff in the respective offices are negotiated each year anew. 
One of the main demands in the “Yunnan Province Regulation on the Promotion of Ethnic 
Minority Education” from 2013 is hence that funding for bilingual textbooks both on the 
nationally unified and the local curriculum should derive from the budget for compulsory 
education rather than from instable project funds. It remains to be seen if decision 
makers on budgets will listen to that demand. 
School programs 
Minority language education in Xishuangbanna is - similarly to the mentioned 
trends in China (see chapter 4) - conducted mostly in pre-school and elementary school 
level, but hardly ever at secondary and tertiary education level (see Table 13). Official 
statistics claim that in 2005 minority language education was conducted at 264 
elementary schools in Xishuangbanna either orally or literacy-based (Xishuangbanna 
Bureau of Education 2010b). At kindergarten level, the mushrooming of kindergartens 
(see chapter 3) did not lead to a similar increase in minority language education. Until 
2013 there was only one kindergarten (the Jiguan kindergarten) in Xishuangbanna 
Prefecture that experimented officially with Dai language education, and for late 2013 the 
Minzu Kindergarten was scheduled to participate as well. Both kindergartens are public 
kindergartens, whereas none of the private kindergartens in Xishuangbanna offered any 
tuition in minority languages.239 Middle schools similarly seldom offer education in 
minority language education. In 2012 there were only two such middle schools in the 
                                                     
238
 This refusal to pay additional rewards is in contrast to practices in other Chinese regions, for 
instance Xinjiang, where the government pays an additional benefit of 400 to 600 RMB per month and a 
"settlement allowance" of 3,000 RMB directly to each bilingual teacher (Ma 2009, p. 213). 
239
 Public kindergartens are here defined as not-for-profit institutions that are organized and 
funded at least partially by the state and that are only allowed to levy study fees based on regulations. 
Private kindergartens, by contrast, are for-profit institutions that are privately owned and that can 
determine study fees by themselves. 
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prefecture, both in Menghai County, as remains of a program from 2008 of Dai education 
at eight schools.240 At college level, finally, education is conducted generally only in 
Chinese. There are, however, a few options for Dai studies in Xishuangbanna. At 
Xishuangbanna’s only college, the Xishuangbanna Vocational Technical College, Dai 
language was taught in 2013 for one single class of pre-school teacher students, whereas 
previous Dai-Chinese programs (a three-year program between 1986 and 1999 and a five-
year program between 2003 and 2009) have been terminated. Additionally, there are 
opportunities to learn Dai outside Xishuangbanna at the Yunnan Nationalities University 
with intensive classes on Dai linguistics, Dai literature, and Dai-Chinese translation241 and 
at the Xishuangbanna Buddhist College, where approximately 30 students learn the Old 
Dai script in addition to subjects such as Chinese or English (MO-04_2012-02-27). 
However, all these programs at higher education levels reach only small numbers of 
students (a few small classes at the Buddhist College and 20 to 40 students at the 
Vocational College). 
 No. of schools in 2005 No. of schools in 2013 
Kindergartens 0 2 
Elementary schools (incl. pre-school 
classes) 
264 141 (in 2010) 
Middle schools 10 2 
Colleges 2 2 
Table 13: Kindergartens, schools, and colleges with minority language education in Xishuangbanna. Sources 
for data 2005: Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education (2010b); for 2010: Liu, Yang (2010); for 2013: interviews 
with Prefecture and County Bureaus of Education. 
In sum, minority language education is mostly conducted at earlier educational 
levels. Although the numbers of schools with bilingual tuition generally declined, this 
decline was more severe at middle school level and at higher education level than in 
elementary schooling. When one takes the overall decline in the number of primary 
schools in Xishuangbanna caused by school mergers into account, the situation of 
minority language education at Xishuangbanna can be seen as stable.  
The development of the numbers of classes with Dai language education shows a 
similar picture. Minority language education is most extensively conducted in very young 
grades, such as pre-school, first grade or second grade. All schools that take part in 
county, prefecture, or province programs for Dai language education start with Dai 
                                                     
240
 Bilingual education increased in Menghai greatly in 2008 when minority language teaching was 
expanded from primary to middle school level through hiring eight additional middle school teachers 
especially for Dai classes. According to several informants in the region (OF-01_2013-05-03, OF-07_2012-
01-11, TE-29_2013-05-07) this increase in Menghai was initiated and orchestrated by the then-vice-director 
of the County Educational Bureau, but once he left the local bureau and was transferred to a position at the 
prefecture Educational Bureau in 2008 bilingual activities in Menghai slowed down and one year later only 
two of the originally eight middle schools continued this program. 
241 See program description in Yunnan Nationalities University, Institute of Ethnic Cultures (2010). 
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language education at very early grades, whereas in higher grades they generally 
schedule minority language education to only one or two school hours per week. At 
kindergarten level minority language education has expanded, but is currently not 
reaching significant levels.242  
In addition to the finding that bilingual education in Xishuangbanna is mostly 
conducted in early educational levels two other findings are important for understanding 
the situation of bilingual education at schools in Xishuangbanna. Firstly, the above 
mentioned programs are only offered for Dai language education, whereas for Hani and 
other languages spoken in Xishuangbanna there are no formal courses in school 
education and higher education, but merely a few evening classes organized by the Hani 
research association. This indicates not only the prioritization of languages in education in 
Xishuangbanna with Chinese at the top, followed by Dai, and only then the other minority 
languages, but it is also a result of the area-based approach of offering education only in 
those minority languages that obtained official status in “their” autonomous regions. 
Secondly, similar to other localities in China minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna is conducted at schools of generally lower educational infrastructure, in 
areas of large ethnic minority population, and in rural areas, 243 whereas elite schools, 
urban schools, and private schools hardly ever take part in any program for minority 
language education, with the exception of the two mentioned high-level kindergartens.244 
                                                     
242
 The differences in the minority language teaching situation between kindergarten and pre-
schools stem from differences in authority of Educational Bureaus over both. Educational Bureaus are the 
direct supervisors of schools and have the means to run programs for minority language education there 
(see chapter 4). Kindergartens in China, by contrast, are often private and much less subject to regulation 
by the Educational Bureaus. Kindergartens are not requested to implement bilingual curricula and they 
hardly ever participate in provincial or county bilingual programs. However, since pre-school classes are 
more and more substituted by kindergarten education, the Educational Bureaus of Xishuangbanna seek to 
expand bilingual education programs also to kindergartens. The governmental request towards the two 
mentioned kindergartens to implement bilingual programs can be seen as a step to include more 
kindergartens into the programs and to spread bilingual tuition to these institutions. 
243
 Neither the urban center of the prefecture capital Jinghong (市区) nor the urban centers of the 
counties (县城) have any schools that teach bilingually (in the administrative area of Jinghong City bilingual 
schools are found in the rural township districts of Gasa, Menglong, Menghan, and Mengyang), but all 
bilingual schools are “rural schools”, as defined by administrative location. The term "rural schools" will be 
used here in accordance with official Chinese educational statistics that defines all schools located in a 
township (县镇) as rural schools (乡镇学校) as opposed to city schools (城市学校) (Wen 2011). This 
differentiation is based on administration and denotes to the different supervision and financing of rural 
and urban schools. Township schools are supervised by township government and city schools by the 
county or city government. From this term one can thus neither directly conclude an agricultural 
environment nor an agricultural employment of the parents 
244
 The provincial bureau of education ranks Kindergartens in China into nine categories, based on 
regulations such as the “Regulation on the Evaluation Levels of Kindergartens in Yunnan Province” (云南省
幼儿园等级评估方案). The Zhou Jiguan Kindergarten has been ranked in 2010 in the best possible category 
(一级一等园) and the Minzu Kindergarten in the second best category (一级二等园) (Jinghong City 
Educational Bureau 2011). The difference between the prevalence of minority language education 
programs at schools with comparatively low educational infrastructure and high-end kindergartens can be 
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Interestingly, none of the designated “nationalities schools” provide bilingual education, 
which can be explained by the functions of this specific type of schools: Located in the 
prefecture or county seats these schools offer a chance for educational careers for 
students of ethnic minority status and serve as a gateway to a “modern” and “hanified” 
environment. According to the principal of one of these schools there is “no need” for 
minority middle schools to conduct tuition in minority languages anymore, as the 
students here have high proficiency in Chinese (PR-11_2012-01-12). 
The limitation of minority language education to rural schools in combination with 
general lower quality of infrastructure has several consequences for these programs. 
Firstly, program implementation suffers when school buildings, teaching materials, or 
teacher trainings are of inferior quality. Secondly, the programs also suffer from rural 
small schools’ bad reputations. The image of underdevelopment of the schools 
contributes to the opinion that bilingual programs are only suitable for those locations 
that are anyways off the track of modernization. Generally speaking, minority language 
education is treated as a type of education that is suitable only for “backward” ethnic 
homogeneous communities, but not for modern and multi-ethnic city schools. 
Diverse government agencies and a few social organizations conducted “model 
experiments” for bilingual education in Xishuangbanna. According to interview partners 
at schools and in the Bureaus of Education, education in minority languages was in the 
initial years after its re-introduction in the 80s a very non-standardized issue. Schools 
conducted their own projects, and some county governments edited textbooks, but the 
provincial and prefecture government had little to offer for bilingual schools. Over the last 
ten years, however, models from province to county have flourished (see Table 14). Four 
specific Dai-Chinese bilingual projects have been conducted. Additionally, several projects 
on education in local knowledge and ethnic culture have been conducted that do not 
directly aim at teaching language skills, but that in their so called “local curriculum 
courses” focus on history, geography, and culture, and languages of the ethnic groups of 
Xishuangbanna. Several of these projects have been organized by non-governmental 
organizations, e.g. by the US-based language NGO “SIL” or the Kunming-based “Center for 
Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge”. 
                                                                                                                                                                
explained by the different approaches of the Educational Bureaus. All rural schools in Xishuangbanna are 
under supervision of the Educational Bureaus and have to implement minority language programs when the 
Bureau selects them as pilot schools. Rural kindergartens, by contrast, that are often private, hesitate to 
implement minority language programs when these do not attract new students. If the Bureaus of 
Education want to run minority language programs at kindergartens they thus have to rely on the urban 
ones, and these are generally of better infrastructural quality than their rural and private counterparts. 
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Name of program Agency Schools in 
XSBN 
Duration Content 
“Yunnan Provincial Bilingual 
Experimentation Schools 
Program” 
双语教学试点项目 
-1980s - 2000: YN Committee of 
Guidance Work for Minority 
Languages and Literature  
-Since 2000: YN BoE: Office of Ethnic 
Education 
ML: 1 
MH: 1 
1980s - 
today 
bilingual education 
in 18 languages (in 
XSBN: Dai-Chinese) 
Dai-Chinese Bilingual 
Education Experimental 
Program 
傣汉双语教学实验项目245 
-JH BoE 
-YN BoE: Research Department 
-XSBN BoE 
-SIL 
JH: 5 2005-10 Dai-Chinese 
bilingual education 
Zero Barrier Bilingual 
Education 
零障碍双语246 
-YN Edu. Association: Minority Edu. 
Committee 
-YN Committee of Guidance Work 
for Minority Languages and 
Literature 
-SIL
247
 
XSBN: 7 
schools and 1 
kindergarten 
2010-20 Bilingual education 
(in XSBN: Dai-
Chinese) 
“Menghai primary school and 
middle school Dai tuition” 
MH BoE MH: 8 2008-09 Dai language 
education 
“School-based Curriculum 
Development Project”  
-Beijing Minzu University 
-XSBN BoE 
-JH BoE 
JH: 1 2006-08 Local culture, and 
language 
knowledge 
Community-based Education 
for Traditional Knowledge and 
Biodiversity: Coming home to 
our village 
传统知识和生物多样性社区
教育:回到我们的村寨248 
-JH BoE 
-Centre for Biodiversity and 
Indigenous Knowledge
249
 
JH: 1 2003-06 Local culture, and 
language 
knowledge 
Table 14: Table: Programs for bilingual education and local culture at model schools in Xishuangbanna 2003 
to 2013 (selection). Note: Program names without quotation marks are my translations of the official names; 
those in quotation marks are descriptions of programs without official names. This table shows only 
programs that target individual schools directly. General textbook provision and teacher trainings as well as 
language tuition programs that are not bound to schools are excluded (such as Hani script courses by the 
Hani Research Organization). YN = Yunnan; XSBN = Xishuangbanna; JH = Jinghong; MH = Menghai; ML = 
Mengla; BoE = Bureau of Education. 
The Yunnan Provincial Bilingual Experimentation Schools Program as the largest 
program in Yunnan selects 36 schools in Yunnan Province, two on each language. Being 
selected to take part in this experimental program, however, means for these schools a 
larger input of investments. The program offers up to 300,000 RMB to each model school 
for classroom infrastructure or teaching equipment such as video cameras or computers. 
In Xishuangbanna one school has been chosen in Menghai and one in Mengla. 
The Dai-Chinese Bilingual Education Experimental Program, a cooperation of the 
NGO SIL and the Educational Bureaus of Yunnan, Xishuangbanna, and Jinghong, by 
contrast, does not provide lump sums to schools, but sends instead foreign and Chinese 
                                                     
245
 See SIL - East Asia Group (2010).  
246
 See Yunnan Provincial Ethnic Affairs Commission (no date). 
247
 This project is still in its initial phase. The listed three organizations signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding and media reported on the new project. The Minority Education Committee of the Yunnan Education 
Association is attached to the Yunnan Bureau of Education, see Yunnan Provincial Education Association Minority 
Education Committee (2009).  
248
 See Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge: http://www.brooks.ngo.cn/xtjc/xxzx/xx200612-
jg10.php, last access June 21, 2014. 
249
 See Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge: http://www.cbik.org/, last access June 21, 2014 
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experts to schools in order to support language curriculum development based on 
participatory approaches. This project includes an all-Dai head start tuition in pre-school 
and first grade and a slow shift to Chinese in higher grades. After the Dai-Chinese Bilingual 
Education Experimental Program together with SIL’s projects in other parts of Yunnan 
(Cobbey 2007) were evaluated as successfully in raising both student’s skills and teacher’s 
methods the experiences were transferred to a larger project called “Zero Barrier”, which 
intends to lower the difficulties in educational access for non-Chinese speaking children. 
The Zero Barrier project will be of much larger scope and contains investments of 1 
Million RMB per year. Although the project officially started in 2010 the number of 
schools was still unclear in 2013, but in Xishuangbanna at least two more schools and a 
kindergarten will join. 
Projects in Menghai and Mengla were very short-lived, as they were initiated and 
tightly connected with the careers of individual leading cadres in the County government 
or the County Educational Bureaus. The Mengla Bureau of Education drafted in 2009 the 
Mengla County Development Plan on Bilingual Education (see above) with a scheduled 
introduction of bilingual education to several schools. However, this plan was never put 
into reality, at least not in terms of model schools. Although some schools in the County 
conduct Dai language education, only one gained the status of a model school, namely as 
a model school of the Province bilingual program. In Menghai the Bureau of Education 
similarly proposed a large project in 2009 that would introduce Dai language to eight 
schools. This model project was implemented for a short time and eight new Dai teachers 
were hired. One year later, however, this project stopped abruptly after the responsible 
director in Menghai’s Bureau of Education was transferred to the prefecture Bureau of 
Education, and the new director did not support this program anymore and degraded 
responsibility for bilingual education from the Bureau director to the Research 
Department (OF-07_2012-01-11). According to teachers in Menghai not only have there 
been no new teachers hired, but the “atmosphere” changed, teachers felt less supported 
and schools have been less pressured to continue Dai language education (TE-29_2013-
05-07). 
Finally, two projects conducted development of curricula and textbooks for local 
knowledge. The “School-based Curriculum Development Project” was supported by 
Beijing’s Minzu University and produced a voluminous school-based textbook on 
Xishuangbanna’s culture and geography. Similarly, the Community-based Education for 
Traditional Knowledge and Biodiversity project produced a textbook on Hani culture. Both 
projects contained large participation by the teachers, but the effects were rather limited. 
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The textbook developed by the “School-based Curriculum Development Project” is still 
used in local culture classes, but to my observation it did not succeed in influencing other 
classes. The Hani culture textbook is not used for tuition anymore. 
The instruments of experimental pilots for minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna have brought additional resources to schools in terms of teaching 
material, teacher trainings, and in the case of the Menghai project also new teacher 
positions. Experimental projects have bundled these resources to schools, schools have 
experimented in different models of teaching, and some schools gained the chance to 
participate in project development. For the cause of bilingual education this has created 
“lighthouses” that show what can be reached through bilingual education, which might 
induce more such education at other schools or in other localities. The expansion of the 
“Dai-Chinese Bilingual Education Experimental Program” from county to province proves 
that expansion is possible and that locally gained experiences can be made useful for 
other localities and schools. 
On the other side, the experimental mode also created flaws in sustainability. 
Firstly, since merely 20 out of 363 bilingual schools have been reached by experiments 
(Editorial Committee of Xishuangbanna Yearbook 2012), the share of other schools that 
conduct tuition without these programs is very large, and a more equal distribution of 
resources might benefit education more than for instance providing selected schools with 
multimedia labs, whereas others even lack books. Secondly, experiments depend much 
on outcome evaluation, but since standardized tests can only marginally reflect individual 
learning factors and attainments the effects of bilingual learning on learning progress in 
Chinese are only indirectly measurable. Policy learning depends thus to large degrees on 
leaders in governmental agencies and not necessarily on the quality of experiments. 
Thirdly, the limited time of many of Xishuangbanna’s bilingual experimental programs 
creates insecurity for both teachers and learners, which is especially in language learning 
risky, since educational success also in other subjects depends on constant language 
learning progress. Finally, the fate of Xishuangbanna’s diverse model projects shows that 
government agencies have a major role in determining the implementation of model 
projects, but that there is lack of participation of the local population in determining the 
start or the continuation of experiments. As generally the government selects even 
schools for program run by social organizations and support by parents, students, or 
school staff is not a precondition for this selection (SO-02_2011-10-21) sustainability and 
success of implementation might be endangered by diverging interests of government, 
target population, and implementers. 
 196 
Textbooks 
Government agencies and other organizations resort to textbook distribution and, 
in the former case, to textbook approval as instruments to provide resources for minority 
language education in Xishuangbanna. As has been specified in chapter 4 the Bureaus of 
Education and sometimes also the Ethnic Committees edit textbooks themselves or buy 
and distribute textbooks by one of the large national or provincial publishing houses. 
So far, these activities have resulted in a variety of textbooks for school education 
in minority languages in Xishuangbanna, mostly in Dai (see Table 15). Firstly, the Yunnan 
Bureau of Education has ordered and funded the translation of the regular Chinese 
language textbooks into Dai, Hani, and other languages.250 So far, the Dai editions of the 
textbooks for the Chinese “Language and Literature” school subject from pre-school to 
6th grade (see all references in Table 15) have been published with 5000 copies each.251 
Secondly, the prefecture and county Bureaus of Education have also printed local 
textbooks to be used specifically at schools.252 Due to a lack in new editions Dai language 
teachers had for decades no choice but to use old Dai textbooks from the 50s that were 
printed in black and white, had no pictures, and lacked instructions and exercises. In 2002 
the Educational Bureau of Menghai produced a new colorful series of books (5000 copies) 
that introduced the Dai syllables and graphemes, but lacked texts and exercises. From 
2008 onward the Xishuangbanna Prefecture Bureau of Translation and Editing of Chinese-
Ethnic Teaching Materials took over and produced textbooks for primary schools that 
feature introductions into Dai writing, exercises, and short texts in two volumes with 
10,000 copies each. Thirdly, social organizations and universities, in cooperation with 
schools, also produced “school-based textbooks” such as “Coming home to our village” or 
“Multicultural home village”. Although these textbooks include language knowledge into 
lessons on local culture, they do not specifically teach communicative skills in these 
languages, and they are written in Chinese.253 The Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 
                                                     
250
 Both the Yunnan Ministry of Education and the Yunnan Ethnic Affairs Commission present each 
year rising numbers of minority-language textbooks that they edited, evaluated, and printed (see e.g. 
Editorial Board of Yunnan Yearbook 2012). Until 2012 more than 300 bilingual editions of textbooks have 
been produced in Yunnan (Yunnan Ethnic Languages Commission 2012). 
251
 Similar to other minority regions in China (Zhang, Zhu 2012) also in Xishuangbanna the 
"Language and Literature" textbooks were translated initially because support through minority script was 
deemed most necessary in "Language and Literature", a subject that demands even from Chinese speaking 
students a large effort to acquire new vocabulary. Translations of the textbooks of Math or other subjects 
have thus been postponed. 
252
 In addition there are of course also Dai language learning materials for adults available, such as 
the Dai language learning books by the Beijing Minzu University and the Yunnan Nationalities University 
(the former Yunnan Nationalities Institute), but this material is mostly used only at higher education. 
253
 Xishuangbanna seems to be no exception from the overall situation in China. Three quarters of 
the 2000 local textbooks that scholars of Beijing’s Minzu University collected from all over China were 
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composed some basic lessons in Dai language and published these free of charge on their 
web-page. They also published a DVD with children songs in Dai and a set of five 
beautifully illustrated children story books based on folk-tales (Yu, Zhang 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                                
written in Chinese and that share was even higher among the textbooks from Yunnan (Teng et al. 2011). An 
explanation for this might be that the school-based authors lack the writing skills in minority languages or 
deem it unsuitable for their school, especially when not all children understand the local non-Chinese 
language. Another explanation might be that the organizers of the school-based textbook editing projects, 
often national social organizations, focus on transmitting cultural knowledge, but not on language learning. 
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Title Editing agency Date Content Locality Target audience 
Designated school textbooks in minority languages 
“Language and Literature” – 
Chinese Xishuangbanna Dai 
contrastive edition 
语文，数学 – 汉文文西双版纳
傣文对照254 
YN BoE From 
1950s 
onward 
-Chinese and Dai 
-Regular Chinese and 
math book translated 
XSBN Pre-school to 
sixth grade 
“Xishuangbanna Dai language” ? 1950s -Dai 
-graphemes and texts 
XSBN Primary school 
to adult 
education 
“Xishuangbanna Dai textbook”  
 西双版纳傣文教材255 
MH BoE 2002 -Dai 
-graphemes 
XSBN, mainly 
MH 
Pre-school and 
primary school 
“Xishuangbanna Dai primary 
school textbook” 
西双版纳傣文小学教材256 
XSBN BoE From 2008 
onward 
-Dai 
-graphemes and texts 
XSBN Pre-school to 
junior middle 
school 
“Dai textbook” JH BoE; 
SIL 
2005 -Dai 
-graphemes and text 
JH Pre-school and 
primary school 
Examples of other minority language textbooks for possible use in classrooms 
“Concise reader of 
internationally used Hani/ Aka 
script”  
民间国际通用哈尼/阿卡文简明
读本257 
XSBN Hani 
Research Organi-
zation 
? -Hani 
-phonology, 
graphemes, texts 
XSBN and 
other Hani 
speaking 
regions 
Adult education 
and partly 
schools 
“Basic tutorial for 
Xishuangbanna Dai” 
 西双版纳傣语基础教程 
Beijing Minzu 
University 
2012 -Dai 
-phonology, 
graphemes, texts 
YN Adult education 
“Learn Dai with me” 
 跟我学傣文258 
XSBN BoE 2012 -Dai 
-graphemes 
XSBN Children to 
adults 
“Apollo butterfly Dai language 
paradise series” 
 赞巴蝶傣语乐园丛书259 
XSBN BoE 2011 -Dai and Chinese 
-texts 
XSBN Kindergarten to 
primary school 
children 
Examples of designated school textbooks on local culture that include chapters on language knowledge 
“Multicultural home village“ 
多元文化乡土260 
 
Menghan 
Township Middle 
school; 
Minzu University 
Beijing 
2009 -Chinese 
-local culture 
JH, 
1 middle 
school 
Middle school 
“Coming home to our village” 
回到我们的村寨261 
JH BoE; Centre for 
Biodiversity and 
Indigenous 
Knowledge; local 
schools 
2003 -Chinese 
-local culture 
JH, 
1 middle 
school 
Primary school 
Table 15: School textbooks in minority languages used in Xishuangbanna. Note: “Editing agency” means 
here the main agency that funded and organized the editing and publishing of the respective textbook. 
“Locality” refers to the place where the book is mainly used. YN = Yunnan; XSBN = Xishuangbanna; JH = 
Jinghong; MH = Menghai; ML = Mengla; Boe = Bureau of Education. 
Today Dai language textbooks are in relative abundance available to schools. After 
text book fees were abolished these textbooks are now available for most schools that 
intend to run Dai language classes. The existence and the trends of textbook production 
                                                     
254
 See Yunnan Bureau of Education (2001). 
255
 See Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education (2002). 
256
 See Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education (2010a). 
257
 See Xishuangbanna Hani Research Organization (no date). 
258
 See Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education: http://jh.xsbnedu.cn/bnjyjmcjy/Default.html, last 
access 2013-09-17. 
259
 See Yu, Zhang (2011) 
260
 See Editorial Board of "Yunnan Province Jinghong City Menghan Township Middle School 
School-Based Textbook" (2009). 
261
 See Ling et al. (2004). 
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indicate a rising attention to education in minority languages in Xishuangbanna, at least 
to Dai language education. The fact that after several decades of absence four editions of 
specific local Dai language textbooks were produced since 2000 means that local 
governments in Xishuangbanna have begun to invest into this type of education. The 
numbers of printed copies rose from 5,000 in the edition of 2002 to 10,000 in the edition 
of 2008. Also the quality of these textbooks improved compared to the textbooks from 
the 1950s. Compared to low paper quality of Yunnan’s minority language textbooks that 
Tao and Yue (2002b) still observed at turn of the 21st century the new textbooks in 
Xishuangbanna are of much better quality. In interviews Dai teachers complained about 
some pictures in the books,262 but overall the teachers were pleased with the new Dai 
textbooks. In terms of layout and writing the books have been modernized and include 
now exercises. 
However, there are also severe lacks of textbooks. For those languages without an 
officially recognized script, such as Jinuo, there are no school textbooks available. Even 
for Hani language that has an officially recognized and established script, schools in 
Xishuangbanna don’t possess books. The standard provincial textbooks have been 
translated into Hani, Lahu, and Yi to name just three speaker groups in Xishuangbanna, 
but these books seem to have been exclusively delivered to schools in other localities in 
Yunnan, but not to Xishuangbanna. Together with the overwhelmingly preference of Dai 
language in experimental school model programs this shows that the provision of 
textbooks in minority languages and thus the possibility to teach these languages depend 
on the status of the ethnic group in a given administrative unit. Xishuangbanna’s 
government prefers Dai over the other minority languages not only in official public usage, 
but also in the editing, funding, and delivery of textbooks. This, however, is not a specific 
blunder of the Xishuangbanna government, but rather an outcome of the general 
approach to grant autonomy rights and to conduct measures for cultural protection 
merely for groups in “their” officially designated areas, instead of entitling individuals to 
be provided with textbooks in his or her mother tongue language irrespective of place of 
residence. Furthermore, there is also a lack in accompanying books. Educational Bureaus 
as well as the market failed to provide those additional teacher guidance books that exist 
for math and Chinese in abundance. Furthermore, due to the general lack of media in 
Xishuangbanna’s minority languages (see above) teachers find it difficult to add content 
                                                     
262
 Teachers complained especially that pictures were not "localized". A lesson on ploughs, for 
example, has images of ploughs that are used by Han in central China, but not ploughs that the Dai use. The 
editors of these textbooks in the Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education said that they tried to find images of 
local plants, tools, and animals, but due to financial constraints they were unable to take such photos by 
themselves and had to rely on downloads from the internet. 
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to their classes beyond the regular textbooks. In later chapters I will discuss in detail how 
teachers work with this situation, how they adjust their tuition to the provided textbooks, 
and how they depart from prescribed content. 
Teachers 
Employment and staff trainings are further fields where Bureaus of Education can 
influence the conditions of minority language education in schools. Provincial, prefecture, 
and City/County Bureaus of Education engage here in organizing pre-service professional 
education through bilingual college and university majors, in hiring bilingual teachers, and 
in conducting in-service trainings for bilingual teachers. 
A few college and university programs conducted pre-service teacher trainings for 
Dai language education (see Table 16). Since the early 80s teacher students at the 
Xishuangbanna Vocational Technical College263 have been obliged to take Dai language 
seminars, but when in 1986 the college offered a special Dai-Chinese bilingual degree 
only students in this program where obliged to take Dai classes. By covering Dai and 
Chinese linguistics, didactics, and educational science this degree entitled graduates to 
teach at public schools. However, when school positions gradually required more 
Bachelor degrees for teachers, the College, unable to provide Bachelor degrees, 
terminated their teacher major program in 2009. In 2011 the College started a new 
program to educate future pre-school or kindergarten teachers with one regular Chinese 
language class and one “Dai-Chinese bilingual class”. Despite its name, however, the 
latter class schedules only one or two Dai language seminars for the last study years, 
whereas all other subjects are taught in Chinese. For 2017 the College is scheduled to 
expand its scope with a new campus and to gain the status of a university. The Institute of 
Dai Language considers offering a Dai-Chinese BA by then, but the final decision has not 
been made yet.264 Additionally the Yunnan Nationalities University offers a degree 
program on minority languages with a Dai branch including linguistics and didactics as 
elective courses. However, according to one instructor at the faculty (SC-15_2012-03-23) 
graduates of this program seem to find teaching positions unattractive, especially those 
positions at rural primary schools, and tend to take instead jobs in government or 
academia. Teacher universities at the provincial level, finally, don’t include minority 
languages into their courses. 
                                                     
263
 I translated the name of Xishuangbanna’s only college (职业技术学院) as "Vocational Technical College" 
since its website and brochures don't provide an official English translation. 
264
 All of the above mentioned data on the different programs derive from interviews with Dai language 
instructors at the Xishuangbanna Vocational Technical College and the Yunnan Nationalities University. 
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Educational Institution Student entrance Subject Content 
Yunnan Nationalities 
University  
(云南民族大学) 
At least since 2010, 
probably earlier 
China’s Minority languages, 
Xishuangbanna Dai branch
265
 
中国少数民族语言文学专业（西双版
纳傣族语言文学方向） 
Dai and Chinese linguistics plus 
didactics as elective 
Xishuangbanna 
Vocational and 
Technical College  
(西双版纳职业技术学
院)  
Before 1986 (?) Regular teacher education 1 or 2 Dai seminars for each 
class 
1986 (?) to 1999 Dai-Chinese Bilingual Education Three-
year Secondary Vocational Education 
傣汉双语教育，中专 
Several seminars on Dai 
linguistics and didactics 
2003 and 2004 Dai-Chinese Bilingual Education five-
year Secondary Vocational Education  
傣汉双语教育，大专 
8 seminars on Dai linguistics and 
didactics per semester 
2009 and 2010 Dai-Chinese secretarial Three-year 
Secondary Vocational Education  
傣汉双语文秘，中专 
1-3 seminars Dai language per 
semester 
Since 2011 Regular pre-school teacher education  1-2 Dai seminars for 1 Dai-
Chinese bilingual class in last 
year 
Table 16: Dai language education majors in Xishuangbanna’s institutes of higher education. Source: 
Interviews with lecturers at Xishuangbanna Technical College and Yunnan Nationalities University (SC-
13_2012-03-20; SC-15_2012-03-23). 
Minority language teacher education suffers from a scarcity of available study 
majors, but also from low enrollment rates to existing programs. The scarcity of minority 
language teacher education programs is due to differences in interests between the 
provincial Educational Bureaus that seems to be only marginally interested in the issue of 
teacher pre-service education in minority languages, and the Ethnic Affairs Committees 
that are interested in minority language teacher education but have no say in teacher 
education at the Normal Universities, but only at the Nationality Universities. After the 
upgrading of teacher education to universities and the centralization of teacher education 
away from local colleges to provincial level universities local Bureaus of Education have 
no influence on designing the curricula for teacher education anymore. The provincial 
Bureaus, by contrast, are more interested in educating province-wide deployable 
teachers than in educating teachers for small, locally defined, and unstable numbers of 
schools. Furthermore, the existing programs suffer from comparatively low enrollment 
rates due to a lack of attractive employment opportunities. According to one instructor, 
the Xishuangbanna Vocational Technical College’s Dai-Chinese bilingual study programs of 
2003 and 2004 and the Dai-Chinese pre-school program all were scheduled for 40 to 50 
students per year, but there were only 20 to 30 applicants per year.266 After the job-
assignment system of previous decades ended that guaranteed each graduate a life-long 
teaching position at schools, graduates of seldom-required degrees such as Dai-Chinese 
can no longer be sure to find jobs at schools. Additionally, especially jobs at village 
                                                     
265
 See Yunnan Nationalities University, Institute of Ethnic Cultures (2010). 
266
 According to one lecturer at the Xishuangbanna Vocational Technical College the Institute for Dai language 
requires a minimum of ten students per year (SC-13_2012-03-20). 
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schools are perceived as unattractive, despite the special benefits such as university fee 
exemptions (see chapter 4). Especially for children from Dai families, who on average 
have higher income than other local populations in Xishuangbanna (see above), become a 
teacher seem to be less promising than managing the family’s land. 
In bilingual teacher hiring policies governmental agencies similarly do not 
contribute to increase the pool of available bilingual teachers. Only a small number of 
graduates from bilingual education programs transferred to bilingual teaching positions. 
Of the Dai-Chinese vocational classes that started in 2003 and 2004, for example, only 
two out of approximately 40 students per year were in 2012 employed as teachers either 
at kindergartens or primary schools, according to one College Instructor (SC-13_2012-03-
20). All others either found Dai-related jobs at newspaper agencies or broadcasting 
stations or found jobs not related to Dai language or teaching at all. Even many of those 
graduates from this and from earlier Dai language teacher education programs who 
worked as teachers afterward did not teach Dai at the time of my interviews, but taught 
other subjects in Chinese.  
Both the termination of the Dai teacher education at Xishuangbanna’s College and 
the unattractiveness of employment at rural schools for graduates of the Dai language 
programs at Yunnan’s Nationalities University result in a scarcity of educational programs 
for minority language teacher education. With respect to the limited demand for minority 
language education at schools the Bureaus of Education are still able to find sufficient 
numbers of Dai teachers, but unless new teacher education programs will be started this 
sufficiency in Dai teachers is threatened. Educational Bureaus that singly aim at offering 
Dai language teacher education programs without having the means to increase the 
conditions for finding jobs or making bilingual teaching jobs more attractive face the risk 
of not producing the intended numbers of graduates. 
In-service teacher trainings for bilingual teachers as the third instrument to 
support education in minority languages have been much more employed than pre-
service teacher trainings. After the in-service training of teachers has been standardized 
and intensified (see chapter 3) bilingual in-service teacher training also increased over the 
last years.267 Although all levels from Yunnan Province to county governments run own 
programs for general teacher trainings, only the Bureaus of Yunnan Province, 
                                                     
267
 Training plans differ between professional groups (e.g. different classes for teachers and principals) and 
schedule the sequence of eligibility to trainings. Generally speaking, the order is the following: first come principals, 
followed by "backbone teachers" or "key teachers" (骨干教师), followed by class head teachers, and finally the subject 
teachers. This means that the eligibility to trainings rises with the level of management obligations. It means, however, 
also that those teachers who are already in relatively outstanding positions receive more trainings, whereas teachers at 
lower positions have less opportunities to improve through trainings. 
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Xishuangbanna Prefecture, and Jinghong City offer specific bilingual teacher trainings.268 
According to the respective officers (OF-01_2011-12-05; OF-13_2012-03-23) the Yunnan 
Bureau of Education organizes trainings in bilingual education for approximately 350 
teachers per year, and both the Xishuangbanna and the Jinghong Bureaus of Education 
for approximately 50 teachers each. Menghai used to offer trainings for bilingual teachers 
as well, but these activities terminated when the Xishuangbanna Bureau became more 
active in bilingual teacher trainings in 2008. The Bureau of Education initiated new 
teacher trainings especially after each time it ordered schools to change from teaching 
New Dai script to Old Dai script or the other way round (Xishuangbanna Bureau of 
Education 2010b). 
The various minority language trainings offer quite similar curricula. All trainings 
for bilingual teachers are grouped by languages and last for approximately five days 
during school holidays. The provincial level bilingual education trainings start with general 
seminars on education theory, before the participants split into different language groups. 
The prefecture and county trainings officially aim at all of Xishuangbanna’s minority 
languages, but in reality there is only training on Dai language available.269 
Different to other localities in China where bilingual teacher trainings aim at 
improving teachers’ Chinese knowledge 270  the bilingual teacher trainings in 
Xishuangbanna and Yunnan aim at improvements in the instruction of minority languages. 
Hence they contain elements such as bilingual education theory, linguistics of Dai or the 
other languages, as well as didactics how to teach these languages. Once new minority 
language textbooks come out the teacher trainings focus on how to teach these books. 
However, participants of Dai language teacher trainings told me also that the content of 
seminars is flexible to the teachers’ suggestions. The Xishuangbanna trainings in 2010 and 
2011, for example, included seminars on Dai computer font input software and Thai 
language linguistics, both on the participants’ demands (TE-29_20-05-07). Since according 
to interviewed teachers teacher trainings which are not related to minority languages are 
less flexible, the Educational Bureaus seem to use teacher training seminars as a tool to 
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 Seminars on minority language education are also conducted for other professionals than teachers. In 
2013 the bureau of Education and the bureaus for Ethnic Affairs in Yunnan and in Xishuangbanna conducted a six-day 
joint seminar for their officers and for broadcasting and newspaper professionals on Dai-Chinese bilingual education 
(Yunnan Bureau of Education 2013). 
269
 Of all teacher trainings for minority languages at prefecture, city, or county level there was only one 
training session on Hani language, and all others were exclusively on Dai language. Similarly, Xishuangbanna sends often 
Dai language teachers to the Yunnan bilingual teacher trainings, but only seldom Hani or Jinuo teachers. 
270
 All seminars that the Bureau of Education of Urumchi in Xinjiang offers under the title "bilingual teacher 
trainings", for example, aim at improving non-Han teacher's Chinese language skills. None of them aims at improving 
tuition of Uighur, Kazakh or Xinjiang's other non-Chinese languages (Wang, Chen 2012). 
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disseminate the latest regulations and textbooks, but beyond that the responsible offices 
give participants and instructors also discretion to decide on seminar content. 
Other forms of training for teachers that the Bureaus of Education organize are so 
called teacher competitions and school-based research. School based-research means 
here small-scale research conducted by teachers on research topics created by the 
Bureau of Education. According to my interview partners at the Bureaus of Education in 
Xishuangbanna some of these topics also include issues of language-related educational 
barriers for minority students. However, as research topics seem to be generally 
generated broad enough to be conducted at many schools there are no research topics 
specifically on minority language education. Teacher competitions, by contrast, often 
specifically aim at one subject. In these competitions teachers of different schools meet 
at one school in order to conduct model lessons with students of that school. The rewards 
affect promotions, similar to the training credit points. Nevertheless, several interviewed 
participants said that the opportunity to meet other Dai-language teachers is a more 
essential outcome of these competitions than the credentials. According to informants at 
the Bureaus of Education both the County/City Bureaus and the Prefecture Bureau 
conduct and fund such competitions yearly. 
Nevertheless, there are shortages of teacher trainings in minority languages. 
Firstly, teacher trainings are almost only offered for Dai language, whereas there is hardly 
any such training for Xishuangbanna’s other minority languages, although a training in 
bilingual didactics can also benefit education in languages without scripts, for instance by 
training awareness for students’ linguistic barriers or by training methods to use bilingual 
education orally. Secondly, not all of these educational programs enable teachers to 
teach Dai languages successfully. Both the Dai language programs at the Yunnan 
Nationalities University and Xishuangbanna’s College focus on Dai linguistics, but didactics 
how to teach minority languages are hardly included in the curriculum (Yunnan 
Nationalities University, Institute of Ethnic Cultures 2010). It is highly questionable if pre-
service and in-service teacher trainings of extremely limited scope enable teachers to 
teach minority languages sufficiently. Furthermore, despite the relatively high number of 
bilingually trained teachers the number of teachers who are actually employed and active 
in minority language teaching is much lower. Statistics claim that in 2005 there were 596 
teachers available for teaching minority languages in Xishuangbanna271, but merely 22 
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 The term used in statistics is “teachers qualified to teach bilingually” (能胜任双语教学的教师). 
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teachers were active in teaching Dai language in Jinghong and 65 in Menghai272 
(Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 2010b), which means that around 500 bilingually 
trained teachers merely teach Chinese language classes. 
Research and evolutional instruments 
Research and evaluations are the last type of instruments that shall be discussed 
here. They have been also used in Xishuangbanna’s minority language education, but not 
as intensive as in other subjects. The regular school evaluations by the Xishuangbanna 
Educational Bureaus that compare schools regularly exclude minority language education 
as they for comparative reasons focus on those subjects that are taught at all schools. 
Furthermore, even in those cases where inspection teams aim at visiting classes of all 
subjects that are taught at a given school they often leave out classes in minority 
languages because inspectors who themselves do not speak the respective language feel 
uneasy to evaluate instruction in this subject. 
In contrast, some inspections specifically aim at evaluating minority language 
school subjects. In interviews the officers for minority language education within the 
Bureaus of Education described “researching bilingual education” and “understanding the 
school situation” as part of their mission. Language barriers are less a problem for 
classroom evaluation here since the share of minority language speakers is higher in the 
offices responsible for minority languages in the Bureaus of Education than in other 
departments. However, detailed inspections of program implementation are irregular and 
depend on the individual officers in the Bureau. In some cases officers who were 
responsible for minority language education did not even know the number of schools 
that actually conduct bilingual education in their jurisdiction. Other officers, by contrast, 
keep close contacts to schools through individual visits. These visits, however, do not 
contain standardized evaluations, but are rather meetings, project planning, or 
discussions with teachers, as one officer explained (OF-12_2012-03-23). Officers in the 
Bureau of Education stated that individual contacts to teachers and principals, for 
example at the occasion of yearly teacher trainings or teacher competitions, are more 
important tools than school evaluations for the improvement of minority language 
education. 
Finally, external evaluations are another way of gaining information about policy 
implementation. Several research projects of various scale have been conducted on the 
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 The statistics lack in information about Mengla, but with respect to the low number of bilingual 
schools the County's number of active bilingual teacher can be expected to be even lower than that of 
Jinghong. 
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educational situation in Xishuangbanna with the support of local Bureaus of Education, 
some of them also on the situation of minority language education (see e.g. Hansen 1999; 
Zhao, Zhao 2010a; Luo 2011). The Minzu University in Beijing, for example, conducted a 
project on school-based textbooks in Xishuangbanna (see Editorial Board of "Yunnan 
Province Jinghong City Menghan Township Middle School School-Based Textbook" 2009. 
Although their impact on program design cannot be evaluated at this point, their direct 
feedback to schools seems to be very limited. Several school leaders said in my interviews 
that their schools have been visited by external scholars, but they also said that they 
hardly ever received feedback after these visits. 
In addition to evaluation instruments governments use informational tools also to 
propagate their perspectives on minority language education in Xishuangbanna. The 
journal “Xishuangbanna Education”, the (educational) yearbooks, and on-line information 
on government agencies’ web-pages are examples for tools to disseminate both 
information and official interpretations of minority language education projects in 
Xishuangbanna. Similarly, information tools also support agencies in inter-agency 
bargaining. Conferences on minority language education, for instance, supported the 
Yunnan Ethnic Affairs Commission to make an argument for their cause during bargaining 
with the Province Bureau of Education. Similarly, one can interpret proposals that 
individual delegates propose in the Consultative Conference or the People’s Congress as 
agenda setting, such as the one by Xishuangbanna’s delegate to the National Consultative 
Conference, Yi Paxin, who demands more minority language education (National 
Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference 2/9/2010). Although such 
proposals have no binding character to governmental agencies they remind other 
decision makers in the government of this issue. Additionally, local and provincial 
government agencies also conduct activities that are directed more to the non-academic 
and non-governmental public. Ceremonies and festivals such as the publically staged 
launch of a book about a local school in a Hani village in 2012 by the Hani Research 
Association, where politicians held speeches on the value of minority language education 
(Yang 2011), are means through which the Bureaus of Education conveys a generally 
positive image of minority languages.273 
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 Minority language education is often presented as contributing to raise student’s educational 
attainments, to keep control over students, and to generally “civilize” them. Many of Xishuangbanna’s 
official brochures, of the yearbooks on education in Xishuangbanna, and of the textbooks present happy 
students in clothing of different ethnic groups harmoniously together in a clean environment. All Dai 
textbooks produced by the Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education (e.g. Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 
2010b), for instance, show students in minority dresses who play or walk at green grass in front of their 
schools. 
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In sum, although the Bureaus of Education engage in disseminating information 
and propaganda about minority language education in Xishuangbanna, this type of 
education is only to minor degrees included in the evaluation system. Blachford (2004) 
concluded in her analysis of minority language policies in Xinjiang that there is a general 
lack of evaluation of policy implementation in the realm of language policies there. This 
counts also for minority language education in Xishuangbanna. Regular school evaluations 
exclude minority language education by default, which indicates a low political 
importance of these evaluations for policy makers. For school leaders and language 
instructors this has two consequences: firstly, they know that minority language 
education does not directly affect the official school ratings, and that their decisions in 
this subject arguably are less important for their own careers. Secondly, school leaders 
and instructors who want to get feedback on how to improve minority language 
education can rely only sporadically on contacts to the Bureau of Education, which might 
cause some school leaders and teachers to gain support from other sources, e.g. from 
peers at other school. Both issues will be discussed in depth in chapter 6. 
Tuition models, languages, and students 
With the above mentioned instruments minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna has been conducted in at least three models. The “pre-school mother-
tongue language education” (all model titles derive from interviews with officials in the 
Bureaus of Education, e.g. OF-01_2011-12-05) contains a head-start education in minority 
languages and aims especially at children with insufficient Chinese language skills. Dai is 
the language of instruction for grades pre-school one and two and grade one of primary 
school, but from grade two onwards the language of instruction switches slowly to 
Chinese. The “minority language as support tool” similarly uses minority languages to 
support students whose level of Chinese is insufficient to follow Chinese-only classes, but 
here the teacher merely occasionally uses minority languages in addition to Chinese, for 
instance to translate new Chinese terms into students’ mother tongues. “Heritage 
language education”, finally, teaches skills and knowledge in Xishuangbanna’s minority 
languages to students as a tool to transmit cultural knowledge to future generations and 
to secure the survival of minority languages amid an increasingly Chinese language 
environment. This type contains classes on minority languages and scripts for students of 
older ages, typically in fourth and fifth grade. It follows rather the pattern of continuous 
parallel tuition, contains Dai language education for merely very few hours per week, and 
normally does not affect the language of instruction in the core subjects, which are 
further conducted in Chinese. In some schools students are segregated into bilingual 
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classes for ethnic Dai students and Chinese-only language classes for students of all other 
ethnic groups.274 
These models are based on combinations of different “ideological frameworks” of 
bilingual education (see chapter 2). Some models aim at one-way monoglossic language 
usage where minority language speakers become fluent in Chinese language and Chinese 
language speakers don’t have to learn minority languages, but others schedule also Han 
students to learn Dai. Although tuition models such as the “Pre-school mother-tongue 
language education” under the “Dai Chinese bilingual experimental program” train Dai 
language skills among students also excessively and students leave these classes with 
skills in Dai language, bilingual education is seen either as a tool to learn Chinese or as a 
subject of additional knowledge, but the overarching goal is not to shift education 
towards Dai. The linguistic orientations of the conducted models, finally, are similarly 
diverse. In the transitional models of “pre-school bilingual education” and the “minority 
language as a support tool” students’ home languages are used as tools, but the main 
perception of students’ language skills is that of a problematic lack of Chinese skills. In the 
“heritage model”, by contrast, knowledge in minority languages is defined as goal and the 
linguistic knowledge that students have already from home education is seen as an asset. 
The cultural ecology that these models aim at, finally, is similarly diversified. On the one 
side minorities are expected to assimilate into what is considered the mainstream culture. 
On the other side there are attempts to create what García calls a “transcultural ecology”, 
that is a society that sees a value in multicultural environments, for instance when 
textbooks describe the ethnic diversity of Xishuangbanna as an asset for the whole 
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 Segregating students according to ethnicity and mother tongue languages has been practiced in 
Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and other regions for decades, and included not only the establishment of “ethnic 
schools”, but also ethnic classes in inland China for ethnic minorities (Tsung 2009; Jiang 2002; Postiglione 
2007). Teng and Wang (2009, p. 261) define ethnic schools as “educational institutions in multi-ethnic 
countries that are erected in ethnic minority regions or that serve mainly ethnic minorities. They teach the 
culture of the mainstream society as well as that of the ethnic minority society in goal-driven, planed, and 
organized ways in order to achieve training of talents that a society needs.” Joint schools, by contrast are 
defined as “educational and social institutions that are installed in ethnically mixed areas according to 
ethnic composition and the situation of use of languages and writing systems. These schools conduct tuition 
in minority languages and in Chinese language in different classes but in one united school” (Teng, Wang 
2009, p. 269). Recently, ethnically segregated schools have been merged into joint schools under the goal of 
strengthening "ethnic unity" and improving minority students’ educational attainments (Mujiapaer, Yimiti 
2006). In 1999 then-president Jiang Zemin said famously that minorities and Han Chinese educationally 
“cannot be separated” (离不开, cited in Teng, Wang 2009, p. 272). In Xishuangbanna, school mergers have 
added to the high level of heterogeneity of students. Roughly half of the schools that I observed during my 
research had non-Dai students in Dai language classes. A small number of these children voluntarily opted 
to visit the Dai language class instead of regular only-Han-Chinese class, but the majority of non-Dai 
speaking students were involuntary visitors to classes that teach a language foreign to them (see discussion 
of parents’ opinions on these arrangements below). 
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population (e.g. Editorial Board of "Yunnan Province Jinghong City Menghan Township 
Middle School School-Based Textbook" 2009). 
However, despite these differences in models the above outlined findings indicate 
three trends in minority language education in Xishuangbanna. Firstly, there is a major 
hierarchy in serving the different languages. Chinese as the language of teacher education, 
textbooks, classroom tuition, and evaluation is positioned at the top of this hierarchy. 
Among the minority languages that are taught at schools Dai language clearly is the 
leading minority language, in many cases the only one at schools, colleges, and 
kindergartens. Hani language education has been merely conducted outside schools, and 
teacher trainings in that language have been similarly few. In Bulang language there have 
been some few experiments conducted, but overall this bilingual education has not been 
propagated since several years. All other mother-tongue languages that are spoken by 
Xishuangbanna’s population have been completely ignored by minority language 
education, which not only reflects the low standing of these languages in current 
language engineering projects, but also reflects the approach that minority language 
education is merely in those autonomous regions propagated and promoted where the 
respective ethnic group is in majority or where it holds the officially designated autonomy 
status. 
Secondly, although the number of students who received bilingual education in 
Dai language experienced ups and downs from the 1980s until today almost every year 
between 5 and 10 percent of all students in Xishuangbanna sat in Dai language classes 
and between 10 and 20 percent of all students went at some point of their formal 
educational career for at least one year through Dai language tuition (see Table 17). 
According to one official there are non-published plans that schedule even an increase of 
the number of students (OF-01_2011-12-05). Although there has been a slightly negative 
overall trend over the last 30 years, recent extension of experimental programs (e.g. the 
“Dai bilingual experimental program” that was expended in 2010 from five to ten schools) 
and the above mentioned plans might indicate that minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna will not be terminated in the near future, but will rather continue to stay 
on a low level. 
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 1984 1993 2005 2010 2012 2015 
Number of 
students 
8,744 8,810 5,381 8,184 5000 
(estimation) 
8,000 
(target) 
Percentage of 
students 
10.88 % 9.27 % 5.66 % 9.27 % 5.63 % 
(estimation) 
- 
Table 17: Students who received Dai language education at schools in Xishuangbanna. Source: Number of 
students: Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education (2010b, pp. 214–217). Data for 2012: Estimation by 
informant in the Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education (OF-01_2011-12-05). Data for 2015: Unpublished plan, 
data by informant in the Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education. Value for Percentages: own calculation based 
on overall student numbers provided in Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education (2010b, pp. 214–217), for 
caveats concerning quality of official statistics refer to remarks in introductory chapter of this thesis. 
Thirdly, minority language education in Xishuangbanna is conducted mostly at 
rural schools with high shares of ethnic Dai students. Although there is a lack in specific 
statistics on the issue of who sits in minority language classes in Xishuangbanna, one can 
deduce information firstly from overall data on the schools that offer minority language 
classes and secondly from studies made in other regions in China. Although aggregated 
data on ethnicity cannot reflect every individual student275 findings indicate that students 
in minority language classes are in majority of non-Han ethnicity and that their parents’ 
have lower educational attainment levels.276 As in Xishuangbanna’s primary schools, 
similar to other regions in China (see Wu, Zhang 2010; Hannum et al. 2009), the gender 
gap has reduced over the last years (Editorial Committee of Xishuangbanna Yearbook 
2013) bilingual classes in elementary schools in Xishuangbanna can be expected to be 
visited to similar degrees by boys and girls. In the financial status of the families not only 
children of families below the prefectural average income receive minority language 
education as in many other regions in China (compare with chapter 4), but also children 
of comparatively wealthy Dai families (see detailed analysis of family background at case 
study schools in the next chapter). 
5.3 Summary of chapter 
In this chapter I have outlined an overview on the geographical, social, and 
linguistic characteristics of the multiethnic and multilingual case study region at the 
Southwestern tip of China and I have presented in detail its current situation of ethnic 
minority language education. With this I have indicated that many of the regions’ 
characteristics in terms of language policy are reflected in its education in minority 
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 Accuracy of aggregated data on student characteristics is limited by several issues. Socio-
economic characteristics vary extremely within ethnic groups and should be seen in combination with other 
factors, such as income, locality, or gender (Gustafsson, Sai 2009a, 2009b). 
276
 Both the non-Han population of Xishuangbanna and the rural Han-migrant workers at 
Xishuangbanna’s farms have on average lower levels of formal education. Furthermore, parents with higher 
educational levels and especially teachers try to send their children not to the local schools, but make sure 
that their children attend better and bigger schools in the county seats (see also Bulag 2010, p. 275). Since 
bilingual education is hardly ever conducted at the latter ones, educational elite children are less likely to be 
instructed bilingually. 
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languages at schools. Firstly, the preference of Chinese language over minority languages 
in most public domains in Xishuangbanna is reflected in the overwhelmingly stronger 
position of Chinese in all school subjects here. Secondly, at the same time, the emphasis 
of the regional government as representatives of a multiethnic region has resulted in 
programs for Dai language education at schools that comprise diverse instruments such 
textbook editing, experimental school projects, or teacher trainings. Thirdly, the fact that 
this support for Dai language is stronger than that for the region’s other ethnic minority 
languages reflects also the historically stronger position of ethnic Dai in the official Dai 
Autonomous Prefecture. 
With this reflection of the social, political, and linguistic situation of 
Xishuangbanna in its minority language education the programs and the tuition of 
minority languages in this region are quite unique. However, at the same time, 
Xishuangbanna’s ethnic minority language education features also many of the 
phenomena that have been discussed in chapter 4 as general trends of minority language 
education in China. The focus of minority language education on early years of schooling 
the models that schedule a shift from tuition in minority languages to Chinese tuition 
within primary schooling, the general decrease of bilingual education especially in 
secondary education, and the “experimental mode” of bilingual education have been 
reported from all over China, and Xishuangbanna seems to be no exception. 
What is interesting here, however, is the intensive variety of bilingual education 
within the Prefecture. Not only are there differences between the Counties and between 
the programs for specific languages, but even within one county and within student 
populations of one heritage language analysis has shown differences for instance in 
tuition models, textbook availability, funding, and the numbers of teachers active in 
minority language teaching. In the next chapter I will reflect further on this variety, when I 
will discuss how school staff in Xishuangbanna makes decisions under various institutional 
settings for minority language education.  
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6 Case study: implementation decisions at schools in 
Xishuangbanna 
Minority language education at school can only be implemented within the 
specific educational and institutional settings of a given school. As has been discussed in 
chapter 2 factors such as the student population or the linguistic environment are the 
basis for minority language education, but the institutional settings of school 
management further widen or limit the space for such education. In this chapter I will 
investigate into how institutional settings unfold effects on various elements of tuition, 
which might even trigger a complete stop of minority language tuition altogether. I will 
here define the institutional settings that surround minority language education as 
independent variable and school personnel’s behavior concerning minority language 
curriculum as dependent variable. 
In the first part of this chapter I will provide an overview of the institutional spaces 
for school-based decision making on minority language education in Xishuangbanna. After 
presenting institutional spaces and limits I will analyze which areas of decision making are 
affected by these institutions, before in the last paragraphs of this part I will create a 
broad typology of institutional settings for minority language education at schools, 
divided into three categories. In order to elaborate these categories I will analyze here a 
larger number of schools that I have visited in Xishuangbanna.277 
These broad categories will be represented by three case study schools in the 
second part of this chapter, where I will introduce firstly to the schools’ general 
characteristics in terms of location, educational attainments of students, languages used, 
administrative status, and staff situation, before I will secondly specifically elaborate on 
the contrasting institutional spaces for minority language education at each school. 
In the third part of this chapter I will analyze and compare the decisions of school 
personnel at these three case study schools. This part will be based on interviews with 
personnel at the three schools and on observations that I made at the schools. 
Additionally and for contrastive purposes, I will here also refer to observations and 
interviews from a few other visited schools in Xishuangbanna. In this part I will focus on 
the behavior of principals and teachers in the implementation process and on the effects 
that their decisions have on minority language policy implementation. Three processes in 
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 I will refer to the visited educational facilities with numbers from 1 to 33, as shown in the 
appendix. Additionally, however, I will refer to the three case study schools that will be intensively 
discussed later with three pseudonyms that I have created with reference to Xishuangbanna’s practices of 
naming places as Mengyi, Menger, and Mengsan (see remarks on these pseudonyms in introductory 
chapter). 
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decision making will be especially outlined: interpreting spaces, making use of spaces, and 
making decisions. In a summary I will conclude this chapter with a pointed discussion on 
the effects of institutional settings on decision making strategies at the three types of 
settings at the observed schools. 
6.1 Institutional spaces for school-based decisions in Xishuangbanna 
The above described diversity of models and outcomes in Xishuangbanna’s minority 
language tuition is closely related to school-based decisions making on curriculum. In the 
following paragraphs I will thus firstly outline the specific institutionally provided spaces 
and limits for school-based decision making on minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna. Secondly, I will provide an overview on decision making areas and 
decisions that have been mentioned by my interview partners during fieldwork visits at 
numerous schools in Xishuangbanna. Based on this I will thirdly develop a typology of 
three different types of schools defined by institutional settings for school-based decision 
making on minority languages. These three types will form the basis for the selection of 
three case study schools in the next sub-chapter, where I will discuss the effects of 
institutional settings on processes and perceptions of school-based decision making. 
6.1.1 Institutional spaces and limits 
The policy instruments and institutional settings described above provide a specific 
space for school-based decision making on issues of minority language education. In 
chapter 3 three types of institutional settings have been elaborated that shape the space 
and the limits for curriculum decision making at Chinese schools: firstly, societal norms on 
teachers’ roles; secondly, the modes of resource allocation and program participation; 
and thirdly, organizational structures of school, personnel, and curriculum management. 
Institutional settings in all three types resemble those on curriculum decision making on 
other school subjects at Chinese schools, but there are also specific differences. 
Norms of teacher behavior between state and local community 
As I have outlined in chapter 3 the multiple roles of teachers in China between 
autonomous moral leaders and representatives of the state widen the space for 
discretionary decision making of school personnel, but at the same time they also limit it. 
On the one hand teachers, and especially those in ethnic minority areas, are defined by 
their position as state representatives, as for instance the accounts of Han teachers show, 
who have been sent to build up a school in Nannuoshan, a Hani village in Xishuangbanna 
in the early years of the People’s Republic. In expressions such as “the villagers cultural 
level was very low” and “we had difficulties of bringing local students to school“ (Zhou 
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2011a, pp. 117–118) indicate the perceived teacher responsibility to bring knowledge to 
the villages. As this knowledge is expressed in the nationally unified curriculum there 
seems to be no space for local diversity as departure from that knowledge. 
Additionally, villagers view teachers, especially transferred Han teachers, as 
representatives of a state that is far away. One teacher describes in these memories the 
first days when she as a Han teacher was transferred to the newly opened school: 
“The first cohort of students in 1955 was a little bit older. […] Some of these older students said to 
me: ‘On our way to school the village head told us, when the Han teachers beat us, we can beat 
them back’” (Zhang 2011a, p. 146). 
In her text the teacher goes on to describe how much effort it did cost her to 
establish trust between the teachers and the students. One of her colleagues of that time 
remembers how they used games such as basketball to attract students and how they 
invited the villagers’ elderly to take part in class to reduce the tensions (Zhou 2011a, 
p. 120). These examples illustrate the special role that teachers have as representatives of 
the state not only in the eyes of their employers, but also in the eyes of the village 
population. 
This role of representatives of the state, however, is not always connected with 
representatives of the CCP. As teachers described their own roles at schools they often 
referred to ethnic belonging, their professional status as educated teacher, and their 
position in the school system, but hardly ever as party member. Nevertheless, and 
although “ideological work” is rather in the realm of the schools’ CCP branch secretaries 
and tuition decisions are separated from this role, especially at small schools where the 
principals often also have the position of CCP branch secretaries principals might not 
distinguish between school administrator and party ideology, so that in this case they are 
representatives of both state and party.  
In contrast, teachers of the same ethnicity as the villagers, and arguably particularly 
those teachers who teach minority languages, also fulfill a role of representatives of 
ethnic and linguistic groups in the predominantly ethnically Han school system and the 
role of preservers of minority culture and languages in a linguistically Chinese school 
environment. Within these roles teachers are expected to make discretionary decisions 
based on their own beliefs and that of their community. In a plan for future development 
of bilingual education at one school teachers and principals of that school define teachers 
as central to represent minority culture: 
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“The basis to establish a school with special characteristics is […] to educate and train teachers in 
order to develop their ethnic consciousness, to raise their cultural awareness, and to make them 
grasp the use of ethnic culture.”
278
 
The local community sometimes also sees ethnic minority teachers as community 
representatives. Students and their families generally know the ethnicity of the local 
teachers, and they know if these teachers grew up within the community or moved in 
from outside. Especially to those with local roots, interviewed parents referred to as “one 
of us”, either in the sense that these teachers have succeeded in a career and are thus 
role models for the community or in that they represent the community at school. Several 
Dai teachers, for instance those at the schools no. 17, no. 4, and no. 11 told me, that 
members of the local community have approached them to receive either support in 
translations of text in Dai script to Chinese or to conduct extra-curricular private classes in 
Dai language for adults. Although all of these classes have terminated after a short time, 
they nevertheless exemplify that the local community at many schools has established 
norms that define ethnic minority teachers as representatives not only of the village 
community, but also of the language group. Minority language teachers, who in large 
majority are members of the local ethnic groups, are thus entangled with two competing 
roles, one demanding loyalty to employers, and the other demanding loyalty to the local 
communities. 
The behavior of parents and students who speak non-Chinese languages at home 
towards teachers indicates this double position of teachers. On the one side, students 
have described their contacts to teachers as especially close when teachers speak their 
own mother tongue. Yao language speaking students in school no. 7, for instance, said 
that when they were little and when their Chinese was not that well developed they went 
especially to Yao teachers to solve problems with schooling, as they felt these teachers 
would better understand them (TE-10_ST-04_2012-01-06). Similarly, teachers often 
described that those teachers who speak the language of the children and their parents 
have closer contacts to both. In this respect, ethnic status and language skills are 
perceived as a tool for special connection between students and teachers. 
On the other side, however, parents and students hardly ever raise specific demands 
concerning minority language education towards teachers. All of the mentioned examples 
where parents approached Dai teachers to gain Dai language education targeted adult 
tuition outside regular school classes. Concerning Dai education in schools, by contrast, 
teachers at all visited schools said that parents hardly ever raise any demands on Dai 
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 Source: Document “Establish the special characteristics of ethnic cultural education. Build up an 
outstanding bilingual school” (September 15, 2011). 
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education. In parent meetings, for instance, parents do ask teachers for advice on how to 
raise students’ educational attainments in general schooling, or they request teachers to 
more harshly discipline the children (TE-22_2012-03-05), but none of the interviewed 
teachers said that parents have similar demands on Dai language education. The finding 
presented in chapter 5 that ethnic minority parents in Xishuangbanna generally are in 
favor of minority language education, but their affective language attitudes only seldom 
translate into behavioral language attitudes such as raising political demands or choosing 
schools based on languages can also be attributed to the relation between school staff 
and parental demands. Parents generally know that Dai language only plays a limited role 
in schooling, that their children are requested to pass exams in Chinese, and that the job 
market requires competition in Chinese language. Referring to Hani language in school 
one mother said: “This is an ethnic minority area. It’s better if they speak Chinese in 
school.” She explained that the schools are the only chance for village children to learn 
Chinese (FA-01_ST-07_2012-02-13). However, despite these sometimes critical voices 
towards Dai or Hani language in school, none of the interviewed parents recalled cases 
where they actively went to the school staff to ask for less tuition in minority languages. 
Even Han parents who complained to me about Dai language courses (FA-09_2012-01-01) 
have not carried their complaints to schools. The perception of school staff as experts and 
as officials, whose authority over educational matters cannot be questioned, seems to 
have prevented such actions. 
In effect, the double role of ethnic minority language teachers between state 
representatives and members of the local community builds up norms for behavior of 
these special street-level bureaucrats at school level. At the same time, however, the lack 
of parents’ and students’ specific requests towards minority language education leaves 
also space to modify this role. 
Modes of resource allocation and program participation 
After the abolishment of study fees taking part in specific minority language 
education programs is a major source for schools to gain resources in terms of tuition 
materials or teacher trainings. In order to gain trainings for minority language teachers 
and to gain the regular prefecture-wide textbooks for usage in class it suffices for schools 
to be registered on lists at the county or prefecture Bureau of Education. However, 
trainings by the arguably more prestigious “Dai-Chinese Experimental Program”, which 
involve extensive trainings, development of new materials together with foreign experts, 
and generally an increase in media attention (see program descriptions in chapter 5), 
requires to be selected by provincial and local Bureaus of Education. For the “Yunnan 
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Provincial Bilingual Experimentation Schools Program”, which brings about 30,000 RMB to 
pilot schools to be spent on their discretion, being selected as pilot school depends on 
introduction by local Bureaus of Education or the Yunnan Provincial Committee of 
Guidance Work for Minority Languages and Literature. Taken together, the pilot-based 
approach of minority language education experiments triggers dependency of schools on 
Bureaus of Education and external actors, for instance social organizations, and thus 
limits the space for discretionary decision making at schools. 
However, there are major differences in how the programs connect resource 
allocation with instructional decision making. The “Dai-Chinese Bilingual Education 
Experimental Program”, for instance, interferes considerably with schools’ decision 
making on instruction, as it demands schools to implement specific methods, timetables, 
and teaching materials. On the other side, teachers in this program have been involved in 
writing textbooks and in deciding about the use of materials and the selection of content 
for each lesson. The “Yunnan Provincial Bilingual Experimentation Schools”, by contrast, 
does not involve any teacher participation with program development, and it also does 
not interfere with methods or content, as it merely provides school equipment according 
to the schools’ demands. The prefecture-based program for minority language education, 
finally, provides textbooks and limited teacher trainings, but in light of the lack of 
mandatory teacher handbooks or standardized evaluations this program similarly merely 
provides support, but leaves considerable space for school-based decisions on how to 
make use of this support. 
Management of school, personnel, and curriculum 
Both internal and external organizational structures of school, personnel, and 
curriculum management open up and at the same time limit the spaces for school-based 
decision making on minority languages in Xishuangbanna’s schools. In terms of internal 
management schools have much discretion to organize staff groups and to assign 
responsibilities between these groups. The diversity of organizational structures between 
schools indicates this discretion. 
The space defined by the scope of evaluations of personnel is split between large 
discretion in internal evaluations and small discretion in external evaluations. Internally, 
schools can organize the scope, the frequency, and the criteria for assessment procedures. 
As has been elaborated in chapter 3, localities and schools in China vary in the criteria and 
the mechanisms used for evaluations. Concerning minority language education 
particularly self-evaluation and peer-evaluation as the most localized modes of evaluation 
systems depend on teachers’ own beliefs and preferences. Self-evaluation in minority 
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language education cannot rely as much as in other subjects on calibrating one’s own 
planned and delivered curriculum according to teacher handbooks, textbooks, and other 
curriculum prescriptions, due to Xishuangbanna’s lack of such handbooks for minority 
language tuition. Peer-evaluations face similar issues when teachers are required to 
analyze their colleagues’ lessons without clear guidelines. On the one side, this may 
provide difficulties for both types of assessments, but on the other side it considerably 
widens the space for school-based decision making when teachers develop their own 
assessment criteria and modes. 
External evaluations, by contrast, limit the space of school-based decisions on 
minority language education in Xishuangbanna considerably. Since external evaluators 
often lack Dai language skills they often do not even visit Dai language classes, as several 
teachers told me. More importantly for teachers is the finding that school evaluations and 
personnel evaluations also only rarely cover minority languages. In Xishuangbanna 
neither the large-scale tables of individual and irregular “Educational Quality 
Examinations”, nor the prefecture-wide or county-wide tables of the grades of graduate 
students (e.g. the “Primary Student Graduation Examination”) include items of minority 
language education (see next sub-chapter). 
However, as has been outlined above in detail, even the Bureau of Translation and 
Editing of Chinese-Ethnic Teaching Materials as Xishuangbanna’s best staffed office for 
minority language education is limited in its grip over schools. Firstly, this office, similar to 
its smaller counterparts at county level, is separated from the Office for Basic Education 
and the Bureau for Human Resources, which hold schools and school staff responsible. It 
has thus no authority or resources to reward successful schools or to sanction non-
cooperating schools. Secondly, officers in this Bureau lack the overview on minority 
language education at individual schools since their resources are mainly to be spent on 
producing textbooks, not on research on individual schools. Both caveats open up spaces 
for school-based decisions, for instance on decisions concerning the use of resources 
provided by the Bureau or the actual implementation of curriculum. 
On the one side this blindness of external evaluations towards minority language 
education limits schools’ discretionary spaces. In times when ideas of reformed school 
management encourage schools to make local and school-based decisions only under 
simultaneously increased accountability, minority language education faces the risk that 
unobservable decisions might be seen as irregular or even counterproductive. Schools 
might thus be pressured to keep the profile of minority language education subjects low 
and to invest less time and energy here. 
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On the other side, however, this lack of evaluation mechanisms also creates spaces 
for school-based decisions. Once teachers know that their decisions will not be evaluated 
and that they are free to follow their own criteria of good tuition (see discussion of 
teachers’ preferences in the next chapter), schools have gained a large piece of autonomy 
in making decisions on their own affairs. Especially when the necessities of actual 
teaching demand tuition in minority languages, for instance when children do not 
understand tuition in Chinese, the external evaluations focus on outcomes rather than on 
tuition increases this space further.  
Flexible spaces 
In sum, institutional settings of the three areas have large effects on the space for 
school-based decision making. Some settings limit the space for school-based decision 
making, such as requirements towards teachers to represent the state, resource 
dependency on programs, and evaluation criteria that demand performance in 
assessment-relevant subjects. Other settings, however, widen the space for school-based 
decision making on these subjects, such as low interference of program designs with 
instruction decisions or the absence of evaluation criteria for minority language education. 
Taken together, these institutional settings are united by a degree of flexibility that 
is larger than that in other school subjects in China. In chapter 3 I have specified that the 
space for school-based discretionary decision making in China is one of temporary 
delegation of decisions to schools rather than of fixed autonomy, and that this space is 
shaped by vague and unclear institutional boundaries. Compared to the nationally unified 
subjects this is especially true for minority language education. Institutional settings for 
minority language education in Xishuangbanna are characterized by a continuous 
swinging between enabling and limiting discretion. This mode creates flexibility, but it 
also demands interpretation by school personal in arguably more decisions than in other 
subjects. In the next paragraphs I will introduce some examples of decisions made on 
minority language education at schools in Xishuangbanna. 
6.1.2 Areas of decision making 
Based on King and Guerra’s (2005) definition of the “locus” of decision making on 
educational matters (see chapter 3), curriculum decisions on minority language education 
in Xishuangbanna’s schools can be distinguished into those made by government and 
those made by schools. Table 18 shows a non-exhaustive list of decisions in the areas 
resource allocation, personnel management, and instructional matters. This table is not 
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meant as a comprehensive catalogue of decisions, but as a selection of issues that either I 
have observed during school visits or that interview partners mentioned. 
Decision area Decisions Locus  
Resource allocation 
application 
 
applying for resources  a, b 
approaching external donors a, b 
allocation selecting pilot schools a 
allocating funds to school a, b 
budget spending resources a, b 
Personnel management 
assignment assigning staff a, b 
evaluation evaluating staff internally b 
evaluating staff externally a 
employment hiring teachers and principals a 
rewards defining salaries and rewards a, b 
announcing results of teaching competitions at schools b 
training 
 
organizing teacher competitions a 
sending teachers to competitions and trainings a, b 
undertaking research projects a, b 
Instructional matters 
course content defining class content a, b 
exams 
 
defining class requirements b 
assigning and evaluating exams a, b 
defining student rewards b 
students 
 
assigning classrooms b 
assigning students to classes b 
grouping students in classrooms and dormitories b 
assigning students to live at home or to board at school b 
instruction time timetabling b 
language 
 
choosing language in class a, b 
choosing language at the school ground a, b 
choosing language for signage and announcements at school a, b 
methods preparing lessons a, b 
assigning and evaluating homework a, b 
support activities decorating school buildings and classrooms b 
organizing student excursions to study local culture b 
inviting externals to lecture at school b 
teaching materials writing textbooks a, b 
publishing textbooks a 
using textbooks b 
handing out textbooks b 
publishing teacher handbooks a, b 
using teacher handbooks b 
Table 18: Table: Locus of selected key decisions on minority language education in Xishuangbanna. Note: 
“Locus” refers to: a: government (central and local, represented e.g. by Bureau of Education) or b: school 
(principals, administrative school staff, teachers). 
Resource management 
The area of decisions on resource allocation, application, and spending is much 
dominated by government responsibilities. According to interviewed principals, schools 
that have been chosen as pilot schools for program implementations schools are 
generally required to participate and can hardly reject cooperation (PR-12_2012-01-17; 
PR-16_2012-03-01; PR-12_PR-18_2013-05-10). On the other side, however, some of my 
case study schools have also been active in applying for resources to spend on minority 
language education. Principals at the central school no. 9, together with the principal of 
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the branch school Menger, for instance, received grants of about 30,000 RMB to purchase 
educational equipment after application with the Yunnan Bureau of Education. 
Personnel management 
Personnel management is similarly dominated by government activities. None of the 
schools that I have visited hired teachers specifically for minority language on a school-
based system. All so-called “substitute teachers” were employed for subjects such as 
math, Chinese, or English, but not for minority language education. In terms of teacher 
evaluation, teacher trainings, and assignment to classes, however, school staff is able to 
make considerable decisions on a school-based level. Assigning teachers to classes is a 
school-internal decision, made by staff assembly and administrative staff within the 
schools, and teachers can informally raise wishes. 
The question if minority language education is included in teacher evaluations 
similarly depends on both the schools’ internal administration and on external 
arrangements. External evaluation is much in the hands of the Bureaus of Education, for 
instance the decision if minority language education will be included into the evaluation 
process, but internal evaluations are within the discretion of the school. One school 
leader, for example, explained that he has the authority to decide if at his school there 
will be special minority language teacher groups installed for supervision (PR-17_TE-
14_TE-28_2013-05-06). However, the majority of the observed schools with minority 
language education decided to not establish specific internal evaluation mechanisms for 
minority language tuition.  
Decisions if teachers will receive training in minority languages depend on both 
government and schools. Although the decisions on the overall number of training 
vacancies for schools is made by the Bureau of Education, and although principals told me 
that they have to follow lists provided by the Bureaus, the specific decision of who goes 
to these trainings relies on the school staff. Among the three Dai language teachers at 
Menger, for instance, only two have been to minority language trainings, whereas the 
school leaders decided to not send the third soon-to-be-retired teacher. At school no. 5 
teachers did not fulfill the vacant training positions, as the school lacks staff to 
compensate for teachers on training. As one teacher told me (TE-02_2013-05-17) the 
decision to not go was there jointly made by the teachers and the school leaders. 
Responsibility to decide on handing out rewards for well-performing staff is split 
between the Bureaus of Human Resources, the Bureaus of Education, and the schools. 
The government agencies define the additional benefits for teachers in so called “remote 
areas”, whereas schools can determine the share of school-based performance-related 
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rewards. At Menger, for instance, school leaders decided to acknowledge teachers’ 
performance in Dai language teaching competitions as a factor to determine teacher 
benefits. They also announce the results of these competitions among their staff. 
According to one principal at this school (PR-12_PR-18_2013-05-10) school leaders have 
the discretion to decide not only on what will be rewarded, but also on the amounts of 
rewards. 
Instructional matters 
Decisions on instructional matters are much more made by schools than the 
previous discussed decisions of resource allocation and personnel management. 
Decisions on course content and methods are partly prescribed by textbooks, but the 
usage of textbooks in class differs between schools. One school, for instance, decided to 
not hand out Dai textbooks for students to take home, since school staff feared students 
might lose the books, but instead to collect books after each class (no. 4), whereas the 
large majority of schools gave these books to students without request to return the 
books even after students graduated.  
Furthermore, teachers also constantly make decisions on what to teach and how to 
adjust teaching to their class. Dai language teachers at all observed schools decided on 
the amount of homework they prescribe and the methods they choose. One teacher said 
that in her Dai class it is mostly herself who decides on the content and methods of 
tuition. She said that she finds singing Dai songs a much more valuable source for tuition 
than the elsewhere more trained reading, writing, and copying of Dai characters, and that 
she consequentially uses approximately 50 percent of class time for songs (TE-29_2013-
05-07). Another teacher, who also found teaching songs in the diverse languages of 
Xishuangbanna to be of much use for students, by contrast, hesitated to base her tuition 
on these songs, since she feared that other teachers at school might find this 
inappropriate (TE-02_2013-05-17). Despite the differences in outcome, decisions on 
methods were in both cases made within the school and by the individual teacher, but 
not by the Bureaus of Education. 
Exams and rewards for students are partly affected by decisions by the Bureau of 
Education and partly by decisions of school personnel. The decision to conduct Dai exams 
at pre-school level in Mengla County was made within the government, but both the 
decisions to include Dai language in students’ report cards and the decision to count Dai 
language class results for calculating student rewards were made at school level. At 
Menger, for instance, student report cards by default list Dai language grades, whereas in 
school no. 22 the Dai teacher has to ask the students’ class teachers individually to have 
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the grades of her Dai courses listed on students’ report cards (TE-29_2013-05-07). 
Similarly, as one principal at Menger explained, her school used its discretion to reward 
the approximately 15 percent best-performing students in all subjects, including Dai, with 
a financial reward of 10 RMB per semester, whereas other schools, and especially those 
with less regular minority language education, do not include minority languages to these 
performance-related rewards. 
Decisions on grouping students into classes, courses, and dormitories are much left 
to the schools’ discretion. As will be discussed in the next chapter in detail schools differ 
in arrangement of students to linguistically heterogeneous and homogenous classes. They 
have the authority to decide on this issue. Similarly, in the matter of assigning students to 
dormitories schools use different practices. In Menger, for instance, students can choose 
their dormitory partners, but in other schools teachers will assign who will reside with 
whom in one room, which might have effects on ethnic consciousness and language 
learning of students. In terms of assigning classes to specific classrooms schools also 
enjoy discretion. In several schools that I have visited Dai language is conducted in the 
newest and best equipped buildings (e.g. school no. 17 and Mengyi), whereas other 
schools do not distinguish class room quality by minority language education (e.g. school 
no. 4). 
Schools also largely decide on organizing additional support activities for students, 
such as excursions to local sights or invitations to local handcraft experts. Although not 
directly related to minority language education, these activities can potentially also be 
used to support minority language education, for instance by inviting scholars to lecture 
on Dai language. School no. 17, for instance, has installed a small museum room for 
traditional Dai farming and handcraft. According to the teachers especially minority 
language classes use this room also as additional classroom, where students learn 
minority languages in a classroom environment that teachers perceive as showing local 
culture.  
Finally, decisions on the rules of language use on the school ground are made both 
by government and by schools. On the one side schools are required to promote the 
national language Chinese and to make this language the official language at the school 
ground, for instance in public announcements. On the other side, schools are free to add 
minority languages to public announcements and to establish additional regulations 
concerning languages used in the contacts between staff and students. Even in the choice 
of languages within class teachers enjoy certain discretion. Teachers at one school 
(Menger) said that they decide themselves on the amount of Dai language they use in 
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class and that neither school leaders nor administrators from the Bureau of Education 
inspect this share. Similarly, Dai teachers can decide which of the several Dai varieties 
they use in class. Several teachers told me that in theory they intend to educate students 
in the standard Jinghong Dai variety, but in practice their teaching focuses on the local 
variety of Dai, in order to build up on students’ previous knowledge (TE-29_2013-05-07; 
TE-25_2013-05-01). 
Diversity in decision making locus 
In sum, this differentiation of decision making between school-based and 
government-based decisions indicates three findings. Firstly, school-based decisions are 
found mostly in the area of instructional matters. However, schools also have a say in 
personnel management and resource management, and government also interferes with 
instructional matters. This mix of responsibilities between areas reflects the situation in 
regular curriculum management that has been described in chapter 3. 
Secondly, many decisions are made under unclear or shared responsibilities.279 
Decision making under frameworks of consultation has been reported for general 
curriculum management as well, but in the case of minority language education the 
unregulated mode of decision making seems to be more prevalent. The lack of 
regulations, the lack of superiors’ knowledge, and the low role of minority language 
education in evaluations are institutional settings that provide more spaces for school-
based decisions on minority language education than for other subjects. 
Thirdly, schools vary in the locus of decision making and in the outcomes of 
decisions. Differences can not only be found in the materialization of tuition decisions, 
but also in the locus of decisions, for instance when at some schools decisions about 
curriculum content are made by the teachers, but at others tuition follows the 
instructions provided by projects developed under the Bureaus of Education. 
6.1.3 Three types of school settings 
The diversity of institutional settings discussed above allows for a large variety 
concerning the locus, the mode, and the area of decision making on minority language 
education at schools in Xishuangbanna. Arranged by the level of involvedness with 
programs for minority language education I propose to distinguish between three types 
of schools: “showpiece schools”, “resource supported schools”, and “left-alone schools” 
(see “Table of visited educational facilities” in appendix). In light of the flexibility of 
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 Although a statistical comparison of the decision would suffer from bias through the selection 
and definition of decisions, since these were irregularly mentioned in interviews, the analysis of decisions 
provided above nevertheless indicates this finding. 
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institutional settings I view these types as continua on a multidimensional span of 
combined institutional settings,280 rather than clearly defined points. 
Showpiece schools 
The first type of schools is defined by strong involvement of schools with minority 
language education under far-reaching decision making by school-external actors. 
Minority language education at schools of this type is strongly connected to programs, as 
these allocate large resources to schools and define modes and content of tuition. There 
are externally defined structures for regular contacts between the schools and the 
minority language officers at the Bureaus of Education. Evaluation mechanisms support 
the schools’ efforts in minority language education. The schools have established internal 
organizational structures such as committees that strengthen the voice of minority 
language teachers in school matters. The Bureaus of Education expect teachers here not 
only to represent the state, but also to function as presenters and preservers of local 
culture and with this combined role to stand in for the state’s promise to respect local 
culture in the educational realm. 
With this type of schools decision making is predominately located with the Bureau 
of Education, with donor organizations, or with school-external experts who design the 
programs. Decisions on funding allocation can be expected to be made outside schools, 
but there might also be considerable space for school-based decision making on 
instructional matters if school staff is involved in designing programs as school-based 
experts. 
Examples of schools of this type can be found in Xishuangbanna especially among 
those schools that participate in the “Dai-Chinese Experimental Program”. These schools, 
as has been said above, received considerable additional resources in terms of material, 
teacher trainings, and funds. In exchange, minority language education at these schools is 
more supervised than at all other schools in Xishuangbanna. Pilot schools such as Mengyi 
and school no. 6 have often received delegations from the Bureaus of Education, from 
social organizations, and from scholars. Additionally, their tuition model received much 
attention by print and online media, and local population seems to be well informed 
about these schools’ minority language education. In light of this public attention and the 
role that the Bureaus of Education assign to these schools, I will refer to this type of 
schools with the metaphorical term “showpiece schools”. 
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 This idea echoes Hornberger’s (2007) model of the continua of bilingualism, according to which 
language use in education is shaped by multi-dimensional factors of language practices and ideology in 
society, schools, and politics.  
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Resource supported schools 
The second type of schools is also involved in programs, but these programs merely 
provide support in resource allocation and refrain from extensive institutionalized 
interference with instruction. External structures of minority language curriculum have 
been established, such as the Xishuangbanna Prefecture Office for Translation and Editing 
of Chinese-Ethnic Teaching Materials, to provide support for schools by textbook 
provision and by organizing teacher trainings. However, institutionalized formal contacts 
between the Bureaus of Education and the schools on the matter of minority language 
education are comparably few. The regular external evaluation mechanisms 
overwhelmingly ignore minority language education; and there have been no specific 
assessment measures installed that could evaluate, reward, or sanction minority language 
education teaching activities. 
Decisions under this type of school settings are much more located at school level 
than decisions under the first type. On the one side schools are expected to deliver some 
kind of minority language education, but on the other side many decisions are left to their 
discretion due to the lack of supervision, guidance, and standards in teaching procedures. 
During my visits to diverse schools in Xishuangbanna I found the large majority of 
schools that currently conduct Dai language education with the support of county, 
prefecture, or province programs to be in this type. Schools such as no. 17 and Menger 
run tremendous Dai language education, but they lack, for instance, in institutionalized 
measures to include teachers’ performance in Dai language classes into the promotion-
determining teacher assessments. Since these schools receive considerable, although at 
times unstable, support for minority language education, but this support does not 
include much steering on the content or methods of tuition, I call schools under this 
setting “resource supported schools” with the emphasis on the absence of control and 
management beyond material resources. 
Left-alone schools 
The third type of schools consists of those schools that lack institutionalized support 
for minority language education completely, but that, nevertheless, are in some way or 
another involved with minority language tuition. Programs for minority language 
education have either never reached these schools or they have been run here in earlier 
times, but have terminated in the meantime. There is a lack of external management 
support for minority language education at these schools. Teachers, for instance, are not 
invited to minority language trainings, and there are no books provided in minority 
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languages for teachers and students. The Bureau of Education defines the teachers’ role 
here as representatives of state and national knowledge, whereas local language 
knowledge transmission is not supported by any kind of assessment measures. 
Surprisingly, within these non-supportive institutional settings for minority language 
education there is quite some space for school-based decision making on tuition in these 
languages. Despite that these schools are strongly bound to follow the standardized 
national curriculum, and assessment measures evaluate their success, the lack of 
assessment and requirements specifically on minority language education also opens up 
spaces for school-based decisions. Firstly, as these schools are merely subject to outcome 
evaluations, such as students’ grades in Chinese language, there is still some room to 
make decisions on how to reach these goals. Secondly, as there are no requirements to 
fulfill specific goals of minority language education schools can decide themselves on how 
much they let the local languages influence their teaching. 
I found that several schools in Xishuangbanna belong to this type of schools. Firstly, 
there are schools such as no. 8 and no. 19 that have been pilot schools but after experts 
from social organizations or universities have left, the schools have been left with the 
discretion to continue, to marginalize, or to terminate the tuition started by these 
projects.281 Secondly, there are those schools where minority language education has 
been conducted under the auspices of the Bureau of Education for a certain period of 
time, but later the Bureau has withdrawn resources or the local school leaders have 
decided to fade out minority language education. School no. 4, for instance, that used to 
have an extensive Dai language education, does not list Dai language education anymore 
in the students’ timetables, and teachers merely occasionally use Dai in their regular 
teaching. Thirdly, there are also those schools where teachers use minority languages for 
communicative purposes in class, even though the schools have no official minority 
language education. Teachers at many schools in Xishuangbanna told me that they 
sporadically use minority languages when students’ Chinese skills are insufficient to 
conduct tuition all in Chinese. In all three cases schools have considerable discretion to 
make language-related decisions beyond the official minority language education 
programs. As school staff is here not only left with the remains of previous programs, but 
also with the decisions of how to best conduct tuition under the lack of institutionalized 
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 The project on “Community-based Education for Traditional Knowledge” at school no. 8, for 
instance, has been terminated within a few years after the project was introduced to the school. School no. 
19, by contrast, continues to teach the curriculum of the “School-based Curriculum Development Project” 
weekly. According to teachers at both schools the decision to continue or to terminate teaching project 
content has been made within the school (TE-26_TE-27_2013-05-01; TE-02_2013-05-17). 
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support for minority languages I call schools under this type of institutional settings “left-
alone schools”. 
Differences within types 
These three types of institutional settings indicate that specific institutional settings 
shape the modes of decisions on minority language education differently. Institutional 
settings at the “showpiece schools” can provide larger resources, but limit schools’ 
discretion on instructional decisions. Schools are required to implement minority 
language education, and due to the outstanding position of schools under this setting an 
exit from minority language education based on schools’ wishes is very unlikely. Settings 
at the “resource supported schools” similarly provide resources, but leave instructional 
decisions in larger degree to the schools. Schools are likely to continue with minority 
language education once they have been selected by higher echelons, but the modes of 
implementation of this tuition depend on school-based decisions. Settings at the “left-
alone schools”, finally, can provide teachers and principals with discretion to make 
decisions in far-reaching areas, including the complete stop of minority language 
education. 
However, at the same time, these types also must be seen as rather idealized types 
of institutional settings and decision making processes that cover the differences 
between schools within one type. In the realm of institutional settings, schools within one 
type can vary in the way a program is “taken up” at schools. The five “showpiece schools” 
of the “Dai-Chinese Experimental Program”, for instance, differ in their enthusiasm for 
the program and developed thus different reactions and support mechanisms, from 
hosting conferences and writing proposals on the one extreme, to rather hesitative or 
superficial implementation on the other extreme. Schools within one type also differ in 
the management structures that they installed for minority language teachers. Although 
in terms of program support schools no. 22 and no. 17, for example, can be grouped into 
the “resource supported schools” type, but school no. 22 assigns the school’s only Dai 
teacher into the Chinese language teacher group, whereas school no. 17 leaves this 
decision to the teachers. Finally, the roles of teachers also differ within the schools of one 
type, based on the local community’s beliefs, and the modes of how the teachers respond 
to these beliefs. Decisions made on such diverse bases can be expected to differ as well, 
from continuing minority language education unofficially on the one side, to shifting all 
tuition to Chinese on the other. 
In sum, the types of institutional settings at schools provide a broad categorization 
of spaces for school-based decisions. I argue that institutional settings for school-based 
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decision making on minority language education in Xishuangbanna are larger than those 
for other subjects, and that the flexibility and the diversity of institutional settings can 
explain differences in implementation between schools. However, a more detailed 
categorization must be complemented with in-depth analysis of institutions and decisions 
at individual schools. This analysis must include firstly the specific requirements, goals, 
and problems of the individual schools, and secondly an analysis of the decision making 
process, the intentions of those who make decisions at schools, and their perspectives on 
institutionally provided spaces for decisions. 
6.2 Minority language education at three case study schools 
In the last subchapter I have developed three different school types, distinguished 
by the space for school-based decision making on minority language education. In this 
subchapter I will introduce three case study schools as examples for these three types. As 
I have elaborated in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, the case selection 
follows what Gerring (2007) has termed the “diverse case” selection strategy, namely to 
choose cases in maximum variety in order to represent full range of variation of variables. 
These three cases hence do not aim at establishing representativeness within a 
population of schools, but rather they aim at establishing validity through causal 
relationships within the case. The goal of this selection is to build up exploratory 
hypotheses and to provide results within the parameter of different institutional settings 
for ethnic minority language education. I selected thus case study schools on the criteria 
of similarity in the respective languages taught (Dai or Bulang language in addition to 
Chinese), and difference in the institutional settings that accomplish the tuition (one 
school per institutional type). 
In order to understand the background of the three case study schools (which I 
will refer to as Mengyi, Menger, and Mengsan282) I will in the remainder of this sub-
chapter firstly introduce to the overall educational, administrative, and linguistic situation 
at the three case study schools, before I will secondly describe specific items of minority 
language tuition here. In the last part of this sub-chapter I will investigate into specific 
institutional settings for minority language education at the three schools. Similarities and 
differences between the three schools will be in the center of this presentation. 
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 Concerning the usage and development of these three pseudonyms, see remarks in the 
introductory chapter. 
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6.2.1 Education, administration, and languages at case study schools 
The three schools presented here all share specific characteristics such as a high 
percentage of non-Han students, but they differ largely in other characteristics, such as 
school size and administration. In the following paragraphs I will present these 
characteristics in four areas: first, school location and catchment area population; second, 
school infrastructure, administration, and personnel; third, schedules, students, and 
educational attainments; and fourth, ethnic groups and languages. 
School location and catchment areas population 
The three case study schools are located in three different counties or county-
level cities (Mengyi: Jinghong City, Menger: Mengla County, Mengsan: Menghai County), 
but they are all located in rural areas, are referred to as rural schools (乡镇学校), and sit 
on grounds belonging to village committees (村委会). However, there are major 
differences in location of the schools and the local villages with effects on accessibility. 
Mengyi and Menger are located in valleys (called “bazi”) of agriculturally rich areas with 
developed road networks, whereas Mengsan is located in a rather small and secluded 
mountain village, reachable merely on a sand road. Mengyi and Menger are 
comparatively near to the political and economic centers of Xishuangbanna (Mengyi is 30 
minutes and Menger one hour away from Jinghong’s city center by bus), but Mengsan 
fulfills criteria that interview partners had in mind when they spoke about “remote 
villages”: after a 4 hours bus ride from Jinghong center one needs a foot walk of two 
hours to reach the village, it has no through traffic, and, additionally, it is the closest of 
the three schools to international boarders (the boarder to Myanmar is reachable in 
approximately 30 minutes by car). 
In all three cases the location of the schools and the building style distinguish the 
schools from the surrounding dwellings. The schools are located in exposed positions at 
the main overland streets amidst rice paddies (Mengyi, Menger) or at the village street 
(Mengsan). The architecture clearly identifies the buildings as schools, and thus as part of 
a national network of similar looking school buildings; and it distinguishes them from the 
architectural style of the students’ homes. The school buildings, including teachers’ 
residential buildings and student dorms, sit amidst gated school ground and consist of 
two-floor buildings made of concrete with no reference to local architectural styles (see 
example images from schools in Xishuangbanna in appendix). The villagers, by contrast, 
reside in majority either in traditional wooden houses or newly build bungalows which 
both in majority stand on stilts and feature distinctive regional elements, such as roof 
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ornaments in local style. Long ago are the days when, as one interviewee described, 
school buildings where made of wood or bamboo donated by villagers. Together with 
symbols such as the national flag, the school name, and other information written on the 
gates, the school buildings thus indicate already from the outside a special sphere of 
nationally unified structures that represent the state as distinct from the villages. 
Nearly all families of the schools’ student population are registered under a rural 
Hukou household registration, work their own fields, or, in the case of rich households, 
manage employed farm laborers. Both Mengyi and Menger are, although in few numbers, 
also visited by children of non-local and migrant farm laborers from other parts of 
Xishuangbanna, Yunnan, or China. This means that the students within one school come 
from very diverse families in economic terms. On the one extreme there are rich families 
who rented their land to plantation companies, live well from these rents, and moved 
into new bungalows, and on the other extreme there are families who live in one-room 
shacks within the plantations and harvest rubber or Banana trees with a monthly income 
below the local average. 
The level of formal educational background of the students’ families is on average 
lower than that of urban students,283 which in the eyes of many interviewed teachers has 
negative effects on the students’ motivations to learn and on parents’ motivation to 
support their offspring in learning. Teachers (including Dai teachers) employ stereotypes 
to describe Dai children and especially those Dai children with wealthy family background 
as lazy, as putting no efforts in homework, as often skipping class, and as often dropping 
out from school in young ages. 
School infrastructure, administration, and personnel 
The educational infrastructure differs much between the schools, but all three 
schools are less well equipped than the respective central schools or the schools in 
Xishuangbanna’s urban areas, not to mention comparison with schools in China’s big 
cities (see chapter 3). The school buildings of Mengyi and Mengsan have both been build 
several years ago, the buildings are in a grey and uninspiring style, chairs and tables are 
rather old, and the school ground, at most, offers one basket ball field for physical 
education. However, Mengyi has a special building that is painted in white and that has 
been newly equipped with furniture, which is reserved for Dai language education. 
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 Although I possess no survey data specifically on the family educational background for the 
three case study schools, in interviews teachers and family members of selected students said that the 
current children’s grandparent generation often did not visit schools at all, and parents generally only for a 
few years. In hardly any of the households there were any books or other literature. Reading was not a 
common leisure time activity in the families, but instead TV sets were present in each visited household. 
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Mengyi offers a small teachers’ room. In Mengsan there are teachers’ rooms, but these 
are extremely small and teachers prefer rather to go home during breaks. As, according to 
the teachers, there are already plans to move Mengsan’s students and teachers to the 
nearest central school and to reuse the school-building for other purposes there are no 
investments into improving Mengsan’s current school building. Menger’s infrastructure, 
by utilizing provincial funds for school building safety, improved in the last years from 
grey concrete buildings with rotten furniture to brand new white multi-story school 
buildings. The teachers’ rooms are larger than in the other two schools and the principal 
has an office with room for a secretary. A student dormitory building was opened in 2011. 
However, when compared to Menger’s central school’s library, science lab, and piano 
room284 we find extreme differences between both schools. The reason for this difference 
is simple: The central school runs a kindergarten and can transfer the fees from this 
business to the school in order to fund school infrastructure or to hire additional teachers 
for extracurricular activities. All three case study schools lack this opportunity as most of 
the parents in their catchment area are farmers who refrain from sending their children 
to a kindergarten. 
The three schools are examples of different stages in the national school merger 
program. Mengyi and Mengsan have been established decades ago as village schools, and 
remained at their locality, but now there are plans to merge these schools with other 
schools. Mengyi took already students of other schools, but currently, as school staff told 
me, the school is exempted from the merger program, which, as will be discussed below, 
might be related to the school’s Dai language tuition. Mengsan, as the smallest, is 
scheduled to be merged with the closest central school in the near future, as teachers 
said, and selected cohorts of the village children already visit classes there. Menger, in 
contrast, can be seen as the product of school mergers. Although the school existed 
already before, the school took up altogether 8 teaching point schools between 2007 and 
2008 from the surrounding villages, has been renamed, and has been transferred to a 
new school campus.285 
In terms of school administration all three schools are branch (or satellite) schools 
which are attached to and administered by central schools. However, the schools differ 
much in the exact specification of this share of administration. Both Mengyi and Menger 
have a school-based “Branch School Manager” in the rank of a vice-principal who 
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 School-internal statistics from 2011 provide more details on educational material available at 
the central school, such as 50 electronic piano keyboards, 15 pairs of Badminton rackets, 10 pairs of Ping 
Pong rackets, 400 books in the library, an orchestra of 89 drums, and 50 chess boards. The attached school 
Menger does not possess any comparable tools. 
285
 Between 2005 and 2013 24 schools merged to three in Menger’s township. 
 233 
organizes educational and administrative matters at the branch school, whereas political 
representation of the school is formally in the hands of the principal at the central school. 
Additionally, both schools have administrative posts that are filled by teachers who, in 
return, have their teaching obligations reduced. “Teaching and Research Groups” and 
“Subject Groups” engage in planning and organizing of curriculum, but according to my 
interview partners at the schools, teachers discuss school matters more often in informal 
meetings than in formal meetings by these groups. At Mengsan, by contrast, there is no 
position of vice principal or “Branch School Manager”, and instead one of the teachers 
serves as “contact person” to the central school. As leaders from the central school, 
however, only seldom visit Mengsan, and the other teachers see this contact person as 
their leader, he has much discretion in organizing teaching matters. Due to the small size 
of the school’s teacher body there have been no formal committees or groups for 
administrative or teaching matters installed at Mengsan. Instead, teachers regularly 
discuss tuition decisions in informal talks during breaks or after class.286 
Similarly, the schools differ also much in the number of teachers, in teachers’ 
educational background, and in teachers’ professional level. Altogether 24 teachers work 
at Mengyi, 27 at Menger, and merely 3 at Mengsan, which is a teacher-student ratio of 
1:16 at Mengyi and 1:19 at Mengsan (see Table 19). Some of these teachers obtained 
bachelor degrees, whereas others have only a low formal education, especially those who 
have been privately hired by the village committees and have been transferred into the 
regular teacher pool when China’s formerly village teachers increasingly become paid by 
government (see details in chapter 3). Similarly, the school staff varies in age and teaching 
experience from teachers who only recently came to the school to teachers who worked 
for decades at this particular school and are soon to retire. 
 
 Mengyi Menger Mengsan 
Teachers 24 27 3 
Students 389 443 56 
Teacher-Student ratio 1:16 1:16 1:19 
Table 19: Number of teachers and students at case study schools. Note: Data refers to different years: 
Mengyi: 2009, Menger 2012, Mengsan: 2011. Source: Own calculation, based on interviews. 
Worth mentioning is also that teachers’ own children overwhelmingly often have 
a high educational status. Several teachers had their own children send to the best 
secondary schools in the county and even during primary schooling some teachers sent 
their children to the central school instead of the schools where they teach themselves. It 
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 All teachers at Mengsan live in very close distance to each other, often cook together, and have 
many opportunities to chat. 
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seems that they especially valued formal education which is not only understandable 
through their own professional background, but also by the lack of other income 
opportunities for children of non-local teacher families with little access to farm land. 
As most of the teachers at all three schools have a history of being transferred 
between schools in Xishuangbanna,287 they have detailed opinions on the quality of their 
current workplace, based on their perceptions of desired work places. Although all 
interviewed teachers are paid equally288 and in time289, they are disadvantaged to their 
colleagues at urban schools. Firstly, in contrast to teachers at urban schools who might be 
able to earn extra income by offering additional private tuition (despite its legal 
prohibition) none of the teachers at the three case study schools can offer such teaching 
since there simply is no demand for private tuition in the villages. Secondly, although 
housing was provided by the schools for those teachers who came from outside teachers 
at complained much about their housing situation on school ground. In Mengsan the two 
teachers who were not born in the village live in brick barracks that have been erected 
several decades ago and that both teachers describe as “dangerous buildings” (危房), a 
term used in policy documents to describe school buildings that are in risk of endangering 
the life of teachers and students by collapsing. Menger’s teachers live in barracks of 
somewhat similar appearance, only this time they have erected these buildings by 
themselves, since even in the new school building no teacher housing was provided for. 
Schedules, students, and educational attainments 
Both the daily schedule and the taught subjects differ between the three schools. 
Curriculum at all three case study schools covers the core subjects math and Chinese as 
well as the non-core national subjects “ideology and morality” and physical education. 
Tuition of other subjects, by contrast, varies between the schools and some subjects of 
the national curriculum are not taught at all. None of the schools teaches English or 
Information Technology due to a lack of educated teachers in the former case and a lack 
of teaching materials in the latter case. Mengyi and Menger regularly teach Nature, Social 
Science, Music, and Art. Teachers specialized in some of these subjects take turns in 
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 The large majority of my interview partners at all three schools migrated during their college 
education and for finding jobs. A typical biography of teachers at Mengyi and Menger is the following: Being 
born in towns or villages in Xishuangbanna or other localities in Yunnan, they visited local schools and 
studied an education major at colleges. After graduation they took a position as teacher and have been 
transferred to rural schools. After several transfers due to school mergers or due to climbing the career 
ladder they have been transferred to their current post. 
288
 Teachers at Mengsan received an additional “remote school” compensation of 50 RMB per 
month, which they, however, perceived as low and unsuitable to compensate for their hardships. 
289
 The problem of so the called “delayed teacher payment”, that was a common complaint among 
teachers since the 1980s, has been solved at Xishuangbanna’s schools. 
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teaching these subjects to students in special courses. At Mengsan, by contrast, these 
latter subjects are taught merely irregular and by non-specialized class teachers. Although 
the weekly schedule also provides for these subjects, math and Chinese receive much 
more time than scheduled, which is due to the teachers’ preferences towards subjects 
that they find more useful for their students (see discussion below). Although all three 
schools conduct tuition in the morning and in the afternoon, differences in boarding 
facilities trigger differences in schedules. Only Menger has facilities for school lunch and 
for boarding, which shortens school breaks and allows adding specific “self-learning” 
classes in the evenings for doing homework under the supervision of teachers. In 
Mengsan, as there is generally only one teacher per class who teaches all subjects, 
students and teachers both become more easily tired, and teachers more often decide to 
end class earlier. 
The schools’ student population differs much in size. Menger is the largest school 
with 443 students, Mengyi is in a middle position with 389 students, and Mengsan is the 
smallest school with 56 students in three classes. They all have no apparent gender 
gaps,290 they feature enrollment rates of 100 percent in the case of Mengyi and Menger 
and 99.38 percent in Mengsan,291 and there is hardly any official dropout of students.292 
Compared to the central schools these schools are small: The central school that 
Mengsan is attached to, for instance has a student population of around 500, which is 
more than 9 times of that of Mengsan. Similarly, Mengyi’s number of students is only half 
of that of the central school. Mengyi and Menger feature the complete set of grades of 
pre-school and primary education with one year of pre-school education and six years of 
primary education. Mengsan, by contrast, conducts only tuition for classes in three grades, 
with every second year one first grade starting. Students of enrollment ages between 
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 As the schools’ statistical data sheets that principals gave me during the interviews regularly do 
not differentiate student population according to gender, I am unable to determine specific gender ratios. 
The school data claims that in each of the school districts there are enrollment rates of 100 percent during 
primary schooling, which thus counts for both genders. My interview partners told me that student drop- 
out, which often is related to gender, is merely a phenomenon of secondary schooling, but not of the case 
study’s primary schooling. 
291
 The delayed schooling of school-age students in Mengsan who had to wait to start schooling 
until next year contributes to this lower number, which is one reason for planning to merge Mengsan with 
the central school in order to allow schooling for all children. 
292
 The official rate of students who graduate from primary schools compared to the enrollment 
rate (巩固率) is nearly 100 percent at all three townships. Although both the enrollment rate and the drop-
out rate have been found to lack accuracy especially during secondary schooling (see remarks in the 
introductory chapter), not only teachers and principals at the three schools but also villagers in the 
catchment areas said that since enrollment is mandatory and families of drop-out students are punished 
these figures are likely to be accurate for locally registered children, although this cannot be guaranteed for 
children of migrant workers and farm helpers with non-local registration. According to school 
administrators the schools set no barriers for school visits by these children. 
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these grades either wait to be enrolled with classes in the next year or they visit the 
central school. The latter option, however, is difficult due to the long school way to the 
central school. Similarly, the schools differ in the student-per-class and the student-per-
teacher ratio. With an average class size of 19 Mengsan’s classes are also the smallest, 
because there aren’t that many children in the village. Class sizes at Mengyi and Menger 
are much larger with 34 and 39, respectively. These numbers are around the national 
average,293 but in comparison to the central schools they are still small.294 
Only one of the schools has facilities for students to board at school. 
Approximately 50 percent of Menger’s students board at school. The school-internal 
regulation is that students whose home is within a distance of three kilometers from 
school should live at home, whereas the others shall board at the schools from Monday 
to Friday for fees. 295  Over the weekends all students should stay at home, but 
occasionally the school administrators allow students from difficult family backgrounds to 
stay at school. The school (in contrast to its central school) has no special staff for 
boarding students,296 and teachers have to care for students after class and during night 
shifts. Generally, teachers and school administration are thus interested in sending 
students home for weekends, and especially if students got ill they send students home in 
order to avoid any risk related to giving medicine to students. Students, by contrast, not 
necessarily prefer living at home over school dorms. In interviews some boarding 
students at Menger preferred to live at the school, claiming that it is “more fun”, whereas 
others said that they missed home (ST-12_2012-03-02). 
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 For 2010 statistics reported an average class size in China of 38 students per class (own 
calculation, based on data from the Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education 2012)). Note: These 
statistics are approximations and include to a small degree over-reported student numbers due to 
administrators’ tendency to keep those students who have already left school in statistics (see introductory 
chapter). Furthermore, as an effect of the rural school merger program that explicitly aims at reducing 
costly small-sized classes in villages, the national class sizes can be expected to have grown in the meantime 
to some degree. Finally, they only reflect accumulated average class of schools, but between the classes of 
one school there can be large differences. In Menger, for example, I counted up to 56 students in one class, 
whereas pre-school classes have been much smaller in all observed schools. 
294
 As has been elaborated in chapter 3 parents seem to prefer central schools over satellite 
schools. Especially those students whose families reside in border regions between catchment areas are 
allowed to choose schools, although students are generally asked to visit the schools in their catchment 
areas. The principal of Menger’s central school said that his school often takes students from border areas, 
but that his school has difficulties to enlarge the school due to its location within the township center. (PR-
12_2012-01-17) As a result, this school had a student-per-class ratio over the last years of an average of 49. 
295
 According to one principal the fees for one year of boarding accumulate to 1640 RMB (PR-
12_2012-01-17). For wealthy land owners this is no problem, but especially for farm helpers paying this sum 
at once can be difficult, which is why the school also offers to pay the fees on a monthly base. 
296
 Such staff is called “life teachers” (生活老师). They take care for students’ needs and security, 
but they do not have to possess formal teacher education. 
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Analysis of selected data297 of the student results in the so called “Education 
Quality Evaluations” by the County Bureaus of Education and the “Primary Student 
Graduation Examinations” by the Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education298 indicate that 
students at the three schools often, but not always, score lower than their peers at the 
central schools and at urban schools (see all Table 20). At Mengyi, for example, class 
examination conducted in grade 5 in 2008 show that Mengyi’s students scored lower than 
students at the central school and lower than the township average. Grade 1 students in 
the year 2011 at the same school, by contrast, scored higher than both students at the 
central school and on township average. Students at Menger have been said to score 
regularly lower than students at the center school. School leaders at the central school 
said that they worry much about Menger’s scores (PR-12_PR-18_2013-05-10). The 2010 
Primary Student Graduation Examination scores document this, when Menger’s graduate 
students scored merely 87 percent of the students at the central school, 83 percent of 
those in township average, and nearly one third lower than their peers in urban schools. 
 
Examination Mengyi Menger Xishuangbanna 
Name Subject Grade Mengyi Central 
school  
Township Menger Central 
school  
Township Prefecture Urban 
schools  
Rural 
schools 
2008 EQE Chin. 5 58 70 63       
2011 EQE Math 5 45 66 60       
Chin. 1 88 84 84       
Math 1 75 68 66       
Chin. 1 (Dai ) 83         
Chin. 1 (Han ) 93         
Math 1 (Dai ) 75         
Math 1 (Han ) 76         
2010 PSGE Chin.+ 
Math 
6    101 116 121 124 145 121 
Chin. 6    58 63 63 63   
Math 6    43 53 58 61   
2012 EQE Chin. 3    67      
Math 3    68      
Table 20: Selected evaluation results at case study schools compared to central schools. Note: Table 
indicates average student scores (平均分). Maximum achievable scores: 100 per subject. EQE: Educational 
Quality Examination; PSG: Primary Student Graduation Examination. Source: Own calculation after school-
internal documents and unpublished data of Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education. 
Within the student population of all three schools there is a share of monk 
students.299 Among the three schools Mengsan’s student population has the highest 
share of monk students with approximately 10 percent of the whole student population 
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 Note: The data that I obtained during fieldwork research differs much between schools. At this 
point I am merely able to present selected data on examination results on classes in non-matching grades 
and years. Comparability between the individual data sets can thus not be achieved. 
298
 Due to the differences in exam sheets the “County Education Quality Evaluations” data only 
allow comparing between schools within one county, whereas the “Primary Student Graduation 
Examinations” as prefecture-wide standardized test sheets allow comparing schools in different counties. 
299
 The term “student monks” refers to boys who live in Buddhist temples, but who are educated at 
both the regular schools and in classes within the temples, see chapter 5. 
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or 20 percent of the male student population, next to Mengyi with some 5 percent (10 
percent among the boys) and Menger with not more than 1 to 2 percent. According to 
their class teachers, monk students at all three schools do not score noticeably lower in 
tests, despite their double workload in school and temple.300 Although highly visible as a 
group through their orange robes and shaved hair, monk students seem to be integrated 
in school life at all three case study schools. They join regular tuition and after-class 
games, including sports. None of the schools installed special classes for monk students; 
and integration seems to be a goal of the school leaders. When I asked non-monk 
students about making friends with monk students some students made jokes about the 
monk students’ praying and eating habits, but others said that there is no difference to 
making friends with other students. 
Ethnicity and languages 
In terms of official ethnic registration the student populations at the three schools 
are predominately non-Han, but the teachers are in majority Han. The high share of non-
Han population in the location of all three schools is reflected in the officially registered 
ethnicity of student population at the schools as well, although the specific ethnic 
composition differs between the schools. Mengyi’s and Menger’s students are 
predominantly registered as Dai, followed by Hani, whereas Mengsan’s students are all 
registered as Bulang (see Table 21). School mergers and migration have reduced the 
share of Dai students at both Mengyi and Menger. Mengyi, for instance, took the first Han 
students when the neighboring Han settlement school was merged into Mengyi in 2006. 
The currently ethnically homogeneous Bulang classes of Mengsan will become more 
heterogeneous once the school merges with the central school and students visit the 
central school together with Han, Hani, and Dai children of the surrounding villages. 
The ethnic share of the school personnel, however, differs much from that of the 
students. Mengyi’s and Mengsan’s teachers are in majority Han, whereas Menger’s 
teachers in majority are Hani (see Table 21). Menger has been above the Prefectures 
average of 67 percent non-Han teachers in 2005 (Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 
2010b, p. 221), whereas Mengyi and Mengsan have been below this average. Although all 
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 This observation differs from that of Luo (2011) who observed that monk students workloads 
resulted in anxiety and fatigue with negative effects on their school marks. The gap between my 
observation and Luo’s might result from a change in learning schedule of the monk students. Luo’s analysis 
that state and religious education to compete with each other can be complemented by the finding that 
state education seems to have won this competition. In all three schools, similar to other schools that I have 
visited, teachers told me that the number of student monks has reduced over the last years, that temples 
reduced workloads for religious studies, and that today monk students’ educational achievements are not a 
problem anymore. 
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three branch schools’ leaders are registered as non-Han, all three central schools are 
headed by Han principals. 
 
 Mengyi Menger Mengsan 
Central school’s principal Han: 1 Han: 1 Han: 1 
Branch school’s principal  Dai 1 Hani 1 Bulang: 1 (position: teacher) 
Teachers Han: 10 (42%) 
Dai: 9 (37%) 
Yi & Jinuo 5 (21%) 
overall: 24 
overall non-Han: 14 (58%) 
Hani: 18 (67%) 
Dai: 5 (18%) 
Han: 4 (15%) 
overall: 27 
overall non-Han: 23 (85%) 
Han: 2 (67 %) 
Bulang: 1 (33%, is also “Contact 
Person”) 
overall: 3 
overall non-Han: 1 (33%) 
Students Dai: 241 (62%) 
Hani: 86 (22%) 
Han: 62 (16%) 
overall: 389 
overall non-Han: 327 (84%) 
Dai: 244 (55%) 
Hani: 186 (42%)  
Miao: 9 (2%) 
Han: 4 (1%) 
overall: 443 
overall non-Han: 439 (99%) 
Bulang: 56 (100%) 
overall: 56 
overall non-Han: 56 (100%) 
Table 21: Ethnic registration of school population at case study schools. Note: Principal at branch school 
refers also to “Branch School Manager” or “Contact Person”. No. of students in Menger is approximation. 
Year of data: Mengyi: 2009; Menger: 2012; Mengsan: 2011.. Source: Own calculation after school 
documents and interviews. 
Ethnic registration has at all three schools a strong function as ethnic marker for 
students. All students who I spoke with knew which ethnic group they, their parents, their 
classmates, and their teachers belong to. Being Dai or Hani was clearly an issue for 
students in defining if other students belong to one group or not. Students in Menger, for 
example, separated their dorms according to ethnicity and seem to play during class 
breaks more often with students from the same ethnic group than with students of other 
ethnicity. 
However, this official ethnic registration indicates only parts of the picture. Firstly, 
as I have discussed in chapter 4, the ethnic registration is firstly merely an umbrella term 
that subsumes different ethnic groups. Within Menger’s Hani registered students, for 
example, there are several students that others refer to with the unofficial term Ake and 
who differ from the other students in family background (lower family income than the 
average Dai and Hani families), looks (often wearing dirty or shabby clothes), language 
(other than Chinese, Hani, or Dai), and behavior (language barriers limit communication 
with many class mates). Referring to these indicators their classmates saw these children 
as a distinct group, and referred to them as being “strange”, “poor”, or simply “different”. 
Secondly, the official registration neither necessarily reflects the identity of groups, nor 
does it indicate preferences of individuals. When I asked students about their best friends 
they pointed to other children from their home village, regardless of the ethnic 
registration of that group. Also, the choice of students’ clothes did not depend ethnicity, 
but rather on financial background. 
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Within this complex net of strong ethnic belonging on the one side and 
individuality beyond ethnic markers on the other side, institutional settings at the schools 
play a major role in determining the role of ethnicity in defining identity. Generally, and 
similar to all other schools that I have visited in Xishuangbanna, all three schools 
emphasize ethnic registration status of each student and make these statuses public, for 
instance by student lists in the classrooms. However, there are also differences in how 
schools treat ethnic registration of their students. Foremost, the case study schools 
presented here differ in the question if students study in ethnically separated or in mixed 
classes. Mengyi, for instance, segregates students according to ethnicity. Although the 
distinction between students into classes is officially conducted according to language 
ability and the languages to be learned, in reality students of Dai ethnicity are 
scheduled301 to visit Dai classes and students of all other ethnic groups visit the Chinese 
classes. Among students and teachers these classes are known as “Dai classes” and “Han 
classes”. When I asked one Han student who sat in the Dai class he furiously told me that 
he should not sit there because he is Han. In this respect ethnically divided classes 
contributed to increasing the importance of ethnic registration for identity formation. 
School leaders at Menger, by contrast, decided to not segregate students by ethnicity into 
different classes, but instead carefully try to achieve ethnic mixture. For appointing 
students to classes Menger established the rule that a maximum group of eight students 
from one village (and thus often from one ethnic group) can attend together one class, 
whereas they are separated into two classes once the group is larger. With classes of up 
to 56 students, students from one village form thus only small groups within the classes. 
Additionally, individual teachers’ references to ethnicity also affect the 
construction of ethnic identity in the schools. Teachers at both Mengyi and Menger 
(similar to other schools that I have visited in Xishuangbanna) often used terms such as 
“you Dai students” or “you Hani students” in class when addressing groups of students, 
for instance when they asked if students understood what they said. In the case of the 
above mentioned Ake students at Menger, teachers also contributed to installing a 
negative image of this group. When I asked the students who had difficulties in 
understanding me the teacher said in front of the class that “those Ake students” would 
lack in Chinese. Later students explained me that this teacher, similar to other teachers, 
often yells at these students, which is, in their words, because Ake students in general are 
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 The school claims to ask the parents for their consent to send children to either of the classes, 
but several Dai parents told me that they have not been asked and thus had no option about their 
children’s language tuition at Mengyi (e.g. FA-08_2012-03-09). 
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“misbehaving”. Through this, the teacher’s perspective became the students’ perspective 
in creating a negative image of an ethnically defined group of students.  
Generally, ethnic registration can serve as an indicator for the case study students’ 
heritage language. Most students at Mengyi and Menger speak Dai or Hani as their 
heritage language, and students at Mengsan speak Bulang. However, a large share of the 
students at the three case study schools also speaks Chinese or other non-Chinese 
languages at home, often split between generations.302 According to several villagers in 
the village of Mengsan, for instance, the village population speaks in addition to Bulang 
also Dai and Hani as the languages of their neighboring villages. Similarly, many students 
said that since that their parents have different heritage languages they speak at home 
both or even more languages. Taken together, this indicates that language diversity and 
bilingualism (and sometimes even trilingualism) is common among the student 
population of the case study schools. 
In majority non-Han children at all three schools get acquainted at young age to 
minority languages, whereas script knowledge seems to be learned only by those 
students who undergo minority language education at schools. Although several 
interviewed Dai and Bulang students said that their grandparents can read and write Dai 
only very few said that their grandparents taught them Dai script. Similarly, none of the 
Hani students who I spoke with at Menger or at Mengyi even knew of the existence of a 
Hani script. Furthermore, despite a few shop signs in Dai script there is hardly anything to 
read in minority script. The local bookshops do not offer a single book in minority scripts. 
Comic books, favorites of students at all visited schools, are also only available in Chinese 
script. 
Not only the Han students, but also the ethnic minority students get acquainted in 
large majority to Chinese at young age, either through contact to Han students or through 
exposure to Chinese language media. The language learning process that children in the 
communities of the three case studies undergo outside schools is one-directional: 
speakers of minority language learn Chinese, but not the other way round. Each visited 
household of locally registered families with school-aged children in the case schools’ 
villages had a TV set, and some even a computer (the latter ones not in Mengsan, though). 
Migrant worker families, by contrast, own less often TV sets and computers, but often 
radios. In any case, language exposure either to conversation of Chinese speakers, TV, 
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 Non-Han students said in non-representative surveys at the case study schools that they use 
both Chinese and minority languages to speak with their parents, but only minority languages to speak with 
their grandparents. Xishuangbanna’s linguistic divide between generations, can thus be found with the 
families at the three case study schools as well. 
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radio, or computer usage results in high prevalence of basis Chinese skills among some of 
the students at the case study schools, and teachers who remembered difficulties that 
they encountered in earlier years of basic communication with the students said that this 
problem is much lower today. 
However, ethnic minority students’ Chinese skills at the case study schools not 
only lack behind those of their Han peers, but some of the non-Han students suffer 
especially. According to teachers at Mengyi and Menger there are only few students who 
do not understand Chinese at all at the time of school entrance, whereas teachers in 
Mengsan said that the majority of students does not understand Chinese. To large parts 
this can be attributed to linguistic heterogeneity at Mengyi and Menger and to linguistic 
homogeneity at Mengsan, but partly also to differences in the frequency of travelling to 
Jinghong or the near towns, as students in Mengyi and Menger on average have more 
opportunity to visit these places and hear Chinese language. In effect, students of 
“remote” places, have difficulties not only in the first grades,303 but also when it comes to 
advanced knowledge. Mengyi’s ethnic Dai grade 1 classes, for instance, scored in the 
2010 Educational Quality Examinations ten points less than the students in the Han class, 
although they scored similar in math (see above Table 20). Similarly, within the Han 
classes ethnic Dai students attained also the three lowest scores in Chinese (14, 18, and 
27 points out of 100 possible points). In Menger, where students sit in ethnically mixed 
classes, one cannot compare student results by ethnicity based on classes, but teachers 
assured me that in their experience a similar finding can be drawn here: ethnic Han 
students gain higher scores in Chinese language than Dai, Hani, Ake, and Yao students, 
which shows that Chinese language education provides particular difficulties for ethnic 
minority students. 
Teaching Chinese proved to be difficult in all three schools since the teaching 
schedule was not adjusted to teaching and learning Chinese as a second language. In 
Mengsan, where none of the students spoke Chinese as heritage language these 
difficulties were especially obvious. School books and thus the book-oriented teaching 
schedule followed at this school reserve only the first few weeks of grade 1 for learning 
Pinyin. Texts of the complete first year are only written in Pinyin. They do not schedule 
learning sound, pronunciation, and the complete language system at all. The teachers at 
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 Especially students of recently merged schools more often lack in Chinese skills. The so called 
“Ake” students that I have referred to above, for instance, were not able to communicate in Chinese when I 
visited Menger’s pre-school and even first grade classes. Teachers found it extremely difficult to teach as 
they themselves did not speak the students’ language and lacked the time and skills to teach Chinese for 
beginners.  
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Mengsan tried their best to explain the sounds of Chinese, but for the students’ learning 
the sound system of a language that they barely spoke provided difficulties. In result, 
after the first semester Pinyin and pronunciation as well as basic skills in expression, 
reading, and writing were still largely problematic, and even after one year the Pinyin 
rules had to be repeated again and again, which slowed down the learning of vocabulary 
and texts that the textbooks scheduled for the first years. 
Within this mixed linguistic background the use of languages at the school ground 
also differs much. Firstly, ethnic minority students in younger grades more often choose 
minority languages than Chinese when they speak to other students of the same ethnic 
group, but for contacts with Han students they use Chinese as the common language. In 
communication with teachers, however, this distinction is less clear. Teachers address Dai 
students at Mengyi and Menger during class mostly in Chinese, whereas after class they 
also use Dai language. Sometimes, however, teachers also use minority languages to 
address students in class, especially during the bilingual classes or when they feel that 
students might not understand Chinese. Secondly, schools differ in their written language 
environment at the school ground. All signboards at Menger and Mengsan are merely 
written in Chinese, whereas at Mengyi some selected boards such as classroom numbers 
and offices are also indicated with Dai script. 
6.2.2 Minority language tuition at case study schools 
The three schools all use minority language education at some point in their 
curriculum. Mengyi and Menger have Dai language education included in the regular 
schedule with two hours per class in selected grades (this is called “non-program” Dai 
language courses here, 非项目傣文课), but since 2005 Mengyi has been additionally 
chosen as a pilot school in the “Dai-Chinese Bilingual Education Experimental Program” 
and in the successor program, the “Zero Barrier Bilingual Education Project” (see program 
description in chapter 5). With the support of diverse project partners the school 
conducts bilingual education from pre-school on with a completely different set of 
methods than the so called “regular” Dai language education in Xishuangbanna. Menger, 
by contrast, is one of the two schools of the “Yunnan Provincial Bilingual Experimentation 
Schools Program” in Xishuangbanna. Although this program did not change methods of 
Dai tuition, the school’s Dai language education expanded under the support from grade 
four and five to pre-school classes. Mengsan, finally, is not involved in any minority 
language education program anymore. After a Bulang-Chinese program for bilingual 
education that uses Dai script was terminated around the turn of the century, Mengsan 
has not been selected as pilot or project school for any bilingual education program 
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anymore. Nevertheless, as one of the teachers here uses Bulang language as an additional 
tool for class communication in the first grade, minority languages continue to play a role 
in this school, although a limited and a rather unofficial one. In the following paragraphs I 
will provide an overview on the tuition of minority languages at schools, before I will 
distinguish the institutional settings for management and decision making on minority 
language education at the schools in the next sub-chapter.  
Classes and school hours 
Classes and school hours of minority language education differ much between the 
three schools (see Table 22). Mengyi has extensive minority language education. The 
school has two streams of classes: a Dai language stream and a Chinese language stream. 
Whereas students in the Chinese stream have to wait for Dai language education until 
grade 3 or 4, the Dai stream students of so called “project classes” begin their school 
education in junior pre-school purely in Dai, add Chinese from senior pre-school, and 
switch in grade 1 completely to Chinese with the exception of merely two Dai hours per 
week until grade 6. Menger’s’ Dai language education follows a different path: here all 
students receive Dai language education, independent from their ethnicity. Pre-school 
students sit in Dai courses of flexible time, and in grade 4 and grade 5 they attend Dai 
classes of two hours per week. Mengsan, as the third school, differs much from the two 
other schools. After the official Bulang/Dai-Chinese bilingual program has been 
terminated, there is no official minority language education conducted at this school 
anymore and officially all tuition is conducted in Chinese. 
 
 Mengyi Menger Mengsan 
Grades with Dai language tuition 
and no. of classes 
junior pre-school : 1 
senior pre-school: 1 
grade 1: 1 
grade 2: 1 
grade 3: 1 
grade 4: 1 
grade 5: 1 
grade 6:1 
junior pre-school: 1 
senior pre-school: 1 
grade 4: 2 
grade 5: 2 
0 
No. of classes overall and no. of 
minority language classes 
13: 8 14: 6 3: 0 
Weekly school hours taught per 
class 
junior pre-school: Dai only 
senior pre-school: Dai and Chinese, flexible 
grade 1 to 6: 2 
pre-school: flexible 
grade 4 and 5: 2 
0 
Table 22: Classes and school hours of minority language education at case study schools. Source: Own 
calculation after interviews. 
However, in addition to the official language education indicated above teachers 
in Xishuangbanna also sometimes use minority languages as language of instruction and 
as tool in their classes. Teachers at Mengyi and Menger use Dai language as language of 
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instruction in pre-school classes, whereas, according to my interview partners at these 
two schools, this was not necessary from grade 1 onwards. Once students enter this class, 
they said, tuition can be completely conducted in Chinese. At Mengsan, a school that 
does not have official minority language education scheduled, teachers in majority also 
start with Chinese. One of the three teachers, however, said that in the first months of 
the grade 1 he often uses Bulang language as additional language of instruction in class, 
which means that at least one third of the students at Mengsan experience Bulang 
language at school, although they do not learn to write Dai script. 
In both Mengyi and Menger the weekly timetable reflects the low importance of 
Dai language tuition in the schools’ curriculum compared to the core subjects such as 
math and Chinese. In both schools Dai courses, similar to courses of the subjects Labor 
and Art, are scheduled on the afternoon. Only at pre-school level Dai language education 
is also conducted in the morning, due to the flexibility that pre-school teachers, who are 
also the class teachers, have in determining the schedule of their own classes. The 
morning classes at both schools have been reserved for math and Chinese. Mengyi’s Dai 
lessons are mostly scheduled for the 4th, 5th, and in majority for the 6th school hour of the 
6 hour-days (see Table 23). According to my observations students at all three schools are 
more tired in the afternoon school hours than in the morning classes, which means that 
scheduling Dai language education to the afternoon has negative effects on learning 
abilities, motivations, and outcomes. 
 
Grade Junior Pre-
school 
Senior 
Pre-school 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Position 
in 
timetable 
flexible flexible Thu: 4 
Fri: 6 
Mo: 6 
Thu: 6 
Thu: 6 
Fri: 6 
Tue: 5 
Wed: 4 
Mo: 4 
Tue: 6 
Thu: 4 
Fri: 5 
Table 23: Timetable of Dai language classes at Mengyi in school year 2011-12, second semester. Source: 
Own calculation based on school-internal documents. 
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Students, parents, and teachers 
The three schools differ strongly in the number of students and teachers who are 
involved in the tuition of minority languages (see Table 24). 
 Mengyi Menger Mengsan 
Estimated percentage of students who ever underwent Dai 
language education at school 
100 % 100 % 0, but flexible 
informal minority 
language 
education 
Estimated percentage of students who underwent Dai language 
education at school in 2012 
 61 % 100 % 
Teachers overall 24 27 3 
Teachers trained in minority languages education total 5 2 1 
Teachers who received minority language education pre-service 
trainings 
at least 1 1 1 
Teachers who received minority language education in-service 
trainings 
5 2 0 
Teachers currently officially teaching minority languages (and in 
percentage of all teachers at school) 
4 (17 %) 3 (11%) 0 (0%) 
Table 24: Students and teachers in minority language education. Note: No. of teachers trained in minority 
languages refers to pre-service and to in-service trained teachers. Percentage of students who ever or in 
school year 2011-12 underwent Dai language education is estimation, based on no. of classes with Dai 
language education. Source: Own calculation after school-internal documents and interviews. 
All students at Mengyi and Menger undergo Dai language courses at some point of 
their primary school career, irrespective of their ethnicity or language background,304 but 
students who went through schooling in the year 2012 at Mengsan never received official 
school education in Bulang language or Dai script, and they only occasionally use Bulang 
language at school (see Table 24). However, Mengyi and Menger differ in the role that 
ethnicity plays in the amount of Dai language tuition that students receive at each school. 
Mengyi, as has been elaborated above, distinguishes students rather rigidly into those 
who visit Dai language classes from pre-school level on and those who visit Chinese 
language classes from pre-school and receive merely a short tuition of Dai language in the 
fourth and fifth grade. At Menger, by contrast, all students receive Dai language 
education in pre-school, grade 4, and grade 5. 
The preference for Dai over Bulang, Hani or other languages, however, means also 
that some students, who presumably could benefit from mother-tongue education, are 
only served by unofficial language usage in class, but not by official language programs. 
Students in Mengsan, who have, according to their teachers, a lower Chinese language 
background than other students in the region, receive merely a few explanations by their 
teachers in Bulang language over the first few months. Especially after the school will 
have merged with the nearest central school and when younger students will visit classes 
with non-Bulang speakers, it will be much more difficult for them to receive such 
additional support. Menger’s Hani or Ake speaking students who have difficulties with 
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 According to a projection of classes that contain courses of Dai language, but not considering 
students who come later than grade 5 or who leave earlier than grade 4, all students at both schools 
receive Dai language education. 
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understanding Chinese are similarly not served by formal bilingual mother tongue 
language education. For them learning Dai language in additional classes could potentially 
help in communication with Dai students, but as the Dai classes focus on script rather 
than on oral communication, Dai language classes construct an additional burden to 
students who already struggle with learning Chinese. 
Students’ and parents’ opinions on the segregated tuition at Mengyi and the 
ethnically mixed education at Menger reflect the perceived pyramid of language 
hierarchy in Xishuangbanna. Some non-Dais criticized the forced Dai language education 
at Menger as detrimental for learning Chinese, and non-Dai students said that they don’t 
like the class because they don’t see a use in it. One student answered the question of 
what he thinks about his Dai studies with the simple sentence: “I am not a Dai” (ST-
12_2012-03-02). One Han mother who migrated from Sichuan to Xishuangbanna argued 
that although learning the local Dai language might be good for understanding the 
region’s language she is worried about her son’s progress in the other subjects (FA-
09_2012-01-01). Ethnic Dai parents at both schools, by contrast, approved that their 
children learn Dai language at school. They said that their children should inherit their 
ancestors’ language and learn about Dai traditions. However, other Dai parents saw the 
ethnic separation at Mengyi more critical. One Dai father, for instance, assumed that the 
ethnic separation is more a measure to separate well-performing Han students from 
presumably less studious Dai students (FA-08_2012-03-09). Parents of children at 
Mengsan, where students do not receive any official minority language, expressed 
diversified opinions. Among my interviews partners some argued that they wished their 
children had the chance to learn minority languages at schools to preserve ethnic 
heritage, but others argued that the school should merely prepare their children in the 
national curriculum. 
In sum, the hierarchical ordering of languages seems to be often welcomed by Dai, 
but criticized by speakers of other languages. However, none of the parents and students 
who expressed their dissatisfaction with the current language schooling was able to 
recollect any action that they have done to change this situation. Generally, even the 
dissatisfied parents and students have the idea that whatever the school arranges must 
be followed and cannot be changed from the parents’ side. Especially the decision of who 
receives Dai language education is seen as made “high above”. The expression “listen to 
teachers’ arrangement” was common in statements of parents in Xishuangbanna (e.g. FA-
08_2012-03-09; FA-04_2012-02-26). 
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Dai script teachers at all observed case study schools have acquired Dai or Bulang 
as mother tongue, and have additionally learned Dai script at home, at temples, or at 
schools and colleges. The majority of these teachers have been also educated in Dai 
language pedagogies, either through pre-service teacher education or through in-service 
teacher trainings in bilingual education. At all three schools at least one teacher 
underwent Dai education during his or her college studies at the Xishuangbanna 
Vocational Technical College. In addition, two of Menger’s teachers have also attended 
teacher trainings at the Yunnan Province Bilingual Teacher Training Program and went to 
trainings organized by the Prefecture and County Bureaus of Education, but one teacher 
never underwent a specific training in Dai language pedagogies.305 Mengyi’s teachers 
received bilingual training through the “Dai-Chinese Bilingual Education Experimental 
Program”.306 However, the number of teachers who currently teach minority languages 
differs from that of bilingually trained personnel at all three schools. Mengsan’s one 
teacher with a degree in Dai-Chinese education is currently not involved in official 
bilingual teaching, although he uses minority languages unofficially in his classes to 
communicate with students. In Menger, the situation is the opposite: more teachers 
engage in official Dai language tuition here than there are teachers who underwent 
teacher trainings. At Mengyi, finally, less teachers are currently teaching Dai language 
than there have been trained, since one teacher, who has been trained by the “Dai-
Chinese Bilingual Education Experimental Program” is permanently ill. 
The staff situation at these schools prevents further expansion of Dai tuition. None 
of the schools gained additional teacher posts in the staff appointment scheme 
specifically for minority language education. Since they similarly cannot hire additional 
private teachers (see chapter 3), Mengyi and Menger had to fulfill Dai teaching 
requirements with already available teachers at the schools. Although Mengyi is one of 
Xishuangbanna’s schools with the highest share of Dai-Chinese bilingually trained 
teachers there is still a lack of such teachers, for instance to cover for teachers on leave. 
Menger’s available Dai teacher force suffices currently merely for tuition in selected 
classes, since all Dai teachers have to fulfill teaching requirements in other subjects and 
have class teacher responsibilities as well. Even if, however, all available Dai teachers at 
this school would be scheduled to teach only Dai language courses, their combined class 
hours workload would be insufficient to expand Dai tuition to all classes from pre-school 
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 This teacher regrets that school leaders never sent him to teacher trainings. Since his two 
younger Dai colleagues both have been sent to such trainings, he assumes that the school is only willing to 
“invest” into younger teachers, but not into him who was going to retire soon. 
306
 For a description of these trainings refer to chapter 5. 
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to grade six. At Mengsan, finally, the available bilingually trained teaching force would 
allow installing minority language courses, but currently this potential is not used. 
Curriculum 
The intended curriculum of Mengyi and Menger, as formulated and justified in 
schools documents, combines language goals with goals of learning about ethnic cultures 
and of becoming a “civilized” citizen. The yearly plan for bilingual education at Menger 
lists language goals such as “to be able to communicate in Dai”, “to learn the 42 letters of 
the Dai script”, or “to master 1500 Dai words”, but it also proposes that tuition should 
cultivate students’ qualities, such as “to enjoy reading”, to “love books”, and “to avoid 
uncivilized speech”.307 In a proposal for minority language education at Mengyi the school 
staff and administrators at the Jinghong Bureau of Education write that the overall goal of 
Dai-Chinese bilingual education is not only to educate “experts in both minority languages 
and Chinese”, but also to “rise the quality of the teaching force”, to “strengthen the 
ethnic cultural knowledge among teachers”, to “develop moral work at school”, to 
“propagate the beauty of ethnic culture” and to “strengthen ethnic confidence.”308 By this 
combination of language goals with educational goals and cultural goals in the intended 
curriculum reflects the different policy goals of educational and ethnic policies in China. 
In detail, however, the frameworks of the intended curriculum for class education 
differ much between the schools. The pre-school “project” classes of Mengyi follow an 
additive-maintenance model that aims at bilingualism. This model intends to build up a 
multi-glossic language environment as a tool for Dai students and a monoglossic one for 
the separated Han students (see chapter 2 on linguistic and social goals in bilingual 
education models). The “school-based” Dai classes at Menger in grade 4 and 5, by 
contrast, follow at least in theory a recursive-developmental framework. The linguistic 
goal is hetero-glossic bilingualism where both Dai and non-Dai students speak Dai in 
addition to Chinese. Minority language education is a means to fulfill the right of the 
minority to preserve their own language and to transmit language knowledge to the next 
generation. Bilingual education at Mengsan, finally, that uses Bulang language as a tool to 
support tuition in Chinese language, follows the subtractive-transitional framework. The 
focus is on the students’ lack in Chinese language skills, and the linguistic goal of this 
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 Source: Internal document of school Menger: “2012-2013 学年善学期双语教学工作计划 [Plan 
for bilingual education in 2012-2013, first semester].” Received during interview PR-16_2012-03-01. 
308
Source: Internal document of Jinghong City Bureau of Education concerning minority language 
education at Mengyi (2011-12-15): “景洪市 XX 小学创建傣汉双语教学示范点实施方案 [Proposal for 
implementation of Dai-Chinese bilingual education at XX Elementary School in Jinghong City]”. Received 
during interview TE-32_2013-05-20. 
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tuition is monolingualism. The direction is thus clearly one way: Minority students (in the 
case of Mengsan Bulang students, in the case of Menger Hani or Miao students) are 
supposed to learn Chinese, and using minority language is thus only a tool on the way. 
However, the picture features also much diversity. Firstly, the content of the 
enacted curriculum differs much between the schools. Dai tuition at the pre-school 
classes at both Mengyi and Menger and the “project classes” in Mengyi of grade 1 and 2 
focuses much on script acquisition, but also contains communicative approaches. Tuition 
at the pre-school classes in Menger includes songs, and in Mengyi Dai language is used to 
produce stories. Especially Mengyi’s Dai pre-school classes combine language learning 
with non-language-related content, such as studying local culture, nature, and ethnic 
customs. The so called “regular” classes of prefecture-wide Dai education models 
conducted in Menger’s grades 4 and 5 and Mengyi’s grades 3 to 6 focus on language 
knowledge, but not on communicative skills, and on written language, but not on oral 
language. In all observed classes under this model observed tuition was limited to 
teaching Dai graphemes, words, and sentences. Dai is here merely a content of tuition, 
but neither Dai language classes nor core subjects use Dai as language of instruction. 
Unlike at the two other schools, tuition conducted in Bulang language at Mengsan is 
limited to the oral domain and to a few sentences used in the class. It does not contain 
lessons specifically on minority language knowledge or for the improvement of already 
existing Bulang oral skills. 
Secondly, there are also differences in the methods. Teachers in Mengyi’s “project 
classes” use a more varied set of productive methods. Each week the class discovers a 
new topic based on the program’s Dai textbook, and this topic will be the basis for story-
composition, drawing, and class discussion. “Non-project” Dai courses in Mengyi and 
Menger use the “Xishuangbanna Dai primary school textbook”. The methods are book-
oriented and center on rote learning, such as copying graphemes or repeating single 
words in class. Students have to do very little homework in Dai language, mostly only 
coping letters and words. In the tuition model of Mengsan, by contrast, teachers use 
minority languages merely as a tool in regular classes of other subjects. The Bulang 
teacher at Mengsan, similar to other teachers at village schools with students of low 
Chinese proficiency, uses minority languages merely as an oral tool to explain other 
school subjects’ content, but he does not engage specific methods for language tuition. 
In terms of the assessed curriculum all official minority language courses at the 
schools contain written tests on knowledge in Dai language, but there are differences in 
the modes and content of assessing students. Only in the Dai pre-school class at Menger 
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teachers use standardized county-wide test sheets on script recognition and writing 
provided by the County Bureau of Education, whereas in all other classes teachers use 
self-composed test sheets. In Mengyi students of pre-school classes and higher grades are 
also assessed in Dai language skills, but here assessment is completely based on school-
internal and class-internal evaluation sheets. Mengsan’s students, finally, are only tested 
in Chinese language, whereas neither Dai script nor Bulang language is used for test 
sheets or is assessed by examinations. 
Although the learned curriculum in minority languages is difficult to assess in light 
of a lack of standardized assessment, through classroom observation and exemplary 
interviews with students and teachers I was able to collect some insights into the 
outcome of the observed language classes. Dai language pre-school classes at Mengyi 
enabled students after a few months to write not only graphemes and words in Dai 
language, but also to compose complete stories in Dai. Grade 5 students at Menger, by 
contrast, were even after 18 months of Dai instruction unable to write basic words such 
as their own name in Dai. Tuition stood still with repeating graphemes, and students did 
not sufficiently learn to combine these into words, let alone to write texts. Similarly, there 
were large differences in students’ oral competencies in these two classes. Tuition at 
Mengyi’s project pre-school classes enabled students to narrate stories and to comment 
on the stories of their classmates. Menger’s Dai speakers in grade 5, by contrast, did not 
seem to have improved Dai oral skills and non-Dai speakers in this class did not gain oral 
or written language skills that could be used for communication. At Mengsan, finally, 
students seem to have not improved their minority language skills, as the curriculum did 
not include explanations or exercises on minority languages. 
The schools also differ in what students learn beyond minority language skills. 
Firstly, concerning knowledge on specific “ethnic” culture students in Mengyi’s pre-school 
project classes gained knowledge about Dai culture such as architecture, traditional tools, 
or festivals, but Menger’s grade five students, by contrast, were unable to recollect any 
other class content than the language-related one. Secondly, the schools differ in the 
effects of the minority language education on Chinese language learning. Several 
indicators suggest positive effects of Mengyi’s “project classes” on Chinese language 
education, for instance teachers’ statements that tuition conducted in Dai language has 
supported their students’ Chinese learning, (PR-04_2011-12-31; TE-32_2013-05-20; TE-
04_2012-01-04) and the project classes’ better attainments in Chinese grades: students at 
the bilingual classes (overwhelmingly ethnic Dai, who at other schools regularly score 
lower than Han, see above), scored in the project classes similar to the predominantly 
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Han classes (see Table 25). At the other two schools effects of minority language 
education on Chinese attainments where not measurable due to a lack of test groups for 
comparison. 
 Bilingual classes (ethnic Dai students only) Chinese language classes (diverse students) 
1 75 76 
2 82 84 
3 only one class: 69 
4 only one class: 77 
5 77 74 
6 70 74 
average  75 76 
Table 25: Average grades of Dai-Chinese classes versus Chinese-only classes in “Chinese language and 
literature (语文) at Mengyi in 2010/2011. Source: County-wide student evaluation by County Bureau of 
Education. 
The curriculum at the three observed case study schools differs in its 
implementation from the intended curriculum in the case of Mengyi and Menger, but it 
fulfills the intentions in the case of Mengsan. The additive-maintenance model of the 
intended curriculum of the bilingual pre-school “project classes” of Mengyi succeeds in 
following the bilingual model in the first two years of pre-school, but once students enter 
the first grade minority language tuition is reduced to merely two school hours per week. 
In effect, this program helps students to overcome language barriers at the first place, 
and it supports the transmission of script knowledge in students’ heritage languages, but 
in the long run the succeeding reduction causes a standstill of language usage at school. 
Curriculum implementation similarly corrupts the recursive-developmental framework of 
the intended curriculum of Dai classes at Menger in grade 4 and 5, as this Dai language 
education fails to enable students to actively use the language and script and hence does 
not contribute much to revitalization of heritage languages. The limited usage of Dai 
script to merely special courses prevents Dai language from becoming a resource for the 
students. Since non-Dai students in class stay monolingual, the classes also fail to create a 
hetero-glossic linguistic environment. Minority language education at Mengsan with 
unofficial usage of minority languages in class is the only case where the enacted 
curriculum fulfills the intended curriculum. The subtractive-transitional framework, that 
sees minority languages as a problem and aims at language shift of students, is fulfilled by 
the enacted, the tested, and the learned curriculum. Minority speakers learn Chinese and 
they also learn that their heritage languages are not suitable for schooling. Learning is 
thus one-directional and bilingualism in class changes after a few months to 
monolingualism. 
In sum, the different modes of minority language curriculum conducted at the 
schools presented here can be seen as different stages in the shift from the “traditional” 
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to the “reformed” curriculum that reform policies in China aim at since the beginning of 
the new century. Education at Mengsan follows the most centralized curriculum. Chinese, 
math, and other standard subjects are the only courses offered, whereas local curriculum 
subjects are currently not taught here. Minority languages are excluded from the 
intended and learned curriculum content, and are merely used as a tool when Chinese 
language tuition reaches communicative barriers. The model of Dai language education 
practiced in the higher grades of Mengyi and through all Dai courses in Menger is a first 
step form leaving the centralized curriculum in selected courses. Curriculum in this 
language is localized and intended to connect to students’ linguistic background. However, 
this curriculum is restricted to specific courses of comparatively few school hours per 
week, whereas the regular courses remain unaffected and monolingual. Furthermore, the 
still prevalent teacher-centered methods and book-oriented content also remain far from 
the agenda of the curriculum reform policies. The project pre-school classes at Mengyi, 
finally, are nearest to the curriculum reform agenda. Content of classes is localized and 
teachers have the opportunity to adjust content to local environment and to use student-
centered, production-oriented, and project-based methods. 
6.2.3 Accountability to state control and spaces for school-based decisions 
Minority language tuition at the three schools is embedded in institutional settings 
which both support and limit the use of minority languages in class. These institutional 
settings not only determine which languages can be used in class and to what degree, but 
they also affect the space that school staff has for making decisions on these issues. In the 
next paragraphs I will first consider a selection of different institutional settings with 
relation to program participation, evaluation mechanisms, and the norms of teacher 
behavior, before in the second part I will address the effects of these settings on school-
based decision making at the three case study schools. 
Program dependency 
All three schools are currently or have formerly been pilot schools in minority 
language education programs by the Bureaus of Education. In addition to the general 
modes of how schools are embedded in the system of state provision of educational 
services (see chapter 3) these programs use schools again as implementers of state 
policies and define schools as part of state hierarchy. Governments choose schools to 
implement programs. According to several interview partners, schools have hardly any 
choice to reject these programs, but instead they are required to find ways and resources 
to add school hours, to assign teachers, and to organize tuition. 
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On the other side, however, the above mentioned programs also open up spaces 
for school-based decisions. Firstly, the specific instruments of programs in minority 
language education provide schools with additional resources. In the realm of 
organizational tools, programs have provided Mengyi and Menger with teacher trainings, 
textbooks, and other educational tools. As far as authoritative tools are concerned, 
Mengyi and Menger have been both approached by government offices to conduct 
minority language education, but in the case of Mengyi this has been more regularized, 
for instance, when the Jinghong Bureau of Education edited a plan to conduct minority 
language education specifically at this school.309 In terms of financial tools, Mengyi 
received educational supply through programs, Menger received direct financial funds to 
spend on educational supply on own’ discretion, and Mengsan did not receive any funds 
or tools specifically for minority language education at all. In terms of informational tools, 
finally, program participation brought especially for Mengyi additional benefits in 
knowledge about educational methods when teachers and external experts designed 
methods, wrote textbooks, and generally discussed the benefits and approaches of 
minority language education. Furthermore, Mengyi’s visibility in printed and online media 
improved through the program,310 which together with comparatively frequent visits by 
external experts can also reflect back on “school identity”, when school staff, superiors in 
educational bureaucracy, parents, and students see the school represented by minority 
language education programs. At Menger, informational tools in the shape of teacher 
trainings have been used merely to inform teachers about methods, but did not schedule 
method development with teachers. Mengsan, again, lacks in such tools, and the school is 
not represented in the internet. 
Additionally, participation in programs for minority language education also 
affects the schools’ prospects in the school merger program. Although Mengyi is a rather 
small school, it was so far exempted from school mergers, similar to the other pilot 
schools of the “Dai-Chinese Bilingual Education Experimental Program”. Menger’s school 
merger, by contrast, has triggered expansion of Dai language education, as it increased 
the number of available Di language teachers. The plans to merge Mengsan presumably 
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 Internal document of Jinghong City Bureau of Education concerning minority language 
education at Mengyi (2011-12-15): “景洪市 XX 小学创建傣汉双语教学示范点实施方案 [Proposal for 
implementation of Dai-Chinese bilingual education at XX Elementary School in Jinghong City]”. Document 
received during interview TE-32_2013-05-20. 
310
 As of March 2014, the internet provided only information about Mengyi and Menger, including 
photos of the school and classes. Whereas for Menger online reports relate merely to the newly opened 
school buildings, information on Mengyi focuses on the schools’ Dai language program. Additionally, 
publically available printed and online project reports by the organization SIL present also minority 
language education at Mengyi (SIL - East Asia Group 2010).  
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have contributed to terminate this otherwise successful program here. Although my 
interview partners at the Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education were reluctant to comment 
on the effects of minority language programs on the sensitive issue of school mergers311 
they repeatedly emphasized that minority language education programs need 
linguistically homogenous student populations of small, non-merged village schools. In 
the rather inapprehensible process of the Bureau of Education’s selecting merger 
candidates minority language programs might thus well be a factor that contributes to 
exempting pilot schools from school mergers. 
Evaluations as management tool 
Similarly to other schools in China (see chapter 3) the three case study schools as 
part of government bureaucracy in China are subject to regular evaluations. Officers from 
the Office of Compulsory Education and from the Office of Educational Research in the 
Bureaus of Education regularly visit all three case study schools for classroom observation 
and for controlling teachers’ class preparation and student supervision. Additionally, all 
three schools have also been approached by the irregular evaluations of student exams in 
specific classes. Similarly, the prefecture-wide and county/city-wide comparative tables 
based on graduation exams of sixth-graders graduation exams list the yearly results of 
two of the schools (Mengyi and Menger; Mengsan has no students in sixth grade). Finally, 
in all three schools, as teachers and administrators assured me, teaching is also peer-
evaluated by regular mutual teacher classroom visits. All these different evaluations 
establish accountability of staff at the three schools, and they embed the schools in the 
state hierarchies. As school staff is regularly evaluated, their leeway for decision making 
in regular subjects is rather small and confined to those decisions that benefit evaluation 
results. 
For minority language education, by contrast, evaluations provide a much larger 
space for school-based decision making. External school evaluations in Xishuangbanna 
generally do not list criteria on minority language education in the catalogue of assessed 
items. Neither the “Educational Quality Examinations” nor the “Primary Student 
Graduation Examinations” contain information about student results in minority language 
classes. Accordingly, school rankings based on these exam tables cannot reflect success in 
Dai language education at the three case study schools. For teachers, however, the lack of 
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 As has been discussed in chapter 3, school mergers in China are a highly controversial issue 
when they mean that village students have to board at school due. Due to the wide criticisms towards this 
program officers for minority language education in the Bureaus of Xishuangbanna and the Counties 
hesitated to comment on this issue. 
 256 
institutionalized quantitative assessment of their work means that at all schools Dai 
language teaching is disadvantaged compared to other subjects and that they may focus 
on those subjects where they gain benefits in assessments. The only exemptions are here 
the pre-school classes of Menger that have been subject to Mengla County-wide 
examinations in Dai language in 2011 and subsequent years. Interestingly, in these years 
Dai language has been the only subject in which pre-school students at Menger had to sit 
in county-wide exams, which arguably provides Dai language education with a specific 
weight here compared to minority language education at other schools. 
However, qualitative assessments of teaching processes beyond the student 
examinations have been more outstanding at Mengyi. This school has regular and 
frequent contacts to the minority language officers in the City Bureau of Education with 
mutual support in writing proposals and it also often hosts Chinese and even foreign 
visitors to conduct research and teacher trainings on minority language education. 
Institutional settings provide for Mengyi’s Dai language teachers hence more chances for 
feedback than for teachers at Menger and Mengsan. Menger has hosted once the Dai 
language teacher competition, but the school has never hosted minority language 
education experts from province, prefecture, or county on the issue of Dai language 
education (TE-22_2012-03-05). According to the then-teacher, Mengsan’s former 
Dai/Bulang-Chinese bilingual program has been evaluated as successful in raising students’ 
skills in both Chinese and minority languages, but this evaluation seems to not have 
benefitted the minority language education conducted here, as the program was 
terminated soon after, speculatively due to the small size of the school’s language 
program and the school’s merger prospects (TE-12_2012-01-27).312 Since then, the school 
has not been approached ever again by official evaluators on the issue of minority 
language education or on the problems of ethnic minority students’ acquisition of 
Chinese language. 
Similarly, internal Dai teacher evaluation mechanisms are more elaborated at 
Mengyi than at Menger. Mengyi, for instance, demands that teachers visit each other’s 
classes once a week, and this includes also visits to Dai language classes. Since there are 
several Dai language teachers especially in pre-school classes, they can even visit 
colleagues who teach the same grade. Menger, by contrast, does not schedule teachers’ 
peer-evaluation, and in the above mentioned plan for bilingual tuition the school writes 
merely that Dai teachers should mutually visit each others’ classes in unspecified 
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 Although during fieldwork I was not able to clarify the exact reasons for terminating the official 
minority language education at Mengsan, at this point it suffices to show that the decision was made 
outside the school and positive evaluations of the teaching success did not stop termination of the program. 
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frequency and content, but during my one-week fieldwork I never saw teachers visiting 
each other’s Dai classes. At Mengsan, finally, neither colleagues nor visiting leaders of the 
central school provide feedback on minority language education. 
Evaluation mechanisms at all three schools paint a complex and even confusing 
picture for the students. On the one side, students both at Mengyi and Menger receive 
their assessment results in Dai language similar to that in other subjects on their report 
cards (see picture in appendix), which also effects students’ rewards (Menger hands out 
10 RMB per semester to high-achieving students; Mengyi hands out classroom supply 
such as pens and notebooks). However, once students enter the last step of their 
elementary school education, only results in Chinese and math count for the Primary 
Student Graduation Examinations, which determine students’ chances to visit prestigious 
secondary schools. Furthermore, the lack of Dai language education at all secondary 
schools that graduates from the three schools regularly transfer to also lowers the 
importance of Dai language education for students. 
Norms of teachers’ roles 
Generally, institutional settings define minority language teachers at the three 
schools by their professional positions as members of the state bureaucracy. They have 
been trained at state-run colleges, their job positions are provided by government 
agencies, and both salary and promotion depend on standardized evaluations. Taken 
together, these institutional settings demand that all three case study schools’ 
educational and administrative staff, similar to other schools in China, represent the state 
and consider state ideology in curriculum decisions. 
However, in addition to this, institutional settings at least partly also define that 
teachers and administrators are experts on street-level. The program design of Mengyi’s 
Dai language education values teachers’ expertise when it asks for their advice and 
support in writing textbooks, choosing content, and discussing methods. In the case of 
Menger different institutional settings have been provided to use teachers’ expertise in 
Dai language tuition. Teachers at this school are regularly asked to participate in teaching 
competitions and teacher trainings, and there is the possibility to conduct small school-
based research. Teachers can publish results online or in Xishuangbanna’s educational 
journal edited by the Prefectural Bureau of Education. However, these opportunities to 
use teacher-generated expertise are also limited to few occasions: teacher competitions 
are scheduled only once a year; teacher trainings are often one-directional meetings to 
inform teachers rather than to gather their experiences; and school-based research 
projects designed by the Bureau of Education either never reach Menger or do not cover 
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minority languages (TE-22_2012-03-05). At Mengsan, however, the institutional settings 
are even more detrimental for valuating teachers’ expertise. After the program for 
Bulang-Chinese language has been terminated the one teacher with a formal Dai-Chinese 
bilingual education has never been again invited to teacher trainings in bilingual 
education, and the superiors at the central school also have not forwarded research 
projects to this branch school (TE-12_2012-01-27). 
Party membership, by contrast, has been seen by my interview partners as distinct 
from their roles as professionals at schools. Teachers only seldom mentioned in 
interviews their party membership or meetings of the school’s teacher union. In fact, 
even for school principals, since party membership is not anymore required for principals’ 
promotion, their role as professional representative of the state seemed to have been 
more important for accountability in school administration than their potential role as 
party members. 
Finally, institutionalized norms also attribute the roles of representatives of ethnic 
groups and preservers of ethnic cultures or languages to the teachers at the three schools, 
although, again, in much varied degrees. At all three schools administrators, students, 
and parents know the ethnic status of the teachers.313 The teachers are members of the 
local community and reside in the villages.314 Generally, villagers wish that teachers 
preserve the local knowledge, including languages.315 Mengyi amplifies teachers’ role as 
ethnic representatives. School leaders here regularly select specifically ethnic Dai as class 
teachers in the bilingual pre-school classes and commission these teachers to inform the 
parents about the Dai language program. According to several interviewed teachers, 
Mengyi’s teachers of higher classes, the teachers at Menger, and those at Mengsan, by 
contrast, are not required to visit parents on behalf of the schools specifically for Dai 
language issues. 
Differences in the spaces for school-based decision making 
The above discussed institutional settings provide a series of similar limits and 
spaces for school-based decision making on minority language education at the three 
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 Students, parents, and colleagues know teachers’ ethnicity partly because the school made 
ethnic statuses public, partly because teachers introduced themselves as members of one group, and partly 
because names, language abilities, or physical appearance provide indicators for ethnicity. 
314
 This distinguishes minority language teachers from those teachers, mostly ethnic Han, who 
migrated into the area and who reside at school ground due to a lack of privately-owned housing. 
315
 Although none of the family members who I interviewed ever actively approached the teachers 
on this matter, many of them said that they wished that teachers at the school fulfill this role of language 
workers. However, as these findings are merely preliminary and non-representative, more research is 
necessary on villagers’ perceptions on the role of teachers of minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna. 
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schools. None of the schools presented here is able to specifically hire minority language 
teachers, resources for such tuition at all schools depend largely on programs, and 
programs are generally started outside schools. Similarly, spaces for discretionary 
decision making overlap, as institutional spaces allow at all three schools also for school-
based decision making, especially in instructional matters, for instance on the choice of 
language in the first months of schooling, in the use of textbooks, and in assigning 
students to classes. 
However, the institutional settings also largely differ between the three schools; 
and in this each school resembles one of the types of institutional support for minority 
language education presented in chapter 6.1. 
Mengyi belongs clearly to the category of the “showpiece schools”. It is a pilot 
school in Xishuangbanna’s most prestigious program for minority language education, its 
internal evaluation mechanisms emphasize the value of Dai language education, and its 
teachers are defined as experts in Dai language. These institutional settings open up 
spaces for school-based decision making in the realm of instructional matters when 
teachers have been involved in designing the programs, but the larger parts of decision 
making rest with the Bureaus of Education from city to province level, for instance on 
program participation, media attention, and resource allocation. 
Menger can be seen as a school of the “resource supported schools” type. The 
school has run minority language education for a relatively long period and government 
agencies sporadically supported the school with textbooks, teacher trainings, and other 
educational equipment. However, Dai language education never was as much popularized 
here as it was at Mengyi. Its institutional settings, such as the absence of both external 
and internal evaluations, create considerable space for school-based decision making on 
minority language education. Different from other schools of this type, however, pre-
school classes in Menger have been subject to Xishuangbanna’s only standardized county-
wide student examinations in Dai language education in the years 2011 and 2012, which 
limits the space for school-based decision making here. 
Mengsan, as the case study school with the lowest profile in minority language 
education, belongs to the category “left-alone schools” in terms of minority language 
education. Although the school has with a bilingually trained staff of one third and with a 
history of successful bilingual education rather beneficial preconditions to run minority 
language education, the school hardly conducts any minority language education, except 
occasionally using Bulang language for communication in class. Institutional settings 
provide a varied picture for this school. On the one side, there are no specific incentives 
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for teachers to conduct minority language education, and in light of a lack of programs, 
textbooks, or official top-down requirements it would be a difficult task for the school to 
run extensive minority language education in times when even the core subjects are 
underserved at the school. On the other side, however, staff at this school is much less 
subject to external and internal evaluation than that of the other two schools. Since the 
main requirements for teachers are merely to raise students’ grades especially in math 
and Chinese, no matter how these goals are reached, spaces for school-based decisions at 
Mengsan are rather wide.  
In sum, the discussion in the subchapters above have indicated that the three case 
study schools not only differ much in their implementation of minority language 
education, but also in the space provided for school-based decision making on this 
subject. In the next sub-chapter I will discuss how principals and teachers at these three 
schools make decisions under these various institutional settings. 
6.3 Decision making processes on minority language education at case 
study schools  
With the different institutional settings these three case study schools can serve 
as examples to investigate into the effects of perceptions of institutional spaces on 
decision making at school-level, especially under vague policy goals. On the following 
pages I will, in a deductive approach, describe how principals and teachers at the three 
case-study schools (and for comparative reasons also at selected other schools in 
Xishuangbanna) make decisions under different institutional settings. Guided by the 
interview partners’ statements I will structure this detailed picture of perspectives and 
decisions into three areas: ways of how teachers and principals articulate and consider 
their own interests, their interpretations of minority language policies and institutions, 
and strategies that they choose to make decisions at school-level on the implementation 
of curriculum.  
6.3.1 Considering own interests and street-level bureaucratic positions in 
state agencies 
The approach to analyze decision making through decisions by street-level 
bureaucrats views street-level bureaucrats as caught in dilemmas between their position 
as bureaucrat in state agencies and service providers to clients. According to the 
framework these multiple roles determine also the interests that policy implementers 
connect with specific policies. Before I will analyze my interview partners’ interpretation 
of policies and decision making, I will thus in the next paragraphs investigate into how 
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teachers and principals define their own role in relation to school institutions and how 
they describe their own interests in the realm of minority language education. 
Considering roles of street-level bureaucrats 
Notwithstanding individual identities,316 institutions define teachers and principals 
at the observed schools as bureaucrats in government-run social units. Teachers know 
about their responsibility to educate their students in nationally unified knowledge, 
including Chinese language. Under this environment principals and teachers define 
themselves as supporters for the children. Many principals and teachers at rural schools 
complained about the hard environment, the long distance to city life, and the 
comparatively large workloads. Interviewed teachers said that they wished more for 
reduction of workload than for increase in salary. For them the additional 20 RMB that 
teachers at “remote” schools receive monthly on their pay check are in no way a 
compensation for the additional work. One teacher at school no. 5 listed the difficulties of 
rural teachers at small schools with the following words when she described why teachers 
want to leave the school: 
“The reason for this, one has to say, is the treatment here. We have to teach more school hours 
than in Jinghong and at the central school. Our school does not have a guard, so teachers must also 
work as guards. We don’t have nurses, so once students get sick the teachers must care for them. 
We have no custodian for the dormitories, so teachers must do that as well. All in addition to 
teaching the lessons and correcting homework exercises.” (TE-02_2013-05-17) 
 However, at the same time they compare their own suffering with the support 
they can deliver for students. One teacher at Mengsan put it in these words: “If we would 
not come to this place, no one would” (TE-12_2012-01-27). In addition, rural teachers 
have the opinion that their role is even more important in shaping students’ knowledge 
than that of their urban colleagues, since villagers have less ability to support their 
children. One teacher expressed this with a comparison:  
“Children in cities are supported by the teachers in the classroom. When they come home the 
parents additionally supervise their homework and push them. One can say that city children’s 
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 Analysis under categories such as gender, age, ethnicity, history of migration, family background, 
educational level, language skills, socio-economic status, and professional status, to name just a few, would 
certainly produce the insight that my interview partners differ much in their individual identity and that this 
identity goes beyond the officially ascribed attributes. In terms of ethnicity, for instance, one teacher at 
school no. 14 called himself a “fake minority person” and explained that although he is registered as Jinuo, 
he does not speak Jinuo and knows nothing about Jinuo culture. Other teachers, who proudly said to be Dai, 
claimed that this is related to birth and education by parents in traditional Dai customs. Some respondents 
experienced ethnicity as responsibility, but also as a dilemma, for instance in choosing home language. One 
teacher said that she find it sad that the Hani language in their village slowly dies, but “since it is definitely 
better for my child’s studies” she uses only Chinese at home (TE-02_2013-05-17). These few examples 
indicate that ethnic identity, similar to other markers of identity, is more complex than official registration 
would suggest. 
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grades are only that good because teachers and parents both take care of them, but for our village 
children all depends on the teachers. Students learn only as much as the teacher teaches in the 
classroom here. When they come home parents don’t care for that.” (TE-32_2013-05-20) 
Minority language teachers’ identity is defined by their profession in a specific way. 
Firstly, many teachers connect their professional focus on Dai with their own identity. In 
the interviews they often used terms such as “we Dai” and “our Dai language” when they 
described their own role in class. Secondly, minority teachers also often define their 
professional education as an asset for their own identity that makes them special and 
valuable for schools. Although only very few of my interview partners have been 
specifically hired because he or she speaks minority languages, the ability to teach 
bilingually has been a factor for transfer and promotion for many. One teacher who was 
sent to Mengsan to teach a Bulang-Chinese experimental class claimed that “[t]he leaders 
wanted me to transfer to this place, they needed someone like me” (TE-12_201-01-27). 
These roles are much determined by state-governed institutions, beginning at 
college. On the one side, pre-school education major students at Xishuangbanna College 
are separated at College according to the official ethnic registration into Chinese language 
Han classes (visited mostly by Han) and Dai-Chinese bilingual classes (visited only by Dai). 
In this selection college students are pushed towards combining ethnic registration and 
professional identity. One teacher spelled this out: “See, we are ethnic Dai, so the College 
just has placed us into the bilingual classes” (TE-22_2012-03-05). Accordingly, students of 
Dai-Chinese pre-school teacher major at the Xishuangbanna Technical College described 
their motivations to study this subject as a mixture of advice by parents to generally study 
pre-school education and the assignment by the College to this major according to their 
ethnicity. When I asked them about their wishes for the ideal pre-school or kindergarten 
job they stated issues such as “good salary”, “friendly environment”, or “that the little 
devils will not be too naughty” (TS-02_2011-12-19). Despite their major as bilingual 
teachers the question if that kindergarten will offer minority language education was 
irrelevant for all interviewed students in this class. 
On the other side, however, teachers who have graduated in bilingual education 
told me that they wished to be transferred to schools that offer bilingual classes. 
According to the Dai teacher at school no. 22 more than 30 graduates of the bilingual 
classes at Xishuangbanna’s college applied for the eight job positions that were offered in 
Menghai in 2008. Without going into the details of each individual teacher’s ethnic and 
professional identities, this nevertheless indicates that minority language teachers who 
stay in this profession develop certain affection to this role. 
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Finally, group building processes of minority language teachers depend to large 
degrees on government activities. Minority language teachers in Xishuangbanna regularly 
meet, although in different constellations, at officially organized teacher trainings at 
county/city, prefecture, or province level, but there is no self-organized minority language 
teacher group in the region. Although some Dai language teachers have sporadic contacts 
to colleagues at other schools to share experiences in Dai tuition regular contacts focus in 
majority on Dai language colleagues within one school. Most Dai language teachers who I 
interviewed said that they don’t feel the need to intensify contacts to Dai language 
teachers outside their schools. In effect government-organized events are one of the few 
channels where teachers could develop a professional group identity as minority 
language teachers. 
Party membership, by contrast, is much less considered by school staff as a factor 
in determining their interests in minority language education than their professional roles. 
Although some interviewed teachers and administrators have been party members, in 
interviews they did not connect party membership with their position at schools 
concerning minority language education. Similarly, they perceive the ideological seminars 
at school not as part of their daily tuition, and especially not of decisions in minority 
language education, but as a necessity of school work beyond teaching content and 
methods. Especially concerning decisions on minority language education it is rather 
principals and teachers who make decisions, than Party secretaries. One school principal 
explained that the schools’ teacher CCP organization and the school’s branch party 
secretary neither interfere with daily tuition decisions nor with questions of installing 
minority language education programs at school (PR-10_2012-01-06).  
Despite these similarities between school staff’s roles at the three case studies 
there are also differences. Firstly, the share of minority language tuition compared to 
other teaching obligations differs between teachers at the schools discussed here. At 
those schools that I have introduced as “showpiece schools” Dai language programs 
define teachers’ workloads and position much, as instructors teach in separated and 
generally better equipped classrooms, and regularly attend teacher trainings. At the 
“resource supported schools” minority language tuition determines Dai teachers’ 
professional positions only to lesser degrees, as teachers here devote a larger share of 
their workload to teaching other subjects and as there are no specific institutionalized Dai 
teacher groups here. At the “left-alone schools”, finally, teachers’ professional identity is 
hardly any more defined by their ability to teach minority languages, but rather by their 
professional roles as teachers of the core subjects. 
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Secondly, there are also differences between the teachers at the three school 
types in terms of how externals and the local village society see them. At Mengyi as one 
of the “showpiece schools” both the principal and the Dai teachers have been regularly 
approached by external researchers to discuss minority language education. In these 
schools and similarly in the “resource supported schools” the local villagers also seem to 
view teachers through their Dai language profession. One teacher at school no. 17 said 
that villagers regularly approach him for transcription of Dai words for greeting cards, 
ceremonies, or house blessings, and that they see him as an expert of local cultural 
knowledge. For teachers at the “left-alone schools” this image seems to have faded 
slowly after the school’s official minority language education has terminated. One teacher 
at school no. 4, who used to teach Dai language at school until recently, said that in 
earlier times he was approached by villagers to open up a class to teach Dai script, but 
that after the school stopped the official program villagers seemed to have lost interest, 
and he as Dai language expert is less demanded (TE-30_2013-05-19). The village Mengsan, 
to name a final example, uses Dai script extensively in religious ceremonies, but the 
villages’ only Dai script teacher at school is not approached by villagers for his expertise. 
The teacher’s role as instructor of “national” or “external” knowledge at school seems to 
prevent villagers to use his knowledge for “local” or “internal” ceremonies. 
Teachers take over these institutionally defined identities differently. Some 
teachers said in the interviews that they are glad to be teachers of minority languages as 
they can hence contribute to preserving ethnic culture. Others said that they experience 
ethnic tuition as a burden, for instance, when they are required to teach minority 
languages although they feel not trained well enough in minority language education 
pedagogies. In any case, the profession of minority language teachers adds the role of 
mediators between schools and villagers to the professional identity of these teachers. 
This, in turn, distinguishes them from ethnic Han, from non-local school staff, and 
especially from teachers who teach core subjects. 
Considering interests 
The diverse interests that teachers and principals related in interviews to their 
own work in general and with minority language education specifically can be grouped 
into three kinds: material interests, professional interests, and ethnic-cultural interests. 
In terms of material interests, minority language teachers, similar to other 
teachers and principals, strive for increased income, work security, and comfortable living. 
Interviewed teachers wished for higher salary and bemoaned that teachers at rural 
schools have little chance to add additional income through offering private tutoring 
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classes. In light of increased chances for additional income and better educational 
opportunities for their own children317 teachers preferred city life over village life, and 
some wished to be transferred to urban schools. Job security, however, is more important 
than salary for many teachers and principals. One teacher said, for instance, that her 
college cohort has been lucky to be the last cohort that was after graduation directly 
assigned to teaching positions, whereas the others were required to find jobs by 
themselves. Although she was first assigned to remote schools where in her view life and 
working for teachers was extremely difficult she nevertheless valued this security highly 
(TE-22_2012-03-05). When I asked teachers if they consider changing their profession, 
many similarly argued that although their current position at schools are tough they 
nevertheless don’t want to miss the benefits and security of a stable job, health 
insurances, pensions, and in some cases also housing. 
Although minority language education contributes not more to satisfy these 
interests than teaching other subjects, and in fact teaching minority language education 
provides less opportunities for promotion, minority language teachers uttered only little 
discontent with their material status. In financial terms, only few teachers mentioned 
their exclusion from the yearly bonus pays as unfair. Teachers sometimes particularly 
disconnected teaching minority languages from financial interests. One teacher, for 
instance, mentioned that he did not expect financial compensations when he taught 
minority languages in evening classes to villagers (TE-25_2013-05-01, at school no. 4). 
Another teacher explained that she rather wants to have Dai language excluded from the 
painstaking unified exams than gaining the regular 200 RMB as bonus for teachers whose 
students perform well in these exams (TE-32_2013-05-20). In terms of promotion to city 
schools minority language education is similarly less useful, but even here the interviewed 
teachers seemed to be satisfied with the current situation, including their housing. The 
finding that they expressed higher material satisfaction than other teachers can on the 
one side be explained by bias in selection of interview partners, as I approached merely 
those minority language teachers who are active in teaching, whereas I was unable to 
approach teachers who left the service earlier. More importantly in terms of comparison, 
however, seems to be that minority language teachers on average seem to be more 
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 One teacher at Mengsan described the better educational opportunities in cities for his own 
child. When I asked if he was unhappy with his daughter studying and living at a secondary school far from 
his own home he answered: “No, I don’t think so. When your own child can go down there [down from the 
mountain villages to the valley cities] you are very happy, because schools down there have many teachers 
who take care. The children get in touch with many people and they receive a lot.” Additionally, he argues 
that city life offers more culture and more job opportunities in comparison to the villages: “Here [at the 
village] it’s all labor, it is very hard. It’s better to learn some culture in the cities and find something to do 
there” (TE-12_2012-01-27). 
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locally settled than other teachers. Most interviewed teachers who ever taught minority 
languages at school live off-campus in family-owned houses, have partners who bring 
additional income to the family, and seem to be pleased with not being transferred to 
other schools. 
Professional interests, finally, have been mentioned by teachers in the interviews 
far more often. Generally all teachers and principals described themselves as concerned 
about their students. They developed a high interest in students’ future and strive to offer 
qualitative tuition to their students. When I asked one teacher at Mengsan about his 
opinion about the scheduled school merger, which means for him a long daily way from 
his house to the new school or alternatively renting an additional flat, he said that he 
welcomes the school merger as “once we are there, seen from teaching and from 
management, the children will learn more” (TE-12_2012-01-27). One teacher at Mengyi 
explained that in her view minority language teachers merely think about doing their job, 
but not about promotion: 
“Dai language teachers […] don’t think about being transferred to cities. Normally they just teach 
their lessons with a very peaceful and quiet heart. Anyway, it’s all for the children, so they don’t 
consider these things.” (TE-32_2013-05-20). 
In addition to material and professional interests, minority language teachers at 
different schools described a third interest that they connect with their profession: the 
protection and transmission of minority culture to the next generation. Most interviewed 
ethnic minority teachers felt that their respective ethnic culture, understood for instance 
as customs, art, or the use of traditional agricultural tools, is endangered. In connection 
with their own tuition many teachers develop an interest in protecting this culture, and 
even the young pre-school students at the bilingual class in college had these ideas when 
they said statements such as: 
“I believe that it is important to learn something about minority cultures. China is a country with 
many ethnic groups […], and each leaves their own traditions, customs, and art as a heritage. I 
believe that letting [the students] receive and use this culture from small age has many benefits for 
the development of ethnic groups” (TS-02_2011-12-19). 
One teacher generalized this perspective when she argued that all parents and 
students support minority language education “because it is their own ethnic language 
culture. If you don’t study it, it will disappear” (TE-14_2012-01-30). Regardless if parents 
and students really think so, this exemplifies how Dai language teachers in Xishuangbanna 
connect language learning with cultural protection. One teacher at Menger connects this 
with the goal of educating students in Dai etiquette, traditions, and customs that she 
believes are essential for being Dai: 
 267 
“I think that Dai-language education in preschool should not be for tests. Even less should it be for 
scoring in the league table. It should be for learning the basics of our Dai ethnicity – for example, 
customs of daily life.” (TE-22_2012-03-05) 
Teachers also experience linguistic changes as a threat to ethnicity. Some teachers 
transferred this interest in minority culture protection into their own teaching career. 
One ethnic Hani teacher, for instance, said that “they all say that our Hani ethnic group 
will in the short future change into Han. Now many even can’t speak our Hani language” 
(TE-02_2013-05-17). She exemplifies this by referring to her own personal change in 
language use and that she regrets this change: 
“No need to point to the children, but even I can’t speak many terms in Hani language. See, from 
primary school to middle school, and to graduation I was not in this village, how could I get in 
touch with Hani language, when all was in Chinese?” 
A Dai teacher, when I asked her for reasons why she applied from a former 
position as regular teacher at a primary school to become Dai teacher at school no. 22 
under the 2008 Menghai Dai teacher hiring program, summarized this in a remark of how 
the wished to secure Dai knowledge for students: 
“I want our Dai script to continue to be passed on […]. I want [the students] to bring their own 
ethnic language home, and later they are Dai, and the newspapers will have Dai script, and in the 
documents there will also be Dai, so they can see, and then they will have learned a little 
knowledge about Dai script and bring that to their home, that will be fine” (TE-29_2013-05-07). 
Experiencing differences 
In sum, minority language teachers in Xishuangbanna uttered in the interviews 
much more dissatisfaction with their professional situation than with their material 
situation. Furthermore, they framed their own interests not in gaining material benefits, 
but in serving both the students and the culture of their ethnic group. Interestingly, 
however, many of these interests and perceptions of work overlap between teachers, 
principals, and sometimes even officials in the administration. The opinion that minority 
language teachers have an especially difficult profession due to the dilemma of the 
double goals of enabling students to speak Chinese and of protecting minority languages 
at the same time, for instance, is shared by principals, officials, and teachers. One official 
in the Yunnan Province ethnic administration, for example, said about this burden: 
“These teachers do an exhausting job, because they must promote Chinese language and script 
and at the same time they must protect ethnic cultures. Their work has much value, but they must 
invest lots of energy” (OF-12_2012-03-23). 
Nevertheless, there are also differences between the interests of my interview 
partners. On the one side, these differences relate to identities, and especially ethnic 
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identities. Generally, teachers said more often that they gained support for Dai languages 
from principals when these principals were also ethnic Dai. In an interview that I 
conducted with one Dai principal and two Dai teachers at school no. 17, all participants 
agreed on the necessity of Dai language education. The principal specifically commented 
on Dai language education at his school: “Most important is that we can pass on our Dai 
culture” (PR-17_TE-14_TE-28_2013-05-06). In this regard, ethnicity is in Xishuangbanna a 
factor that lowers those clashes of interests between street-level workers in the 
classroom and their immediate superiors that Lipsky has seen as typical for the street-
level bureaucrat working environment (see chapter 2). The case of ethnic language 
education thus on the one side adds a layer of complexity in determining interests in 
tuition decisions, but on the other side it also opens up channels for mutual 
understanding, congruency across professional boundaries between teachers, principals, 
and at times administrative officials. 
However, at the same time, ethnicity of respondents is not the major indicator for 
perspectives on minority language education and even less so for decisions related to 
tuition in these languages. Interestingly, nearly all interview partners at schools with 
minority language education agreed that firstly the protection of minority cultures is a 
necessary policy goal and that secondly mother tongue language education can benefit 
students in early grades who lack in sufficient Chinese skills. This opinion was shared by 
respondents of all ethnic groups, including Han teachers and principals. Many of these 
respondents related the issue of minority language education with “ethnic unity”. An 
ethnic Hani principal at Menger, a school with Dai language education, framed this 
perspective in the following words: “This is about ethnic unity. You add one more 
language, you gain one more skill. This is also true for languages. They mutually 
complement each other” (PR-16_2012-03-01). 
In light of these congruent interests beyond ethnic separation other factors can be 
expected to cause the differences in decision making on minority language education. In 
the next paragraphs I will discuss the role of institutional settings, especially in how 
teachers and principals at the different schools perceive these institutions as support or 
as discouragement for decisions in favor of minority language education. 
6.3.2 Interpreting policies and spaces 
Teachers’ and principals’ decision making depends on their perspectives on their 
schools’ tuition problems, their interpretation of how policies can contribute to improving 
tuition, and their perception of the spaces that institutions provide for their own 
discretionary decision making. In the next paragraphs I will thus present the perspectives 
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of my interview partners on these three fields, before I will summarize these perspectives 
through the lens of dilemmas that principals and teachers experience through unfitting 
policies and institutions. 
Interpreting problems and policies 
Teachers and principals specified in the interviews their interpretations of policy 
goals, the current means of implementation, and the outcomes of minority language 
education. Teachers and principals interpreted policies on the one side as directed 
towards supporting students in their Chinese learning. They described tuition in mother 
tongue language as a solution to the problem of students’ lacks in Chinese skills. The 
principal at Mengyi, for instance, said that since students in pre-school classes lack 
Chinese the school must start with minority language education and can only slowly 
change it afterwards (PR-04_2011-12-31). Another teacher similarly said: “After one 
semester they slowly speak Chinese, then its better” (TE-04_2012-01-04 at no. 6). 
Menger’s principal has formulated the goals of the Dai language education at his school 
most strongly in this direction:  
“Bilingual education is to support Dai students to better master Chinese. The Dai have a script, a 
written record, this is important. First learn through Dai, after that advance to understand and 
experience the national language, Chinese. This supports learning.” (PR-16_2012-03-01) 
Teachers and principals also interpreted the policy goals as a tool to attract 
students to school. Minority languages are for these teachers one tool to support their 
students in learning, for attracting students to school, and to enable communication 
between teachers and students. Some teachers pointed to the benefits that minority 
language education can bring to communication between teachers and students. One 
teacher said that unofficial use of minority languages as auxiliary tool in Chinese language 
classes supports the students: “When the children don’t know the meaning of a word, 
one should use our Hani language to translate” (TE-02_2013-05-17). Another Dai 
language teacher at a secondary school argued that minority language education can 
support students when tuition in the core subjects proves to be fruitless: 
 “Dai students come to […] schools anyway, but some of them […] cannot learn. They just play from 
morning till evening. Although these students are at school, they just don’t internalise other 
subjects, Chinese and maths. They know nothing. So, I think when they don’t learn this, we can 
bring their own ethnic language here.” (TE-29_2013-05-07) 
With this interpretation of policy goals principals and teachers argue similar to 
governmental documents and policy statements, but additionally some principals and 
teachers also see minority language as a tool to reform education. One teacher, for 
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instance, said that minority language programs also bring back those students to school 
that otherwise might skip schooling earlier (TE-29_2013-05-07). Finally, one principal also 
saw a connection to reform trends in the general overall system when he explained the 
reasons of conducting minority language education at his school: 
“Nowadays it’s all about innovation, teaching innovation. We should not forget: It’s all for the 
students’ good. Honestly, if teachers don’t reform their didactics and continue to use their old 
didactics we can’t elevate teaching quality and we can’t elevate student quality.” (PR-16_2012-03-
01) 
In their interpretation of the usefulness of the current policy implementation, 
however, teachers and principals expressed much criticism. In this my interview partners 
differed between the three school types. At the “showpiece schools” principals and 
teachers were overwhelmingly satisfied with the provision of teachers, class hours, 
training opportunities and textbooks. Since teachers at these schools have participated in 
editing the textbooks and determining the methods for the project classes they 
developed a feeling of ownership over the project classes. At the “resource supported 
schools”, by contrast, particularly teachers have been less satisfied with the 
implementation of policy tools. They bemoaned that there are too few class hours to 
effectively teach Dai language, that the textbooks lack in accuracy in describing Dai 
culture, and that the schools lack teacher resources. They experienced a lack of support 
from above and at the same time large burdens of teaching responsibilities in Dai 
education and in the core subjects. Teachers at the “left-alone schools”, finally, have been 
most critical towards minority language education. They experienced the lack of 
resources in terms of teachers and the lack of minority language class hours as 
detrimental for students’ learning progress. Teachers at these schools said that the 
resources that they could provide as Dai teachers remain unused. One Dai teacher at 
school no. 4, for instance, argued that one would need at least three school hours per 
week to effectively teach Dai, but she was merely allowed to teach one hour per week in 
her class (TE-25_2013-05-01). She said that Dai language education suffers mostly from 
the high workloads of teachers for other subjects: 
“I think in order to conduct long-term Dai education, you need special full-time teachers. I am also 
a bilingual teacher, I should teach only the Dai-Chinese bilingual courses. It would be fine if I would 
only teach Dai […]. But now I have to teach everything. […] I am tired.” (TE-25_2013-05-01) 
Principals and teachers at the three types of schools also differ in their evaluation 
of the outcomes of this curriculum. Both teachers and principals at “showpiece schools” 
that conduct minority language education under the “Dai-Chinese bilingual experimental 
program” agreed that the program has not only improved students’ overall study results, 
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but that it also improved students’ general study behavior. One teacher at school no. 6, 
for instance, said that students in bilingual classes learn how to translate their thoughts 
form Dai to Chinese, that they can write more “standardized” Chinese articles, that they 
can more actively participate in class, and that they have a closer relation to the teachers 
(TE-04_2012-01-04). Teachers at the merely “resource supported schools” and the “left-
alone schools”, by contrast, have been much more critical towards the outcome. One 
teacher at Menger, for example, said that although students learn some Dai in pre-school, 
this achievement is unsustainable due to later interruptions of learning (TE-22_2012-03-
05). Another teacher, whose students attend merely one hour of Dai language per week, 
said that under this marginalized tuition learning cannot produce more outcome than a 
few graphemes which does not help students at all (TE-25_2013-05-01). 
These examples indicate that school staff’s perceptions of outcomes sometimes 
vary between the professional statuses of the respondents. Principals pointed in 
interviews rather to the value of minority language education programs in order to 
manage schooling in ethnic minority areas, whereas teachers more often referred to the 
value of minority language education for their communication with students. And there is 
another distinction: Teachers, who exclusively teach minority languages at schools more 
often referred to minority language education as a tool to protect minority cultures, 
whereas teachers who also teach other subjects at the schools tended more to emphasize 
the value of mother tongue instruction for learning pace in other subjects. 
More striking, however, are the differences in evaluation between the types of 
minority language education. Principals and teachers at the “showpiece schools” in 
mutual accordance based their evaluation of the minority language program on their 
understanding of the programs as tools to lower students’ barriers to regular Chinese 
education. Both professional groups at these schools were satisfied with the outcome and 
had no suggestions on how to improve. Teachers at the “left alone” schools, who similarly 
perceived minority language education as a tool to achieve these goals said that using 
minority languages as an auxiliary tool to translate course content for students enables 
them to teach faster, reach more students, and establish a better contact to their pupils 
(TE-12_2012-01-27). One teacher at school no. 5, who used to teach bilingually in Hani 
and Chinese, even mentioned that Hani language tuition has helped foreign students 
from Myanmar to follow instructions in her class (TE-02_2013-05-17). Teachers at the 
“resource supported schools”, by contrast, saw ethnic cultural conservation as an 
important outcome of their courses. One teacher at Menger, for instance, said that her 
class has some success in teaching students basic “ethnic” social behavior, for instance 
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how to greet elderly people (TE-22_2012-03-05). Another teacher at school no. 22 said 
that her tuition awakens students’ interest in their own ethnic culture and that it attracts 
students to school who otherwise might have skipped schooling already (TE-29_2013-05-
07). Dai teachers at this type of school recommended expanding minority language 
education, to make tuition more sustainability, and to add more ethnic traditions to the 
curriculum. In this regard, teachers’ and principals’ opinions on the outcome of minority 
language education seem to depend more on the type of institutionally defined minority 
language education that the schools follow, than simply the teachers’ ethnicity. 
Interpreting institutions of support and accountability 
Principals and teachers find that their own role in the implementation process is 
much determined by institutions. Evaluation measures, the support by leaders, and the 
institutionalized trainings have been mentioned to have important effects on minority 
language education, but the opinions of parents have been described as less important 
for their own policy implementation decisions. 
Teachers perceive school management structures as one of the most important 
institutional settings for minority language education decisions. Many interview partners 
described support by school leaders to be of utmost importance for their courses. In 
cases where this support lacked they saw this as a reason for negative outcomes of 
minority language education or as a reason for the complete stop of these courses. 
Teachers furthermore described institutional settings of teacher evaluations as important 
for the fate of a language program. One teacher at Mengsan as one of the “left-alone 
schools” said that the Bulang-Chinese bilingual pilot project at his school was terminated 
because his superiors “came very seldom up here” (TE-12_2912-01-27), so they could not 
see the success of the pilot. Similarly, another teacher explained how Dai language 
education depends on support by leaders in the Bureau of Education when she described 
how “the spirit” changed when one leader of the Menghai Bureau of Education was 
transferred to another post in 2008: 
“He was the vice head of the Bureau of Education. He particularly conducted investigation work of 
the Dai language research group. […] There was a special atmosphere. After he left, well, we all lost 
the mood.” (TE-29_2013-05-07) 
 On the other side, teachers also say that for Dai language education institutional 
settings are more relaxed. Several teachers, and particularly those who work under the 
“Dai-Chinese experimental program” said that they don’t have to write the notorious 
“after class thoughts” in Dai language, which are a constant issue of time struggles for 
them in courses of other subjects. One teacher from Mengyi explained that, firstly, “there 
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are no requirement from above” to write these reports and, secondly, due to the large 
workloads of Dai teachers, they lack the time to write these reports (TE-32_2013-05-20). 
However, even at other schools where teachers feel required to write such reports, they 
say that hardly anybody reads these reports. The Dai language teacher at school no. 22 
said that she regularly writes the reports to reflect her own tuition, but since she writes in 
Dai script, evaluation teams merely superficially flip through her pages as they in most 
cases are unable to read Dai (TE-29_2013-05-07). Furthermore, teachers said that 
currently evaluations cover minority language courses to lesser degrees than the courses 
in regular subject. One teacher at school no. 4 explained that due to the absence of 
repercussions evaluations on Dai language education have lesser effects on her own 
teaching behavior than those in Chinese courses: 
 
“When they come to observe teaching, you can say the leaders come down to check the level of 
our Dai teaching. They say that they wanted to establish Dai education, and they want to see how 
the students achieve that. In Chinese courses they come to evaluate the teachers. This evaluation 
is closely connected with our pay, so there is some pressure, […] but in Dai course there is no 
pressure. Whether they come to listen or not makes no difference to us.” (TE-25_2013-05-01) 
Teachers described evaluations by peers as more important for their own teaching 
than evaluations by officials and superiors. One teacher at Mengyi, for instance, said that 
she works closely together with her three Dai language colleagues to prepare classes and 
that she highly appreciates their comments. The only Bulang teacher at Mengsan, by 
contrast, regrets that he cannot share minority language teaching experiences with his 
colleagues, since none of them speaks Bulang (TE-12_2012-01-27). Another teacher at 
school no. 22, who is the only Dai language teacher there, similarly said that the teachers 
at her school can’t support her in Dai teaching, and that trainings and teacher 
competitions are important to receive feedback from other Dai teachers (TE-29_2013-05-
07).  
Additionally, teachers described evaluations by parents and students as less 
important than those by peers and superiors. Although many teachers and principals said 
that the main goal of minority language education is to serve the students, they all agreed 
that neither parents, nor students raise many demands towards them with respect to 
minority language education. Several teachers have said that during parent meetings, for 
instance, parents merely raise questions how to best discipline their children or how to 
make them study harder, but never on minority language education. This means that 
principals and teachers feel little accountability towards parents concerning minority 
language education, but on the other side they also don’t perceive parents specifically as 
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allies for promoting minority language education. One teacher at Mengsan, for instance, 
once tried to invite parents skilled in traditional handcrafts to class to teach “traditional 
Bulang knowledge” to his students, but after these invited parents said that they had no 
time for this, he terminated this project (TE-12_2012-01-27).  
However, principals and teachers also describe existing institutional accountability 
settings as flexible. Teachers pointed on the one side to the perceived importance of 
evaluations for promotions, but on the other side many teachers also did not know about 
the exact modes of selecting teachers for promotion and for transfer to other schools. 
One teacher at Mengsan experienced these modes as flexible when he negotiated with 
superiors about his own transfer. Through bargaining he successfully made a deal with his 
superiors that after being transferred as an interim teacher to an unpleasant school he 
will be transferred back to his former school after one semester (TE-12_2012-01-27). A 
principal of another school refers to this flexibility as “soft rules” when she speaks about 
the question what happens to underperforming principals: 
“[Evaluations] have effects, but there are no hard rules that you as principal will automatically be 
exchanged. He only tells you that your management is not good and that he gives you time to 
change. But if you don’t change in the time he estimated, he will consider exchanging you. […] He 
does not use documents, and does not use indicators, but there are soft things. When the leaders 
know that [a principal] can’t do it, they will of course exchange him.” (PR-12-PR-18_2013-05-10) 
In sum, although principals and teachers have different insights into the 
institutional environments of minority language education, they are consistent in the 
evaluation that institutions matter for minority language education. At the same time, 
however, they also believe that institutions are subject to interpretation and adjustment 
at the street-level. 
Interpreting institutional spaces for decision making 
In my respondents’ eyes institutional settings provide spaces for discretionary 
decision making by both school leaders and the teachers. School leaders, my interview 
partners argued, have the autonomy to decide if schools run minority language education 
at all, to make decisions which parts of the student body shall receive this type of 
education, and which teachers will be assigned to these courses. This space for 
discretionary decision making has not only effects on minority language teaching, but also 
on the teachers’ careers. One teacher, for instance, analyzed that school leaders have the 
power to determine teachers’ careers and income through appointing teachers to classes. 
In her view, class assignment is for teachers a highly important issue in those schools that 
separate students into classes of “good performing students” and “bad performing 
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students”, since teachers’ income depends on student performance indicators. As she 
further argues that class assignment is based on teachers’ relations (关系) to leaders 
within the school, she perceives the decision making authority of school leaders as higher 
than that of teachers (TE-24_2013-04-29). Other interview partners, however, also 
described the space for discretionary decision making by teachers as large. Especially the 
lack of evaluation mechanisms has been described by some teachers as relaxing and 
allowing them to focus on what they think is important in teaching. Several teachers 
mentioned in the interviews that they are free to choose not only the methods of class 
and the amount of homework that they assign to students, but also the content of their 
classes. Respondents used terms such as “upper levels did not issue any requirements on 
this” (TE-32_2013-05-20) and “you need space for this” (TE-25_2013-05-01) to describe 
the institutional settings that lead to this discretion. 
Teachers perceive the relation between both often as blurred and as a subject to 
negotiations. Although schools receive in a top-down process from the Bureau of 
Education so called “research topics”, i.e. the permission to conduct research on a specific 
pre-defined topic, principals at the schools also said that after they have received these 
topics they can adjust them to the local environment. Similarly, the principal of Menger 
explained that although the provision of funds for Dai language education at his school 
depends on decisions by the Yunnan Bureau of Education the school has the autonomy to 
write proposals and to choose which educational tools they apply for (PR-16_2012-03-01). 
Similarly, teachers said that some requirements of their work must be fulfilled, but there 
is always room for shifting and negotiating. One teacher, for instance, explained that in 
her view the Bureau of Education regularly establishes the requirement that one or two 
Dai teachers per school attend trainings, but the question of who actually goes can be 
negotiated with school leaders (TE-25_2013-05-01).  
At the same time, however, my interview partners also perceived many limits to 
their authority to make discretionary decisions. Firstly, they saw settings of school 
environment as limits to their own actions. The ethno-linguistic background of non-Dai 
students, for instance, has been described as a major barrier to Dai tuition. A principal at 
Menger explained that in his opinion teachers could no longer use Hani or other smaller 
minority languages as unofficial tool in class after Menger had merged with other schools 
and the school’s student population became more linguistically homogeneous. Although 
he presented this homogeneity as positive for learning Chinese, he nevertheless also 
perceived these environmental factors as a limit to teachers’ choices. One teacher at 
school no. 4 said: 
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“If [the Han] can’t speak Dai, how could we teach them by force? We can’t force them. If they want 
to learn, they all can, but if they don’t want to learn, we can’t force them.” (TE-25_2013-05-01) 
 Secondly, teachers and principals also think that institutional settings of school 
management limit their space for discretionary decision making. Two principals at school 
no. 9, a central school, explained in an interview that even the central schools are not 
allowed to hire teachers by themselves, to approach potential donors for educational 
material in minority languages directly, or to use funds without accountability (PR-12_PR-
18_2013-05-10). The discretionary power of branch schools, as the principal of Menger 
explains, is further limited through their shared responsibility with the central schools: 
“We mainly depend on the central school. For instance, we conduct our education research 
activities together with them. When they allow us to conduct activities, we send our teachers there 
to work together with the central school teachers. It’s anyway one family.” (PR-16_2012-03-01) 
Thirdly, teachers, and especially those at the “resource supported schools”, 
described institutional settings as barriers to teacher-centered decision making. One 
teacher at Menger, for instance, described in interviews how she depends on the 
provision of textbooks. She recalled that when at the beginning of one semester the new 
textbooks did not arrive in time, she “had no choice than to continuously repeat the old 
lessons” (TE-22_2012-03-05). She also felt that exam orientation and the lack of time 
both pressured her to closely stick to the textbooks. As she is required by county-wide 
end-of-term tests to “finish” with her pre-school students one textbook per semester, she 
explained, she has hardly any additional time to spend on her own discretion in class. 
Teachers at the “left-alone schools”, who do not participate in any official minority 
language education program anymore, perceived these limits as even stronger. In the 
opinion of a teacher at Mengsan, for instance, time pressure did not allow adding any 
Bulang language courses to the curriculum, and he had to use even the last school hours 
of the afternoon to continue teaching Chinese and math (TE-12_2012-01-27). Another 
teacher at a school without official minority language program, school no. 5, explained 
that in her perspective teachers’ decision making on minority language education is 
prevented by a combination of both test-focusing on Chinese and the ideology of the 
value of the Chinese language: 
“If I would use class time to present a course [in minority languages] to my students, the principal 
would probably not agree, because nowadays it’s all about Chinese and math. Everybody wants to 
raise the results in Chinese and math. But since this [minority language education] has no use for 
Chinese and math, the principal would probably not agree.” (TE-02_2013-05-17) 
However, the perception of the scope of this space and its limits differs between 
the schools observed here. Teachers at the “showpiece schools” said that they had much 
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influence on choosing the content of the textbooks when they participated in writing 
textbooks, but after that tuition has been somewhat determined by these books. 
Although one teacher at Mengyi said “we teach according to our students’ needs, and not 
necessarily according to the program”, she also said that the textbooks predefine each 
week’s topic and that teachers stick to this topic (TE-32_2013-05-20). Teachers at the 
“resource supported schools”, by contrast, saw spaces for discretionary decision making 
rather in terms of methods, than in terms of content. At Menger, for instance, the pre-
school teacher has to teach all Dai graphemes in one year, but she can decide on the 
methods of how to teach these. Teachers at the “left-alone schools”, finally, argued that 
due to the absence of accountability concerning minority language education they have 
large discretionary spaces in both content and methods. One teacher at school no. 4, for 
instance, said that she is free to choose the methods of teaching, as student results are 
the only measurement in educational evaluations, that she can decide which Dai variety 
she uses in class since her school’s principal anyway does not understand Dai, and that 
she is free to pass textbooks to students or to withhold them (TE-25_2013-05-01). At 
Mengsan, where official minority language education was terminated, the one Bulang 
teacher explained that he is nevertheless free to use minority languages unofficially as 
auxiliary tool, and besides this he can also use the last afternoon school hour of each day 
to his own discretion to discuss class matters with the students, to play games, to conduct 
physical education, or to lecture about local ethnic culture (TE-12_2912-01-27). 
Interpreting dilemmas 
Teachers and principals, in their roles as street-level bureaucrats, experienced 
several dilemmas. In the interviews three dilemmas have been extensively mentioned: 
the dilemma of multiple roles between bureaucrat and street-level worker, the dilemma 
of diverging pressures from superiors and externals, and the dilemma of a misfit between 
policy goals and institutional settings. 
Many interview partners, especially teachers, expressed the dilemma of multiple 
roles between official in the state bureaucracy, carriers of professional standards, and 
ambassador of minority language protection. On the one side many ethnic Dai teachers, 
but also ethnic Hani or Bulang teachers, feel that they should “do more” for the 
transmission of local ethnic cultures and languages to the next generation, but on the 
other side they also have a strong feeling of responsibility towards their students in terms 
of preparing them for life in a language world that is dominated by Chinese. One Hani 
teacher expressed this dilemma with the following words: 
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“I think that [the students] will not be able to speak our own language anymore in the near future, 
because our students all will communicate with ethnic Han. So I am also thinking: Do we need 
[Hani language education]? I see this as a problem.” (TE-02_2013-05-17) 
The second dilemma of teachers as street-level bureaucrats relates to divergences 
in the pressures from superiors within school and external advisors. Teachers experience 
this dilemma especially in contact with the principals at their schools. As almost all of my 
interview partners said that minority language education depends much on the support 
by school leaders teachers consider this support also to be important for their own work. 
Especially teachers at the “left-alone schools” experienced this as dilemma. The Bulang 
teacher at Mengsan, for instance, said that his superiors’ wish to terminate the official 
minority language program has disadvantaged his school (TE-12_2012-01-27). Similarly, a 
Dai teacher at school no. 4 argued that when the principals at her school decided to put 
less emphasis on minority language education she had to reduce the amount of her 
teaching to merely one class hour per week and class, although she wishes for more 
minority language education (TE-25_2013-05-01). Finally, a Hani teacher at school no. 5 
said that that although school external experts suggested at a teaching training to not use 
a single Hani word in class she thinks that the method of unofficially using Hani language 
here and there supports her students. All these teachers perceive this not only as a lack of 
support, but also as top-down demands against minority language education and as 
measures against their own potential and wishes. 
Principals perceived this dilemma similarly, but in their case they suffer from 
diverging requirements from superiors at the Bureaus of Education. On the one side, they 
are subject to regular evaluation based on the quotas of students’ grades, but on the 
other side they are also expected to implement pilot projects, even when these do not 
contribute to raising these results. Two principals at school no. 9 argued that even when 
there are no regulations on the success of pilot programs principals are subject to 
constant evaluation on their management capacities with the threat of being degraded 
(PR-12_PR-18_2013-05-10). Other principals similarly said that even when schools did not 
apply to conduct pilot programs they have to find ways and resources to implement pilots 
once they have been choosen as project schools (PR-16_2012-03-01). 
The third dilemma denotes to the misfit between policy goals that favor minority 
language protection and institutional settings that favor Chinese language education. The 
perception of this misfit as a dilemma is shared between principals and teachers alike. 
The principal at Menger, for instance, explained that the two year-interruption of Dai 
language at the school between 2007 and 2009 was a result of unsuitable school 
resources: 
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“This interruption was not because they stipulated it, but it came from our own school. After we 
finished our responsibilities in the national curriculum we saw that the remaining class hours were 
not that much. Back then, there were only five courses per day and most of this was occupied by 
Chinese and math, and when the other subjects were included, we had to reduce Dai education.” 
(PR-16_2012-03-01) 
Similarly, many teachers argued that institutions such as evaluation mechanisms 
favor Chinese language education despite the policy goal to equalize minority language 
education. One teacher at Menger, for instance, found that the exam-based focus of the 
complete schooling pushes teachers to invest more resources in terms of time and energy 
into test-relevant subjects, such as Chinese or math (TE-22_2012-03-05). On the other 
side, however, teachers also suffer from institutional settings that demand a different 
minority language education than teachers wish for. The same teacher at Menger also 
said that she disagrees with the current test system for pre-school Dai language 
education that pushes teachers to teaching for tests. In her opinion Dai tuition should not 
be for test preparation, but rather for learning about culture. She experienced the 
demands from policies that prescribe minority language teaching on the one side and 
institutional settings that demand to focus on Chinese language education on the other 
side as a double burden in her daily tuition activities. This burden, she argue, is heavier 
than that for other teachers, and the remuneration for this burden is unfairly shared 
between teachers. 
However, my respondents’ perceptions on how institutions present dilemmas for 
their own educational work differ between the different minority language education 
school types. Teachers at the “showpiece schools” said that they are satisfied with the 
current institutional settings of management and accountability at their schools. One 
teacher at Mengyi said that she is pleased with the lack of unified and centralized exams 
(TE-32_2013-05-20). Teachers at these schools emphasized in the interviews that their 
teaching, including the use of textbooks and the choice of methods, is in accordance with 
superiors. One interviewed teacher at Menger, by contrast, found that the current 
institutional settings are much too demanding and that the space for her own discretion 
is too small. In her opinion, teaching minority languages should not be for tests, but for 
the students’ “real learning” in terms of language improvements and in terms of learning 
about ethnic culture and etiquette (TE-22_2012-03-05). She demanded in interviews less 
pre-structured tuition. One of her colleagues at school no. 22 said that even the top-down 
demand that all students should learn minority languages should be loosened, and 
instead it should be enough to teach merely those students who are interested in the 
class (TE-29_2013-05-07). Teachers at the “left-alone schools”, finally, argued much 
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differently. They not only wished that superiors support minority language more at their 
schools, but they also said that institutional settings such as evaluations, regulations, and 
supervision should be designed to benefit minority language education more. A Dai 
teacher at school no. 4, who merely sporadically teaches Dai one hour per week, similarly 
wished for more supervision by principals or externals when this benefits minority 
language education (TE-25_2013-05-01). 
In sum, teachers and principals see institutions as major determinants for the 
space for school-based decision making on minority language education, but their 
opinions on the value of these institutions differ much between the school types. 
Interestingly, recommendations by teachers and principals in some cases diametrically 
opposed the current situation at their schools. The principal at Mengyi, for instance, 
emphasized that parents should have the final say in the decision if their children will 
attend minority language classes or Chinese language classes (PR-04_2011-12-31), but in 
reality the school at least in some cases pre-decides this question, as they sort students 
by their ethnicity into classes. One teacher at Menger saw the value of her own tuition as 
a tool to learn about ethnic culture and etiquette (TE-22_2012-03-05), but in reality 
institutions forced her to limit her class to teaching language. At Mengsan, finally, the 
Bulang teacher perceived a lack of institutionalized evaluations as the reason for the 
termination of a successful project (TE-12_2012-01-27), but at the same time strong 
existing institutional settings of evaluation and of test-orientation in Chinese and math 
also prevent him from using the last afternoon school hours to teach a school-based 
curriculum in Bulang language. 
Although some institutional settings were for my interviewees incomprehensible, 
such as details of teacher promotion, my respondents did not refer to this as a lack of 
their own insight, but rather as a matter of vague rules that create room for negotiation. 
6.3.3 Making and justifying decisions 
As not only the requirements of teaching demand street-level bureaucrats to 
adjust policies to the schooling situation, but also the institutional settings of minority 
language education provide space for school-based decision making, principals and 
teachers at the case study schools constantly make decisions on the implementation of 
minority language curriculum. At the same time, however, their decisions are informed 
and guided by strategies that they developed to reach own preferences such as satisfying 
students’ needs, reducing workloads, or material interests. In the next paragraphs I will 
introduce a selection of the major strategies and decisions that teachers and principals 
follow at the observed case study schools, before in the last part of this subchapter I will 
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provide an analysis of how they described, justified, and legitimized these decisions in my 
interviews and in communication with superiors and parents.  
Developing strategies 
In light of the conflicts between the goals and interests of school staff on the one 
side and policy requirements, limits of resources, and institutionalized requirements on 
the behavior of school staff as street-level bureaucrats on the other, teachers and 
principals choose different strategies to deal with these conflicts and to model outputs in 
a way that benefits their understanding of the goals of minority language education. 
Firstly, both teachers and principals communicate their own preferences towards 
higher levels, peers, and externals. Among these, communication with superiors seems to 
be the most relevant strategy for many teachers. One teacher at a “left-alone school”, for 
instance, remembered that she told her superiors once that her double teaching burden 
of Dai and Chinese was too much and that she asked her superiors to reduce either of 
them (TE-25_2013-05-01). 
On the other side, teachers also approached school leaders to gain more support 
or more class hours assigned for Dai language education. One teacher at a “left-alone 
school”, for instance, described how she approached the leaders of her school when 
students registered for a Dai interest course. At another time she approached her schools’ 
principal to request permission to attend bilingual language education trainings even 
during the semester: 
“Last year the trainings were during the summer and winter holidays, and so they did not affect 
class. But for the last one in this year, we had already started with the semester, and the school 
leaders did not want to let me go. So I told them that I really want to take part in it, because the 
program for this training offered much that I had not studied so far.” (TE-24_2013-04-29) 
At the same time, however, teachers also experienced the limits of this strategy 
when principals denied support or were unable to help the teachers. Many teachers came 
to the conclusion that approaching superiors can be a minor strategy at most. The above 
mentioned teacher was unsuccessful in her approach, as her request to offer Dai 
language as an interest course was answered by the order to offer computer classes 
instead. At another time she felt the limits of her approach to confront leaders with 
suggestions during a meeting where she expressed her evaluation of bilingual programs:  
“Our bilingual education is only always done in experiments, experiments, experiments, 
experiments. It’s very painful that there are only experiments. The teaching methods have 
produced very clear results. We can use this method to teach, and we always have done so. So one 
time at a meeting when many leaders were present I mentioned in one sentence that our 
Xishuangbanna only conducts experiments. This sentence was not good. The leaders were not 
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happy, they were really not happy. […] They probably thought: ‘How can this teacher behave like 
this?’ Actually they did not really say something, but maybe they thought that it’s not good to say 
this. I am not sure about their work. But anyway the leaders were very unhappy, so I stopped in 
the middle of the sentence […] and we did not talk about this again.” (TE-24_2013-04-29) 
In addition, teachers and principals employ communication with peers as a 
strategy, but only as a minor one. Although many teachers stated that they think that 
advice from peers is important to improve their own teaching methods most teachers 
located this peer-learning merely in the yearly teacher trainings. One teacher, for instance, 
described her reaction when she was asked to lecture Dai language teaching methods to 
other Dai teachers: “I said ‘I want, I want, I want to do this’” (TE-24_2013-04-29). With 
this emphasis she expressed how much she thinks these trainings are a valuable source 
for learning from each other. At the same time, however, only few teachers seem to use 
existing means to communicate with other teachers about their experiences. A specific 
chat group for Dai language in “QQ”, one of China’s largest internet forums, for instance, 
has been hardly ever used by my interviewees. Direct feedback from colleagues at their 
schools seems to be more important than the communication with teachers from other 
schools via chat groups. One teacher at Mengyi explained: 
 “There is a QQ chat group especially for this type of teachers. But I don’t have the time to 
communicate much with other teachers there. I checked many times, but normally only the 
officers form the Bureau of Education post there. […] You can use this group to greet other 
teachers. You can ask which class one teaches, how the students learn, or how the students’ skills 
are. But concerning methods we don’t communicate there much.” (TE-32_2013-05-20) 
Even for teachers who work as the only Dai teachers at their school the chat group 
seems to be of little value. One teacher at school no. 22, for instance, said: 
“We chat about how we can conduct tuition in our Dai language. But actually everybody only 
writes a little about their own feelings and how it is at their schools. Apart from that we don’t 
discuss too much. Sometimes I want to discuss how to teach well, but they have their own 
problems; and we have ours. Since the students are different, so the teaching methods are surely 
also different.” (TE-29_2013-05-07) 
Similarly, school staff uses communication with parents or other externals only to 
small degrees as a strategy to reach their goals. Although principals claimed in interviews 
that parents will be involved in the decision making of bilingual tuition, in reality there 
seems to be little communication between schools and parents on this matter. In parent 
meetings, for instance, teachers rather speak about the general learning habits of the 
students and urge the parents to intensify their supervision of homework, whereas the 
basic goals and arrangements of minority language education are not discussed at these 
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meetings. One principal said that the actual process is more about informing parents on 
decisions than about participation: 
“There are a few things on which we can seek the parents’ opinions. We first organize [the 
assignment of students] and after that we speak to the parents and tell them that our class is a 
bilingual class. If some parents don’t want their children to be in this class, they can raise their 
opinions and we can help them to adjust, for instance if one student wants to come into that class. 
See, we have to control the numbers of students in the classes. If the parents’ requests are really 
strong and if there are only a few parents [complaining]  we can organize that. […], but if there are 
too many, we have to do ideological work with them again.” (PR.17_TE-14_TE-28_2013-05-06) 
In this respect, neither principals nor teachers perceive communication with peers 
or organizing interest groups as successful means to reach their own interests. Only very 
few of the interviewed principals approached other principals outside their own township 
on the issue of minority language education, and none of the teachers engaged in 
establishing profession-based organizations for Dai language teachers. Similarly, school 
staff did not organize parents as pressure group towards officials to demand Dai language 
education.  
More often – and with more success – do principals and teachers engage in a 
second type of strategies which can be described as “shifting implementation”. These 
strategies also include selecting the goals of policies and division of resources. Principals, 
for instance, select from the diverse top-down policies those that have the most 
congruency with their own goals. The principal at school no. 11 defined Dai language 
education as less useful than IT classes at his school and ordered to stop teaching Dai 
language interest classes. The principal at school no. 17, by contrast, followed his own 
understanding of Dai language education as a means to educate students in local culture 
when he, together with his teachers, decided to establish a small “cultural exhibition 
room” with local agricultural tools and clothes of the Dai, thereby following a strategy to 
connect language education with learning about local ethnic traditions. As many teachers 
perceived a large space for their own decision making in the classroom in terms of 
content and methods some teachers choose the strategy to adjust the class content in 
relation to their own understanding of what minority language education should be about. 
One teacher at school no. 22, for instance, adds regularly lectures about “local 
knowledge”, such as the origins of local place names, to her tuition. Another teacher, at 
Menger, adds lectures about etiquette of Dai people to her language teaching. With these 
and many other examples teachers engage in defining the content of their classes, and 
they fill in spaces left by institutions and vague policy goals. 
Similarly, by selecting requirements towards the students teachers also shift the 
implementation of curriculum. Some teachers, for instance, require only Dai students to 
 284 
pay attention to Dai language education, whereas other teachers tell their students that 
all students in class, irrespective of ethnicity, must pay attention to the class. With this 
distinction teachers establish contrasting definitions of the value of minority language 
education. In the former cases they establish the idea that minority languages are only of 
value for minority students and that the goal of their class is bilingualism for Dai students, 
but monolingualism for Han students. In the latter cases teachers establish goals of 
biglossia for all students. 
Additionally, however, teachers and principals also use “shifting implementation” 
to follow own material interests, to reduce own workloads, or to simply allow tuition 
under scarce resources. One teacher at school no. 17 said that the school staff at her 
school, despite the school’s Dai language education program, still focuses on teaching 
Chinese: “If [the students] don’t learn Chinese Pinyin well, later teaching will be difficult. 
That’s why we put our main energy on Pinyin” (TE-14_2012-01-30). Teachers follow 
sometimes similar strategies when they schedule their own investment in terms of time 
and energy for student supervision and class preparation. One Dai teacher at Menger 
explained: 
“Last year our [preschool] class was ranked first [in the county]. This year we did not achieve that 
much, because I invested more time in the sixth grade. The sixth graders will graduate. This is very 
important for them, so I spent more time guiding them.” (TE-22_2012-03-05) 
There are also differences between principals and teachers in the strategies they 
use. According to their responsibilities in daily work, school leaders engage more in 
strategies that focus on the organization of schooling, whereas teachers focus more on 
strategies to affect implementation within their own classroom. However, in sum, both 
teachers and principals use strategies within organizing schools or classroom tuition to 
adjust policies much more than strategies to affect policy making outside the school, 
since they experience the space for school-internal adjustments as larger than their 
chances to affect policy formulation. In their role as street-level bureaucrats both 
teachers and principals avoid the risks of direct confrontations with superiors or with 
policy formulators, but instead they rather refer to the means that their position as 
implementers allows them to take. 
Nevertheless, there are also striking differences in the choice of strategies 
between the school types. Teachers and principals at the “showpiece schools” engage 
largely strategies of cooperation with externals. Mengyi, for example, cooperated with 
the NGO SIL and the Bureaus of Education not only by organizing the pilot at their school, 
but also by supporting teacher meetings and by receiving delegations of scholars. School 
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leaders and teachers at Menger, as an example of the merely “resource supported 
schools”, follow a strategy to use the provided resources for minority language education, 
but to prevent minority language education to affect much of the regular tuition. 
Teachers at this school invest more time into teaching Chinese than into teaching Dai 
language. Menger also applied for computers and TV sets for their multimedia room with 
the Dai language program, but since there is a lack of media in Dai language, one can 
assume that this equipment will be used mainly for tuition in other subjects. Teachers and 
principals at the “left-alone schools”, finally, seem to concentrate their strategies on 
adjusting curriculum, rather than on approaching externals or superiors. After some 
teachers at these schools have tried to approach their school leaders to gain more time or 
other support for minority language education none of the teachers here viewed this 
strategy as useful for the next future. Instead, some of these teachers try to support 
minority language education within the school hours of their regular curriculum. Several 
teachers at these schools said that they use the last class hour of the afternoon or the 
weekly “class meetings” to lecture on local ethnic culture and languages. 
Implementing tuition 
Under these strategies of adjusting curriculum implementation principals and 
teachers constantly make multiple decisions on the delivered and tested curriculum. 
According to the overview presented in previous chapters I will describe decision making 
processes in three areas: decisions on resources, on personnel management, and on 
instructional matters. 
Some of the observed schools are allowed to make decisions on smaller amounts 
of resources. Principals at the central school no. 9 said that they provide sums of up to 
500 RMB directly for Dai teachers of Menger if the teachers need funds to conduct special 
activities (PR-12_PR-18_2013-05-10). One teacher at Mengyi described this non-
bureaucratic funds provision as a support for the teachers: 
“If the principal would not order the schools’ financial department to equip us with materials we 
surely would not have these. If we would need to wait for the Bureau of Education, well … . But the 
school says directly: ‘I buy it next week for you.’ If the school would not internally manage this, we 
could not realize it. It depends on the support by the principal.” (TE-32_2013-05-20) 
However, decisions on larger resources are still made outside the schools. Both 
Mengyi and Menger have been chosen as pilot base schools by the Bureaus of Education. 
Although Menger also applied for additional funds these have been transferred only after 
the Bureaus of Education have approved the request, and principals at Mengsan, similar 
to staff at other “left-alone schools”, did not even try to apply for funds to keep minority 
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language projects going. In sum, the application and provision of resources rests much in 
the hands of school-external actors, whereas the usage of smaller amounts has been 
given to the discretion of the schools. 
Concerning personnel management, school staff at the case studies engages much 
more in discretionary decisions than on the issue of financial resources. On the one side, 
teacher positions at all observed schools depend on the assignment of the Bureaus of 
Education and the Bureaus of Human Resources. On the other side, staff at all observed 
schools has also a say in questions of who teaches what, where, and when. According to 
one teacher at school no. 5, the central school decides on teachers’ transfer from branch 
schools to central schools, but teachers can also apply for transfer. Similarly, the 
assignment of teachers to classes and subjects depends on school-internal bargaining 
processes. A teacher at Mengyi said that the school tries to adjust teacher assignments 
according to the teachers’ wishes. Some schools also base their decisions on teacher 
assignment on teachers’ ethnicity. The principal at Menger, for instance, said: 
“We assigned [the Dai bilingual teachers] according to their work loads, to the quality of their work, 
and to their capabilities […]. [We] also consider ethnic share in the decisions.” (PR-16_2012-03-01) 
Comparing the three school types especially those schools with larger teacher 
resources can reflect teachers’ wishes for assignment to specific classes. At Mengyi, for 
instance, some Dai teachers voluntarily have chosen to take over Dai-Chinese bilingual 
classes, whereas other Dai teachers kept teaching the regular Chinese classes. Since 
Mengsan’s teachers, by contrast, generally take over first-grade classes in all subjects and 
“move” with the students of these classes to grade six, the lack of Dai or Bulang speaking 
teachers did not allow for specializing in a minority subject. Similarly, at school no. 22, 
where there is only one Dai teacher, this teacher has to teach all Dai classes, and there is 
no room for her to teach also other subjects. 
Decisions on instructional matters, by contrast, are the realm where personnel at 
the observed schools are most active in decision making. Teachers and principals make 
here not only discretionary decisions on the methods of teaching, but also on the content 
and the organization of tuition. 
In the realm of organizing the teaching, schools unfold much activity in assignment 
of students to classes, of school hours, and of languages to use inside and outside class. 
The largest differences between schools can be found in assignment of students to 
classes. Mengyi, for instance, decided that generally Dai students are to attend the Dai-
Chinese bilingual classes, whereas the Han students are to visit the Chinese language 
classes. Some “resource supported schools” followed that example by segregating 
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students in the pre-school and first grade, but some schools of this type as well of as 
schools of the “left-alone schools” decided that all students visit minority language 
classes together, irrespective of their ethnicity. The principal at Menger, for example, has 
decided that all students at his school undergo Dai language education. 
Teachers at all observed schools choose methods of tuition in minority languages 
according to their own preferences, but under balancing own preferences with pre-
defined methods. However, the process of decision making seems to depend on the 
status of management of minority language education at the school. A teacher at school 
no. 22 described that she makes decisions on the methods of the class all by herself. 
Similarly, one of the teachers at Mengsan countered the decision at higher levels to 
terminate official minority language education by using minority language unofficially as a 
tool for communication in class. Even teachers at the “showpiece schools” negotiate 
between pre-defined methods and own adjustments. One teacher at Mengyi described 
the process of decision making on methods with the following words:  
“The teaching methods are all unified. There is a model, and we teach according to that model. 
However, in reality we teach according to our students’ results, and not necessarily according to 
the assignments of our project. […] The teacher surely develops the methods. For example, when 
we develop stories in class, the project told us to use the teaching materials at hand, so we can use 
the materials in a, let’s say, lively way. When we teachers don’t want to teach this, we can develop 
other stories.” (TE-31_2013-05-20) 
Similarly, teachers engage in decision making on the content of class. As has been 
mentioned above, teachers at all schools follow the strategy to adjust the content of class 
to their own preferences and their understandings of good tuition in minority languages. 
A teacher at Mengyi who teaches under the “Dai-Chinese experimental project” model 
makes content-related decisions when she chooses the content of the writing exercises. 
The Dai teacher at the “resource supported school” Menger, by contrast, teaches the Dai 
graphemes one by one until the end of the semester, thereby following the structure of 
the book. The Bulang teacher at Mengsan, finally, uses the “third class hours” in the 
afternoon merely to teach some issues of local culture and a few Bulang sayings, but in 
general he refrains to invest much time on this. He defined thus that Bulang language can 
be used as an additional tool in class to support the students learning, but not as a subject 
in its own right. 
In sum, teachers at all observed schools engage constantly in decision making, 
especially concerning content and methods of their classes. At the “showpiece schools”, 
represented here by Mengyi, decision making by school staff focuses especially on the 
content and the organization of Dai tuition, whereas at the “resource supported schools”, 
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e.g. at Menger, the content of tuition seems to be more defined by the textbooks, and 
teachers’ decision making focuses on the methods of tuition. At the “left-alone schools”, 
on the example of Mengsan, decision making is more differentiated between school 
leaders on the one side who in some cases ordered the termination of minority language 
education (e.g. at school no. 11), and teachers on the other side, who continue to use 
minority languages as an informal tool for communication in class (e.g. at Mengsan, 
school no. 11, and no. 5). 
Justifying decisions 
School staff described the decision making process on implementing curriculum as 
both a school-external and a school-internal process. On the one side interview partners 
at the schools described that the decision making happens inside the school. The phrase 
“the school decides on this” was used in a number of interviews. One teacher at Mengyi, 
for instance, used the phrase “neither the principal nor the vice principal interfere with 
that” (TE-32_2013-05-20) when she described her own decision making on Dai language 
education. Principals also mentioned their own actions, but framed these more often as 
cooperation with superiors. The principal of Mengyi, for instance, used the term “we 
reported our needs to the central school” (PR-04_2011-12-31) when he explained how he 
tried to raise the number of Dai teachers at his school. 
On the other side, however, interview partners at schools described decision 
making processes as located outside the schools. The respondents described hierarchies 
with references to superiors “above”. One teacher described how teachers adjust their 
tuition towards higher levels: “Anyway, we teach according to the assignment of upper 
levels” (TE-32_2013-05-20). A principal similarly described how he experienced the 
assignment of research topics to school: “Research topics come from above” (PR-
16_2012-03-01). Interestingly, respondents at each “level” pointed to a next higher level 
of decision makers. Teachers pointed to principals with phrases such as: “That depends 
on the principal,” (TE-12_2012-01-27); and principals pointed to the Bureaus of Education 
with words such as: “We need to apply for teachers with the Bureau of Education and 
they apply with the Bureau of Human Resources” (PR-04_2011-12-31). 
In any case, both teachers and principals have been reluctant to frame decision 
making as steered by their own actions, and rather framed the process as a necessary 
adjustment. Several teachers used the term “flexible” to describe their implementation of 
curriculum. One teacher at Mengyi, for instance, said: “In reality we can use the textbook 
flexibly. It’s not that the teachers necessarily take them as a frame to conduct their 
tuition” (TE-32_2013-05-20). More specific, teachers and principals referred to 
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implementation as adjustment of curriculum to local conditions or to the needs of 
students. With this emphasis interview partners aimed at justifying their decisions. One 
teacher at school no. 22, for instance, said: 
“Some of the textbook content does not fit to our location, so I leave it and add instead my own 
content. I tell them things by myself. Teaching only according to the textbooks would be teaching 
dead things. The textbooks are all written by elderly people and these textbooks surely don’t 
follow our modern thoughts […]. Some vocabulary is very deep and I myself can’t understand it, 
because I don’t have the resources to research it […]. Especially our old Dai needs some reflection. 
Sometimes I don’t teach according to that. If you would teach in this dead way, they would not 
understand, so you need to use some daily language or the language that they often use.” (TE-
29_2013-05-07) 
As a second strategy, interview partners aimed at justifying their decisions by 
pointing to the scientific basis of the decisions. One teacher at Mengyi explained that the 
decisions of assigning class hours to minority language education are not made on basis 
of the knowledge of the teachers alone, but in cooperation with the organization that 
established the “Dai-Chinese bilingual experimental program”: 
“No, no, it’s not the school that decides this alone. It’s according to the project group and their 
many years of experiences and research on how to conduct education in ethnic minority languages 
in the whole nation, in the whole world.” (TE-32-2013-05-20) 
Additionally, both teachers and principals legitimize their own decisions in 
interviews by framing the decisions as being in accordance to regulations, programs or 
even textbooks. Especially principals emphasize that the schools teach according to the 
regulations: “We teach everything according to the standards” said one principal at 
school no. 9 (PR-12_PR-18_2013-05-10). Similarly, the principal of Mengyi modifies his 
opinion that teachers have the space to make decisions on their own discretion by 
pointing to the role of the textbooks: “The teachers […] can lecture a bit according to the 
local conditions, but mainly they teach according to the textbooks” (PR-04_2011-12-31). 
Particularly teachers and principals at the “showpiece schools” emphasized in interviews 
that they conduct classes congruent to the programs. At other schools, where teachers 
cannot point to programs, they emphasized that they still teach according to regulations. 
One teacher at school no. 22, for example, said: 
“When I normally prepare class, I prepare it according to the textbooks, because I have to follow 
the long-term teaching plan. It would not be ok to just write what I normally teach, since each 
subject will be evaluated according to the rules. So I still prepare what the long-term plan wants 
me to prepare, and after it I can add some additional things.” (TE-29_2013-05-07) 
Teachers and principals use these strategies of legitimizing decisions not only in 
the interviews, but also in communication with superiors and parents, although to 
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different degrees. Teachers and principals particularly at the “left-alone schools” present 
their own work as being in accordance with the regulations and policy goals, even if these 
are extremely vague. The principal at school no. 4 reported to the Bureau of Education 
that they still conduct lively Dai language education, although in reality Dai language 
education has already nearly terminated. In his impression the minority language office of 
the Bureau wants to hear this positive feedback. At the same time, however, teachers 
who used minority language education as unofficial tool for communication in class 
denied their way of conducting tuition when superiors where present. One teacher at 
school no. 7, who according to his students regularly uses Yao language in class, said at 
such an occasion that since teachers should promote Chinese he only uses Chinese in 
class (TE-09_2012-01-06). In communication with parents, school staffs similarly 
downplay their own scope for decision making by pointing to orders from higher levels. 
Since neither principals nor teachers perceive students or parents as actor group that can 
support them in affecting policy formulation or as a group that questions decisions by 
school staff (see above), they communicate the need to make decisions at school level in 
much lower degrees than towards peers. 
In sum, the strategies by school staff to justify decisions overlap between 
principals and teachers in many cases. Downsizing the own role as decision makers in 
interviews and in communication with superiors and parents is a common strategy of 
both groups, but also pointing to the benefits of presumably outside-made decisions in 
favor of minority language tuition. At the same time, however, there are also differences 
between the school types. Teachers at the “showpiece schools” pointed more often to 
the project basis of their tuition, which pre-structures educational arrangements. 
Teachers at the “resource supported schools”, by contrast, referred in the interviews 
more to the benefits that their own decisions and behavior have for the students’ 
educational achievements. Teachers at the “left-alone schools”, finally, pointed often to 
the need to use minority language in their tuition, regardless of superiors’ wishes. 
6.4 Summary of chapter 
In this chapter I have investigated into the question of how institutional spaces 
affect the decision making by school staff on minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna. Through detailed presentation of implementers’ views and the decision 
making processes at three case study schools in addition to other schools that I have 
visited in Xishuangbanna, I have analyzed the effects on interpretation of different 
institutional settings on the decision making of teachers and principals. This analysis 
produced insights into three issues: implementers’ interests in minority language 
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education, school staff’s perspectives on the scope for school-based decision making, and 
the effects of differences in institutional settings on these perspectives. 
Firstly, nearly all interview partners agreed to the necessity of minority language 
education in Xishuangbanna, but they reflected different interests and policy 
understandings. Although some interview partners said that minority language education 
fits merely to rural schools with large ethnic minority student populations, members of 
diverse ethnic groups, including Han, largely accepted minority language education, and 
uttered support for teaching even those languages that are currently not taught at school. 
Especially teachers at schools with students who have difficulties in following Chinese 
language classes emphasized the contributions of minority language education to learning 
Chinese. Those teachers who were engaged with official minority language education in 
early education found programs helpful for students’ learning development, and several 
teachers who did not participate in such programs used minority languages as an 
unofficial tool in schooling. At the same time, both teachers and principals connected 
minority language education also with goals of cultural protection. These respondents 
perceived language education policies as a right of ethnic groups; and they presented the 
value of minority language tuition as knowledge transfer to next generations. 
Secondly, teachers and principals engaged constantly in decision making that 
effected minority language education. Although less in budget issues, but more in 
personnel management and to the largest degrees in issues of instructional matters 
decisions by staff of the observed schools affected the content of tuition, its methods, 
student assignment, and teacher assignment. At the same time, however, school staff 
understated their own role in decision making in the interviews. Teachers pointed to 
decisions made by school leaders, and principals pointed to decisions made by the 
Bureaus of Education. Additionally, they framed those decisions that have been obviously 
made at school-levels as being in line with regulations, superiors’ wishes, or instructional 
guidance of textbooks. With this my interview partners employed a set of strategies to 
justify own decisions as legitimate adjustments to students’ needs. School principals and 
teachers avoid the risks of emphasizing own decision making also when they 
communicate with parents, students, and officials from the Bureaus of Education. Only 
few teachers mentioned open opposition to leaders or policy guidelines, but these cases 
have been merely mentioned to describe how they experienced this strategy as 
unsuccessful. None of the implementers at the observed schools perceived parents or 
peers as potential allies to shape policy formulation, and instead they confined their 
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actions to decision making as adjusting curriculum implementation in the realm of the 
schools. 
Thirdly, this decision making behavior is determined by the institutions that 
surround minority language education at schools. Institutions have affected the 
perception of spaces and limits to own decision making at the observed schools and thus 
prevented principals and teachers in many cases from supporting minority language 
education. Institutional settings of the expected roles of teachers as representatives of 
the state and transmitter of unified national knowledge, for instance, established Chinese 
language as a constant competition for minority language education. Teachers found 
hence Chinese education as extremely important for students’ future. The test-focus of 
schooling in China, especially in graduate classes, similarly has urged schools to limit the 
amount of school hours for minority languages in favor of providing time for Chinese and 
math. Institutions of teacher and school evaluation, to name a final example, constantly 
push teachers and principals to reconsider their engagement with those educational 
models that don’t pay off in evaluations and to invest more time and energy in Chinese 
and math courses than in minority language courses. 
A comparison of the three case study schools that represent three types of 
institutional settings for minority language education in Xishuangbanna exemplified in 
this chapter the role of institutions. Without further consideration of differences in 
individual teachers’ motivations analysis of these three cases shows that institutions can 
and do shape the space how school staff’s interests translate into decisions. In this 
respect, the three case study schools can be seen as representatives of the three broadly 
defined types of institutional settings for minority language education at schools in 
Xishuangbanna. 
Institutions at those schools that I have called “showpiece schools” (with the 
example of Mengyi) have been favorable for decisions towards minority language 
education. Schedules of extensive early minority language education in combination with 
student-centered methods guaranteed that minority language education produces 
positive effects also on Chinese learning. Additionally, institutionalized benefits for 
teachers beyond the regular evaluation procedures (e.g. representation in schools, 
teacher trainings, and reputation through program participation) provided the security 
that school staff needed to make decisions for support of minority language at schools. 
Principals and teachers at this type of school invested more time on minority language 
education than at the other schools, they renovated school buildings for Dai classes, and 
they rigorously assigned students to Dai classes. 
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At those schools that are merely “supported” by textbooks and a few other 
resources provided by Yunnan Provincial or Xishuangbanna Prefectural programs, but 
that have not received additional supervision of specific teaching models (represented 
here by Menger), institutions established a completely different picture. The rather 
sporadic support by these programs did not succeed in establishing long-term security for 
schools, and teachers still depended here on the regular evaluation mechanisms that are 
based on students’ grades in math and Chinese. Under these circumstances school staff 
decided here to run minority language education at the school, since it was demanded by 
upper levels, but at the same time to make sure that minority language education is 
hedged to a few hours per week. Teachers at these schools were rather unsatisfied with 
the outcomes, but at the same time they enjoyed the larger spaces to define the content 
of classes according to their own preferences. 
Minority language education at schools of the third category, the so called “left-
alone schools”, where minority language education has been conducted and supported 
formerly until teachers were left alone with their skills (here discussed on the example of 
Mengsan), suffered from detrimental institutional settings. The lack of support in terms of 
resources or staff positions, the lack of evaluation mechanisms on minority language 
education, and – above all – explicit orders to terminate minority language education 
triggered insecurity and anger among teachers, who either felt that students need 
education in mother tongue language or who were convinced that the resources that 
they as instructors can provide through their own skills for the protection of minority 
cultures are wasted. Although teachers at these schools followed the top-down demands 
to terminate official minority language education, they often also continued to use 
minority languages unofficially in classrooms. However, under this situation teachers 
experienced this as dilemma and as a detrimental situation for tuition. 
The above summary has shown that institutions not only govern how teachers and 
principals reflect their own space for decision making, but that these perceptions also 
directly shape the decisions they make. In the next chapter I will analyze what this 
relation between institutions and implementers’ decisions means for the implementation 
process of minority language education policies in China.  
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7 Conclusion: Street-level bureaucrats in ethnic education policy 
implementation in China 
With this study I have outlined and analyzed policy implementation processes at 
Chinese schools under a bottom-up analytical approach. In this last chapter I will 
summarize the findings of the case and discuss how to generalize the findings for our 
understanding of models of policy implementation processes. In the first section of this 
chapter I will reconsider the role of implementers in policy implementation processes at 
Chinese schools, and I will outline a model of policy implementation from a bottom-up 
approach that indicates how street-level bureaucrats shape the implementation process 
by interpreting policies, instruments, and institutional spaces. Additionally, I will provide 
an outlook on what this finding indicates for two of the most pressing issues in Chinese 
educational and ethnic policy making. On the one hand I will discuss the effects of school-
based decision making on the quality of education, as this relation is a question not only 
approached by the Chinese government, but also by the international academic 
community. On the other hand I will discuss how school personnel’s decision making 
specifically on ethnic minority language education affects the issue of representation of 
ethnically defined communities in the Chinese policy making process. As some place great 
hopes in the school-based decision making for both issues, I will discuss here the 
opportunities raised by school-based decision making on ethnic minority language 
education, but I will also outline how current institutional settings limit the potential of 
school-based decision making in China. In the final section of this chapter I will summarize 
this thesis in brief by indicating the main findings, the contributions to various academic 
fields, and the possible directions for further research. 
7.1 Re-considering the role of implementers in the policy process 
Building up on a framework that views decision making by implementers in 
institutionally defined spaces, this study has analyzed policy implementation from a 
bottom-up perspective as a process shaped by implementers. In this section I will firstly 
summarize the findings of this study concerning the role of street-level implementers in 
policy implementation in China, before I will secondly reconsider what these findings 
indicate for modeling policy implementation processes under the focus of street-level 
bureaucrats’ decision-making. With these two parts this section will not only wrap up 
main findings of the study, but also outline contributions to the development of theories 
of policy implementation. 
 295 
7.1.1 Street-level implementers in policy implementation in China 
Seen from a bottom-up approach, implementation decisions by implementers are 
major factors that determine outputs and outcomes of policies. They can shape policies 
from amplification to nullification. Similar to other cases of educational policy 
implementation, that for instance Malen (2006)318 has discussed, decisions by school 
personal as street-level bureaucrats have also large effects on the implementation in the 
case of implementation of minority language curriculum policy at Chinese schools. 
Assigning minority language education to less attractive weekly slots in the timetable, 
reducing Dai language education to one hour per week, or investing only little time into 
preparation of Dai language courses are all examples where school staff’s decisions 
lowered the position of minority languages in schools compared to Chinese language 
education. However, decisions by street-level bureaucrats at schools have resulted mostly 
in mere dilution and appropriation, but much less in amplification and nullification of 
policies during implementation. This can be explained by three approaches of Chinese 
policy formulation and implementation, namely the approach of formulating vague 
guidelines, the experimentation approach, and the approach of policy making by 
“centralized decentralization”. 
Firstly, a specific mix of vague guidelines in Chinese policy formulation with 
evaluation of only partial criteria allows for interpretation and selection of policy goals 
through implementers, as scholars such as O’Brien and Li (1999), Göbel (2011), and 
Heberer and Trappel (2013) have found as a characteristic of policy implementation in 
China. The central government has encouraged local governments and schools to conduct 
minority language education by claiming diverse policy goals, such as securing minority 
language survival, fulfilling promises to ethnic groups, or creating a local “ethnic” 
environment under the shadow of promoting tourism. However, the official documents 
hardly ever specify how these goals are to be reached. The vague goal definitions in policy 
documents, the absence of evaluation criteria, and the lack of specified and stable 
instruments in minority language education programs requires implementers to select 
policy goals and to adjust policy instruments locally. On the other side, it also enables the 
government to terminate programs or to shift goals whenever new approaches appear. 
Implementers are thus likely to avoid investing much time and energy into implementing 
instable policies, and they rather use their resources for reaching stable policy goals that 
                                                     
318
 All concepts and literature references in this summary chapter have been introduced in the 
previous chapters, especially the introductory chapter, the framework chapter, the chapter on ethnic 
minority policy in China, and the chapter on institutional settings at Chinese schools. For discussions of 
these concepts and references please refer to these chapters. 
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are subject to intensive evaluation. Dilution, rather than amplification, is often the result 
of this type of implementation in China’s ethnic minority language education policies. 
Secondly, experimental modes of policy making trigger further discretion for local 
implementers. The cases analyzed in this thesis provide examples for the experimental 
approach, which Heilmann (2008) has described as a major mode in policy making and 
policy transformation in China. Since offices for minority language education within the 
Bureaus of Education and the State Ethnic Affairs Commissions have only small resources 
and low political power compared to the other offices in the Bureaus of Education, they 
are neither able to conduct large-scale programs that would cover all schools in a region, 
nor are they able to shift schooling completely. Instead, they rely on the experimental 
approach to offer support for conducting minority language education at schools. After 
the shift from the rigorous “monopolistic stage” of language engineering to today’s 
“pluralistic stage” the experimental approach has thus developed into the standard mode 
of implementing minority language education in China. However, as the example of 
Xishuangbanna has shown, experiments follow a path that differs from the ideal 
sequenced model of experimenting, evaluation, and policy learning. The government has 
only evaluated a few experiments of those discussed in this study. There is a lack of 
resources for evaluation, a lack of evaluation criteria, and, arguably, also a lack of political 
will to investigate into the effects of minority language education at schools. The lack of 
consequences of experimenting has amplified the scope for implementers to appropriate 
or dilute policies according to their own preferences. 
Thirdly, the current status of “centralized decentralization” in Chinese policy 
making as described by scholars such as Hawkins (2006) or Wong (2009) also allows for 
policy appropriation, but not for complete opposition. Institutional settings that allow 
local governments to run decentralized own programs, but that at the same time secure a 
certain hierarchical steering through the cadre evaluation system, the need to apply to 
co-funding upwards, and the transfer of earmarked funds downwards all shape the 
spaces for local decision making. Implementation modes at the local level of government 
translate into implementation modes at street-level. Schools, for instance, rely on funding 
by programs, but are free to make decisions on how to use these funds. 
These three approaches of policy making in China contribute to implementation 
modes that result in appropriation or dilution. At the same time, however, these 
approaches also prevent implementers from completely nullifying or creating policies. 
Pursuing both latter modes within the implementation process would require either a 
completely autonomous bureaucracy that does not need to care about policies ordered 
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from above or it would require activities by implementers to affect policy formulation 
outside the bureaucratic arena. Neither is realistic for school-based implementers in 
China. Inside the bureaucratic arena teachers and principals are entangled in hierarchical 
structures that determine their salary, chances for transfer, housing, and social security. 
Neither open opposition nor ignorance of policies is an option. The top-down hierarchies 
prohibit starting policy formulation at schools. Outside the bureaucratic arena school staff 
is similarly limited in their actions. Due to the lack of school staff representation outside 
the state-controlled organizations, and for the case of minority language education 
especially important due to the lack of ethnically defined teacher organizations, school 
staff is unable to organize political will outside the bureaucratic arena. In light of these 
limits, school staff can engage in strategies such as division of resources, husbanding 
resources, or superficial adaptation. In Malen’s (2006) model these strategies all result in 
dilution or appropriation. Against the current settings of policy making implementers at 
Chinese schools are very unlikely to pursue strategies that could lead to nullification or 
amplification of policies, such as appealing to higher legislation or coalition building with 
societal actors. 
Can Chinese school staff thus be seen as the makers of policies, as Lipsky (1980) 
has viewed street-level bureaucrats? On the one side, Lipsky’s observation that social 
policy implementation depends on the actions by those in closest contacts with the 
clients counts also for staff at Chinese schools. Teachers in China know best what their 
students need. Educational policies that aim to serve these needs can, arguably, only be 
implemented through using these resources. The principal-agent problem caused the 
Educational Bureaus’ lack of overview on the situation in every classroom and the specific 
approaches of policy making in the Chinese political system, such as vague policy 
guidelines and the experimental modes of policy making, put implementers in a position 
where they can adjust policies through implementation decisions. On the other side, 
however, school-based implementers in China are also entangled in a net of hierarchies 
that limits this role. Their inability to join forces with parents or other social actors in 
organizing opposition outside the bureaucratic arena and their overwhelming role as 
bureaucrats who depend on the state in terms of social benefits, positioning, and their 
own education all reduce Chinese school staff’s ability to oppose government policies. 
In sum we can see that school-based implementers adjust or dilute policies in 
China, but that they only seldom nullify or create policies. Even without organized 
interest representation and without direct negotiations with superiors, school-based 
implementers are forceful actors in the making of Chinese policies. Not so much through 
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membership in party organization, but more through professional accountability towards 
state educational administration school staff is bound to make decisions according to 
their interpretations of state and party lines. This role as decision maker within 
hierarchical state organizations, however, is nowhere written down, it is not fixed, and it 
must be re-defined in practically every decision. 
7.1.2 An extended model of the street-level policy implementation process 
Through combination of the bottom-up approach of policy analysis with a view on 
institutions as structuring elements for human behavior my analysis of the cases in 
Xishuangbanna has contributed examples of how institutions affect the implementation 
process by steering implementation decisions by street-level bureaucrats. Institutions 
such as evaluation mechanisms, promotion schemes, or norms of professional behavior 
demand specific decisions, which in turn trigger curriculum outputs and policy outcomes. 
At the same time, however, institutions sometimes also refrain from demanding only one 
option and rather open up a space for a range of possible options. Taking up Hornberger’s 
(2002; 2005) idea of implementational spaces for multilingual education, I view the space 
that institutions of school and curriculum management provide as an option for 
implementers to make choices. However, as the case of minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna has shown, these spaces are sometimes far from being clearly defined. 
Instead, they provide merely for what I call flexible boundaries of institutional spaces for 
decision making, namely a space for decision making that is only vaguely defined by 
formal guidelines, but rests on informal negotiations and implementers’ interpretations. 
It is this flexibility of the space for decision making that calls for a re-evaluation of 
the policy framework from an implementer-centered perspective. The policy 
implementation process that has been described in the heuristic policy cycle model as the 
stage of putting policies into practice is, as the bottom-up perspective on policy 
implementation has argued, much more affected by implementers’ decisions than top-
down models would assume. However, in combination with the institutional approach of 
defining actors’ behavior, implementation can be understood as a process in which actors 
interact with institutions to make implementation decisions. Four actions by 
implementers complement the framework outlined in the introductory chapter of this 
thesis (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Analytical framework of school-based decision making in curriculum policy implementation 
including implementers’ actors. 
Firstly, implementers interpret policies in order to understand the meanings and 
goals of policies. Especially in cases where policy documents offer only vague goal 
definitions implementers must use their understandings of concepts that the policy 
documents mention and they must also include their knowledge of the policy 
environment. In the case analyzed here teachers and principals used their knowledge of 
ethnic policy goals presented by government and media such as preserving ethnic 
cultures, but they also used their knowledge of educational policy goals that demand 
promoting students to higher levels of education, to secure jobs for graduates, or more 
generally to educate students in ways the government views as suitable for citizens.  
Secondly, implementers compare the policy instruments connected to specific 
policies with their own interests. The choice of instruments among the catalogue that 
policy researchers such as Howlett (2011) describe has thus direct influences of how 
implementers perceive the suitability of policies compared to their own interests. In the 
cases observed here teachers and principals analyzed how instruments such as funding of 
educational equipment or organization of teacher trainings can contribute to reach their 
own interests. Material interests or professional ones are only a few examples of 
implementers’ interests, but also interests to preserve Dai language or Dai culture. 
Thirdly, implementers interpret the institutional settings that relate to the 
implementation of a policy. These institutional settings must not necessarily be directly 
related to the policy, but they can also originate from the management structures that 
implementers are bound to. Implementers distinguish which institutional settings are 
binding for them, and they consider informal rules. In the case of minority language 
education in Xishuangbanna school staff considers, for instance, if the general teacher 
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evaluations also apply for minority language education (they mostly don’t) or if 
requirements to represent the state also apply in minority language classes (they do). 
Fourthly, implementers use the space for discretionary decision making provided 
through these institutions to make decisions and ultimately to adjust policies. In the cases 
observed here, teachers used the discretionary space to lower own workloads and to shift 
energy to other subjects, but they also used it to adjust curriculum towards their own 
understandings of what students need for school career, to their understanding of 
protection of ethnic cultures through tuition, or simply to make schooling enjoyable for 
students. 
This perspective on interpreting and using institutions by implementers enriches 
the framework of bottom-up policy analysis. It not only indicates that implementers make 
decisions, but it also points to modes of how they do so. With relation to the research 
question that I have formulated in the outline of this thesis we can see that institutional 
settings shape the scope for policy implementation decision making. Since the 
effectiveness of these institutions, however, depends on how implementers interpret and 
make use of these spaces it is the interplay of actors and institutions that finally effects 
street-level decisions on implementation. The proposed framework is an approach to 
consider both. 
Three caveats, however, are in order for this framework. Firstly, the above 
mentioned four actions are merely examples derived deductively from the case, and the 
specific context limits generalizations; secondly, this framework focuses on the relation 
between implementers and institutions, whereas interactions with superiors or clients are 
reflected only through their roles in the institutional setting; thirdly, the framework views 
implementers’ actions as subdivided specific actions, although these in reality might often 
overlap with each other. 
In sum, this framework provides a perspective that combines the bottom-up 
approach to view implementation through the eyes of the implementers with an 
institutionalist perspective on the effects of institutional settings on actors’ behavior. 
However, the analysis has also shown that the institutional settings differ between policy 
fields. In the case discussed here, for instance, institutional settings differed largely 
between curriculum policy implementation for Chinese language education and those for 
minority language education. In this respect, policy implementation analysis must include 
the specific institutions in a given policy field, and it must analyze in depth how these 
institutions contribute to implementation decisions.  
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7.2 Raising educational quality by school-based decision making? 
International organizations, the Chinese government, and scholars of educational 
systems have since long called to reform Chinese schooling away from unified curriculum 
class content that students are uninterested in and away from rote learning methods that 
prepare merely for exams. Although the goals and definitions of these reforms differ 
much between, for instance, educating a skillful work force for China’s economy on the 
one end and educating citizens who, for instance, believe in the need for patriotism and 
the rule of the CCP on the other end, reform proponents agree that a localized curriculum, 
flexibly adjusted by school staff’s discretionary decisions to the students’ needs can be a 
path to improve schooling in China. 
The case of minority language education in Xishuangbanna allows discussing this 
proposal due to two reasons. Firstly, curriculum policies in this school subject require 
more decentralized decision making than other school subjects do. Secondly, institutional 
settings in minority language education of less standardization and evaluation 
hypothetically provide spaces for discretionary decision making by school staff. In this 
section I will firstly summarize the attainments and problems of minority language 
education in Xishuangbanna, before in the second part I will discuss the possibilities and 
limits to raise the “quality of education” by school-based decision making in China against 
the specific institutional background of Chinese school management. 
7.2.1 Attainments and problems of minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna 
Governments from Yunnan Province to Xishuangbanna Prefecture to Jinghong City, 
Mengla County, and Menghai County all have conducted measures to support minority 
language education in Xishuangbanna. Three instruments have been especially used: 
textbook editing, personnel training, and establishment of designated experimental 
schools. Bureaus of Education at prefecture and province level have translated, edited, 
printed, and distributed several editions of specific Dai language course textbooks and 
Chinese-Dai bilingual translated textbooks of core subjects. They have trained teachers in 
bilingual tuition methods through short-term in-service trainings and partly also through 
long-term pre-service trainings. Furthermore, they have established programs to support 
experimental Dai tuition at schools throughout Xishuangbanna, which includes permission 
to change the curriculum of several school hours to Dai language, the funding of 
additional teaching equipment, and organizing events such as conferences or teaching 
competitions that enhance minority language education programs publicity and provide 
learning opportunities to teachers. According to official statistics roughly 140 primary 
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schools, which are 16 percent of the Prefecture’s primary schools, conducted education in 
minority languages in Xishuangbanna in 2013 (see sources and discussion of these 
statistics in chapter 5). Even if the actual number is lower than these official numbers, it is 
safe to say that Dai language education is not only in a better position than education in 
Xishuangbanna’s other minority languages, but it is also more developed than education 
in minority languages in many of China’s other regions. Firstly, a comparatively high 
percentage of children sit in Dai language classes for at least one or two semesters during 
their school career Xishuangbanna. Secondly, minority language education, and especially 
Dai language education, became a major point of reference in both official publications 
and in the perception of the people to identify current educational issues in the region. 
Even those respondents who have not been in bilingual classes knew about the existence 
of bilingual education in Xishuangbanna, which reflected back to the Prefecture’s image 
as a multicultural and multilingual locality. 
However, minority language education in Xishuangbanna faces also problems that 
prevent effective policy implementation. Four issues seem especially relevant. Firstly, 
bilingual education policies in Xishuangbanna suffer from low hierarchical positions of 
responsible governmental agencies. Minority language offices in the Bureaus of Education 
in Yunnan Province and Xishuangbanna Prefecture have only limited power in designing 
overall education. They are separated from the Offices for Compulsory Education, they 
must limit their activities to offering additional tuition programs, and their work depends 
on the enthusiasm of the Bureaus’ leaders. Secondly, bilingual education in 
Xishuangbanna suffers from a lack of legislation as a legal basis for its implementation. In 
contrast to Chinese language education, minority language education in Xishuangbanna 
lacks regulations that would standardize the content, methods, and goals of tuition. 
Thirdly, the models followed in minority language education in Xishuangbanna only 
seldom benefit students’ communicative skills, since learning in minority languages is 
often reduced to a few hours per week and does not affect regular school subjects. 
Instead, it establishes a socio-linguistic perspective that learning minority languages does 
not help for communication, for school graduation, or for finding jobs. Due to these 
models learners and teachers invest more time and energy to learning Chinese than 
learning minority languages. Fourthly, the programs’ preference of Dai over 
Xishuangbanna’s other minority languages prevents teachers from using these other 
languages in class. The choice of languages for textbooks, for teacher trainings, or for 
experimental school programs is based on the policy approach to teach merely languages 
of ethnic groups with official “autonomous” status in a given locality. However, this 
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approach prevents creation and implementation of language policies that would lower 
language-related educational barriers for children of other mother tongues than Dai and 
Chinese. 
Although due to the lack of quantitative and long-term study data it is difficult to 
assess which attainments students gain through minority language education, this study 
has shown that the effects of minority language education on both the students’ skills in 
minority languages and their overall educational attainments in regular school subjects 
depend on the institutional settings of this tuition. Under similar parameters of student 
age (pre-school and first years of primary schooling) and languages taught (Dai language 
in addition to Chinese), models that use bilingual education extensively seem to not only 
enhance students’ skills in oral and written Dai, but they also enhance students’ 
attainments in the regular Chinese-based subjects, compared to students at the same 
schools who only went through Chinese language education. In other models that 
schedule Dai language learning as additional subject with a few hours per week this 
subject seems to produce only very slow learning progress in Dai script, and instead of 
supporting learning in other subjects it adds another burden to the student’s timetable. 
These problems reflect partly the overall reduction of minority languages at 
schools in China and partly the increasing linguistic heterogeneity in schools, but - in light 
of the differences of schooling even within one language and one administrative division - 
more important are the institutional settings of school-based decision making. My 
analysis has shown that many of the above mentioned problems relate to institutional 
settings of educational and curriculum management. The low position of minority 
language education administrators in the Bureaus of Education, for instance, relates to 
the Chinese school management system’s focus on the national unified exams, where 
minority language education has no benefits. The lack of legislation and curriculum 
planning for minority language education can similarly be interpreted as preference for 
standardizing the regular curriculum of Chinese language learning over minority language 
tuition standardization. Finally, the models that schedule tuition shifts from minority 
language to Chinese language in early years are similarly an indicator of institutional 
settings that demand proficiency in Chinese and define minority languages only as a tool 
to reach this goal. 
In order to rise the outcomes of minority language education in China, there are 
several options to reform current institutions. A non-exhaustive list of possible measures 
could incorporate some of the following measures: use minority language education in 
school exams, for instance through choice of test sheets in different languages in the 
 304 
college entrance examinations; grant extra points for language skills in minority languages 
in exams; elevate the position of minority language education administrators in the 
Bureaus of Education; promulgate laws that define goals and standards for minority 
language education; develop curriculum plans, teacher guidelines, and evaluation 
mechanisms for minority language education; include minority language education results 
into the teacher evaluation and promotion system. 
The importance of institutional settings for implementation of ethnic minority 
language education indicates that the findings presented here can be transferred to the 
situation of ethnic language policies in China in general. Dai language is more promoted in 
Xishuangbanna than some other local minority languages in other regions in China; and 
the specific linguistic, historical, and social conditions of Xishuangbanna limit 
comparability with for instance Xinjiang or Inner Mongolia. However, the finding that 
many of the institutional settings that shape the implementation process of ethnic 
minority language policies at schools are rooted not specifically in ethnic policy making, 
but derive from the institutions of school, curriculum, and personnel management, 
indicates that relations that triggered the processes observed in this case study are a 
fundamental issue of minority language education policy implementation not only in 
Xishuangbanna, but in China in general. 
The finding that institutional settings have large effects on the outputs of minority 
language education and that shifting these institutions will effect minority language 
education questions the current narrative in much of the literature. Within China not only 
many government publications, but also scholarly contributions argue that the largest 
problems of minority language education in China today are a lack of textbooks, teachers, 
or funding together with a growing linguistic heterogeneity of local populations (Xiong 
2004; Fang 2010; Qi 2003). My examples have refuted these theses or at least call for a 
more differentiated view. Xishuangbanna’s schools have enough textbooks in Dai 
language, but what is needed are texts in Dai and Hani script for school-external use, e.g. 
novels, comic strips, or websites so that students can use their learned reading skills 
outside schools. Similarly, since the pre-service teacher training programs of the last years 
have produced a large pool of bilingually trained teachers in Xishuangbanna there is 
currently no lack in bilingual teachers, but there is a lack in mechanisms to specifically 
hire these teachers and make them teach bilingually not only in the designated Dai script 
courses, but also in math or history courses. Finally, the linguistic heterogeneity of school 
populations make it indeed difficult to conduct Dai language education at all schools in 
Xishuangbanna, but instead of raising illusionary calls for linguistic homogeneity of 
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minority populations the quest seems rather to design institutions that respect and work 
with this diversity. 
Similarly, publications from outside China that merely argue that the Chinese 
government lacks the will to grant ethnic minorities the right to their own languages 
(Human Rights in China 2007) also underestimate the role of institutional settings, as they 
assume a monolithic government. This perspective ignores the diversified goals and 
means of layers of administration, as can be seen for instance in the struggle of the 
offices for bilingual education with superiors in the Xishuangbanna Bureau of Education 
to design institutions of controlling minority language education at schools. Instead, a 
perspective on the diverse goals, programs, and actors within the government levels in 
China, and within the schools is more adequate to understand the complexities of ethnic 
minority language policy making. 
7.2.2 Disillusions of raising educational quality through school-based decision 
making 
School-based decision making has been seen as a measure to improve the quality 
of educational outcomes at Chinese schools. Decentralization of decision making towards 
schools under a simultaneous increase of accountability measures has been one of the 
central proposals for reforms in Chinese school management. Not only the Chinese 
government (Ministry of Education 6/8/2001, 6/26/2012), but also international 
organizations such as the OECD (Wöbmann et al. 2007; Pont et al. 2008) or scholars 
interested in reforms in educational systems from an internationally comparative 
perspective such as Ferris (1992), Fullan (2007), or Law and Nieven (2010) have proposed 
decentralized management and especially school-based decision making as a tool to rise 
the quality of Chinese education. Despite the conceptual differences between these 
proposals (reaching from empowerment of citizens to marketization of the educational 
sectors) and despite the vagueness of the concept “quality education” in Chinese 
government publications (from moral and patriotic education to knowledge useful to the 
labor market), proponents from all three backgrounds have congruently argued that local 
levels can make more use of locally-generated expertise, resources, and motivations in 
order to make wiser decisions. Following that, reform proponents have in varied 
publications proposed to introduce a localized curriculum that is oriented towards 
students’ lives instead of abstract knowledge and that uses methods for individual 
learning paces instead of exam-orientation in order to raise the outcomes of schooling. 
However, the outcomes of reforms conducted so far have been less than satsfying. 
Measures that could shift curriculum decision making towards school personnel have only 
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partially effected school education. Shifts in funding from townships to counties and from 
private fees to public funding have secured the educational continuity, but have not 
increased the discretion for school personnel. Local curriculum, that has been officially 
promoted and elevated to a legitimate element of the school curriculum, has been 
outweighed by the regular standardized curriculum. The shift of methods towards 
communicative approaches, to name a final example, has been implemented in a few 
“elite” schools and in special programs, but the general methods seem to be still based on 
rote learning and exam-fixation, as scholars such as Dello-Iacovo (2009), Wang (2011), or 
Adams and Sargent (2012) have shown. Scholars have argued that these limits to reforms 
have been largely due to institutional settings such as the promotion system for teachers, 
the overall importance of standardized exams, and the high competition to entrance for 
higher education. 
Minority language education has the potential to lead the way towards increased 
school-based decision making, as institutional limits for reforms seem to be lower here 
than in other subjects. The specific role of minority language teachers as experts on this 
subject demands more decision making by school staff than in more standardized 
subjects. Similarly, the experimental modes of implementing minority language education 
enhance the space for trying new teaching methods on a school-wide scope. The lack of 
evaluation standards for this school subject, finally, allows school staff to make decisions 
without fearing detrimental consequences for their own careers. All these settings can 
make a case that minority language education is an advanced area for school-based 
decision making in China. 
However, observations at the case study schools in this thesis show that even this 
wider space for school-based decision making not necessarily leads to decisions that are 
more oriented towards students’ interests, towards communicative methods, and 
towards content that is of use beyond exams. On the one side, some school staff that I 
have interviewed made decisions that shifted Dai tuition to communicative approaches, 
they have developed methods to ask students about their interests, and they taught 
content not oriented towards exams, but towards what they thought students’ would 
need most in their life outside the school. On the other side, I have also observed Dai 
tuition that followed rote-learning methods, that focused on learning knowledge about 
languages instead of enabling students to use this knowledge, and that resulted in 
student’s being not interested in class content. 
These large differences in tuition modes and outcomes depend on the 
institutional settings for decision making on minority languages at the individual schools. 
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Through detailed analysis of the decision making process on minority language education 
I have found that teachers and principals orient their decisions towards different 
considerations, depending on the institutional settings of support for minority language 
education at their schools. Through analysis of three contrasting points on a continuum of 
myriads of specific outcomes of institutional settings, I have analyzed in this thesis the 
effect of institutional settings on decision making. 
At those schools that I have called “showpiece schools” institutional settings such 
as external evaluations and role definition of Dai teachers as experts in bilingual 
education benefit school staff’s interests in supporting teaching of minority languages as 
cultural heritage, their interests in career progress, and their interests in promoting 
students’ educational careers. In effect they made decisions that supported the transfer 
of knowledge between school subjects (e.g. through using methods cross-subjects), to 
use communicative language learning approaches (e.g. through combining script learning 
with exercises in story writing), and to orient teaching towards students’ lives (e.g. by 
including local geography, architecture, or customs into class content). 
School staff at the “resource supported schools”, by contrast, similarly wished to 
conduct tuition that builds up on what they perceived as students’ interests and needs, to 
choose methods that they perceived as being liked by student such as singing songs or 
telling stories, and to include content that they found close to students’ lives, for instance 
local history. However, teachers felt also dilemmas when institutional settings (e.g. their 
assignments as Dai teachers) demanded efforts in teaching Dai and at the same time 
other institutional settings (e.g. teacher evaluations) demand to focus on other subjects. 
The decisions that they make under this dilemma, such as maintaining methods of rote-
learning, investing more time on the core subjects, or limiting minority languages to 
specific subjects without use for instruction in other subjects are often detrimental for 
reform efforts in China’s educational system. 
Examples from schools that I have termed the “left-alone” type illustrate this 
dilemma even more. Here, institutional settings that favor the standardized subjects, that 
have terminated bilingual education at many schools, and that demand investing all 
energy into core subjects have caused school staff – especially the teachers – to make 
decisions against their perceptions of what would be needed for both students and the 
local community. Teachers who have experienced bilingual education as successful for 
students’ attainments or who believe that minority language education is essential for the 
integration of non-Han students into school life had to stop this localized and diversified 
education when superiors decided to terminate projects. Due to their roles as 
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bureaucrats entangled in hierarchical control their decisions had to follow these orders. 
Using minority languages in their own Chinese classes by translating words every now and 
then can be seen as an outcome of this dilemma, but even these small-scale usages of 
minority language education cannot conceal that decision making under these settings 
cannot meet the goals that scholars have proposed under the issue of school-based 
decision making to raise the quality of educational outputs. 
In sum, under current institutional settings the example of school-based decision 
making in minority language education is disillusioning for the prospects of reforming 
content and methods of school tuition in China. School-based decision making on 
minority language education at Chinese schools exemplifies that reforms in education 
require more institutional shifts than a sporadic support for a localized curriculum. Picking 
up the hypothesis by Ferris (1992) that teacher empowerment is a tool to raise the 
performance of schools one can add that this perspective must be complemented by 
shifts in overall institutional settings of personnel and curriculum management, whereas 
mere introduction of another minority language course at schools without institutional 
changes will not affect overall schooling processes and educational outcomes.  
7.3 The chances of ethnic community participation in curriculum 
decisions 
A second line of justification for ethnic minority language education argues that 
education in students’ mother tongues is a right of linguistic groups. This approach views 
policies to support this education as a tool to enhance the voice of ethnic minorities in 
the political system. However, ethnic minority policies in China have been said since long 
to be ineffective in representing ethnic communities due to a lack of democratic control 
of policy making by citizens. In this dilemma school-based decision making has the 
potential to adjust policies to communities’ preferences, to give language communities a 
voice in schools, and to democratize ethnic policy making in China. In this section I will 
reconsider the effects of the bottom-up policy implementation processes on 
representation of ethnically defined communities in policy making in China. In the first 
part I will summarize the findings of the analysis of this thesis’ case study under the focus 
of minority language education as a tool for ethnic policy goals, before in the second part 
I will discuss the possibilities and limits to local community representation through 
decision making by school personnel as street-level bureaucrats. 
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7.3.1 Minority language education as a tool for ethnic policy goals 
Ethnic minority language education policies in China not only reflect the structures 
and approaches of the country’s overall ethnic policy making, such as policy-making 
based on official ethnic group recognition in so called autonomous areas, but they also 
reflect policy goals that scholars such as Harrell (1995), Zhou (2003), or McCarthy (2009) 
have found in other fields of ethnic cultural policies in China as well.  
The goal of appeasing powerful ethnic groups through granting linguistic rights, 
for instance, is reflected in the establishment of ethnic minority language programs for 
those groups that have a larger population and/ or larger political power. The fact that in 
Xishuangbanna merely the Dai have educational school programs in their own language, 
whereas Jinuo or Lahu don’t, indicates that similar principles informed the selection of 
languages for bilingual education in Xishuangbanna.  
Similarly, minority language education also reflects the goals of the language 
engineering projects that aimed at shaping language usage and popularizing “reformed” 
scripts through education. The ups and downs of minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna during the last decades as well as the changes between traditional and 
reformed Dai script in schools mirror the changes of language engineering ideology from 
“pluralistic”, to “monopolistic”, and to “pluralistic” again.  
Furthermore, minority language education also reflects the party-state’s goal to 
demonstrate its benevolence by allowing for ethnic cultural diversity under united 
citizenship. The otherwise Han-dominated CCP uses minority language education to 
substantiate their claim to rule China’s multiethnic population without ethnic 
discrimination. With education in minority languages over a few school hours the CCP has 
found a vehicle to fulfill their historical promise to cultural autonomy for China’s ethnic 
minority groups without threatening the unified character of national education in “core 
subjects” and in citizenship education. Similar to branding Xishuangbanna as an exotic 
location with diverse and peaceful ethnic groups in shows and in publications minority 
language education policies in Xishuangbanna pursue the goal to demonstrate that the 
state cares for ethnic groups. 
Finally, minority language education policies also follow the goals of the 
“civilizational project” by enabling ethnic minority groups to participate in the education 
system by lowering the language barriers for them, thus binding ethnic students into the 
“modern” and “civilized” world of the national school education. 
However, the cases in this thesis have also shown that minority language policy 
implementation in Xishuangbanna has at most only partly reached these goals. The 
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approach to appease the strongest groups through organizing education in their 
languages has succeeded in avoiding public unrest on the issue of minority language 
education, which has been reported from other parts of China, e.g. on the issue of 
Tibetan or Cantonese language usage in schools (Wong 2010; Beckett, Postiglione 2012), 
but the goal to demonstrate the benevolence of the state towards ethnic groups cannot 
be reached when the policies prefer specific groups over others. Although until today the 
underrepresentation of Hani, Jinuo, and Xishuangbanna’s other non-Dai minority 
languages in education has not resulted in public anger, it remains to be seen if these 
languages’ speakers will continue to accept the Dai preference. Similarly, it remains to be 
seen how long the Han population will accept models of bilingual education that under 
school mergers and migration increasingly also affect their children. 
Xishuangbanna’s minority language education also failed to serve the goal of 
“language engineering”, another target of China’s ethnic policies, as it had only little 
effects to increase the usability of minority scripts outside of the class room. The shifts 
between traditional and reformed Dai script in schools have created additional barriers to 
using the language in written domains, and they have reduced the chances for mutual 
fructification between monastic and school education.  
The goal of attracting students to state-organized schooling through minority 
language education, finally, has also been only partly successful. Minority language 
education has contributed to lowering the barriers for students’ access to education only 
in those cases where schools use students’ mother tongue languages as a language of 
instruction, whereas the mere adding of Dai script courses to the regular timetable in 
other schools has in the eyes of many Dai students not made schooling more interesting 
and in the eyes of non-Dai it instead increased educational burdens. 
In the question if these goals are reached by decisions of school personnel makes 
a large difference. The choice to use minority languages or only Chinese in 
communication between teachers and students, for instance, affects not only the position 
of the language in public usage, but it also affects the right of ethnic minorities to use 
their own languages in public and in educational domains. The decision for or against 
using Dai script also in non-language courses has similar effects on popularizing scripts 
through schooling. Finally, the decision either to exclude local culture from curriculum or 
to present aspects of local minority cultures such as handcraft or architecture specifically 
to the students as a value (for example the museum room in one of the visited schools) 
has effects on the image that students receive about the hierarchies of “cultural 
development”. 
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In sum, the examples presented here show that minority language education in 
Xishuangbanna is oriented towards the goals of China’s national ethnic policies, but that it 
only partly reaches these goals. Xishuangbanna is an example of how nation-wide 
approaches to ethnic policies affect local policy making, and this orientation can be 
expected to be found in minority language education programs in other parts of the 
country as well. However, the analysis of individual decisions made at school level has 
also shown that the differences in implementation result in different outcomes in terms 
of language engineering, shaping the ideology of “civilizational hierarchies”, and 
demonstrating the benevolent state. 
7.3.2 Ineptitudes of ethnic representation through school-based decision 
making 
The system of region-based autonomy for ethnic minority groups in China has 
since long been said to be ineffective in representing ethnically defined groups of citizens. 
Scholars have shown that China’s autonomy laws are ineffective to protect human rights 
of ethnic groups, that hierarchical policy making outweighs local autonomous policy 
making, that the selection of “ethnic” local leaders cannot guarantee decisions in favor of 
a specific ethnic group, and that the lack of democratic institutions prevents citizens from 
controlling government (Heberer 1989, 2000; Dreyer 2000; Mackerras 2004; Lundberg 
2009). Similarly, scholars have argued that the contrast between the Han-dominated CCP 
and its claim to be a ruler over a multi-ethnic country triggers a continuous conflict in 
Chinese ethnic policy making (Heberer 2013). In effect, policy making in autonomous 
regions not necessarily reflects preferences of the majority of a localities’ population and 
not even the preferences of ethnically defined groups. Under-represented ethnic groups 
in China have protested in diverse forms for increased representation, which some 
scholars have identified as sources for vulnerability of the government, if not even as a 
threat to social “stability” in China (Dreyer 2000, 2005; Sautman 2005). Even if the 
assumptions of vulnerability are far-fetched, issues of human rights, conflict prevention, 
and the efficiency of policies all point to the need to reconsider the system of ethnic 
representation in Chinese policy making. 
Academia has proposed several paths to reform policy making on ethnic issues, 
from strengthening local autonomy by introduction of federalism and organized 
representation of interests (Heberer 2000) to reducing ethnically defined representation 
in order to make room for cultural diversity under the leadership of an even more 
centralized government (Ma 2007). However, in light of the difficulties of implementing 
large systematic changes one might also look for possibilities to strengthen 
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representation of ethnic groups outside the political apparatus at the more decentralized 
area of implementation at street-level. 
Decentralized decision making on minority language education at school level is an 
option to enhance representation of preferences of local population, generally, and that 
of ethnic groups, specifically. As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, decisions by 
school-staff in China have tremendous effects on shaping, adjustment, and even “making” 
of policies. These effects can be used to enhance communities’ say in policies, when the 
decisions by school-staff represent the preferences of local population. 
This approach can make use of several advantages compared to shifting political 
representation in parliaments and governments. Firstly, ethnically aware school-based 
decision making does not need specific newly group-based representative bodies with all 
the difficulties to reach an appropriate or accepted balance between groups, which 
Kymlicka (1995) has described as a major difficulty for ethnic parliamentary 
representation. In an ideal mode of school-based decision making school staff would 
constantly include parents’ and students’ wishes into their decisions, without specific 
ethnic representation at schools. Secondly, such a model can circumvent the official 
ethnic group identification, which in the case of China has been found to be an 
inappropriate measure to reflect identities of groups or individuals due to its static and 
top-down character (Harrell 2001b; Stone-Banks 2004; Hoddie 2006a). Instead, school-
based decision making could reflect local identities of language communities, of villages, 
and even of individuals, when citizens of a school community make decisions on the 
languages they find necessary for their own community. Thirdly, such small-scale 
community based decision making could be used to enable local communities to decide 
about educational and cultural issues without having these issues connected to demands 
for complete independence of ethnic groups. The government could withdraw from 
certain decisions in order to lower angers against perceived cultural colonialism. 
However, the cases that I have discussed in this thesis do not indicate that a 
higher level of school-based decision making on the issue of minority language education 
compared to decisions on other subjects necessarily leads to decisions that reflect local 
communities’ preferences. Surely, many teachers and principals that I have interviewed 
considered the students’ well-being, educational careers, and even moral development 
when they made decisions. However, even where they did so, they still made decisions 
under their own interpretation of what is good for students, so that representation of 
students’ preferences, or for that matter representation of parents’ preferences, was 
merely shifted from government to school personnel, but not to local communities. In 
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some of the cases that I have analyzed in this thesis competing interests of school 
personnel were simply stronger than school staff’s considerations of benefits for students. 
The decision, for instance, to abruptly terminate Dai or Hani language education at some 
schools has led to disturbed learning processes. The decision to assign Han students to 
Dai classes similarly seems to not have been in the interests of students, but rather 
derived from the interests to fulfill top-down program targets for Chinese education. 
This lack of including communities’, parents’, or students’ preferences in decisions 
is due to a lack of institutional settings that could channel these interests to schools. First 
of all, ethnic minority school staff not necessarily feels inclined to a specific ethnic group, 
simply because ethnic registration does not always coincide with individual identity, 
beliefs, and preferences. Especially for school staff in China institutionalized roles of 
teacher behavior as state representatives at street-level demand a certain distinction 
from local ethnic groups in favor of closeness to the state. Several institutional settings 
such as teacher evaluation mechanisms bind teachers to the state. This means, that 
school staff cannot be expected to serve as representatives of local communities at 
school level, unless the definition as bureaucrats is changed towards increased 
responsibility towards these communities. Secondly, there are only very few channels for 
transferring parents’ preferences to school personnel, and these channels are only 
seldom used. Parent meetings are more used to inform parents than to gather parents’ 
opinions. Home visits by teachers seem to be similarly limited to discuss the students’ 
achievements, but they exclude discussions about the schools’ basic decisions on 
curriculum. In effect, school staff only very seldom uses communication with parents as a 
strategy to make decisions. Interviewed teachers and principals argued that their 
decisions should be oriented towards the students’ interests, but hardly any of the 
schools that I visited had mechanisms installed to reflect the students’ and parents’ 
opinions. Thirdly, there is a lack of organizational structures that represent parents or 
students in schools. Most rural schools lack student or parent committees and where 
such committees have been installed their mandate do not cover decisions on curriculum. 
Finally, since parents in rural areas have only few chances to choose schools they also lack 
in bargaining power over schools that urban parents might have by sending children to 
other schools. 
In effect, this lack of institutional settings prohibits a guarantee that school-based 
decision making reflects local communities’ preferences. Reform approaches must thus 
also focus on institutional changes. Parent councils, community-elected school superiors, 
school choice, and course choice for parents and students all could be scrutinized as 
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possible reform paths, but in the schools that I have visited there were so far hardly any 
signs that these more fundamental institutional shifts will be approached in the near 
future. 
In sum, school-based decision making can only serve as a tool to improve ethnic 
representation in policy making in China when institutional settings provide for 
community-control over schools. Under the current system school-based decision making 
seems to be rather an approach to “let-off steam” from calls for ethnic autonomy by 
shifting small-scale decision making to schools without reforming institutional settings of 
the general system of school management. Since institutional settings in the educational 
system benefit Chinese language education, such as the exam-orientation, they also 
prevent that ethnic minority parents call for more education in minority language 
education. Small alibi courses can thus serve as a demonstration of local autonomy 
without challenging hierarchical control over most of schooling. The approach of “de-
politicization”, to use Ma’s (2007) term, has proved successful to separate the issue of 
minority language education from local representation, but the price has been a backdrop 
in the potential of mother-tongue language education for students’ learning in many of 
the case study schools. Transferring Lipsky’s (1980, p. 7) view that it is easier to lay the 
dilemmas of social policies unto the shoulders of street-level bureaucrats than to reduce 
inequality in social policies in the first place to the case of minority language education in 
China, it seems that it is easier to grant discretion to school-level bureaucrats than to 
grant autonomy for local communities over education matters in their schools. 
7.4 Summary of thesis, innovative contributions, and further research 
In this study I have scrutinized the impacts of institutional settings of curriculum 
and school management on implementation of ethnic minority language education 
policies at school level in the Prefecture Xishuangbanna, one of China’s linguistically most 
diverse regions with comparatively rich programs for bilingual education at schools. 
By examining policy implementation processes on the example of ethnic language 
policies in China, I intended to bridge the theory-oriented literatures of policy 
implementation frameworks with the empirical literature on minority language education 
in China. The former set of literature has already shown in detail that policy 
implementation depends on the decisions by implementers at delivery agencies, the so 
called street-level bureaucrats, but it lacks in understanding of how institutional settings, 
especially those between discretion and accountability, affect the decision making by 
these actors. The latter set of literature has delivered detailed descriptions of the 
institutional settings, reforms, and challenges in China’s systems of school and curriculum 
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management and it provided rich descriptions of policies, programs, and outcomes of 
minority language education, but similarly it lacks in understanding the processes that 
happen between policy formulation and outcomes of minority language education. 
Considering these research gaps I have developed the following research question 
for this study: “How do institutional settings of school and curriculum management affect 
the implementation of minority language education policies at school level in 
Xishuangbanna?” For this question I have defined institutional settings of school and 
curriculum management as dependent variables, the implementation outputs of public 
policies for formal ethnic minority language education at schools in Xishuangbanna as the 
dependent variable, and the decision making by teaching and administrative personnel at 
schools as intervening variable. In the introduction to this thesis I have outlined two 
hypotheses. Firstly, decisions by school staff have large effects on the implementation of 
minority language policies at schools; secondly, under this discretion decisions by 
teachers and school leaders are oriented largely to their own interests and beliefs; and 
thirdly, the specific processes of decision making result in more diversity for minority 
language education than for other school subjects at schools in Xishuangbanna. 
For this study I was able to build up on the data that I have collected during two 
periods of fieldwork stays in Xishuangbanna between 2011 and 2013. Interviews with 
more than 100 respondents, school visits and classroom observations at more than 30 
schools, kindergartens, and colleges, and collection of official statistics, regulations, and 
schools internal evaluation data have established a rich stock of data. This data builds up 
on official descriptions of minority language education, on implementers’, students’, and 
parents’ narratives, and on my own observations on the implementation and outcomes of 
this type of school education. 
Based on an analytical framework of street-level policy implementation at schools 
that views implementers’ decisions in the implementation process as shaped by 
institutional settings, I have conducted a three-step analysis of decision making processes 
on minority language education at the case study schools. Firstly, I have elaborated on 
the main policies and implementational structures of ethnic minority language policies in 
China and Xishuangbanna; secondly, I have distinguished three types institutional support 
for minority language education at schools; and thirdly I have scrutinized the processes of 
decision making at case study schools. In a deductive approach based on my interview 
partners’ narratives I have scrutinized three issues of decision making by school personnel: 
considering roles and interests, interpreting policies and spaces, and making and 
justifying decisions. 
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The findings of this study show that implementing minority language education 
contains sub-processes where implementers interact with institutions in order to make 
decisions, which in turn determine the outcomes of minority language education. 
Firstly, I have found that the actions of implementers have large effects on the 
outcome of policy implementation, but that institutional settings also limit implementers’ 
decisions. Even in minority language education in Xishuangbanna, where the space for 
decision making is larger than in other school subjects, teachers and principals are caught 
by accountability measures, hierarchies, and pressures to fulfill standards of schooling. 
Additionally, their role as bureaucrats within the party-state prohibits actions outside the 
bureaucratic arena. Decisions by street-level implementers on these issues are thus more 
likely to trigger policy adjustment and dilution than policy nullification or creation. In this 
sense, school personnel should be seen rather as policy appropriators, than as policy 
makers at the delivery level. 
Secondly, this study has also shown that school staff is constantly pressured to 
adjust policies under multiple dilemmas. In contrast to Lipsky’s assumption that the 
dilemma of street-level bureaucrats is merely between clients and superiors, my study 
showed that dilemmas are far more complex. On the one side, clients, i.e. parents and 
students, have developed much less pressure towards teachers concerning the content 
and teaching modes of minority language education than scholars who studied street-
level bureaucracy have observed in other cases. Instead, school personnel in China 
experiences dilemmas more within conflicting policy goals of ethnic and educational 
policies, and within the unfitting formal and informal institutional settings that on the one 
side demand discretionary decision making, but on the other side pressure school staff to 
make decisions according to their interpretations of what superior levels in school 
management demand. When staff of the case study schools observed here had to make 
decisions under these dilemmas they constantly compared spaces for decision making 
with their own multiple interests, reaching from material interests in promotions and 
higher salaries, to professional interests in taking care for students’ educational careers, 
to interests in supporting a local ethnically defined culture.  
Both findings indicate that the implementation process through decisions by 
street-level bureaucrats is more complex than a single dilemma, but that it involves 
processes of considering multiple interests and spaces for decision making. Based on the 
analysis of this case I have modified the analytical model of the theory chapter by 
introducing variables of implementers’ interactions with institutional settings, policies, 
and interests. I have outlined four processes: firstly, implementers interpret policy 
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meanings and goals against their knowledge of broader policy goals of the party-state; 
secondly, they compare policy instruments with their own interests in order to find out if 
instruments benefit their own interests; thirdly, they interpret the institutional settings in 
order to grasp which of the often only informally codified institutions apply to the specific 
policy implementation situation; and fourthly, they finally make use of the discretionary 
spaces provided by these institutions by making decisions on organizing and 
implementing education at school and in the classroom. Although these four processes 
are merely a selection of possible processes, they nevertheless indicate that institutional 
settings effect policy implementation at street-level only through interaction of 
implementers with these institutions. 
Building up on this finding I have in this thesis also outlined a discussion on the 
impacts of school-based decision making on two of the most discussed and arguably 
much pressing issues in Chinese educational and ethnic politics: the call to raise the 
quality of educational output through decentralization of curriculum and the call to 
reform the system of ethnic autonomous decision making. My analysis of decision making 
at schools in Xishuangbanna has shown that in both areas there are only few possibilities 
to trigger these changes by school-level decision making, since institutional settings not 
always enable school-based decision making to lead to improved educational outcome or 
improved representation of local citizens. 
In the case of educational quality even the wider space for school-based decision 
making in minority language education has not triggered decisions that increase students’ 
educational attainments, but in many cases this additional school subject has increased 
the students’ burdens. Institutional settings allowed school-personnel to make decisions 
on policy implementation, but settings such as evaluation pressure in other subjects or 
the pressure to prepare students for exams diminished the potential of school-based 
decision making on minority language education. The differences in outcome between 
the schools under various modes of management of minority language education 
programs confirm the strong role of institutional settings of school and personnel 
management beyond the specific ethnic minority language education policies. 
Similarly, school-based decision making on minority language education can only 
partly fulfill the hopes of overcoming the problems of ethnic representation through top-
down group identification that is indifferent towards the preferences of individuals on the 
one side and the region-based autonomy system that prefers selected ethnic groups in a 
given locality over others on the other side by school-based ethnic decision making. Not 
only is the space for school-based decision making limited to the small area of language 
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education, but there is also a lack of institutionalized mechanisms that would support 
school-communities, parents, and students in articulating their preferences and that 
would guarantee policy implementation at schools according to these preferences. 
In sum, although school-based decision making especially on ethnic minority 
language education is a promising way to improve educational quality and to make 
curriculum more responsive to preferences of local communities, the already existing 
spaces must be complemented by institutional settings that on the one side allow school 
personnel to consider students’ preferences more than they can currently do, and that on 
the other side enable communities to control their schools. 
These findings challenge and expand previous literature in at least two ways. 
Firstly, the findings presented here challenge narratives of the ethnically and linguistically 
homogenizing state, that through schooling intends to shift language use of China’s ethnic 
minority children to Chinese, as previous literature that was based merely on analysis of 
policy outcomes at schools has assumed (see literature review). Through contrasting the 
programs for ethnic minority language education in Xishuangbanna with implementation 
processes at school level, my thesis has shown that policy outcomes on minority language 
education in China can be diverse and that minority language education policies in China, 
depending on institutional support, can not only benefit students’ educational 
attainments, but can also enhance the status of ethnic minority languages. Secondly, 
however, my study also challenges the assumption of previous literature (mostly 
literature that was published in China) that presents ethnic minority language education 
in China as a success story. Through including the institutional background my study has 
shown that despite existing programs ethnic minority language education still suffers 
from a marginal status and an institutional misfit at Chinese schools. Finally, and arguably 
the strongest contribution of this thesis, my study expands previous literature that has 
separated policy formulation and outcomes at schools by an analysis of the 
implementation procedures at schools. Under the approach of analyzing street-level 
bureaucratic decisions at school level against the changing background of accountability 
systems my thesis has expanded the existing literature with description of interpretation 
processes in implementation. 
These findings provide contributions to several academic fields. Firstly, they 
contribute to our understanding of policy implementation from a bottom-up policy 
analysis approach. They indicate that policy implementation research under the street-
level bureaucracy framework is good advised to include an analysis of institutional 
settings at the specific case, as the motivations and dilemmas of street-level 
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implementers are closely connected with the institutional environment of their 
organizations. Secondly, these findings contribute to the literature on policy making in 
China by indicating that we need to understand policy making in China not only as a 
process steered by government officials, but as one that is similarly affected by the 
politics within the implementing organizations at service-delivery level. This finding can 
contribute to the literature on evaluation and discretion in policy implementation in 
China, which has previously focused on the role of government officials and cadres, by 
opening up perspectives on discretion and accountability at street-level. Thirdly, my 
findings also contribute to our understanding of how institutional settings affect 
implementation processes within schools. In addition to the often normatively oriented 
literature on decentralization in school management my findings provide an analytical 
example of how shifts towards school-based decision making not necessarily trigger 
increases in the outcome of education. Finally, my findings can contribute to sharpening 
the strength of analyzing ethnic policies and specifically ethnic minority language policies. 
The analysis of the process that happens between policy formulation and outcome 
contributes to extending the literature on governmental goals and individual programs by 
adding insights into implementation processes.  
However, the findings also indicate directions for further research. Firstly, future 
research on minority language education at schools in China could focus on the actions of 
parents and students in policy formulation and implementation. As my research has 
focused on the role of school personnel, I have found that effects of both parents and 
students on the decisions of school personnel at the cases discussed here are rather low. 
In this respect it could be worthwhile studying the actions for instance of parents to 
register students at other schools, to approach officials, or to pursuit options for minority 
language education outside public schools, for instance in private schools, or monastic 
education. Secondly, there is still a need for quantitative measurement of the outcomes 
of minority language education on students’ skills in the minority languages, on their skills 
in Chinese, and on their overall school attainments. So far the majority of literature on 
ethnic minority language education in China seems to rely on often superficial assessment 
of the outcomes and merely assumes beneficial contributions by minority language 
education without being able to prove this. Although I have focused with my study on the 
decision making process that lead to specific outputs rather than on the outcomes of 
specific tuition in students attainments, I have found in small-scale and non-
representative observations of students’ skills in Chinese and minority languages and 
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through analysis of student grades already large differences in attainments that indicate a 
need to invest with quantitative methods into this relation. 
Notwithstanding this need for further research directions this study has shown 
that qualitative case studies can support our understanding of how implementers affect 
policy making and of how institutions shape implementers’ decisions. Ethnic minority 
language education in China provides a suitable case for gaining insights into the 
processes, the dilemmas, and the chances of school-based decision making on policy 
implementation.  
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8.2 Appendix 
8.2.1  Tables of interviews and visited educational facilities 
Table of Visited educational facilities 
No. and 
pseudonym 
of facility 
Type of educational 
facility 
Administrative 
division 
Location Minority 
languages 
officially 
taught 
Pilot 
program 
Type of minority 
language school 
1 Mengyi Branch primary school Township Jinghong + B “Showpiece” 
2 Menger Branch primary school Township Mengla + A “Resource supported” 
3 Mengsan Branch primary school Township Menghai -  “Left-alone” 
4 Branch primary school Township Jinghong +  “Resource supported” 
to “Left-alone” 
5 Branch primary school Township Jinghong - E “Left-alone” 
6 Branch primary school Township Jinghong + B “Showpiece” 
7 Branch primary school Township Jinghong -   
8 Branch primary school Township Menghai -   
9 Central primary school Township Mengla -   
10 Central primary school Township Menghai -   
11 Central primary school Township Jinghong -  “Left-alone” 
12 Central primary school Township Jinghong -   
13 Central primary school Township Jinghong -   
14 Central primary school Township Jinghong -   
15 Central primary school Township Jinghong -   
16 Central primary school Township Menghai -   
17 Nine-year school Township Menghai + C “Showpiece” to 
“Resource supported” 
18 Secondary school City Jinghong -   
19 Secondary school Township Jinghong - D “Left-alone” 
20 Secondary school City Jinghong -   
21 Secondary school City Jinghong -   
22 Secondary school Township Menghai + C “Resource supported” 
to “Left-alone” 
23 Public kindergarten City Jinghong -   
24 Public kindergarten Township Jinghong -   
25 Public kindergarten Township Jinghong +  “Resource supported” 
26 Public kindergarten City Jinghong -   
28 Public kindergarten Township Jinghong -   
29 Public kindergarten Township Jinghong -   
27 Private kindergarten Township Jinghong -   
30 College City Jinghong +   
31 University City Beijing +   
32 University City Kunming -   
33 University City Kunming +   
Table 26: Visited educational facilities. Note: Table indicates all schools, kindergartens, colleges and 
universities that I visited during fieldwork for this dissertation between 2011 and 2013. Indexed are the 
number and if applicable pseudonym that was used throughout the text to refer to case study schools 
(on the creation of pseudonyms Mengyi, Menger, and Mengsan for the three case study school see 
introductory chapter). “Administrative location” refers to the localities’ administrative status, not to 
facilities’ administrative status. “Pilot program” refers to minority language education or ethnic culture 
pilot programs: A: Yunnan Provincial Bilingual Experimentation Schools Program; B: Dai-Chinese 
Bilingual Education Experimental Program; C: Menghai primary school and middle school Dai tuition; D: 
School-based Curriculum Development Project; E: Community-based Education for Traditional 
Knowledge and Biodiversity: Coming home to our village. “Type of minority language school” indicates 
support schools receive from minority language education programs, as elaborated in sub-chapter 6.1. 
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Table of interviewees 
Altogether 108 interviews with the following interviewees: 
Index Interviewee’s professional position or other interview-relevant 
characteristics  
Interviewee’s registered 
ethnicity 
FA-01 Family member(s) of student(s) Hani 
FA-02 Family member(s) of student(s) Hani 
FA-03 Family member(s) of student(s) Bulang 
FA-04 Family member(s) of student(s) Bulang 
FA-05 Family member(s) of student(s) Dai 
FA-06 Family member(s) of student(s) Dai 
FA-07 Family member(s) of student(s) Bulang 
MO-01 Novice or junior monk Dai 
MO-02 Novice or junior monk Dai 
MO-03 Former monk Dai 
MO-04 Senior monk Dai 
OF-01 Official at Prefecture Bureau of Education Dai 
OF-02 Official at County/City Bureau of Education Dai 
OF-03 Official at Prefecture Bureau of Education unknown 
OF-04 Official at Township Government Jinuo 
OF-05 Official at County/City Bureau of Education Han 
OF-06 Official at Prefecture Bureau of Education Han 
OF-07 Official at County/City Bureau of Education Dai 
OF-08 Official at County/City Bureau of Education Han 
OF-09 Official at County/City Bureau of Education Han 
OF-10 Village Leader Hani 
OF-11 Official at Prefecture Bureau of Education Dai 
OF-12 Official at Province Ethnic Affairs Commission Miao 
OF-13 Official at Province Bureau of Education unknown 
OT-01 Former Foreign Teacher Foreign Citizen 
OT-02 Villager Hani 
OT-03 Villager Hani 
OT-04 Villager Hani 
OT-05 Villager Hani 
OT-06 Villager Bulang 
PR-01 Principal at college unknown 
PR-02 Principal at kindergarten Han 
PR-03 Principal at kindergarten Han 
PR-04 Principal at branch primary school Dai 
PR-05 Principal at branch primary school Han 
PR-06 Principal at branch primary school Dai 
PR-07 Vice-Principal at branch primary school Han 
PR-08 Principal at kindergarten Han 
PR-09 Vice-Principal at central primary school Han 
PR-10 Vice-Principal at central primary school Han 
PR-11 Principal at secondary school Han 
PR-12 Vice-Principal at central primary school Han 
PR-13 Principal at central primary school Han 
PR-14 Vice-Principal at central primary school Bulang? 
PR-15 Vice-Principal at central primary school Bulang? 
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Index Interviewee’s professional position or other interview-relevant 
characteristics  
Interviewee’s registered 
ethnicity 
PR-16 Principal at branch primary school Hani 
PR-17 Principal at nine-year school Dai 
PR-18 Vice-Principal at central primary school unknown 
SC-01 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-02 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-03 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-04 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-05 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-06 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-07 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-08 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-09 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-10 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-11 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-12 Scholar in the field of minority languages, education, or ethnicity unknown 
SC-13 Scholar, teaches minority languages Dai 
SC-15 Scholar, teaches minority languages Dai 
SO-01 Staff of social organization Foreign Citizen 
SO-02 Staff of social organization Foreign Citizen 
SO-03 Staff of social organization  Foreign Citizen 
SO-04 Staff of social organization  Hani 
SO-05 Staff of social organization  Hani 
SO-06 Staff of social organization  Hani 
SO-07 Staff of social organization  Hani 
ST-01 University Student Hani 
ST-02 Adult Student Hani 
ST-03 Secondary school students Diverse interviewees 
ST-04 Primary school students Diverse interviewees 
ST-05 Secondary school student Dai 
ST-06 Adult Student Hani 
ST-07 Primary School Student Hani 
ST-08 Primary School Student Hani 
ST-09 Primary school students Diverse interviewees 
ST-10 Primary school students Diverse interviewees 
ST-11 Primary school students Diverse interviewees 
ST-12 Primary school students Diverse interviewees 
ST-13 Primary school students Diverse interviewees 
ST-14 Primary school student Dai 
TE-01 Teacher for other subjects at kindergarten Han 
TE-02 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at primary school Hani 
TE-03 Teacher for other subjects at primary school unknown 
TE-04 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at primary school Dai 
TE-05 Teacher for other subjects at primary school Jinuo 
TE-06 Teacher for other subjects at primary school unknown 
TE-07 Teacher for other subjects at primary school unknown 
TE-08 Teacher for other subjects at primary school Jinuo 
TE-09 Teacher for other subjects at primary school Yao 
TE-10 Special post teacher for other subjects at primary school Han 
TE-11 Teacher for other subjects at kindergarten Hani 
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Index Interviewee’s professional position or other interview-relevant 
characteristics  
Interviewee’s registered 
ethnicity 
TE-12 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at primary school Bulang 
TE-13 Former teacher for other subjects at primary school Han 
TE-14 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at nine-year school Dai 
TE-15 Former teacher for other subjects at primary school Han 
TE-16 Teacher for other subjects at primary school Bulang 
TE-17 Teacher for other subjects at primary school unknown 
TE-18 Former teacher for other subjects at primary school Dai 
TE-19 Teacher for other subjects at primary school unknown 
TE-20 Teacher for other subjects at primary school Han 
TE-21 Teacher for other subjects at primary school unknown 
TE-22 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at primary school Dai 
TE-23 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at kindergarten Dai 
TE-24 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at primary school Dai 
TE-25 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at primary school Dai 
TE-26 Teacher for other subjects at primary school Dai 
TE-27 Teacher for other subjects at primary school Dai ? 
TE-28 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at primary school Dai 
TE-29 Teacher only for minority languages at secondary school Dai 
TE-30 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at primary school Dai 
TE-32 Teacher for minority languages and other subjects at primary school Dai 
TS-01 Teacher Student in pre-school education major Hani 
TS-02 Teacher Students: College students in pre-school education major, including 
bilingual education 
all Dai 
Table 27: Interviews. Note: The category “professional position” in this table has to simplify. Principals, for 
example, often also teach, and “teacher for minority languages” merely indicates that the teacher currently 
teaches or has taught minority languages, irrespective of other school subjects that he or she also teaches 
or has taught. Ethnicity is only indicated for selected interview partners, whereas for others, e.g. many 
scholars, interviewees’ ethnicity has not been part of the interview (marked as “unknown”). Furthermore, it 
is noteworthy that “ethnicity” refers here merely to official registration, but, as the body of this text shows, 
there are many different perceptions of ethnicity and in fact oftentimes interview partners’ descriptions of 
their own ethnic belonging differed from this official registration. Variables such as gender, age, and locality 
are not indexed in this table in order to protect my interviewees’ privacy. 
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8.2.2  Maps of Xishuangbanna 
Geographical position of Xishuangbanna in China and Yunnan 
 
Figure 6: Geographical position of Xishuangbanna in China and Yunnan. Source: Wikipedia (September 27, 
2007): Location of Xishuangbanna Prefecture within Yunnan province of China, online accessible at 
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Location_of_Xishuangbanna_Prefecture_within_Yunnan_%28China%29.p
ng, last access: Mai 26, 2014. 
Administrative division of Xishuangbanna 
 
Figure 7: Administrative division of Xishuangbanna. 1: Jinghong City, 2: Menghai County, 3: Mengla County. 
Source: Wikipedia (April 11, 2010): Map of Xishuangbanna in Yunnan province, online accessible at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Xishuangbanna_mcp.png, last access: Mai 26, 2014. 
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8.2.3 Curriculum schedules and evaluation criteria for core subjects 
Selected courses in primary and junior secondary schools in China 
Subject 
学科 
Description for primary school Description for junior secondary school 
Ideology and 
Morality/ 
Ideology and 
Politics 
思想品德 / 
思想政治 
 
Students learn about social morality and 
general politics, with a focus on “five 
loves”: love for the motherland, people, 
labour, science and socialism.  
Students study the principles of socialist morality, the rights 
and responsibilities of citizenship, conditions of the country, 
and the construction of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. They are to develop a belief in socialism and 
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.  
Chinese 
语文 
Students learn 2,500 common Chinese 
characters, Mandarin Chinese and the 
pinyin (Chinese romanization) system, 
and the use of general dictionaries.  
Students learn the basics of modern Chinese and a little bit 
of ancient Chinese, enlarge their vocabulary, become 
proficient in the use of dictionaries and references, improve 
language skills through listening, speaking, reading and 
writing, and develop observation and thinking abilities.  
Math 
数学 
 
Students learn the arithmetic of whole 
numbers, fractions, and decimals; basic 
geometric forms; simple algebraic 
formulas; the abacus; logical and spatial 
thinking; and the application of 
mathematics to simple practical 
problems.  
Students acquire basic knowledge and skills of algebra and 
plane geometry, study rudimentary statistics and spatial 
forms, and improve their computing, logical and spatial 
thinking, and problem solving abilities.  
Social Studies 
社会 
Students acquire a basic understanding 
and knowledge of social phenomena 
and the history, geography, and society 
of China and the world, learn to observe 
and adapt to social life, and are 
educated in patriotism and the law.  
 
History 
历史 
 Students study the history of China (including their local 
region) and the world, with a focus on the major events and 
key figures in modern and contemporary China.  
Geography 
地理 
 Students study the basic geography of the world and China 
(including their local region), learn to use maps and 
geographical charts, and understand the relationship 
between human activity and geographical environment as 
well as China’s national policy on demographics, natural 
resources and the environment. 
Nature 
自然 
Students study common natural objects 
and phenomena and understand how 
humans use, transform, protect and 
explore Nature. They learn to make 
scientific observations, apply science to 
practical use, and reject superstitions.  
 
Physics 
物理 
 Through observation and experiments, students acquire 
basic knowledge of mechanics, thermal dynamics, electricity 
and optics and understand their essential applications. 
Emphasis is put on fostering scientific attitudes and 
developing the ability to observe, experiment, and solve 
simple practical problems.  
Chemistry 
化学 
 Through observation and experiments, students learn the 
basic concepts and theories of chemistry and become 
familiar with a few important common chemical elements 
and their compounds. Emphasis is put on fostering scientific 
attitudes and developing the ability to observe, experiment, 
and solve simple practical problems.  
Biology 
生物 
 
 Through observation and experiments, students learn the 
structure, physiology and classification of plants, bacteria, 
fungi, viruses, and animals, acquire basic knowledge of 
genetics, evolution, and ecology and basic understanding of 
the human body with relation to its form, structure, 
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Subject 
学科 
Description for primary school Description for junior secondary school 
physiological functions, as well as hygiene and healthcare 
issues. Emphasis is put on fostering scientific attitudes and 
developing the ability to observe, experiment, and solve 
simple practical problems.  
Physical 
Education 
体育 
Students acquire basic knowledge of 
physical education, hygiene, and 
healthcare, develop skills in physical 
education, cultivate habits of exercise 
and hygiene, and are trained in 
discipline, unity, and endurance.  
Students improve their knowledge and skills of basic physical 
education, hygiene and healthcare, cultivate habits of 
regular exercise, and are trained in discipline, cooperation, 
competition, and endurance.  
Music 
音乐 
 
Students learn Chinese musical 
masterpieces, gain some exposure to 
music of other countries, and acquire 
basic knowledge of musical theory and 
performance.  
Students continue to study Chinese musical masterpieces 
and some music from other countries, learn basic musical 
theory and skills, and develop the ability to understand, 
perform and appreciate music.  
Fine Art 
美术 
Students are exposed to excellent 
examples of fine art from China and 
other countries and acquire basic 
knowledge and skills of fine art.  
Students continue to study excellent works of art of China 
and other countries, acquire basic knowledge and skills of 
fine art, and improve their ability to observe, appreciate and 
produce fine art.  
Labour 
劳动 
Students acquire basic knowledge and 
skills of labour through self-serving 
labour, housework, community service 
and simple productive labour.  
 
Students acquire knowledge and skills in service-oriented 
labour, industrial and agricultural production, and certain 
professions.  
Foreign 
Language 
外语 
 A school may offer foreign language (English, Russian, 
Japanese, etc.) at Level I or Level II. Level I includes two 
years in which students learn basic skills in listening, 
speaking, reading and writing. Level II comprises Level I plus 
one year (or two years in the 5+4 pattern) that prepares 
students for further study.  
Table 28: Course description of selection of courses in primary and junior secondary schools in China, after 
Sun (2005, pp.17–18). 
Selected evaluation criteria on efficient usage of funds at Chinese schools 
Subject of 
criteria 
Category of criteria Examples of criteria 
General 
educational 
funds usage 
efficiency 
evaluation 
criteria 
Just usage of educational 
funds criteria 
Structure of educational organizations; number of educational 
organizations 
Educational productivity 
evaluation criteria 
No. of teachers; funding per student; no. of students, student-funding 
ratio; student enrollment rate; student graduation rate; student 
attrition rate 
Individual 
school 
educational 
funds usage 
efficiency 
evaluation 
criteria 
Economic criteria School debts; coverage rate of school; space of school ground per 
student; space of school buildings per student; teaching materials per 
student; share of funds used for buying educational equipment among 
all public educational funds;  
Efficiency criteria Usage of infrastructure; usage of teaching materials; share of 
administrative staff among all staff in school; teacher ratio; share of 
full-time regular teachers among all teachers; workload of teachers 
Effectiveness criteria student enrollment rate; student graduation rate; student attrition 
rate; graduates employment rate; no. of publications per teacher; 
social evaluation of student qualities 
Table 29: Selected evaluation criteria on efficient usage of educational funds at Chinese schools, after Tian 
(2011, p.94), citing Qi, Ye, and Ye (2009): 政府绩效审计 [Governmental Achievement Audit], Beijing: China 
Modern Economy Publishers. 
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Category of 
criteria (1) 
Category of criteria (2) Examples of criteria 
General criteria Funds available (efficiency) Overall provision of funds 
Provision of funds (efficiency) Share of funds provided by province, city, county or other sources  
Specific criteria Results of program 
implementation 
(effectiveness) 
Reduction of dangerous school buildings; construction of new school 
buildings; coverage ratio of teacher trainings; usage of electronic 
teaching materials; … 
Results of program 
implementation 
(effectiveness) 
Student enrollment rate; number of classes in schools; teacher-
student ratio; teaching materials available; literacy rate; … 
Table 30: Selection of evaluation criteria of efficiency of usage of educational program funds, after Tian 
(2011, p.93), citing Henan Bureau of Finance, 2004, no publisher, no location. 
8.2.4 Legislative acts and policy documents on minority language education 
Table of laws, regulations, and plans to promote education in minority 
languages at schools (extended) 
Promul-
gated by 
Date 
(latest 
revision) 
Title Provisions 
National 
People’s 
Congress 
2004 Constitution 
宪法 
- Guaranteed equality, autonomy, and support for ethnic groups (Art. 5; 
112-121) 
- Right to use and develop own languages and scripts for ethnic groups 
(Art. 5, 121) 
- Set-up ethnic representation (Art. 59,65, and others) 
National 
People’s 
Congress 
2006 Compulsory 
Education Law 
义务教育法 
 
- All children irrespective of ethnicity are entitled and obliged to receive 
formal education (Art. 4) 
- Regions required to establish schools or classes specifically for ethnic 
minorities (Art. 18) 
- State provides incentives for teachers with posts in minority areas and 
encourages graduates to take teaching posts there (Art. 31 and 33) 
National 
People’s 
Congress 
2001 Regional National 
Autonomy Law 
民族区域自治法 
 
- Autonomous regions can decide on language of instruction and content 
of instruction (Art. 36) 
- Autonomous regions are obliged to fund the editing and publishing of 
textbooks in minority languages (Art. 37) 
- Schools with ethnic minority students are allowed to use minority 
languages for instruction and to use textbooks in minority scripts (Art. 
37) 
- Chinese language education is to be introduced in primary school either 
from junior or senior classes, according to local circumstances (Art. 37) 
State 
Council 
2010 National Outline 
for Medium and 
Long-term 
Education Reform 
and Development, 
2010-2020 
国家中长期教育
改革和发展规划
纲要(2010-2020
年) 
- Rise education in minority areas, expand boarding school system, 
develop minority schools (Art. 27) 
- Expand bilingual education. Extend Chinese language education, but 
respect and protect the right to use minority languages in education. 
Support bilingual teacher education, textbook publishing, and research 
on bilingual education (Art. 27) 
State 
Council 
2002 Decision on 
Deepening the 
Acceleration of 
Reforming the 
Development of 
Ethnic Education 
国务院关于深化
改革加快发展民
族教育的决定 
- Principles of education for ethnic minorities: modernization and 
development; separation religious and secular education; autonomy 
rights; cooperation center with minority areas (Art. 2: 1-4) 
- Proposed instruments: include targets on publishing of bilingual 
textbooks to local educational development plans and budgets; edit 
textbooks in minority languages that are of use for daily life of 
students; start with Chinese language tuition already in first grade; 
invest into research and publishing on bilingual education (Art. 3: 7) 
YN Province 2013 Yunnan Province - Governments of all administrative levels to support minority and 
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Promul-
gated by 
Date 
(latest 
revision) 
Title Provisions 
People’s 
Congress 
Regulations on 
Work on Ethnic 
Minority Script 
云南省少数民族
语言文字工作条
例 
Chinese bilingual education at pre-school and primary school (Art. 11) 
- The Province Bureau of Education and the Province Ethnic Affairs 
Committee to draft plans for bilingual teacher education, teacher 
trainings and conduct teacher education (Art. 11) 
- Preferential enrollment of students with minority language abilities into 
teacher education at university (Art. 12) 
- The Provincial Bureau of Education and the Bureaus for Publishing and 
Broadcasting shall translate and publish teaching material in minority 
languages (Art. 15) 
YN Province 
People’s 
Congress 
2013 Yunnan Province 
Regulation on the 
Promotion of 
Ethnic Minority 
Education 
云南省少数民族
教育促进条例 
- Governments of counties, county-level cities, and districts to erect 
bilingual kindergartens in those towns and townships where Chinese is 
little spoken. Province, prefecture, and cities to subsidize these (Art. 7). 
- Province, prefecture, and city governments support installing, funding, 
and staffing of institutes of ethnic higher education (Art. 10) 
- Ethnic schools are to implement the national curriculum, to add 
minority unity education, and to integrate ethnic cultures into the 
curriculum (Art. 11) 
- Educational Bureaus of all levels intensify research and usage of 
bilingual education resources and set up a bilingual curriculum (Art. 12) 
- Additional benefits for teachers in minority and border regions: 
financial subsidies and accommodation, their own children receive 
benefits for entry-exams to senior middle school and vocational schools 
(Art. 13) 
- Governments of all administrative levels should install a system to 
education and train bilingual teachers; they should install bilingual 
teacher classes in nationality universities and in institutions of teacher 
education according to the needs of minority areas; graduates of these 
classes enjoy preferential employment possibilities an should be send 
to the local primary schools and kindergartens (Art. 15) 
- Governments encourage teachers to use the local minority languages; 
successful bilingual teachers should be rewarded and should enjoy 
preference in promotions, evaluations, and posting decisions (Art. 15) 
- Governmental and social units in minority regions can install quota for 
employments of bilingual graduates (Art. 17) 
- Funding for bilingual textbooks both on the nationally unified and local 
curriculum to derive from the budget for compulsory education (Art. 
21) 
YN Province 
Bureau of 
Education 
2010 Yunnan Province 
Outline for 
Medium and Long-
term Education 
Reform and 
Development, 
2010-2020 
云南省中长期教
育改革和发展规
划纲要（2010-
2020 年) 
- Strengthen bilingual education at school-level and pre-school level; 
spread Chinese language education, but respect also the right to 
receive education in minority languages; increase the education of 
minority language teachers; establish and fund training facilities for 
bilingual teachers at province, prefecture, and prefecture-level cities; 
publish bilingual teaching material that suits multi-ethnic schools; 
establish earmarked funds to support bilingual education (Art. 27) 
XSBN 
Prefecture 
People’s 
Congress 
1993 
(currently 
under 
revision) 
Xishuangbanna 
Dai Autonomous 
Prefecture 
Regulation on 
Ethnic Education 
西双版纳傣族自
制州民族教育条
例 
- Schools that are visited mainly by students of an ethnic minority with a 
distinct script should conduct tuition in both the minority script and in 
Chinese; schools visited by students of an ethnic minority without a 
distinct script should use this minority language as auxiliary tool in 
tuition; middle schools can install elective Dai courses; the Prefecture 
Nationalities Teacher College [now the Xishuangbanna Vocational 
College] should install Dai-Chinese teacher education classes (Art. 29) 
XSBN 
Prefecture 
Bureau of 
Education 
2009 Opinion on the 
Further 
Strengthening of 
Bilingual 
Education Work in 
- Need for bilingual education: protection of culture and strengthening 
of educational success (Art. 1: 2-3) 
- Models: Dai language in pre-school or first two grades of primary 
school as language of tuition, in grade three to four transition to 
Chinese, in grade five to six Dai as elective course; Hani, Bulang, Jinuo, 
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Promul-
gated by 
Date 
(latest 
revision) 
Title Provisions 
Primary and 
Middle Schools in 
Areas Inhabited by 
Ethnic Minorities 
关于进一步加强
少数民族聚居区
中小学双语教育
工作的意见 
Lahu, Yao language as auxiliary tool for tuition and other languages 
(Art. 2: 2) 
- Instruments: establish research on bilingual education by two to five 
staff in the County and City Bureaus of Education as well as in schools; 
county and city governments install budget for bilingual education; 
schools with bilingual education models be equipped with at least one 
bilingually trained teacher; schools that conduct Dai Chinese bilingual 
tuition develop respective local curricula; improve propaganda on 
bilingual education among parents and village leaders; improve 
bilingual teacher trainings within the next three years, including 
intensive seminars and certificates; establish an evaluation and grading 
system for Dai-Chinese bilingual teachers; install exam system for Dai 
language classes (Art 2: 3-4) 
XSBN 
Prefecture 
Bureau of 
Education 
2010 Xishuangbanna 
Dai Autonomous 
Prefecture Outline 
for Medium and 
Long-term 
Education Reform 
and Development, 
2010-2020 
西双版纳傣族自
治州中长期教育
改革和发展规划
纲要(2010-2020
年) 
- Develop bilingual pre-school education; respect the right to receive 
education in minority languages; develop bilingual teaching force (Art. 
14) 
- Establish a group of bilingual kindergartens; support establishing 
schools with ethnic characteristics (Art. 30) 
- Strengthen the development of Dai-Chinese bilingual teacher trainings; 
publish Dai-Chinese bilingual teaching materials; educate a group of 
Dai-Chinese experts and masters (Art. 35) 
Mengla 
County 
Bureau of 
Education 
2009 Mengla County 
Development Plan 
on Bilingual 
Education, 2009-
2015 
勐腊县双语教学
工作发展规划 
(2009-2015) 
- Install Dai-Chinese bilingual model schools: 10 schools with Dai-Chinese 
tuition at pre-school and fifth grade in 2009, 2 middle school with Dai-
Chinese tuition at seventh grade in 2010; expand the model to all 
schools with Dai students in the County from 2010 to 2015 (Art. 4) 
- Install a research and guidance group at County Bureau of Education; 
propagate the benefits of bilingual education to parents and society; 
provide financial benefits for bilingual teachers; install an exam system 
for Dai language in class; establish regular budget for bilingual 
education within the Compulsory Education Budget; provide Dai 
teaching materials free of charge (Art. 5) 
Table 31: Table of laws, regulations, and plans to promote education in minority languages at schools. YN= 
Yunnan, XSBN= Xishuangbanna. 
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8.2.5 Images from Xishuangbanna 
Note: All images have been taken in Xishuangbanna between 2011 and 2013. Due 
to protection of the interviewees’ identities these pictures are merely examples not 
necessarily from the case studies described in this thesis. Copyright for all images are with 
the author. 
Residential buildings 
 
Image 1: Wooden Dai stilt house. 
 
Image 2: Newly build villas of villagers in valleys, mostly Dai. Note the roof shape resembling that 
of wooden stilt houses. 
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Dai script  
 
Image 3: Street sign in Jinghong in Dai, Chinese, and English. 
 
Student report cards 
 
Image 4: Two pages of student report card indicating also Dai language tuition grades. 
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School buildings 
 
Image 5: Schoolyard and newly renovated school building of one visited school. 
 
Image 6: Schoolyard and non-renovated school buildings at one visited school. Hill-top position of 
school and flagpole distinguish the school as sphere of the nation-state. 
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Dai language education 
 
Image 7: Dai language education at school. 
